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Preface and Acknowledgements  
 
 
‘The pure and simple truth is rarely pure and never simple.’ 
 
       Oscar Wilde 
 
‘The art of living is to be at home as if one were on a journey.’  
 
       Godfried Bomans 
 
 
This book represents a journey in many different ways. For you as a reader, I hope the book 
will bring you more insight into what happens when governments play a part in the serious 
injuries and deaths of human beings. I hope to act as your guide on this journey, but I must 
stress that your guide is just as fallible as those governmental organizations he describes. All 
errors in this book are mine and mine only. All I can do is assure you that your guide has 
invariably aimed at finding out the truth, even when that truth is not pure, is not simple and 
possesses several faces behind the mask that it wears.  
 
Although you might not agree with me on every aspect of my analysis, I hope to explain clearly 
why I chose this path, how analyses have been made and how I have arrived at the conclusions. 
All this is done in the firm belief that having an open mind and learning from the past is crucial for 
government in the current age. A strong government wants to learn from its errors and is mindful 
of its potential for evil, of which it might not be aware itself at all times. 
 
For me, this is the end of a great journey, frustrating and self-confronting at times but ultimately 
rewarding and wonderful to make. I am delighted that I have reached the desired destination.  
 
One of the things I have come to realize more and more is how deep the conviction should be 
that man in pure essence has always been, and will always be, a social being. Not a selfish 
egoist who is bound to be evil, but very human in all his beauty and defects. This is also the 
place to express my gratitude to the wonderful people who have helped me or have been my 
guide on this journey. 
 
First of all I would like to thank Leo Huberts, my promoter, for his wisdom, kindness and help 
all along and for believing that I could complete the journey successfully. The same goes for 
Gjalt de Graaf, my other promoter, who invariably came up with helpful suggestions as well as 
moral support.  
 
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the members of the reading committee (Guy 
Adams, Michel van Eeten, Hans van den Heuvel, Wim Huisman and Frans Leeuw) for their 
involvement and their wise and helpful comments, which have led to further reflection and 
improvements in the final stages of this dissertation.  
 
Colleagues in the Quality of Governance research group at the VU University Amsterdam 
provided helpful advice and comments both at the start and at the end of this research project, 
and this helped me to focus on the right track. I would also like to thank my fellow members of 
the Dynamo reading club at the VU, for inspiration, great debates and good laughs. 
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A special thank you goes out to all the respondents both inside and outside governmental 
organizations who were willing to be interviewed about what were often sensitive issues. Many 
thanks to all of you for your cooperation and openness.  
 
My interest in public administration is not just scientific: I earn my daily bread in government 
and do so with pride and conviction. The support I received from my employer, the Ministry of 
Security and Justice, has been indispensable. I have stressed to all involved that the dissertation 
expresses my views as a social scientist. I greatly appreciate the opportunities granted to me. 
Special thanks go out to Cor Hermans, Jan Willem Schaper and Marjolein Voslamber for their 
support. I would also like to thank many colleagues for inspiring conversations about this 
dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues at the Project, Programme and Advice 
Centre for their support and patience.  
 
This journey has brought me to many different places along the way. Being fed, and finding 
shelter and support with people you love is a great way to make it through and make real 
progress in finishing the book. Many thanks to my family for putting up with me for longer 
periods of time when I was not very sociable at all, but working for the greater good (so I hope) 
of government and science. Saar and George, Jan and Joyce, Hans and Tini: Love is all. My 
twin brother Niels and I share many passions and sources of inspiration: He and I once walked 
into a giant bookstore, went our separate ways and out of 50.000 possibilities both came back 
with exactly the same book. It was a collection of quotes called ‘The dark side’. It’s probably a 
genetic thing.  
 
Above all, home is where my heart is. Three girls make me a happy and proud man, even if 
grey hair and ‘eigenwijsheid’ count against me. Emma, Lotte and Bo: If you put your mind to 
it, you can do it. To conclude: The end of this journey is nothing but the start of many other 
beautiful journeys. Even in the face of all that error or all that evil, life is best lived with 
passionate love. On all journeys, whatever obstacles may be ahead, I have been blessed with a 
life loving wife, who has always been my best choice: Joyce. 
 
Stephan Berndsen 
 
 
Haarlem, February 15, 2015 
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1  Introduction  
 
1.1. Deaths or serious injuries connected to government  
“Twisted steel, blackened walls and burnt out cells. Silent witnesses of a tragedy in 
which 11 people were killed without a chance, locked in their cells, suffocated in the 
smoke. Could the catastrophic fire, which started in one cell, have been prevented? 
Could the lives of those detainees killed have been spared?”1 
With these dramatic words, the Dutch Safety Board introduced a short film which summarized 
the Board’s report on the fire of October 27, 2005, at the detention center at Schiphol-Oost, 
near Amsterdam’s airport in the Netherlands. Although the guards at the detention center 
managed to save 32 detainees, 11 people died and 15 were seriously injured as a result of the 
fire. This was a terrible accident. Nobody wanted this tragedy to happen, but it did. Many 
questions were asked: What caused the fire? Could it have been prevented? Government was 
responsible for the safety of the detainees, but how exactly should this responsibility be 
regarded? The Dutch Minister of Justice, Piet Hein Donner, resigned due to the Safety Board’s 
report and in the House of Representatives he made the following statement:  
“After a disaster, one often sees that many things can be improved, although at the time, 
with the knowledge of what could reasonably be foreseen, they could and should be 
considered adequate. The reports, however, pose more fundamental questions than 
merely looking back and accounting for the past. Those reports seem to imply for 
government such a responsibility and liability for preventing disasters and danger that 
the question is to what extent such a responsibility is still bearable. If only the prevention 
of danger counts, then democracy and the constitutional state are threatened. These 
questions require a serious debate between government and parliament.”2 
This dissertation is concerned with cases such as these, where governmental organizations are 
connected to deaths and serious injuries. There are different ways of looking at these cases. The 
opposite view to the one held by Donner can be illustrated by the words of H.L. Mencken:  
“I believe that all government is evil, and that trying to improve it is largely a waste of 
time.” 3 
         
These two quotes are the starting point for this dissertation, in the sense that they represent both 
ends of a spectrum of possible explanations for the governmental behavior that will be researched. 
You are invited to start out with me on the journey to explore this terrain: between error and evil. 
The words ‘government’ and ‘death’ (or ‘serious injuries’ for that matter) form a troublesome 
combination. Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of events in which this combination 
has manifested itself. Genocidal crimes have been carried out by governments: Special 
                                               
1 http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/nl/onderzoek/13/brand-cellencomplex-schiphol-oost-nacht-van-26-op-27-oktober 
(date last accessed: 3-11-2013) 
2 Minister of Justice Piet Hein Donner, in the House of Representatives to offer his resignation on account of the report 
on the Schiphol detention center fire. 
http://www.elsevier.nl/web/1092310/Artikel/Verklaring-minister-Donner-in-Tweede-Kamer.htm (date last accessed: 
17-02-2013) 
3 http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/1107.html (date last accessed: 17-02-2013). Mencken (1880-1956) was an 
American essayist, columnist and journalist, who was highly critical of government in general. 
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international tribunals and the International Criminal Court in The Hague4 have prosecuted 
cases concerning genocides, such as those in Rwanda and Burundi, Sudan (Darfur), the former 
Yugoslavia, and Cambodia. Wars are almost invariably connected to governments, whether in 
civil wars (government versus rebellion parties) or in wars between countries or regions 
(governments versus governments). Large-scale killings inevitably require organization, which 
governments have often provided. Deaths by government can emanate from the use of legalized 
force, for example the use of gunfire by police. Finally, deaths by government can be the result 
of fatal accidents.  
The focus in this dissertation will be on fatal accidents. While fatal accidents connected to 
government are often the subject of numerous investigations into the specific case itself (by 
investigative committees, the Public Prosecution, inspections, journalists, scientists, and 
others), relatively little research is done to connect these cases. Up until the time of writing, I 
have found no other research that covers cases of deaths and serious injuries connected to 
government (whether in the Netherlands or abroad) in an effort to learn from the overview and 
any connecting patterns between these cases. The point of departure for the journey to be 
embarked on here is the complex situations that are found in governmental organizations when 
things go wrong: when governments are connected to deaths or serious injuries.  
The main research questions here are:  
1) Why and how does governmental behavior in the Netherlands lead to the 
occurrence of deaths or serious injuries to human beings?  
2) How do governmental organizations in the Netherlands respond to these cases 
and why do they respond in that way?   
 
In the chapters that follow, these research questions will be discussed extensively. A deep interest 
in the role of government within society has been the reason for this choice of subject matter and 
will be discussed further in the next paragraph.    
 
 
1.2. Thinking about the role of government in society  
 
In thinking about government, the starting point is the fundamental notion that government 
exists in order to pursue the common good of its citizens. The basic characteristics of developed 
democratic states are in essence simple: The people vote and pay taxes, government in turn 
provides safety, regulates markets and redistributes income to provide for basic social needs. 
The people’s representatives, assembled in parliament, must keep a close eye on government 
to ensure that the people’s will is carried out in the right manner. The rule of law has to be 
respected by both government (which holds the monopoly of force) and the people. The laws 
come about in a democratic process and are drawn up by parliament or government. 
Independent judges assess whether specific behavior is in line with laws and regulations.  
 
This basic picture of the nature of government still provides a limitless source of inspiration for 
scholars of public administration. What should the role of government be? What are the core 
duties government should carry out? How should government be organized in order to be able 
to fulfill its broad tasks? What can or should be required from people who work within 
government, such as politicians, top administrators or civil servants?  
                                               
4 http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/cases/Pages/cases%20index.aspx (date last 
accessed: 24-05-2013) 
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The inspiration for this dissertation springs from what can be learned about governmental 
organizations under those circumstances where death or serious injury has occurred. This is 
precisely what governments seek to avoid. The same government that works for the common 
good and safety of its citizens is involved in or perhaps even responsible for accidents that lead 
to the death of its own people. What does it say about governmental organizations when such 
things go wrong, even when nobody intended such a tragedy to happen? If fatal accidents occur, 
what role does government play and how does government react? In a deeper sense, the question 
is also what these cases tell us about the role of government in modern society. This question 
will be addressed in the concluding chapter.  
 
In order to find out what happens when governments are connected to deaths and serious 
injuries, several bodies of knowledge will be discussed in the following chapter. But first, a 
perspective will be presented that formed another of the inspirations for this dissertation and 
one that is significantly different from other perspectives: It is the view that examining the 
circumstances connecting government with these serious incidents will involve unmasking 
administrative evil. 
 
 
1.3. A different path: unmasking administrative evil 
 
Governmental performance has preoccupied scholars of public administration. Subjects like 
effectiveness, efficiency and governance have been studied extensively. Criminal behavior by 
governments is a subject that has received much less attention, although there is still some research 
that can be quoted and integrity of governance is a subject that has received growing attention 
during the last two decades.  
 
In this area of research, the concept of evil in combination with government is relatively new. This 
issue was raised by Adams and Balfour in ‘Unmasking administrative evil’ in which the authors 
connected the concept of administrative evil with several cases of governmental action.5 
‘Unmasking administrative evil’ was awarded the American National Academy of Public 
Administration’s annual Brownlow Award in 1998 as the most outstanding book in public 
administration. Two different divisions of the Academy of Management have also granted their 
Best Book Awards to this book. According to Adams and Balfour, the field of public 
administration echoes the sounds of technical rationality in its calls for professionalism and for 
more rigorous and scientific research. Historical research and ethical views have too often not been 
incorporated in modern social science, which has often focused on explaining human action 
through the development of general laws and models independent of time and space. ‘Unmasking 
administrative evil’ offered a perspective that was, and still is, significantly different from other 
theories on misbehavior by governments. It is a theory that has attracted both critical acclaim and 
scorn, and has generated not only scientific but also public interest.  
This dissertation will be the first case study research in the Netherlands that includes the theory 
behind ‘Unmasking administrative evil’ and combines it with insights from relevant bodies of 
knowledge. Surprisingly, hardly any studies can be found in the Netherlands, abroad, or even 
in the United States that follow up with factual research on the acclaimed theory of Adams and 
Balfour. An exception is an article by Ghere, who used the theory of administrative evil to study 
                                               
5 Adams and Balfour (2009). The first edition of the book came out in 1998. The most recent edition of the book is the 
third edition from 2009. This latest edition is used here, unless otherwise indicated.  
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a case concerning the suffering inflicted on foster care children in Florida. His conclusion is 
worth noting at the start of this dissertation: 
“It can reasonably be asserted then, that accepted practice in any service profession can 
yield harmful outcomes and that the systematic study of injury back through practice 
could ultimately inform - rather than impugn - that profession.”6 
 
The next paragraph discusses the focus of this dissertation: what happens when things go 
wrong. 
 
 
1.4. What happens when things go wrong  
 
The Dutch situation 
In the Netherlands, public debate on the role of the government in contemporary society has 
been spurred on by several serious incidents since the year 2000. On May 13, 2000, a firework 
factory in Enschede exploded. As a result, 23 people died, 950 people suffered serious injuries 
and an entire residential area was destroyed. An investigative report concluded that the 
governmental agencies involved neglected their tasks of enforcing applicable rules and 
regulations.7 On New Year’s night in 2001, a fire in a local pub in Volendam caused 14 deaths 
and 200 serious injuries. Here too, the conclusion was that there had been lackluster law 
enforcement by the local government agencies. Although the direct cause of the disasters was 
the actions of the private companies involved, these disasters caused public fury over the role 
of government.  
 
The very recent (2013) case of Alexander Dolmatov can be mentioned. Dolmatov was a Russian 
citizen who sought asylum in the Netherlands and eventually committed suicide in his prison 
cell, as he was about to be sent back to Russia by the Dutch authorities. A report by the 
Inspectorate of Security and Justice concluded that the Dutch authorities had made a series of 
errors in the case (for instance, Dolmatov had been unjustly placed in alien detention and did 
not receive adequate medical attention after an earlier suicide attempt).8 A motion of censure 
against the State Secretary of Security and Justice, Teeven, did not receive a majority in the 
House of Representatives (96 against, 48 in favor).9 
 
As the quote from former Minister of Justice Donner at the start of this chapter showed, there is 
another way of looking at these kinds of issues. This way of thinking focuses on what is still 
reasonable to expect of governmental behavior. Society has become more complex and the 
question might be asked if government is at all capable of determining social outcomes. In this 
view, government is seen as just one of many actors shaping modern life in a myriad of 
interactions. Civil servants and politicians are often faced with complicated laws, complex 
procedures, a large variety of stakeholders and considerable public pressure. Under these difficult 
circumstances, wicked dilemmas sometimes have to be faced in which ‘good choices’ do not seem 
to present themselves. What kind of responsibility should government have for natural disasters 
for example?  
 
                                               
6 Ghere (2006), p. 434. 
7 Commissie Onderzoek Vuurwerkramp (2001). 
8 Inspectorate of Security and Justice (2013). 
9http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/3428127/2013/04/19/Teeven-blijft-ook-zonder-het-
volle-vertrouwen.dhtml (Date last accessed: 13-10-2013). 
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The risk management approach 
Beck and Giddens have written about the ‘risk society’ that has emerged.10 In this line of thinking, 
disasters are not caused by nature or by an act of God, but by rational decisions taken by human 
beings. Instrumental rationality leads in this way of thinking. Helsloot made a distinction between 
social safety (threats posed to health and goods by deliberate criminal actions by third parties) and 
physical safety (threats posed to health and goods by all sorts of accidents).11 He focused on aspects 
of physical safety. He found that the greatest threats to physical safety, measured by the number 
of deaths in the Netherlands, were illnesses, caused by smoking (20.000), obesity (8.000) and 
physical inactivity (8.000), followed by accidents at home (2.200), suicide (1.500) and traffic 
accidents (1.200).12 A special group was formed by the ‘large accidents’, those in which the sum 
of deaths and wounded was equal to or greater than ten, and in which the events connected to the 
accident all took place within a period of 24 hours and within a restricted area. In the Netherlands, 
the cases of the Bijlmer disaster (in which an airplane crashed into an apartment building), the 
Hercules-disaster (the crash of a military plane), the Enschede firework factory explosion, the café 
fire in Volendam and the Schiphol detention center fire met these criteria. The number of deaths 
involved in these ‘large accidents’ was very small when compared to the categories associated 
with illness. Nevertheless, these accidents drew more large-scale media attention than the other 
categories combined. Helsloot explained this by distinguishing between subjective and objective 
physical safety. Feelings and emotions are highlighted after large accidents and are often seen as 
equally or even more important than objectively verifiable facts.  
 
“The bottom line for subjectivity realists is that we as a society cannot or do not want to 
accept the existing safety risks that are done to us by others.”13 
 
Claiming complete safety is impossible for those categories of threat to physical safety that relate 
to health, life style and accidents at home or on the road. However, as ‘large accidents’ are more 
rare, it is more appealing to policy makers to claim complete safety and thereby avoid the 
confrontation with worried, demanding citizens. This, Helsloot claimed, makes this area of 
physical safety very sensitive to ‘symbolic actions’. If a physical safety risk nevertheless 
materializes as a ‘large accident’, society will be shocked and government must take immediate 
action to control the consequences of the accident and restore public confidence. In such a setting, 
there will be a lack of relevant information and an excess of non-relevant information. This 
situation can be described as a crisis, which was defined by Rosenthal as: 
 
“a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a social 
system, which necessitates taking critical decisions within a limited time and with a high 
degree of uncertainty.”14 
 
Helsloot concluded that a façade of symbolism is often erected in the domain of physical safety, 
in which rational analysis of the facts is lacking. This symbolism has not come about as a single 
rational decision, but has evolved out of misunderstanding and a sort of indolence into a 
stranglehold of symbolic actions in which politicians, safety professionals, media and citizens have 
become entangled.   
 
The Council for Public Administration (Rob) has written extensively about what it calls the ‘risk 
                                               
10 Beck (1992), Giddens (1990). 
11 Helsloot (2007). 
12 Helsloot (2007), p. 11-12.  
13 Helsloot (2007), p. 14. 
14 Helsloot (2007), p. 16. 
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rule reflex’, the tendency to overreact and to impose more measures, rules and regulations in 
response to risks that have manifested themselves through an accident or disaster.15 The reflex 
consists of three elements: A risk manifests itself as an incident, parliament calls for measures and 
the minister decides on measures to be implemented by the civil service.16 In this line of argument, 
the role of government in major disasters or scandals should be examined by identifying dilemmas, 
unreasonable expectations, ambiguous rules and regulations and so on. The Rob recommended 
that government should deal with these kinds of incidents as follows: 
- Be competent and show empathy: People should come first, not measures, rules and 
procedures 
- Exercise openness and integrity 
- Deliver what you promise, only promise what you can deliver: Do not give in to the 
risk rule reflex and buy time for taking measures 
- Stick to your own role: You are responsible or you are not responsible. Do not take 
responsibility if you hold no authority on the matter, do not blame other governmental 
organizations unnecessarily 
- Government is only one of the actors in the risk landscape, so it needs to involve others 
(like companies, citizens, interest groups and other governmental organizations) to 
hold part of the responsibility 
- Investigate the facts, not the faults: Government should stay in the lead in order to 
prevent the ‘disaster after the disaster’, in the sense that an abundance of investigations 
can be prevented.17 
 
Two ends of the spectrum 
The line of thinking in this risk management approach can be seen as one end of the spectrum. 
This approach can be closely connected to one of the bodies of knowledge that will be discussed: 
error management. On the other end of the spectrum we can place administrative evil or perhaps 
outright evil. In between these extreme ends of the spectrum all kinds of other explanations might 
be possible. It is on this path that the research journey lying ahead will begin: When do we talk 
about error, when does error turn into something worse and ultimately into (administrative) evil?  
 
It should be stressed at the start of this dissertation that the aim here is neither to add some more 
fuel to bureaucrat bashing nor to make sweeping generalizing statements on how terribly 
governments behave, nor to extricate government from any possible blame at all. However, it is 
interesting to find out what happens in those cases in which things go wrong and where 
explanations are possible, ranging from simple error to ‘evil’ or ‘administrative evil’. The question 
how government responds to these cases is equally interesting. Although arguably this dissertation 
then focuses in part on a dark side of government, this is done in the firm belief that learning from 
past mistakes is crucial for maintaining a viable system of government and public service.  
 
 
 1.5. Death and government: the numbers  
 
Although statistics on deaths connected to government are often contested and, admittedly, often 
debatable, it would be useful here to explore these statistics and gain some insight into the numbers 
involved. Clearly, government can often be connected to deaths or serious injuries, but not every 
instance of that is of interest here.  
 
                                               
15 Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur, (2012), p. 7. 
16 Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur, (2012), p. 61. 
17 Rob (2012), p. 68-69. 
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Global numbers 
Rummel has done extensive research, described in his book ‘Death by government’, on the 
numbers of people that have been killed by governments.18 Rummel focused on democide, which 
he defined as “the murder of any person or people by a government, including genocide, 
politicide and mass murder.”19 He found that the number of deaths caused by non-democratic, 
absolutist governments was far greater than the number of deaths caused by wars. According 
to Rummel, 119 million people were killed by government in the 20th Century, 35 million of 
whom were killed during wars. According to his calculations, the governments of free, 
democratic countries were responsible for 0.7% of the total number of people killed. 
Democracy was found to be the most important indicator of whether or not government was 
likely to kill in large numbers. Rummel called this the Power Principle: ‘Power kills, absolute 
power kills absolutely.’20 Pinker comes to a completely different analysis in ‘The better angels 
of our nature’, in which he argues that violence has actually declined in the course of history. 
“A state that uses monopoly on force to protect its citizens from one another may be the most 
consistent violence reducer that we have encountered in this book.” 21 In Pinker’s view, we 
should not let ourselves be guided by dramatic headlines in the media. He points to historic 
trends that show that humanity has never lived in such peaceful times as nowadays.22  
 
This dissertation does not focus on democides nor genocides, nor, for that matter, on wars. The 
focus is on cases of deaths or serious injuries connected to Dutch government in the last two 
decades. Within that, focus is then on fatal accidents in which the Dutch government was 
involved. Reliable statistics concerning fatal accidents in which governments were involved are 
not available on a global level. 
 
Fatal accidents in the Netherlands 
Statistics Netherlands (the CBS) monitors the causes of deaths in the Netherlands in minute 
detail. Unfortunately, there are no specific records on deaths which have been caused by 
government (although it should be granted that such statistics, just like the ones mentioned by 
Rummel before, would inevitably be contested). There are nevertheless some statistics which 
can help us determine a bit more precisely the scope of possible deaths connected to government 
in the Netherlands. The following table shows the number of deaths in the Netherlands caused 
by fatal accidents23 over the years.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
18 Rummel (1994). 
19 http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/WSJ.TAB1.GIF (date last accessed: 21-10-2013) 
20 http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/NOTE1.HTM#PREFACE (date last accessed: 21-10-2013) 
21 Pinker (2011), p. 827. 
22http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/12/the_world_is_not_falling_apart_the_trend_line
s_reveal_an_increasingly_peaceful.html (date last accessed: 27-12-2014) 
23 The CBS defines an accident as follows: “A sudden, unintended and unforeseen event, in which an 
 external cause leads to physical injury and in which there is no intentional violence or food poisoning.”  
 http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/methoden/begrippen/default.htm?ConceptID=2541 (date last accessed: 21- 
10-2013) 
24http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=7052_95&D1=80-
87&D2=0&D3=0&D4=0,10,20,30,40,50,61-62&HDR=G1,G2,G3&STB=T&CHARTTYPE=1&VW=G (date last 
accessed: 3-11-2013).  
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Table 1.1. Causes of death; main primary causes of death, sex, age 
 
 
 
The CBS recorded 3907 fatal accidents in the Netherlands in 2012. People died because of 
traffic accidents (684), accidental falls (2795), accidental drowning (81), accidental poisoning 
(138) and other accidents (209). Regrettably, no distinctions are made that could indicate 
whether government was involved or not. 
 
Fires 
Figures from the CBS for the period 2003 to 2011 show that in the Netherlands, between 60 
and 100 people (including fire brigade personnel) die each year as a result of fire, and between 
800 to 1200 people are injured by fire.25 Again, no specific distinction between governmental 
and non-governmental involvement is made here. 
  
Deaths by disasters in the Netherlands 
A list of disasters26 on Dutch territory has been compiled on Wikipedia. The list starts as early 
as the year 838 and reflects a large part of Dutch history: floods, fires, sunken ships and, more 
recently, bombings (during the Second World War), crashed airplanes and train accidents 
dominate the list. Across the 20th and 21st centuries, the pattern in the number of deaths seems 
to be erratic, but generally fluctuates between a minimum of zero and a maximum of around 
fifty to sixty deaths annually, with a few exceptions (most notably of course the period of 1940-
1945). From 1990 until 2012, there have been a maximum of three disasters per year that fit the 
definition that was used to assemble this list. In the 1990s there were more casualties than there 
have been so far in the 21st century, mostly due to the Bijlmer disaster in 1992, and the Hercules 
disaster and the Dakota disaster, both in 1996. In the 21st century, the explosion in the firework 
                                               
25http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=37511&D1=0,15-23,90-92,147-149,159-
161&D2=0&D3=(l-8)-l&VW=T (date last accessed: 21-10-2013). 
26 For the definition of disaster, article 1 of the Safety Regions Act was quoted: “A disaster is a grave accident or 
another event in which the life and health of many persons, the environment or great material interests have been 
seriously harmed or are being threatened and which requires a coordinated deployment of services or 
organizations of various disciplines to remove the threat or limit the harmful consequences.” Wikipedia added that 
it only included events in the list in which five persons or more had been killed, in which the deceased were not 
related to each other and in which a large area (minimally the size of a municipality) was effected. It should be 
added here that this list has not been verified extensively for this dissertation, it is included here to give an 
indication of the numbers one should consider when looking at deaths by disasters in the Netherlands.  
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factory in Enschede in 2000 was the disaster with the most casualties. Of course, the connection 
between government and the disaster or accident varies. In some cases there is an important 
role for Dutch government while in others the government only plays a minimal part. The 
following table shows the number of deaths from 1990 until 2012, based on the Wikipedia list.27 
 
Table 1.2. Number of deaths resulting from disasters in the Netherlands 
 
 
 
The findings of Helsloot, mentioned earlier, are confirmed here. By any comparison, the 
number of deaths in fatal accidents connected to government should be considered very small. 
Clearly then, this research focuses on what, in quantitative terms, might be described as an 
exception. Nevertheless, as Helsloot also showed, it can be demonstrated that these cases 
received more wide scale public attention than might have been expected from the numbers 
involved. On the other hand, it should not come as a surprise that the grave consequences 
involved attract public attention and that discussions become emotional.  
 
 
1.6. What comes next  
 
In Chapter 2, there will be discussion of the bodies of knowledge that have evolved around 
certain key concepts in theory and practice that are germane to this dissertation. This is 
necessary to place the research subject in the broader perspective of relevant theories already 
developed in the academic world. To achieve this, a multidisciplinary approach is needed in 
which the phenomenon can be explored from different angles. Six key concepts and their 
associated bodies of knowledge have been selected and are outlined in the paragraphs which 
follow.    
 
The thought that being human means making mistakes is taken a step further in the field of 
error management. Careful analysis of errors is carried out in order to improve performance 
and prevent disasters. In public administration, the subject is relatively less well known, but is 
                                               
27 http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lijst_van_Nederlandse_rampen (Date last accessed: 21-10-2013.)  
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gaining attention.  
 
A research group at the VU University Amsterdam has carried out a large-scale investigation of 
rule breaking by governmental organizations in the Netherlands.28 I was involved in this study and 
a short overview will be given, focusing on aspects that are relevant for the research design.  
 
This research subject cannot be considered separately from discussions about public morals and 
integrity. In the science of public administration, growing attention is given to research on 
subjects such as integrity and corruption. A short overview will be given. 
 
Criminology offers various insights into possible explanations of criminal behavior. Within 
criminology, subjects like organizational crime, white collar crime and corporate crime have 
received considerable attention. 
 
State crime is a subject that has spawned numerous publications. One might expect that issues 
of state crime are closely related to our research matter. Many publications on state crime focus 
on specific examples of killings by government, such as genocide or democide. For this reason, 
the literature on state crime will be reviewed more closely.  
 
Unmasking administrative evil has already been introduced briefly in this chapter and will be 
discussed more extensively in the following chapter. 
 
In Chapter 3, the research design (the ‘road map’) will be described. Elements of this research 
design will include the central research questions (to be discussed more extensively) and 
definitions of the most important terms in the selected research area. The scope of the 
dissertation will be outlined, and the chosen research method and data collection explained. 
There will also be a description of the structure within which the research results will be 
presented.  
 
Subsequent chapters will contain the selected case studies: cases in which government was 
connected to deaths or serious injuries. The order in which the case studies are discussed will 
inevitably be somewhat subjective, nevertheless the choice has been made to start with the 
individual cases, those in which one person died. Chapter 4 will cover the Catshuis fire, and 
Chapter 5 will discuss the fire brigade divers who died by drowning (which included three 
individual accidents). The collective cases (in which more people died or suffered serious 
injuries) are discussed in the chapters that follow: Chapter 6 will cover the Probo Koala, Chapter 
7 the Schiphol detention center fire, and in Chapter 8 the AP-23 land mines and Spijkers will 
be discussed.  
 
The findings of the case studies will be compared and analyzed in Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 
will set out the conclusions of the dissertation. A summary in Dutch will be given for Dutch 
readers.   
 
 
                                               
28 Huberts et al, (2005). 
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2 Key concepts in theory and practice and their associated 
bodies of knowledge  
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
In discussing these key concepts, a wide range of possibilities will be explored in order to find 
out why and how governmental behavior can lead to deaths or serious injuries. Secondly, the 
question how governmental organizations respond to these events is examined further. The key 
concepts and associated bodies of knowledge that will be discussed in the following paragraphs 
are error management, rule breaking by governments, integrity and corruption, organizational 
crime, state crime and administrative evil. (In future, for simplicity, these topics and their 
associated bodies of knowledge will be referred as ‘bodies of knowledge’.) 
 
Each paragraph will answer the following questions for the subject under discussion. 
- What is it? (Definition) 
- What explains it? (Causes) 
- How is it responded to? (Responses) 
- What is included in the dissertation in relation to the subject? 
o Definition 
o Explanatory factors 
o Factors relevant to response 
 
 
2.2. Error management  
 
2.2.1. Error: a definition  
Making errors is part of human nature. The first question, then, is how to define ‘error’. 
Homsma, Van Dyck, De Gilder, Koopman and Elfring gave the following definition of error: 
“Errors are generally understood as deviations between the intended and actual 
outcome of an action. Following the action theory perspective, human error is built up 
around three defining aspects: (1) errors are unintentional; (2) occur only in goal 
directed action; and (3) the error maker should have known better, implying that the 
error was potentially avoidable and not chance based. Human error is distinguished 
from failure, which also comprises non-attainment of goals by violations (intentional), 
unavoidable random external events (e.g., lightning strikes) or sabotage (intentional 
damage).”29 
In these definitions, the psychological perspective is clear. The actor’s intentions are paramount 
in determining whether an error has occurred or not. Violation is deemed intentional and 
therefore does not qualify as an error. Here Homsma and his colleagues differ from Helmreich, 
who defined violation (which he sees as a conscious failure to adhere to procedures or 
regulations) as a type of error.30 The suggestion that errors only occur in goal directed action is 
somewhat troublesome, as it could suggest that abstaining from action cannot count as an error. 
It could also suggest that the goal towards which the action should be directed is clear. Since 
                                               
29 Homsma et al., (2008), p. 116 and likewise in Dimitrova (2014), p. 10. 
30 Helmreich (2000), p. 782. 
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that is often not the case, this aspect will be dropped from the definition used in this dissertation.  
Error should also be clearly distinguished from its consequences. In popular speech, the term 
‘error’ often refers to both the error itself and to its negative consequences. But a distinction 
between an error and its negative consequences is essential because the same error may result 
in a variety of negative consequences, depending on the situation or context in which the error 
occurs. Hence there can be no such thing as a severe error, there are only severe consequences.31 
The same erroneous action can lead to a variety of negative consequences. Administering two 
aspirins instead of one will probably not lead to any negative consequences. However, the 
identical erroneous action, administering a double dose of a medicine, can lead to grave 
consequences with a more potent medicine (for example colchicines or blood dilutents). 
 
2.2.2. Error management: a definition  
 
Psychologists and organization science experts have for some time taken an interest in what is 
called error management. For several lines of business, the prevention or containment of errors 
is something that is necessary for unhampered business performance. Making errors costs 
money. Reducing errors and learning from them is profitable. The main concern of error 
management is often safety. It might not come as a surprise that the aviation and space industry, 
as well as the medical sector, are among the sectors most familiar with error management. Here, 
even small errors can have grave consequences. If an airplane crashes, many lives are often 
lost. Large scale investigations are subsequently undertaken, in which an attempt is made to 
examine all the possible causes for the crash. In the medical field, concern is usually over 
individual cases, but here, too, consequences can be severe. 
 
In public administration, error management is a recent introduction, though it is the subject of 
growing attention. There has been some social science research in this area32, but not much on 
error management in public administration. On the other hand, major catastrophes are often 
connected to governments and often receive wide attention, albeit without explicit reference to 
error management. Scientists often argue that organizations can benefit from errors and 
mistakes can be instructive when people find out why they occur and how they can be corrected. 
However, the conditions under which organizations actually learn from errors are unclear. 
Scholars have come up with attractive ideas, concepts and frameworks for learning from 
unsuccessful actions such as errors, but empirical evidence remains scarce.33 
 
Van Dyck identified two general approaches to errors: prevention and management. Error 
prevention is aimed at avoiding errors happening. In error management, it is acknowledged that 
not all errors can be avoided, no matter how hard we try. While accepting that errors will 
happen, the focus is on learning from them and on reducing the negative consequences if they 
happen.34 The framing of errors is important here. Error prevention sees them as negative 
occurrences that should be avoided, while error management sees them as potentially beneficial 
opportunities for learning.35 
 
There are several definitions of error management. Helmreich, a psychologist who has 
                                               
31 Van Dyck (2000), p. 13. 
32 For example Van Dyck (2000). 
33 Homsma et al., (2008), p. 1. 
34 Van Dyck (2000), p. 14. 
35 Dimitrova (2014), p. 15. 
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published on error management in the aviation industry and the medical sector, claims that error 
management recognizes the inevitability of error and he adopts a non-punitive stance toward 
inadvertent error.36 He gives the following definition: 
 
“By error management we mean the use of all available data to understand the causes 
of errors and taking appropriate actions, including changing policy, procedures, and 
special training to reduce their incidence of error and to minimize the consequences of 
those that do occur.”37 
 
 
2.2.3. Explanatory factors  
 
Research on error management has found that there is seldom a single cause for error, but 
instead a concatenation of contributing factors. Even when at first sight it looks as though there 
is a single factor that is the causative factor, it often turns out that other factors could be just as 
– or even more – influential. To illustrate this point, a real life case from the medical sector is 
given here. It throws light on some of the complexities that exist when trying to find 
explanations for errors.  
  
An 8 year old boy was admitted for elective surgery on his eardrum. He was anaesthetized and an end tracheal 
tube inserted, along with an internal stethoscope and a temperature probe. The anesthetist did not listen to the 
boy’s chest after inserting the tube. The temperature probe connector was not compatible with the monitor (the 
hospital had changed brands the previous day). The anesthetist asked for another but did not connect it; he also 
did not connect the stethoscope. Surgery began at 08 20 and carbon dioxide concentrations began to rise after 
about 30 minutes. The anesthetist stopped entering data on CO2 and pulse on the patient's chart. Nurses 
observed the anesthetist nodding in his chair, his head bobbing; they did not speak to him because they “were 
afraid of a confrontation.” At 10.15 the surgeon heard a gurgling sound and realized that the airway tube was 
disconnected. The anesthetist was informed of the problem and he reconnected the tube. The anesthetist did not 
check breathing sounds with the stethoscope. 
 
At 10.30 the patient was breathing so rapidly the surgeon could not operate; he notified the anesthetist that the 
rate was 60/min. Though he was alerted, the anesthetist did nothing. At 10.45 the monitor showed irregular 
heartbeats. Just before 11.00 the anesthetist noted extreme heartbeat irregularity and asked the surgeon to stop 
operating. The patient was given a dose of lignocaine, but his condition worsened. At 11.02 the patient's heart 
stopped beating. The anesthetist called for code, summoning the emergency team. The endotracheal tube was 
removed and found to be 50% obstructed by a mucous plug. A new tube was inserted and the patient was 
ventilated. The emergency team anesthetist noticed that the airway heater had caused the breathing circuit's 
plastic tubing to melt and turned the heater off. The patient's temperature was 108°F. The patient died despite 
the efforts of the code team. 
 
At first glance, the case seems to be a simple instance of gross negligence during surgery by an anesthetist who 
contributed to the death of a healthy 8 year old boy by failing to connect sensors and monitor his condition. 
When the model was applied, however, nine sequential errors were identified, including those of nurses who 
failed to speak up when they observed the anesthetist nodding in a chair and the surgeon who continued 
operating even after the anesthetist failed to respond to the boy's deteriorating condition. More importantly, 
latent organizational and professional threats were revealed, including failure to act on reports about the 
anesthetist’s previous behavior, lack of policy for monitoring patients, pressure to perform when fatigued, and 
professional tolerance of peer misbehavior.38 
 
If we then look at factors that can explain why errors happen, these factors most often depend 
upon the setting in which the errors occurred. Possible explanatory factors can be quoted from 
the literature on error management, such as fatigue and workload, flawed procedures, 
                                               
36 Helmreich (1998), p. 2. 
37 Helmreich (1998), p. 1  
38 Helmreich (2000), p. 784. 
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maintenance errors or inadequacies and simple chance.39 From the medical sector, further 
frequently identified factors can be added in, such as lack of communication, lack of leadership, 
lack of preparation, planning, vigilance and conflict.40 The requirements on organizations for 
successful error management are more positive: trust, a non-punitive policy toward error, 
commitment to taking action to reduce error-inducing conditions, production of data that show 
the nature and types of errors occurring, training for crews in error avoidance and management 
strategies, and training for instructors and evaluators in evaluating and reinforcing error 
management.41 Since the above is taken from an article on error management in the aviation 
industry, it should not come as a surprise that the recommended focus here is on following 
SOPs: standard operating procedures.  
 
 
2.2.4. Reactions and responses  
 
Wisdom often comes after the fact. Admitting mistakes is difficult for many people. Somehow 
it seems that it is always easier to pinpoint other people’s mistakes than to admit that you were 
wrong yourself. This is backed up by research, as research among airplane pilots has shown: 
 
“Most of the 30,000 pilots surveyed report that their decision making is as good in 
emergencies as under normal conditions, that they can leave behind personal problems, 
and that they perform effectively when fatigued. Such inaccurate self-perceptions can 
lead to overconfidence in difficult situations.”42 
 
The distinction between error and its consequences is a relevant one for error management. 
Error management not only focuses on identifying the causes of errors, it is also concerned with 
the way in which organizations react to those errors. As Dutch comedian Freek de Jonge once 
jokingly said: ‘a disaster is only a disaster if the plan for dealing with the disaster does not 
work.’43  
 
The way organizations react to errors comes to light in part of the research on error culture. Van 
Dyck pointed out that in organizations it is error culture that is important, more so than focusing 
on individual orientations towards errors. This error culture is relevant for error prevention, but 
it is certainly of importance when reacting to errors. The error culture is made up of shared 
beliefs, attitudes and behavioral styles and might be seen as a system that either supports or 
hampers effective error management. Van Dyck believed this error culture to be an important 
factor in organizational or team performance.44 Error management culture consists of several 
organizational practices: communicating about errors, sharing error knowledge, helping in error 
situations and quickly detecting and handling errors.45 Helmreich also emphasized the 
importance of culture, distinguishing three levels: national, professional and organizational 
culture, all of which have their own influence on the way in which errors are being dealt with.46  
 
                                               
39 Helmreich (1998), p. 4 
40 Helmreich (2000), p. 783. 
41 Helmreich (1998), p. 5 
42 Helmreich (2000), p. 782. 
43 http://www.citaten.net/zoeken/citaten-ramp.html (Date last accessed: 10-08-2013.) 
44 Van Dyck (2000), p. 17. She goes on to illustrate the different possible error cultures by elaborating on the fascinating 
story of two expeditions to climb Mount Everest, both of which had dramatic consequences but very different approaches 
towards errors. 
45 Van Dyck, Frese, Baer and Sonnentag (2005), p. 1229. 
46 Helmreich (1998), p. 2. 
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There appears to be a tendency when reacting to errors – especially in politics – to be unwilling 
to accept risks, failures and impossibilities. Ministers and State Secretaries are often asked to 
assure the House of Representatives that ‘this will never happen again’. Van Eeten delivered 
an enlightening oration on fatalism, in which he showed how there is a taboo in politics on 
powerlessness or fatalism.47 Fatalism (summarized simply by ‘that is how it is’) is a way of 
thinking which seems to be forbidden in politics, even though ordinary citizens understand full 
well that a risk-free society is impossible and that mistakes will always be made. Van Eeten’s 
plea to come to grips with fatalism entails that it is wiser to accept errors in some cases than to 
downplay or deny them. Frissen has also written about this fatalism.48 He feels that the state 
fails to understand the tragic condition of humanity. As a consequence, it is to no avail that the 
state tries to intervene in society in order to shape social outcomes.  
 
Going a step further is the belief that errors should at times be received as a blessing in disguise. 
An interesting exploration of this thought is given by Gladwell, who quotes the example of an 
American railway line in the mid-nineteenth century for which tunneling through a great 
mountain was required. It was estimated that it would cost two million dollars to dig through 
the mountain. A leading geologist had said that the mountain consisted of soft rock and that 
tunneling would be easy once the surface had been breached. It turned out that the experts were 
wrong. Digging through the mountain turned out to be a nightmare. The project cost more than 
ten times the budgeted estimate. If that had been known beforehand, the railroad would never 
have been funded and therefore never constructed.   
 
“But, had they not, the factories of northwestern Massachusetts wouldn’t have been able 
to ship their goods so easily to the expanding West, the cost of freight would have 
remained stubbornly high, and the state of Massachusetts would have been 
immeasurably poorer. So is ignorance an impediment to progress or a precondition for 
it?”49 
Gladwell goes on to connect this with the economist Hirschman’s explanation of the ‘Hiding 
Hand principle’: People do not want to take on great challenges, they dare to take on new tasks 
precisely because they think that in fact they are manageable. Then, when it is already too late, 
they find out the truth, cannot turn back and are forced to finish the job. In this line of thought, 
sometimes errors should be embraced by all of us. 
 
2.2.5. Content of this dissertation in relation to the subject  
 
Definition 
In this dissertation, the following definition will be the standard when it comes to labeling 
governmental actions as ‘errors’. 
 
Errors: deviations between the intended and actual outcome of an action, that are  
(1) unintentional, and where (2) the error maker should have known better, implying that the 
error was potentially avoidable  
 
Explanatory factors  
The explanatory factors listed below are considered when conducting the case studies. 
                                               
47 Van Eeten (2010), p. 14. 
48 Frissen (2013). 
49 Gladwell (2013).  
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- fatigue and workload 
- flawed procedures 
- maintenance errors or inadequacies 
- lack of communication  
- lack of leadership 
- conflict 
- lack of preparation, planning, vigilance 
- lack of trust 
 
Factors relevant to response 
When analyzing the responses of governmental organizations to cases in which they are 
connected to deaths or serious injuries, the following factors will be taken into account.  
 
Error management culture, consisting of several organizational practices: 
  
- communicating about errors 
- sharing error knowledge 
- helping in error situations and 
- quickly detecting and handling errors 
 
The taboo on fatalism: refusing to accept risks and errors 
 
 
2.3. Rule breaking by governments50  
 
2.3.1. Introduction: rule breaking by governments  
 
There has been heated legal debate in the Netherlands for many years if, and to what degree, it 
should be possible to prosecute governmental organizations for breaking the law. The Dutch 
criminal law is not explicit on this point, leaving it up to the courts to form jurisprudence to 
clarify the matter. Currently, based on the rulings by the Supreme Court in the Pikmeer-cases51, 
local governmental organizations can only be prosecuted for failure to act while fulfilling a 
function that was exclusively the role of government. By virtue of the ruling by the Supreme 
Court in the Volkel case52, the national government possesses immunity to criminal prosecution. 
After many years of discussion (a proposal for reform of the law was first sent to the House of 
Representatives in 2006), the House of Representatives on June 11, 2013 accepted a motion by 
House members Recourt, Oskam and Segers to abolish the immunity awarded to governmental 
organizations. At the time of finishing this dissertation, this proposal still had to pass through 
the Senate. If passed, it will be possible to prosecute national government in the same way as 
private companies and local governments.53  
 
Although there had been debate about the criminal liability of government in the Netherlands, 
there was scant knowledge about the content and extent of rule and law breaking. The exception 
was research by Kleiman and Van den Berg in 1995, who identified 56 cases where government 
                                               
50 This paragraph is largely based on the article by Huberts, Van Montfort, Doig and Clark (2005), which in turn was 
based on Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen, Van den Heuvel, Van Montfort, Huisman and Vermeulen (2005), in which 
I participated as an author.  
51 Pikmeer I, HR 23-04-1996, NJ 1996, 513 and Pikmeer II, HR 06-01-1998, NJ 1998, 367. 
52 HR 25-01-1994, NJ 1994, 598. 
53 http://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/30538_initiatiefvoorstel_recourt (Date last accessed: 22-08-2013) 
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
17 
 
organizations had broken environmental laws.54 At the request of a governmental task force for 
strengthening law enforcement55, in 2005 a research group at the VU University Amsterdam 
executed a large-scale investigation of rule breaking by governmental organizations in the 
Netherlands.56 The research project was aimed at providing more insight into the scale and 
nature of governmental rule breaking. Research into the same subject by the Verwey-Jonkers 
Institute followed in 2010. At the request of the Public Prosecution, Mein and Van de Bunt studied 
twelve cases in which governmental organizations were suspected of criminal behavior.57  
 
On an international level, there has been research on state crime58, but rarely on governmental 
crime (with the exception of Friedrichs59). Governmental organizations function within a 
developed liberal democracy. They are expected to work towards the public interest, are governed 
by the rule of law, are subject to various legal and normative requirements to work in an impartial 
and effective manner, and carry out activities that are scrutinized by a number of regulatory and 
other agencies. A central tenet in liberal democracies that function under the rule of law is that the 
government which makes the rules will itself abide by those rules. The question that has come up 
is whether this presumption would be borne out in practice.  
 
The VU project investigated how often and in which manner governmental organizations break 
rules, what the underlying reasons for this rule breaking are, what the consequences and 
subsequent sanctions are and which preventive measures are taken. The focus in the research 
project was on public law and in particular on possible violations of criminal and administrative 
law by governmental organizations. It was anticipated that the majority of violations would be 
minor ones. The criminologist Van den Heuvel referred to these as ordinary mistakes.60 In his 
opinion, the majority of these are blameworthy, but not serious and can be rectified. These 
‘everyday’ violations were also incorporated into the research to obtain an accurate impression 
of the scale of the problem of rule breaking in governmental organizations. The VU project was 
guided by an analytical framework, which will be discussed in more detail in the following 
paragraphs.61  
 
 
2.3.2. Rule breaking by governments: a definition  
 
Governmental organizations are defined as decision-making institutions in public life, from 
national government to local municipalities, whose members or staff are elected or appointed 
as public officeholders, whose budgets are funded largely by public revenue and audited by 
public bodies, and whose activities are accountable to the legislature or other public bodies. 
 
Rule breaking governmental organizations are governmental organizations that violate rules or 
standards while executing their responsibilities. Standards indicate what is correct in specific 
situations. Rules clarify the provisions laid down. This means that rule breaking can relate to a 
wide scale of conduct. The standards relate to morals and decency. However, the standards are 
not unambiguously laid down in precise regulations and rules. In many cases there are rules in 
place, which are of a contextual or procedural nature. This includes laws and regulations, rules 
                                               
54 Kleiman and Van den Berg (1995).  
55 Stuurgroep Handhaven op Niveau. 
56 Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen, Van den Heuvel, Van Montfort, Huisman and Vermeulen (2005). 
57 Mein and Van de Bunt (2010). 
58 See the next paragraph for a detailed discussion of the literature on state crime.  
59 Friedrichs, in: Ross (2000), p. 58-59. 
60 Naturally, the connection to what was discussed in the paragraph on error management can be recalled here. 
61 Huberts, Van Montfort, Doig and Clark (2005), p. 9-14. 
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that create order within society, not all of which are in written form.  
 
 
2.3.3.  Explanatory factors  
 
Motives for rule breaking  
Three forms of rule breaking are identified. Rational rule breaking is when the consequences 
of adherence and non-adherence to rules are taken into account, based on the interests and 
objectives that are at stake (whether personal interests or interests of the governmental 
organization). Sub-rational rule breaking is when rule breaking forms a practical solution in 
situations where optimal legal solutions are apparently not available. Another form of rule 
breaking is sub-conscious rule breaking, when the consequences of the rule breaking are not 
deliberated due to ignorance or carelessness.62  
 
The motives for rule breaking relate to the decision to break the rules. With respect to the 
conditions for rule breaking, the key factor is the context in which the decision (either rational 
or irrational) is made. Motives for breaking rules and the rule breaking conditions are closely 
linked and, in reality, difficult to separate. For instance, there is often a relationship between 
the deliberations of the individual about breaking the rules and the circumstances under which 
the administrator or civil servant functions.  
 
Conditions for rule breaking 
To identify the most significant conditions (circumstances) under which rules are broken, 
research on governmental integrity, administrative decision making and rule breaking in 
organizations was examined. Influential conditions were found at micro-level (individual 
characteristics), meso-level (organization features) and macro-level (context and environment). 
Six conditions were identified: 
 
1) Individual characteristics 
Personal character and moral awareness can influence whether people break rules and some 
people are more inclined to break rules than others. Opportunity is often the key to tempting 
these persons to start rule breaking. Organizations in which employees are dissatisfied with or 
alienated from their work are more predisposed to display rule-breaking conduct. 
2) Work and task specifics  
Some types of work are more sensitive to rule breaking than others. In some tasks, taking 
shortcuts and bending rules can seem easier. Work pressure can also play an important part, as 
well as the room for discretion that civil servants and the governmental organization involved 
possess. Other factors that can play a role here are the time that is available for decision making, 
the type of decisions to be made and the extent of the digitalization of the work.  
3) Type of rules  
If there is a large set of rules to be reckoned with, and if the rules are complicated, unclear or 
in contradiction with other rules, this can stimulate rule breaking. It is the rules themselves that 
lead to rule breaking in this case.  
4) Organization structure  
The way the organization is structured can relate to rule breaking. If managers are unaware of 
their employees’ tasks and conduct, it is easier for employees to conceal it from their superiors. 
However, the converse situation, a high power concentration at management level, may also be 
advantageous for rule breaking (by management). Internal and external control systems are 
                                               
62 Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen, Van den Heuvel, Van Montfort, Huisman and Vermeulen (2005), p. 16-17. 
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important for preventing and dealing with rule breaking. Independent monitoring and effective 
public controls are important to achieve this.   
5) Organization culture  
The opportunity for rule breaking is strongly related to the culture present in an organization. 
Managerial attitude can be a determining factor in these situations: The top has to set the right 
example. Culture involves the thinking, conduct, values and even the personalities of the people 
in the organization. A lack of strict measures against rule breaking can lead to a culture in which 
illegal activities, insubordination and immoral conduct are condoned. The slippery slope within 
the organization can start quickly in this way. 
6) The political administrative context  
The political administrative context of an organization also matters. This involves not only 
political control mechanisms, but can also involve party politics. It is well known that the parts 
of the organization that have the most contact with the outside world are the most susceptible 
to rule breaking. Governmental organizations can also struggle with the different roles they 
have to perform simultaneously.63  
 
The VU research group concluded that governmental organizations at all levels (national, 
regional and local) and in all policy sectors (most often concerning the environment and labor 
conditions, but also in other sectors such as youth care) violated rules and standards. Most often 
these violations concerned administrative law, less often they concerned criminal law. 
According to the Public Prosecution database, in 2002 there were 162 cases against 
governmental organizations for possible violations of criminal law. The number of integrity 
violations in these cases was limited. Law enforcement action against governmental 
organizations was less than that against third parties. When it came to complying with rules and 
standards that apply to both public and private actors, governmental organizations did not 
distinguish themselves, neither in a positive nor in a negative way, from private actors. Possible 
causes for rule breaking that were identified were the rules themselves, lack of clear procedures, 
the quality of the civil service (on an organizational level as well as the expertise and knowledge 
on individual level), the attitude of politicians and top administrators towards possible 
violations of rules and the relationship with society (the closer the relationship between 
government and companies or individuals, the higher the risk of favoritism or selectivity).64  
 
In the research by Mein and Van de Bunt mentioned previously, the following causes of rule 
breaking by governments were identified: 
 
- Errors and carelessness 
- Insufficient expertise and capacity within the governmental organization 
- Insufficient separation of different functionalities, lack of leadership and lack of 
proper criticism of conduct  
- Unclear division of tasks and management 
- The attitude of administrators towards the licensing process and rule enforcement 
- The desire to guarantee an undisturbed progress of the work at hand 
- The desire to avoid high costs and claims for damage compensation. 
 
Mein and Van de Bunt concluded that their findings were in line with the findings of the VU-
project. They too concluded that a combination of motivational and situational factors probably 
formed the best explanation for these cases. They also concluded that the same factors still 
apply and that the same kinds of causes were found as before. This led them to conclude that 
                                               
63 Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen, Van den Heuvel, Van Montfort, Huisman and Vermeulen (2005), p. 17-18. 
64 Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen, Van den Heuvel, Van Montfort, Huisman and Vermeulen (2005), p. 163-169. 
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government has apparently not learned sufficiently from previous experiences, despite repeated 
warnings.65  
 
 
2.3.4.  Responses to rule breaking by government  
 
The VU-research project showed that law enforcement on government is not as stringent as it 
is when it comes to private actors. Inspecting government sites received a low priority when 
inspectors had to make choices about how to spend their limited time and resources. It should 
be added that this research took place at a time when the fatal accidents in Volendam and 
Enschede had heightened interest in law enforcement since these accidents were seen, in part, 
as the result of lackluster law enforcement. At the time, pressure on government to improve law 
enforcement was mounting. The debate now seems to have shifted and the question is whether 
the number of audit organizations and inspections has not increased disproportionately, a 
danger Powers had warned of earlier in ‘The audit society’.66 Sanctions on governments 
breaking rules were not imposed very often and in many cases police or Public Prosecution 
found a warning letter to be sufficient. Prosecution of governmental organizations is rare: The 
policy is ‘active investigation, balanced prosecution’.67  
 
It can be deduced that governmental organizations themselves often reacted to possible rule 
violations by pointing to the complex, contradictory or contested rules and to complaints by 
lower level governments about laws, policies and funding by the national government. Other 
possible responses focused on emphasizing relevant interests, for example, the economy.68 
 
Mein and Van de Bunt concluded in their research that the response of governmental 
organizations that were under suspicion for possible criminal acts was invariably very different 
from the perception of the Public Prosecution. Governmental organizations are shocked when 
they are prosecuted. Whereas the Public Prosecution feels that it is upholding the law and 
protecting the environment, health or safety, the governmental organizations feel they are 
solving governance issues. The Public Prosecution focuses on the importance of the 
environment, whereas the governing bodies point to the many different interests that they have 
to address. The governmental organization most often reacts by stating that under the given 
circumstances, their behavior should be considered adequate. The persons and organizations 
involved did not question their own integrity.  
 
“The governmental organization considers itself to be a developer or entrepreneur, who 
has to weigh complex and contradictory interests. Sometimes mistakes are made, 
everyone makes mistakes, and lessons are learned. Sometimes the governmental 
organization has to get its hands ‘dirty’ considering the interests at stake.”69 
 
 
2.3.5.  Content of this dissertation in relation to the subject  
 
In the research design, the following elements from the research on rule breaking by 
governments will be used. 
                                               
65 Mein and Van de Bunt (2010), p. 22.  
66 Power (1999). 
67 Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen, Van den Heuvel, Van Montfort, Huisman and Vermeulen (2005), p. 159-169. 
68 Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen, Van den Heuvel, Van Montfort, Huisman and Vermeulen (2005), p. 165-166. 
69 Mein and Van de Bunt (2010), p. 21. 
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(a) Definitions (inset) 
 
Governmental organizations: decision-making institutions in public life, from the national 
government to local municipalities, whose members or staff are elected or appointed as public 
officeholders, whose budgets are funded largely by public revenue and audited by public 
bodies and whose activities would be accountable to the legislature or other public bodies. 
Rule breaking governmental organizations: governmental organizations that violate rules or 
standards while executing their responsibilities. 
 
(b) Explanatory factors  
Several factors that have been described here offer possible explanations for rule breaking by 
government. The explanatory factors that are listed below, serve as a basis for the explorative 
phase of the case studies.  
 
Motives for rule breaking 
- Rational 
- Sub-rational 
- Sub-conscious 
 
Circumstances under which rules are broken 
 
- Individual characteristics 
- Work and task specifics  
- Type of rules and level of discretionary powers 
- Organizational structure 
- Organizational culture 
- Political-administrative context 
 
 
(c) Factors relevant to the response 
When analyzing the responses of governmental organizations to cases in which they are 
connected to deaths or serious injuries, the following factors will be considered.  
 
- Governmental organizations are shocked when they are prosecuted 
- Governmental organizations stress that their actions were necessary from the 
 perspective of governance 
- Governmental organizations point to the many different, complex and contradictory 
 interests that they have to address 
- Governmental organizations point to rules that are complicated, contradictory or 
 contested 
- Local or regional governmental organizations point to laws, policies and funding by 
 the national government that do not match with the needs of the local situation 
- Governmental organizations stress that under the given circumstances their behavior 
 should be considered adequate 
- There can be no question of integrity breaches according to the governmental 
 organization. 
- Sometimes the governmental organization admits it made mistakes, adding that 
 lessons have already been learned 
- Sometimes the governmental organization has to get its hands ‘dirty’ taking into 
 account the interests at stake. 
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2.4. Integrity and corruption   
 
2.4.1. Corruption: a definition  
 
Corruption has drawn attention for a long time, both in society and in science. While corruption is 
often a key issue in developing countries, it is also relevant in western societies. The term itself is 
used in many different contexts, with different meanings. In state crime literature for example, 
Green and Ward gave the following definition: 
 
“Corruption can be regarded as a form of organizational deviance where (a) it is engaged 
in as a means to an organizational goal, or (b) the condoning or tacit encouragement of 
corruption serves organizational goals, or (c) the pursuit of profit through corruption itself 
becomes an organizational goal.”70 
 
Green and Ward also stated that political and administrative corruption often takes the form of 
‘political white-collar crime’, committed by individuals against the state. The widely used 
definition of corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’ is appropriate for this kind 
of individual deviance. Other corrupt acts, however, are either committed in pursuit of the 
organizational goals of state agencies, or are tolerated for organizational reasons. It is that kind of 
corruption that is classified as state crime. What distinguishes corruption from other forms of 
official deviance is that it involves some form of clandestine exchange.71  
 
Huberts and Lasthuizen recognized at least three definitions of corruption. The first definition 
is one that is often found in law and regulation and is most often closely related to ‘bribing’. 
This implies that an official is acting in the interest of another actor because of the advantages 
promised or given to him. The second definition of corruption is as follows:   
 
“behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-
regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates 
rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence”72 
 
These elements are in line with the definition often used in the work of international 
organizations against corruption: corruption as the abuse of office for private gain. In these 
definitions, corruption is seen as a breach of moral behavioral norms and values involving 
private interests, but the presence of a third party is not seen as conditional. The third group of 
definitions adopts a much wider view of corruption, including many different forms of 
wrongdoing by officials. All the negative aspects of bureaucracy can be included in these 
definitions.73 
 
The definition that is adopted by Huberts has two elements: bribing and favoritism. Corruption in 
the sense of bribing is defined, then, as the misuse of public power for private gain: asking, offering 
and accepting bribes. Corruption in the sense of nepotism, cronyism and patronage is defined as 
the misuse of public authority to favor friends, family or party.74 
 
Discussions on issues like corruption and integrity often mention that public officials travel down 
                                               
70 Green and Ward (2004), p. 13. 
71 Green and Ward (2004), p. 11.  
72 Nye (1967), p. 419. 
73 Huberts and Lasthuizen (2006), p. 4. 
74 Huberts (2007), p. 210. 
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the proverbial ‘slippery slope’. At first they commit minor offences or give small favors. As time 
goes by, they become involved in increasingly serious offences.75 In order to understand what is 
happening in this area, the concept of corruption (bribing and favoritism) has become too limited. 
 
 
2.4.2. Integrity: a definition 
 
The scientific debate about corruption has been broadened by focusing on a more encompassing 
concept: integrity. Definitions abound on this subject, formulated by public administration 
scientists around the world. It should be clear that integrity has a wider meaning than corruption. 
Huberts, in cooperation with many colleagues from the VU University, has done much research 
on integrity issues and, drawing from work by others such as Kaptein and Wempe, Benjamin, 
Lawton and Pollock, he formulated the following definitions: 
 
“In research on the integrity of governance, integrity can be defined as the quality of 
acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms, and rules. Integrity is a quality 
of individuals as well as of organizations. Additionally, ethics can be defined as the 
collection of values and norms, functioning as standards or yardsticks for assessing the 
integrity of one’s conduct. The moral nature of these values and norms refers to what is 
judged as right, just, or good conduct. Values are principles that carry a certain weight 
in one’s choice of action (what is good to do, or bad to refrain from doing). Norms 
indicate morally correct behavior in certain situations. Values and norms guide action 
and provide a moral basis to justify or evaluate what one does and who one is. It follows 
that integrity violations are defined here as violations of the relevant moral values, 
norms, and rules.”76 
 
Huberts also constructed a typology of integrity violations77:  
 
1) corruption: bribing 
misuse of public power for private gain; asking, offering, accepting bribes; 
2) corruption: nepotism, cronyism, patronage 
misuse of public authority to favor friends, family, party 
3) fraud and theft  
improper private gain acquired from the organization (with no involvement of external 
actors) 
4) conflict of (private and public) interest  
personal interest (through assets, jobs, gifts, etc.) interferes (or might interfere) with 
public interest 
5) improper use of authority (for noble causes) 
use of illegal/improper methods to achieve organizational goals (within the police, for 
example, illegal methods of investigation and disproportionate violence)   
6) misuse and manipulation of information 
lying, cheating, manipulating information, breaching confidentiality of information  
7) discrimination and sexual harassment  
misbehavior towards colleagues or citizens and customers  
8) waste and abuse of resources 
failure to comply with organizational standards, improper performance, incorrect or 
                                               
75 Kleinig (1996), Huberts and Lasthuizen (2006). 
76 Lasthuizen, Huberts and Heres (2011), p.387. 
77 Huberts (2007), p. 210. 
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dysfunctional internal behavior  
9) private time misconduct  
conduct in one's private time which harms the public’s trust in  
administration/government. 
 
Nevertheless, Huberts points out that we should be precise and careful. We should broaden our 
scope from corruption towards the broader concept of integrity, but we should not broaden the 
scope of integrity too much. Not all wrongdoings or mistakes qualify as integrity violations. If 
distinctions are not made clear, organizations will lose their moral compass when it comes to 
separating wrong from right. If every mistake were to be counted as an integrity violation and 
could lead to an investigation, employees will become fearful and paralyzed.78  
 
This line of thinking is also present in the dissertation at hand, as is evident from the previous 
paragraph on error management. This too has to do with the possibility that events might be 
wrongly labeled as integrity violations and that distinctions become blurred. Anechiarico and 
Jacobs have shown in ‘Pursuing absolute integrity’ that there can be serious problems for public 
administration and consequently for society if the concept of integrity becomes fuzzy and 
available for misuse.79 An overload of rules and regulations for safeguarding integrity can have 
crippling effects on the effectiveness and efficiency of governmental actions. Huberts referred 
to these kinds of situations as ‘integritism’, a situation in which attention to integrity is 
disproportionate.80  
 
 
2.4.3. Explanatory factors  
 
In ‘The Good Cause’, De Graaf, Maravic and Wagenaar brought together scientists from different 
disciplines to explore the subject of corruption and its causes.81 It was found that there is a multitude 
of approaches to corruption, evidenced by eight different schools of thought that were discussed 
in the book. The authors explained that corruption research reflects social science in general, 
where, contrary to the beta sciences, many paradigms exist at the same time. Corrupt behavior is 
connected to what is found to be socially acceptable. Since social acceptability is often contested 
even within fairly homogenic societies, universal consensus on the subject of corruption will be 
highly unlikely. 82 A stalemate between two opposing sides in corruption research is identified, 
between universalists, who believe in a universally applicable definition of corruption and 
particularists, who reject such a global definition and expect that corruption definitions will 
differ widely on account of differences between cultures or social worlds, trying to learn from 
the differences.83 The ideas of the social world are, then, so different that one interdisciplinary 
approach to corruption will probably not emerge. 
 
Identifying what causes corruption is fraught with difficulties, not least because in social 
science, causality itself is often the subject of intense debate. In the philosophy of causality, an 
epistemological and an ontological tradition were distinguished by Schinkel. In the 
epistemological tradition, a cause is the coinciding of phenomena where, because the cause 
always precedes the consequence, a belief exists that there is a cause. This kind of causality is 
                                               
78 Huberts (2007), p. 13. 
79 Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996). 
80 Huberts (2005). 
81 De Graaf, Von Maravic and Wagenaar (2010). 
82 De Graaf, Von Maravic and Wagenaar (2010), p. 213. 
83 De Graaf, Von Maravic and Wagenaar (2010), p. 214. 
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not present in corruption research, since no cause can be found that always coincides with the 
consequence ‘corruption’. According to the authors, this leads all too often to confuse 
correlation with causation. In the ontological tradition, causality is perceived as something that 
actually happened. In social science this is often hard to identify. Bourdieu has warned against 
ascribing intrinsic aspects to social phenomena since it would amount to naturalizing something 
that is socially constructed.84 De Graaf, Von Maravic and Wagenaar conclude that what some 
call ‘causes’ of corruption, others describe as ‘contributing factors’, ‘motives’, or ‘enhancing 
circumstances’. ‘Understanding’ corruption might then be more applicable than ‘explaining’ it.85  
 
This problem of causality was also discussed by Caiden, who mentioned several sources of 
corruption: psychological, ideological, external, economic, political, socio-cultural and 
technological. He pointed out that factors that contribute to corruption are not the same as causes 
of corruption.86 As De Graaf noted, there is a tension in corruption research between regarding 
actors as autonomous agents making rational calculations, and explaining corrupt behavior by 
causes beyond individual control. In this latter view, research into the context of corruption 
deserves more attention.87 
 
Although causes, motives or explanatory factors should then be regarded with some reservations, 
research has shown that there are often some relevant factors. A survey carried out among experts 
by Huberts in 1994 identified the following factors which can explain corruption:88  
 
1) lack of control mechanisms, supervision and audits 
2) growth of organized crime 
3) lack of commitment from leaders 
4) the culture of public administration 
5) close ties between the commercial sector, politicians and government 
6) the increasing importance of lobbying 
7) norms and values of individual politicians 
8) disorganization and mismanagement89 
 
De Graaf, Von Maravic and Wagenaar reached the following conclusion: 
 
“What this book clearly shows is that every approach sees different problems with 
corruption and has different solutions. Relevant contingencies prohibit us from testing 
what works under what conditions. Finding one clear solution remains an illusion. After 
reading all the chapters, it becomes clear that the theoretical model chosen to a large 
degree determines the direction of the proposed solutions. Different causal chains, or 
even ideas about causality, lead to different discourses on corruption prevention and 
corruption control. The logical consequence of multiple causes can only be multiple 
answers.”90 
 
 
 
                                               
84 De Graaf, Von Maravic and Wagenaar (2010), p. 9. 
85 De Graaf, Von Maravic and Wagenaar (2010), p. 213-214. 
86 Caiden (2001), p. 21-26. 
87 De Graaf (2007), p. 41. 
88 The factors listed were all named by at least 80% of the respondents to the survey. 
89 Van den Heuvel, Huberts and Verberk (1999), p. 27. 
90 De Graaf, Von Maravic and Wagenaar (2010), p. 221. 
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2.4.4. Responses to integrity violations and corruption  
 
Cases in which integrity violations and corruption occur often draw public attention. Van den 
Heuvel and Huberts studied the Peper affair, in which the cost declarations of the former mayor 
of Rotterdam, Bram Peper (at the time of the affair he was Minister of the Interior), were subject 
of investigation. Peper stepped down as a minister, but in the end, the Public Prosecution 
decided not to prosecute him over the matter. Van den Heuvel and Huberts attempted to draw 
lessons from the affair on how governmental organizations should react to cases of integrity 
violations. The management of integrity affairs, they argued, necessitated several steps to be 
taken by the governmental organization involved. Governmental credibility depends on the 
integrity of politicians, administrators and officials. Insight into the different elements of 
integrity investigations helps to prevent trouble. Van den Heuvel and Huberts identified the 
following steps: 
 
I. The beginning 
1. prevention is better than the cure: preventive measures 
2. the severity and the veracity of the suspicion or allegation should be assessed 
and examined 
3. openness about the further course of events in the integrity investigation 
II. The fact finding 
4. prompt and thorough independent investigation of the facts  
III. The assessment of the facts 
5. authoritative and independent assessment of the facts 
6. political judgment on the facts 
7. disciplinary and / or criminal judgment (sanctions) 
IV. Learning lessons 
8. consequences for politics, administration and civil service.91 
 
 
2.4.5. Content of this dissertation in relation to the subject 
 
For this dissertation, several elements from the literature on integrity and corruption will be 
included. 
 
Definitions (inset) 
 
Corruption in the sense of bribing: the misuse of public power for private gain: asking, 
offering and accepting bribes. 
Corruption in the sense of nepotism, cronyism and patronage: the misuse of public authority 
to favor friends, family or party. 
Integrity: the quality of acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms and rules.   
Values: principles that carry a certain weight in one’s choice of action (what is good to do, 
or bad to refrain from doing).  
Norms: indicate morally correct behavior in certain situation.  
 
Explanatory factors 
Several factors that have been described here offer possible explanations for integrity violations 
or corruption. The explanatory factors that are listed below, serve as inspiration for the 
explorative phase in conducting the case studies.  
                                               
91 Van den Heuvel and Huberts (2001), p. 1151-1156. 
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1) lack of control mechanisms, supervision and audits 
2) growth of organized crime 
3) lack of commitment from leaders 
4) the culture of public administration 
5) close ties between the commercial sector, politicians and government 
6) the increasing importance of lobbying 
7) norms and values of individual politicians 
8) disorganization and mismanagement 
 
Factors relevant to response (inset) 
When analyzing the responses of governmental organizations to cases in which they are 
connected to deaths and serious injuries, the factors identified by Van den Heuvel and Huberts 
will be taken into account.  
 
I. The beginning 
1. prevention is better than the cure: preventive measures 
2. the severity and the veracity of the suspicion or allegation should be assessed 
and examined 
3. openness about the further course of events in the integrity investigation 
II. The fact-finding 
4. prompt and thorough independent investigation of the facts  
III. The assessment of the facts 
5. authoritative and independent assessment of the facts 
6. political judgment on the facts 
7. disciplinary and / or criminal judgment (sanctions) 
IV. Learning lessons 
8. consequences for politics, administration and civil service. 
 
 
2.5. Organizational crime92  
 
2.5.1. Organizational crime: a definition  
 
Criminologists study several forms of crime. For this dissertation, the focus will be on crimes that 
involve organizations. The thinking about organizational crime has been influenced immensely by 
what the sociologist Sutherland called ‘white collar crime’. With this concept, Sutherland wanted 
to make clear that crimes were not committed only by people from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Crimes could also be committed by people who were not poor, had a happy family background 
and were mentally stable. People with a high social status should not be above suspicion. White 
collar crime according to Sutherland “may be defined approximately as a crime committed by a 
person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation.”93 This definition 
has been widely criticized (many found it vague), but it is still very often the starting point for 
discussions on white collar crime. The last part of that definition gave rise to a recognition that 
crimes can be committed while carrying out an assigned task, whether as an individual or as an 
organization. Three orientations on white collar crime can be identified. The first focuses on the 
type of offender (e.g., high socio-economic status and/or occupation of trust); the second lays 
the focus on the type of offense (e.g., economic crime) and the third focuses on the 
                                               
92 This paragraph is for a significant part based on ‘Tussen winst en moraal’ by Wim Huisman. 
93 Sutherland (1949), p. 9. 
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organizational culture rather than the offender or offense.94 
 
The debate on white collar crime made it possible to have a closer look at forms of crime that 
traditionally had not received much attention. Over the years, greater attention has been paid to 
corporate crime, focusing on criminal behavior by corporations95 and on organizational crime, 
where criminal behavior by organizations is the focus.96 That does not diminish the fact that 
criminology is still concerned with individual criminals, but there has been growing interest in the 
crimes committed by organizations and corporations.  
 
There are several schools of thought in criminology that try to find explanations for organizational 
crime. Theories that can be named are the neutralization theory, differential association, the social 
control theory, the opportunity theory, the strain theory, the subculture theory, labeling and the 
rational choice theory. Without discussing all these theories, it is possible to name three factors 
that are essential to all criminological theories: criminalization, motives and opportunities. 
Criminalization concerns why certain behavior is defined as being criminal. Motives and 
opportunities deal with why certain criminal behavior takes place. Huisman stated that every 
criminological theory says something about at least one of these three factors.97    
 
Huisman and Niemeijer have made a study of the literature on organizational crime. They 
concluded that battling organizational crime is hampered by several factors: 
 
- poor knowledge base within the police organization 
- administrative law is often overlooked as a possible instrument 
- law enforcement sometimes shows a cooperative attitude towards these kinds of 
rule breaking (collusion) 
- the priority assigned to tackling these forms of crime is low because they tend not 
to be regarded as serious crimes  
- only a limited number of cases are prosecuted, collection of evidence is difficult, 
organizations are often able to provide strong legal opposition and organizations 
often hold considerable power and influence.98 
 
 
2.5.2. Explanatory factors: rational choice, ignorance or unwillingness  
 
Huisman and Niemeijer identified three causes of organizational crime. Firstly rational choice: 
The perpetrator has weighed his options and rationally chooses to engage in criminal behavior. 
Secondly, ignorance can be a cause of crime: The perpetrator is unaware of certain rules and 
regulations or is incapable of working in such a way as to adhere to legal obligations. Finally, 
unwillingness to abide by the rules can be a cause: The perpetrator feels the laws and regulations 
are unfair or impossible to comply with. It was also found that organizational crime often 
involves breaking laws that aim to regulate socio-economic aspects, since these kinds of rules 
are often put in place for the very purpose of regulating organizational behavior.99 
 
 
                                               
94 Barnett (2000), p.1. 
95 Friedrichs (2010), p. 60., Huisman and Vande Walle (2010), p. 122. 
96 Huisman and Vande Walle (2010), p. 120-121. 
97 Huisman (2001), p. 122. 
98 Huisman and Niemeijer (1998), p. 43. Also see Friedrichs (2010). 
99 Huisman and Niemeijer (1998), p. 46. These regulations aim to protect specific interests, like safe labor conditions 
and consumer safety. 
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2.5.3. Explanatory factors: Coleman’s model  
 
Coleman, who stated that criminal behavior is the result of a combination of the appropriate motive 
and opportunity, developed an important model for white collar crime. That is to say: An 
organization must not only want to break the rules, it also has to be able to do so. The reverse is 
also true: The presence of an opportunity does not mean that every organization wants to make use 
of that opportunity. Coleman defined motives as “a set of symbolic constructions defining certain 
kinds of goals and activities as appropriate and desirable and others as lacking those qualities”. 
Opportunities were defined as “a potential course of action, made possible by a set of social 
conditions, which has been symbolically incorporated into an actor’s repertoire of behavioral 
possibilities.”100 Coleman described two kinds of motives. Firstly, the justifications and 
rationalizations that perpetrators use to justify their acts and secondly, motives that stem from what 
is called ‘the culture of competition’, the striving for wealth and success, and the fear of failure 
that comes along with it.101 Certainly, there are also normative restraints that counter this culture 
of competition. For governmental organizations, these restraints would stem from a belief in the 
public morals of good governance, for example.  
 
Attention to opportunities is found in the situational approach in criminology. The situation and 
the environment are seen as decisive for whether there is an opportunity to commit certain criminal 
acts.102 The situation can also be important for the kind of crime. For example, in explaining the 
sort of crimes committed by corporations, the nature of the work that the corporation delivers is 
important. An insurance company will be more likely to be involved in insurance fraud than in 
environmental crime. The opportunity theory can be characterized in a formula made by Felson: 
A criminal act is the combined result of the presence of a motivated perpetrator, the presence of 
an attractive target and the absence of adequate supervision. For corporate crime this formula can 
be illustrated by the following example: the presence of a motivated perpetrator (a company that 
wants to cut costs), the presence of an attractive target (the natural environment or a procedure that 
is susceptible to fraud) and the absence of adequate supervision (by police or government agencies 
or internal guardians, such as compliance officers). 
 
Coleman believed that for an organization, the attractiveness of any given opportunity for crime 
depends on several factors: 
1) the perception of the advantage that can be achieved by grabbing the opportunity 
2) the perception of the risks, such as the risk of being caught and the nature and 
  probability of a sanction 
3) whether grabbing the opportunity is compatible with the goals, norms and values 
of the organization (organizational strategy and organizational culture)  
4) the comparison with other opportunities of which the organization is aware103 
The attractiveness of any individual opportunity, therefore, depends on the entire opportunity 
structure for abiding by the law or for breaking the law. 
 
Coleman’s model supposed that variations in law-abiding behavior by organizations were 
dependent on the distribution of motives and opportunities. The characteristics of an organization 
must be examined more closely to be able to judge how this distribution would work in practice.  
 
“As strategic goals for the organization shift, the motivations for corporate crime reflect 
                                               
100 Coleman (1987), p. 409. 
101 Friedrichs (2010), p. 244. 
102 Benson and Simpson (2009). 
103 Coleman (1987), p. 424. 
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
30 
 
these adjustments. Likewise, changes in organizational structure adjust crime 
opportunities.”104  
 
For organizational crime, there are internal and external factors that influence possible criminal 
behavior. Internal factors (or organizational conditions) for corporations are the financial situation 
of the corporation, the organizational strategy, the organizational culture and the experience with, 
and knowledge of, the legal requirements and prohibitions. External factors (or contextual 
conditions) can be found in the political and administrative environment of the corporation as well 
as the business and the social environments of the organization. Customers, suppliers, creditors or 
action groups are relevant external factors. Other external factors include the nature of the sector 
or market in which an organization operates, the structure within the sector (the number of 
corporations, the size, differences in pricing and concentration of power), the applicable laws, 
permits and the system of supervision that is upheld by the government.105 
 
 
2.5.4. Explanatory factors: the model of Shover and Bryant  
 
Shover and Bryant developed a different model for explaining criminal behavior. They felt that 
two questions are crucial in criminological theory on organizational crime. Which factors account 
for the variation in the number of organizations that committed at least one criminal act in a certain 
period of time? And secondly, why do some organizations commit at least one criminal act in that 
period of time and others do not? Theories that focus on the first question are mostly concerned 
with the broader political, economic, social and judicial context in which corporations operate. The 
level at which these theories seek explanations was called the aggregate level by Shover and 
Bryant. Theories that are more concerned with the second question focus on organizational 
differences between corporations or differences in the relationship between a corporation and its 
immediate environment. This is called the firm level, the level of the corporation.  
 
Shover and Bryant distinguished five groups of factors at aggregate level that, taken together, make 
up the opportunity structure for organizational crime within a specific sector: government 
regulation of the sector, structures within the sector, the economic insecurity of the sector, the 
sectoral culture and the context of control (deterrence or consultation). At firm level, four 
organizational characteristics were distinguished that influence the risk that corporations make use 
of the criminogenic opportunities that are present at the aggregate level: the structural and 
procedural complexity of the corporation (organizational structure, size of the corporation), the 
amount of pressure on performance exerted by the personnel (organizational strategy, position in 
the market), the estimated negative consequences of criminal behavior (likelihood of being caught, 
sanctions) and the culture of the corporation (ethical climate, moral restraints, neutralization 
techniques).106 Just as in Coleman’s model, variations in organizational crime are dependent on the 
distribution of opportunities and risks throughout sectors and corporations.  
 
 
2.5.5. Explanatory factors: the models combined 
 
Motives and opportunities can be found on several aggregate levels: the micro-level of the 
individual employee or manager, the meso-level of the organization and the macro-level of the 
                                               
104 Simpson (1993), p. 86. 
105 Huisman (2001), p. 123-127. 
106 Huisman (2001), p. 128-129. 
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industry sector. 107 The macro-level perspective could include the nature of the sector and the 
governmental regulations on that market. The meso-level studies the organizational nature and its 
environment. The micro-level is important because in the end, it is individual managers or 
employees who engage in behavior that can be classified as criminal. It was argued by Huisman 
that organizational science shows that the organization plays a major role in shaping and directing 
the behavior of individuals within it. Employees take on certain roles within an organization. The 
organization creates the conditions under which this role is being implemented and by doing so 
provides for the ‘conditioning’ of the employee to his role. For this reason, a ‘classical’ approach 
focusing only on the socio-psychological motives of these employees cannot suffice in order to 
provide an adequate explanation.108 
 
Huisman was convinced that differences in corporate compliance with regulation are dependent 
on the distribution of motives and opportunities. That distribution is determined by the nature of 
the corporation and its environment. For this reason, he chose to focus on the meso perspective on 
the corporation and its environment.109 As Kramer put it:  
 
“Corporate crime is organizational crime, and explaining it requires an organizational 
level of analysis.”110  
 
Although it is not customary to think in such a way, it should be clear that organizations can have 
motives too. This is an anthropomorphic way of looking at organizations, which has led to some 
debate. On one side the argument is that employees come and go, but patterns in organizational 
behavior tend to remain. It is also pointed out that socialization processes can cause people within 
organizations to behave in a uniform way. That is why theories concerning criminal behavior by 
individuals can be applied to organizational behavior as well. On the other side it is argued that 
even when organizations are not just the sum of the individual employees, people still form the 
heart of the organizations. In this line of thinking, individual characteristics of managers and 
employees can be highly influential, also when combined with organizational factors.111 Huisman 
distinguished two kinds of motives for organizations: the motive to violate the law and the motive 
to comply with the law.  
 
Motives for violating the law are: 
- getting bigger profits 
- cutting costs because of the organization’s financial position 
- a wish to improve the position of the organization in the market 
- preferring another norm than the law strives for (for example employment over 
environmental concerns) 
 
Motives to comply with the law are: 
- long term survival of the organization (organizational strategy) 
- concern for the public image of the organization 
- demands by consumers or creditors 
- active support for the norm that the law has formulated (organizational culture).112 
 
                                               
107 Van de Bunt and Huisman (2007), p. 228. 
108 Huisman (2001), p. 129-130. 
109 Huisman (2001), p. 568. 
110 Kramer (1982). 
111 Muller and Van der Leun (2010), p. 231-232. 
112 Huisman (2001), p. 132. 
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If these motives are applied in the context of governmental bodies, some motives should be 
adjusted somewhat or combined. Governmental organizations are not primarily concerned with 
making a profit, but other types of financial concerns (cutting costs, staying within budget, 
avoiding financial claims for example) can be a motive. Markets are not the primary concern of 
governmental organizations, but the concern for the position of the governmental organization 
within government, and indeed within society, can play a role. That sits well with the concern for 
the long term survival of the organization and for public image. Demands by consumers or 
creditors can be replaced by the demands of politicians, citizens, special interest groups and the 
media. Organizational culture is more an opportunity (and formulated as such elsewhere) than a 
motive. These adjustments will be included in the list of explanatory factors that is given at the 
end of this paragraph.   
 
Huisman tried to connect organizational science with criminology in order to better explain 
corporate crime. Organizational science examines the organization and its characteristics. 
Criminology is concerned with motives and opportunities. Huisman related organizational 
characteristics to compliance or violation of rules, which he called a form of organizational 
criminology.113 Classical criminological thinking was aimed at individuals and informal groups, 
but not at organizations. Huisman studied corporations in the area of waste recycling in order to 
find out more about organizational criminology. Where criminology does address organizations, 
the focus is mainly on private companies and not on government and so a form of governmental 
criminology has yet to be developed. Government as a perpetrator of crimes is still largely 
unknown territory for many social scientists. In this dissertation, the motives outlined in this 
section will be combined with those mentioned earlier: rational choice, ignorance and 
unwillingness. These motives can be understood from the more individually oriented criminology 
and will be called primary motives. The motives that were discussed here (financial concerns, the 
position of the governmental organization, preferring another norm than the law strives for and 
demands by politicians, citizens, special interest groups and media) are more oriented towards 
organizations and organizational crime, these will be called secondary motives. 
 
 
2.5.6. Responses to organizational crime  
 
The response to organizational crime, corporate crime and white collar crime can be viewed from 
different angles. Law enforcement is obviously one reaction to crime committed by organizations, 
one for which the police and the Public Prosecution are responsible. Enforcement can take place 
by means of criminal law, administrative law and, at times, civil law.114 The classic criminal 
process is designed to provide a proper response to crime. The police investigate possible crimes, 
the Public Prosecution prosecutes and asks for sentencing, the judge gives a verdict. If the suspect 
is found guilty they are sentenced to prison and, on release from prison, probation officers keep in 
contact to facilitate the return of the offender to society.115 All these steps are frequently the subject 
of investigations by inspections, scientists, media, attorneys and interest groups. Next to law 
enforcement, Friedrichs identified regulatory systems, private policing and self-regulation as 
important responses to white collar crime.116 Friedrichs also advocated attempts to diminishing or 
eliminating motivations and conditions for committing these crimes, as well as transforming the 
                                               
113 Huisman (2001), p. 133. 
114 Huisman (2001), p. 165. 
115 See for instance Maguire, Morgan and Reiner (2012), The Oxford Handbook for Criminology, Fifth edition, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, Part V. 
116 Friedrichs (2010), p. 277-307. 
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ethical climate that helps to promote such crimes.117 
 
In a Dutch study of organizational crime, Van den Berg claimed that organizational crime is a 
form of behavior aimed at problem solving. This happens when the organization is motivated 
to make use of an opportunity to solve an emergent problem by using unlawful means. 
Rationalizations are needed at that time to reduce the severity and culpability of that behavior 
in the perception of the organization itself. Such rationalizations (which are meant to uphold 
the self-image of the organization as a ‘good’ organization) are called neutralizations. With 
reference to Coleman, Bryant and Shover, it is then claimed that the combination of these three 
elements (drivers, opportunities and neutralizations) is the basis for finding causes and 
explanations for organizational crime.  
 
Neutralizations concern both ‘being able’ (opportunities) and ‘being willing’ (drivers).118 Two 
main neutralizations are used by organizations when it comes to dealing with their own criminal 
behavior: denying the severity of the criminal act and denying culpability for the criminal act. 
Subneutralizations for denying severity are denying that damage will occur, denying the 
existence of a victim, reference to ‘higher loyalties’ (as described earlier by criminologist 
Braithwaite) and denial of the criminal character of the act. Subneutralizations for denying 
culpability are denial or shirking of responsibilities, emphasizing the ‘normality’ of the 
behavior, emphasizing the necessity of the behavior and ‘condemning the condemners’, that is 
blaming the investigating bodies, like police and Public Prosecution.119 These neutralizations 
then form inspiration for looking at responses by (public) organizations to their own criminal 
behavior.  
 
 
2.5.7. Content of this dissertation in relation to the subject  
 
Definitions 
The definitions inset emanate from criminology literature and will be adopted for the purposes 
of this dissertation.  
 
Criminalization: adoption by an organization of behavior that constitutes a violation of 
existing criminal law  
Motives: a set of symbolic constructions defining certain kinds of goals and activities as 
appropriate and desirable  
Opportunities: a potential course of action, made possible by a set of social conditions, that has 
been symbolically incorporated into an actor’s repertoire of behavioral possibilities. 
White collar crime: crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the 
course of his occupation   
Corporate crime: criminal behavior by corporations 
Organizational crime: criminal behavior by organizations  
 
Explanatory factors 
Several factors that have been described here offer possible explanations for white collar crime, 
corporate crime and/or organizational crime. The explanatory factors that are listed inset, serve 
as a basis for the explorative phase in conducting the case studies.  
 
                                               
117 Friedrichs (2010), p. 347. 
118 Van den Berg, Aldala and Beenakkers (2002), p. 67. Also see Friedrichs (2010), p. 237-238. 
119 Van den Berg, Aldala and Beenakkers (2002), p. 72-78. Also see Benson and Statler (2012). 
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Motives  
Primary motives: 
- rational choice 
- ignorance  
- unwillingness  
 
Secondary motives:  
- financial concerns (cutting costs, staying within budget, avoiding claims  
- etcetera) 
- the position of the governmental organization and its public image  
- preferring another norm than the law strives for (for example employment over 
environmental concerns) 
- demands by politicians, citizens, special interest groups and media 
 
Opportunities 
Opportunity structures for organizational crime within a specific area are translated to 
opportunity structures for the governmental organizations examined in the case studies of this 
dissertation: 
1) regulation for the government body involved 
2) the structure and size of the government body and the sector in which it operates 
3) the amount of pressure on performance applied by the personnel (organizational 
strategy, position in the market) 
4) the financial situation of the government body 
5) the culture of the government body and its environment (ethical climate, moral 
restraints, neutralization techniques). 
6) the context of control (deterrence, consultation, likelihood of being caught, 
sanctions) 
 
Factors relevant to response 
When analyzing the responses of governmental organizations to cases in which they are 
connected to deaths and serious injuries, the factors inset will be taken into account.  
 
 
Neutralizations 
Denying the severity of the criminal act 
      Subneutralizations: 
- denying that damage will occur  
- denying that there is a victim 
- reference to ‘higher loyalties’ and  
- denial of the criminal character of the act 
 
Denying culpability for the criminal act 
      Subneutralizations: 
- denial or shirking of responsibilities  
- emphasizing the ‘normality’ of the behavior  
- emphasizing the necessity of the behavior 
- ‘condemning the condemners’ 
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2.6. State crime  
 
2.6.1. Introduction   
 
Academic research on crime has traditionally focused on crimes by individuals or on organized 
crime. Crimes committed by organizations have received less attention and this certainly holds 
true for crimes committed by states. Nevertheless, state crime is a subject that has received a 
good deal of attention over the last two decades.120 Estimating how much research there has 
been depends greatly on how the research is labeled. The specific label ‘state crime’ is not used 
extensively, but this does not mean that there has not been widespread interest in forms of crime 
that might be defined as state crime or something very similar. On the contrary, it can be argued 
that there is extensive literature on subjects such as human rights violations (torture, executions, 
disappearances, and rape for example), humanitarian law and governmental abuse (fraud, 
corruption, illegal wiretapping, etc.).121  
 
“But one can quite confidently assert that the worst crimes – in terms of physical harm 
to human beings, abuse of civil liberties, and economic loss - have been committed by 
individuals and units acting in the name of the state, as the most consequential form of 
governmental crime. Quite conservative estimates attribute between 100 million and 135 
million deaths of human beings during the twentieth century alone to the deliberate 
actions of the state. The far larger proportion of these deaths resulted from genocide, 
massacres, and mass executions, rather than war. A large number of the inhabitants of 
the earth, then, have been killed during this century by government criminality.”122 
 
State crime researchers oppose legalistic definitions of crime, because legislators (the political 
elite) define what is criminal. As Chambliss stated: 
 
“The fact that some of the most serious social harms occurring in the twentieth century 
are not defined as crime makes the study of state crime in the global age even more 
urgent.”123 
 
Clearly, discussion about whether certain forms of behavior by states can be defined as criminal 
not only involves describing the behavior of states, but often encompasses moral or political 
components and is influenced by political perspectives, views on the role of the state, and by 
interpretation of human rights. As a result, the subject of state crime has come under fire for 
what critics call conceptual confusion. What exactly is state crime and what is the distinction 
between state crime and other related forms of crime?  
 
 
2.6.2. State crime: its various forms  
 
There are several different types of crime that receive attention in academic discourse and it is 
necessary to clarify the position of state crime in this discourse. According to Ross, states will 
define as political crimes any behavior perceived as a threat, real or imagined, to the state’s 
survival, including both violent and non-violent opposition. A consequence of the 
                                               
120 Ross (2000), Green and Ward (2004), Bojarski (1997), Weiss (1995), Kauzlarich (2003), Chambliss (1989), Tilly 
(1985). 
121 Weiss (1995), p. 520. 
122 Friedrichs in: Ross (2000), p. 54-55. 
123 Rothe and Mullins (eds.), (2011), p. viii. 
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criminalization of this opposition may be that a wide range of basic rights and freedoms will be 
restricted. Conduct which would not normally be considered criminal is criminalized in the 
interests of the group holding power.124 
 
Friedrichs argues that we should not speak of state crime, but of governmental crime.125 
Governmental crime, as a term, can be applied to crimes committed at any level within a 
governmental context and is not restricted to crimes on behalf of the (federal) state. Understood 
in this way, the governmental context includes the state, but can also refer to the administrative 
apparatus of smaller political entities, such as municipalities. The term governmental crime is 
therefore broader than the term state crime that applies to activities carried out by or on behalf 
of the state.  
 
Friedrichs also introduced the term political white-collar crime, which applies to illegal 
activities carried out by officials and politicians for direct personal benefit.  
 
“Governmental crime does indeed have a close generic relationship with white collar 
crime carried out by corporations, professionals, retailers and others. The parties 
involved have a respectable status, occupy a position of trust, are most typically middle 
or higher income and do not regard themselves as criminals. There are also, as 
indicated, many interrelationships and interlocks between the public (governmental) 
and private (corporate and business) sectors. It is clear that there is a symbiotic 
relationship between much governmental and traditional white collar crime as well as 
a mutual interdependence.”126  
 
Political white-collar crime is often motivated, as is much of white-collar crime, by the desire 
for financial benefit. The extension or maintenance of power plays a much larger role in 
political white-collar crime, and is central to governmental crime.127 In addition, when violence 
occurs as an element of state crime it is likely to be much more direct than the violence of 
corporate crime.128 
 
Friedrichs points out that the matter of governmental crime is related to two central themes in 
political philosophy: the nature of a legitimate political order and the nature of the obligation 
to comply with the laws and commands emanating from a political order. A non-legitimate 
political order (like a dictatorship established by force) could be regarded as inherently criminal, 
making many of its undertakings appropriately labeled as criminal acts. However, a political 
order can be considered illegitimate by criteria other than the manner in which power was 
obtained (for example the Nazi state, which came into power by legitimate means). The second 
theme (the obligation to comply with laws) is also sometimes challenged by the idea that in 
some circumstances there is a moral obligation to disobey laws. The former apartheid laws in 
South Africa or the civil disobedience by Gandhi and Martin Luther King are examples.129  
 
Within the subject of state crime, another possible distinction is made between state-initiated, 
state-facilitated and state-corporate crimes. State-initiated crime is defined as an explicit and 
distinct action by a state that violates law or produces social injury for the furtherance of its 
                                               
124 Ross (2003) and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_crime (Date last accessed: 18-02-2013). 
125 Friedrichs, in: Ross (2000), p. 74. 
126 Friedrichs, in: Ross (2000), p. 58-59. 
127 Chambliss (1989). 
128 Kauzlarich, Kramer and Smith (1992). 
129 Friedrichs, in: Ross (2000), p. 60-61. 
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organizational goals. State-facilitated crimes are implicit actions or inactions by the state that 
allow social injury, harm, or violations of law to take place. State-corporate crime is defined as 
those criminal acts that occur when one or more institutions of political governance pursue a 
goal in direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic production and distribution. 
The concept of state-corporate crime thus attempts to examine how corporations and 
governments intersect to produce social harm.130  
 
The term state-corporate crime was introduced by Kramer and Michalowski.131 Their definition 
included all “socially injurious acts” and not merely those that are defined by the local criminal 
jurisdiction as crime.132 These kind of broad definitions, which not only include crimes but 
focus on social aspects as well, are characteristic of many state crime scholars. It is also a source 
of criticism, as these broad definitions feed the criticism of conceptual confusion that is often 
bestowed on state crime scholars. 
 
 
2.6.3. State crime: a definition 
 
An extensive description of state crime was given by Ross:  
 
“State crime refers to a wide range of illicit activities, including cover-ups, corruption, 
disinformation, unaccountability, and violations of domestic and/or international laws. 
It also includes those practices that, although they fall short of being officially declared 
illegal, are perceived by the majority of the population as illegal or socially harmful. 
Moreover, many of these actions are connected to violations of fundamental human 
rights, as defined by the multilateral agreements, international organizations and 
national constitutions in countries where the rule of law is a central feature of the 
political system. This definition recognizes that legal systems are highly normative, slow 
to enact legislation, and often reflect elite, upper-class, or nonpluralistic interests.”133 
 
It is characteristic of state crime literature that the subject is defined very broadly. Both violation 
of criminal laws and socially harmful behavior are included. Human rights are often mentioned, 
as well as adherence to international law. Definitions of state crime also often harbor anti-
establishment views and criticism of capitalist systems:  
 
“We define the thug state as government managed by elite interests that uses domestic 
surveillance and armed force to dominate the poor and working class. Agents of state 
power behave as thugs when they operate as rogues and scoundrels violating the law, 
exercise power illegally or exclusively represent elite interests.”134 
 
And a strong moral component is common in the literature: 
 
“State crimes are the most serious of all crimes; they belong in a category of their own, 
beyond Dante’s ‘Ninth Circle’ where the betrayers of their own kindred cause the devil 
himself to weep tears of bewilderment.”135 
                                               
130 Kauzlarich et al., (2003) and Kramer et al., (2002). This subject has been dealt with extensively in the Netherlands 
with the concept of ‘collusion’ by Van den Heuvel (1998). 
131 Kramer and Michalowski (1990). 
132 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State-corporate_crime (Date last accessed: 18-02-2013). 
133 Ross (1995). Controlling state crime. First edition. New York: Garland Publishing, p. 6-7. 
134 Ross (2000), p. 32.   
135 Jørgensen (2000), preface. 
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Yet there are also definitions that do not possess those characteristics and that present a less 
normative approach: 
 
“State crimes are illegal activities performed by individuals invested with public 
power.”136  
Factors other than the moral component contribute to the difficulty in defining state crime.137 
This is illustrated by Sharansky in his article ‘A state action may be nasty but it is not likely to 
be a crime’. He argued that the term ‘state crime’ is obsolete for two reasons. First, since the 
state has legislative power, it can decide for itself what it defines as criminal. In essence, the 
state has the ability to extract itself from the umbrella of the definition. Secondly, the term ‘state 
crime’ has been overused in the academic debate, which has deprived the term of any or all of 
its meaning.138  
The first argument is supported by Green and Ward. They claim that the criteria for determining 
whether a state is ‘deviant’ will draw on international norms and standards of behavior for 
achieving the state’s usual operating goals. One of those standards will be whether the state 
respects human rights in the exercise of its powers. However, one of the definitional difficulties 
is that the states themselves define what is criminal within their own territories, and as sovereign 
powers, they are not accountable to the international community unless they submit to 
international jurisdiction generally, or criminal jurisdiction in particular.  
Deviance is defined by Green and Ward as follows: 
“An act is deviant when there is a social audience that (1) accepts a certain rule as a 
standard of behavior, (2) interprets the act (or similar acts of which it is aware) as 
violating the rule, and (3) is disposed to apply significant sanctions –that is significant 
from the point of view of the actor – to such violations.”139 
They claim that the central concepts of criminology, such as deviance, motivation, opportunity 
structures, control and labeling, can be applied to organizations just as well as to individuals. 
State deviance, then, is but one category of organizational deviance, along with others like 
corporate and organized crime.140 Green and Ward then give the following definition of state 
crime: ‘state organizational deviance involving the violation of human rights.’141 As mentioned 
earlier, elements of the definition commonly refer not only to crime, but also to socially harmful 
behavior, human rights, international law and anti-establishment views. The obvious normative 
standards to adopt might appear to be those of domestic and international law. Some, like Green 
and Ward, find this too legalistic. Human rights and the guiding principles underlying those 
rights are then often mentioned as reference points. Some even go as far as to state that social 
harm is a form of state crime. In this line of argument, theories about the capitalist state are 
often incorporated by authors with Marxist or socialist views.142 
                                               
136 Della Porta and Vannucci, in: Ross (2000), p. 149. 
137 Weiss (1995). 
138 Sharansky, in: Ross (2000), p. 36. 
139 Green and Ward (2004), p. 4. 
140 Green and Ward (2004), p. 5. 
141 Green and Ward (2004), p. 2. 
142 See for instance Green and Ward (2004), p. 8: “Since much of our analysis is influenced by Marx we shall, 
however, briefly explain why we do not see a contradiction between Marxism and advocacy of human rights.”  
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Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews attempt to unify the different definitions of state crime and 
note that state crime should be seen as a continuum with the following elements: 
 
1. Generates harm to individuals, groups, and property 
2. Is a product of action or inaction on behalf of the state or state agencies 
3. The action or inaction relates directly to an assigned or implied trust/duty 
4. Is committed, or omitted, by a governmental agency, organization or representative 
5. Is done in the self-interest of (a) the state itself or (b) the elite groups controlling 
the state143 
 
It is argued that state crime complicity can be placed on this continuum: commission-omission 
behavior and implicit-explicit policy.144 This continuum has a very broad range: It goes from 
social inequality through bureaucratic failure to unethical experiments and genocide.145 The 
following definition of state crime is in line with this theory: 
 
“illegal or socially injurious acts of omission or commission by individuals in an 
institution of political governance for the attainment of a state or state agencies 
operational goals.” 
 
Kauzlarich, Matthews and Miller give the following summary of the definitions: 
 
“While the labels differ (e.g. political crime, government crime, state organized crime), 
most scholars working in the area agree that governmental or state crimes are illegal, 
socially injurious, or unjust acts which are committed for the benefit of a state or its 
agencies, and not for the personal gain of some individual agent of the state.”146 
 
 
2.6.4. Who are the perpetrators?  
 
Since the state is an abstract concept, who, exactly, are the perpetrators of state crime? It is clear 
that ‘the state’, or ‘the government’ for that matter, does not always act as one single unitary 
body. The state consists of a collection of institutions, which do not by definition share the same 
goals or interests. Many different levels can be distinguished in the state apparatus, even more 
so when we discuss governmental crime instead of state crime. The organizational goal served 
by an act is not always similar to the individual motive of the actor.  
 
“For example, a soldier in war may commit rape purely for reasons of personal 
gratification but still contribute to organizational goals such as demoralizing the enemy 
or promoting ‘ethnic cleansing’. The organizational goal may be of little importance to 
the soldier himself, but may be an important reason for his comrades and superiors to 
turn a blind eye to his action.”147  
 
In general, it is believed that state crimes can be committed by the organization of the state or 
government, by elected officials and by civil servants. Depending on the definition of state 
crime, these organizations or persons can be viewed as possible perpetrators of state crime.  
                                               
143 Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003), p. 244-246.  
144 Green and Ward (2004), in the same way Ross (1995). 
145 Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003), p. 247.  
146 Kauzlarich, Matthews and Miller (2001), p. 175. 
147 Green and Ward (2004), p. 6. 
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2.6.5. What kind of criminal behavior?  
 
Spinellis identifies four categories of offences: 
 
1) Offences which constitute violations of the basic rules of the struggle for power and 
the political game 
2) Offences which violate the human rights of the citizens (sometimes to seize and 
maintain political power) 
3) Offences of corruption or economic scandals 
4) Offences which are committed by a politician in office148 
 
In an article on the involvement of the Australian government in a counter insurgency campaign 
carried out by the Papua New Guinea (PNG) state on the island of Bougainville, Laslett shows 
that state crime can present itself in more indirect and ‘sophisticated’ ways. Strategic foreign 
policy goals seemed paramount to the Australians and were followed up by intelligence 
activities on the island, to exert maximum influence on the PNG government. The goal was to 
provide an extensive assistance package (money, weapons and personnel), while giving the 
PNG government the feeling that they were in the lead. A Socratic approach was used, as 
evidenced by an interview with an Australian government official:  
 
“You would sit down, if you were with Ben [Sabumei the Defense Minister], you’d say 
‘gee things aren’t going too well in Bougainville, tell me about the problems’. ‘Well, we 
have been looking at that too. We wondered whether maybe a bit of extra training here 
[would help], and we noticed you have a limitation in equipment, would you think some 
extra this and that would help enhance your capability’. So you know you’d go through 
that, and by the time you had finished the discussions over a couple of days of gentle 
probing, you’d come up with a list and you could say at the end of it, ‘well I reckon Ben 
that were we to do this, and contribute this, and make this happen, you’d probably be 
more comfortable about your ability to handle the Bougainville situation, is that right?’ 
‘Yes’. ‘Oh ok what do you reckon we try and organize a meeting between Ministers’.”149 
 
According to Lasslett, the result of Australia’s assistance package was that the PNG army had 
the resources and equipment to carry out a large counterinsurgency campaign from 1989 to 
1991. During this campaign, human rights were allegedly violated on a large scale, for example 
by the bombing of civilian targets. Detention centers for insurgents were called ‘care centers’ 
and were routine sites for torture, sexual assault and executions, according to Amnesty 
International. The Australian government has continuously insisted that they have always 
supported a peaceful resolution of the conflict on Bougainville.  
 
It is characteristic of state crime literature that the cases used to illustrate state crime are often 
scandals, or severe violations of human rights. The Holocaust, war crimes by Saddam Hussein, 
the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior by the French government, the police beating of Rodney 
King, the genocide in Rwanda, corruption by well-known politicians: Usually cases are 
examined that have had high impact on society and caused serious public concern. Empirical 
data about the prevalence of different forms of state crime are rarely found. What is clear is that 
the denominator ‘state crime’ can encompass active behavior in the form of genocide, torture, 
war crimes, corruption etcetera. It can also include failure to act by the governmental 
organizations, for example lackluster law enforcement. 
                                               
148 Bojarski (1997), p. 174. 
149 Lasslett (2012), p. 713-714.  
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2.6.6. Explanatory factors  
 
While offering many valuable insights into the nature of state crime, state crime literature does 
not provide much empirical research material. While it is claimed that state crime is not a 
collection of anecdotal incidents150, little statistical information can be found on the extent to 
which governments engage in criminal behavior and why they do so. However, Ward and Green 
have identified a number of explanatory factors, which they partly collected from criminology 
literature (and is therefore quite similar to the earlier findings on organizational crime). 
 
These factors are: 
- the role of individuals (e.g. the connection between individual public officials and 
      corporations) 
- institutional frameworks (organizational goals, reputation, culture, etc.) 
- political-economic framework (e.g. debts, export position) 
- motivation (emphasis on goal attainment, goals of capital accumulation) 
- opportunity structure 
- lack of control151 
 
 
2.6.7. Responses to state crime 
 
The response to state crime is complex. Two questions present themselves. Who, exactly, could 
and should be held responsible? How can state crime be controlled? It is also interesting to note 
how states themselves generally react to accusations of state crime. The first question is how 
responsibility is determined or, to put it plainly, ‘who gets the blame?’ This question can lead 
to a complicated discussion about the relation between the agent, the person delegated to take 
decisions, and the principal on whose behalf that agent acts.152 It is further complicated by the 
fact that governmental organizations could be subject to criminal law. Criminal law systems 
have traditionally focused on determining the liability of individual crime-perpetrators and it 
could be argued that attributing collective or organizational liability for crimes runs counter to 
traditional western law enforcement tradition. In this context, the idea of the state or government 
is even more problematic. For example, it is argued that by punishing the state, its citizens, who 
may not have taken any part in the crime, will be unjustly punished or that it is impossible to 
identify the persons who are ultimately responsible.153  
 
Public agents in democratic systems are supposed to act on behalf of the collectivity. In order 
to limit potential conflicts between the private interests of the agent (elected politicians or 
functionaries) and the interests of the principal (the public), democracies around the world have 
created fixed and verifiable procedures, which restrict the discretional powers of the agent.  
 
“One can speak of state crime, then, when the procedural or political constraints placed 
on public agents by legislation, customary practice, or international law are violated in 
order to favor the private interests of the agent or of specific organizations or groups. 
These illegal activities imply a failure to respect the (implicit or explicit) contract 
foreseeing the delegation of public responsibilities to the public agent who perpetrates 
                                               
150 Ross (2000), p. 31. 
151 Green and Ward (2004), p. 42-51. 
152 Della Porta and Vannucci, in: Ross (2000), p. 149. 
153 Van der Wilt (2005), p. 6-8. 
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state crime.”154  
 
Not only is criminal liability often difficult to determine, it can also be confused with political 
liability and the two must be distinguished. In democratic societies, political liability is a key 
issue in judging the actions of politicians. Criminal liability is usually well-defined, while 
political liability is often more ambiguous.155  
 
The question who should be held responsible for state crimes, is often fiercely debated. This is 
not only a question for politicians and the media, but amongst academics there is a lack of 
consensus on the guiding principles that should determine liability for state crimes. A second 
issue is the extent to which, if at all, state crime can be controlled. Often state crimes are 
revealed by an investigative news agency and lead to scandals. However, from state crime 
literature it is clear that, even among first world democratic states, it is difficult to maintain 
genuinely independent control over the criminal enforcement mechanisms. Few senior officers 
of the state are held personally accountable. When the citizens of second and third world 
countries, which may be of a more authoritarian nature, seek to hold their leaders accountable, 
the problems become more acute. Public opinion, media attention and public protests, whether 
violent or nonviolent, may all be criminalized as political crimes and suppressed, while critical 
international comments are of little real value. Chambliss states that any government operation 
that is shielded from the public and hidden from Congressional oversight over a long period of 
time, will inevitably become reliant on criminal activity to support and fund the operation. 
Covert operations provide the perfect setting for organized criminal activity simply because 
they are clandestine operations conducted with state sanction.156  
 
That leads us to the final issue of state response. It is clear that the debate starts with the question 
whether there can be such a thing as state crime as it is the state itself which defines something 
as criminal.157 It might be expected that the first reaction by the state would be to flatly deny 
that any act of omission or commission by the state can be criminal. If that were the case, the 
discussion would stop at the first hurdle. The second type of response is in line with the 
recognition of the more limited role government takes in modern society (referred to as the 
‘retreat of the state’). Here the response is to say that government is but one of the actors. For 
the state, it can be attractive to point the finger at others: companies, citizens, international 
organizations or other countries. This type of response underlines the difficulty described earlier 
of determining responsibility and of effectively controlling state crime. The response by the 
Australian government on the Bougainville case (‘we have always supported a peaceful 
solution’) that was mentioned before158 is a case in point.  
 
 
2.6.8. Content of this dissertation in relation to the subject 
 
Definitions 
 
State crime: illegal or socially injurious acts of omission or commission carried out by  
individuals in an institution of political governance and aimed at the attainment of a state’s 
or state agency’s operational goals. 
                                               
154 Della Porta and Vannucci, in: Ross (2000), p.150. 
155 Bojarski (1997), p.174. 
156 Chambliss (1986). 
157 Sharansky, in: Ross (2000), p. 36. 
158 Lasslett (2012). 
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Explanatory factors 
Several factors that have been described here offer possible explanations for state crime. The 
explanatory factors (inset), serve as a basis for the explorative phase in conducting the case 
studies.  
 
 
x the role of individuals (e.g. the connection between individual public officials 
and corporations) 
x institutional frameworks (organizational goals, reputation, culture, etc.) 
x political-economic framework (e.g. debts, export position) 
x motivation (emphasis on goal attainment, goals of capital accumulation) 
x opportunity structure 
x lack of control 
 
 
Factors relevant to response 
When analyzing the responses of governmental organizations to cases in which they are 
connected to deaths and serious injuries, the factors inset will be referred to.  
 
 
 
x determining responsibility for state crimes is difficult since 
 - the state is composed of many different organizations and individuals with 
segmented tasks and responsibilities 
 - the state itself can define what is considered criminal 
 - law enforcement systems are traditionally oriented to individuals and not to 
 organizations, least of all the state itself 
 - criminal liability can be confused with political liability 
x controlling state crime is difficult, as independent control over law enforcement 
mechanisms can be problematic when it concerns the state itself 
x denial of criminal activity and pointing to other potentially responsible parties 
are responses to be expected.  
 
 
 
2.7. Unmasking administrative evil  
 
2.7.1. Different perspectives on evil  
 
Evil is a word with strong connotations. Before discussing ‘Unmasking administrative evil’ by 
Adams and Balfour, the subject of evil will be introduced by examining what philosophers, 
sociologists and psychologists have written on this broad, yet intriguing, subject. 
 
 
2.7.1.1. What philosophers say about evil: Neiman and Bernstein  
 
By examining the way important philosophers have treated the subject, Susan Neiman has traced 
how the thinking about evil has developed in the course of history. Neiman states that the problem 
of evil is the guiding force of modern thought. This is a bold claim for many, as the problem of 
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evil is often described not as a philosophical problem, but rather a theological one. The central 
question in this theological view is how a good God can create a world in which innocent people 
suffer. In this view, ‘good’ and ‘evil’ originated in the Fall of Adam and Eve from Paradise. 
Bernstein in his book ‘The abuse of evil’ also examines the history of evil, signaling that the 
question of evil has always attracted attention. He, too, pointed to the religious connotation, 
saying the question has often been how we can reconcile the existence of evil with a belief in a 
loving God. The book of Job in the Bible deals extensively with the question of evil and 
Bernstein states that evil has been closely associated with suffering – especially suffering for 
which there does not seem to be any meaning or justification.159  
 
Neiman distinguished between natural and moral evil. This distinction was made relevant by the 
Lisbon earthquake in 1755, which at that time sparked a philosophical debate in much the same 
way as 9/11 did in recent times. How to comprehend this form of evil that destroyed an entire city 
and thousands of its inhabitants? Kant, Voltaire and Rousseau quarreled over the subject. Natural 
evil seemed to refer to evil in which human action has played no role, whereas moral evil, as 
perceived by Kant, linked evil to the intentions of the human beings. Where Lisbon can be seen as 
the exemplary case of natural evil, Auschwitz could be seen as the exemplary case of moral evil. 
However, the debate is more complicated than that, and Arendt doubted in ‘The banality of evil’ 
that this evil was nothing but the result of rational thinking by calculating human beings. 
 
Neiman divided philosophers into two groups: those who believed that there is another, better, 
truer order than the one we experience (Leibniz, Pope, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx) and those 
who believed that what our senses confront us with is all there is (Bayle, Voltaire, Hume, de Sade 
and Schopenhauer). The first group could be seen as the optimists, the second as the pessimists. 
Nietzsche and Freud are placed outside of this dichotomy.  
 
In the 18th century Rousseau “replaced theology with history”, Neiman argued, by suggesting 
that evil and suffering were the results not of original sin but of error and misguided civilization. 
Later, Hegel turned history into theodicy by explaining all suffering and evil as unavoidable 
elements of an evolutionary process. Marx responded with an economic theodicy - an account 
of societies and their evils - complete with prescriptions for healing suffering. Freud turned 
inward, tracing evil and suffering to thwarted infantile desires and to civilization's inevitable 
discontents. 
 
Neiman concluded that the problem of evil can be expressed in theological or secular terms, but 
is fundamentally a problem about the intelligibility of the world as a whole. It is therefore 
neither purely an ethical nor purely a metaphysical question. The optimists insist that morality 
demands that we make evil intelligible, the pessimists insist that morality demands that we 
don’t. In essence, Neiman believed that the way we define evil says something about the way 
we view our world.160 
 
 
2.7.1.2. What sociologists say about evil: Bauman  
 
The work of sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has been highly influential for Adams and Balfour. In 
fact, it would be fair to state that ‘Unmasking Administrative Evil’ takes the work of Bauman as a 
starting point for many of its key notions. In ‘Modernity and the Holocaust’, Bauman argued that 
the Holocaust was not a case of wicked and evil men, innocent bystanders and harmless victims, 
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nor was it ‘typically German’. Instead, he argued that the Holocaust should be analyzed in terms 
of Modernity, the era in which this genocide took place. Bauman quoted Rubenstein to prove his 
point:  
 
“Civilization brings slavery, exploitation and mass destruction camps. It also brings 
spiritual hygiene, exalted religious ideas, fine arts and delicate music. It is a mistake to 
think that civilization and fierce cruelty are opposites. Creation and destruction are 
inseparable aspects of what we call civilization.”161 
 
In fact, it has been argued that modern bureaucracy was a condition sine qua non for the Holocaust. 
According to Bauman, the rational world of modern civilization made the Holocaust possible. 162   
The fundamental elements of Weber’s bureaucracy (rational mentality, the principle of 
effectiveness, the scientific mentality, the referral of values to the realms of subjectivity) did not 
contain any mechanism that would have been able to exclude the possibility of the Nazis’ excesses. 
Rather, the modern age is preoccupied with a belief that science can and will solve all problems 
that are viewed through a rational lens. The victory of ratio over feeling, and the consequent belief 
that all problems can and will be solved if only the right policy is chosen, represent a dominant 
view of modern society that is too seldom questioned. Bauman called this ‘the gardening state’, 
which considers society as something that can be designed, cultivated and from which the weeds 
can be removed.  
 
Bauman goes on to propose that the Holocaust should be considered a rare, but significant and 
reliable testing of the hidden potential of modern society. One of the most devastating lessons that 
can be drawn from the Holocaust is that the choice for physical extermination as the appropriate 
method to make the German Reich ‘Judenfrei’ was the result of routine bureaucratic procedures: 
consideration of goals and means, budget administration, the application of general laws and 
procedures. Even more clearly: this choice was the consequence of efforts to come up with rational 
solutions for the ‘problems’ that kept occurring under constantly changing circumstances. The 
choice was partly influenced by the abundantly described bureaucratic impulse to shift the goals – 
a disease that is as commonly spread in bureaucracies as are their routines.  
 
Bauman does not contend that all this must have led inevitably to the Holocaust. Rather he states 
that the rules of instrumental rationality are exceptionally poorly equipped to prevent such things 
from happening. More than that, modern bureaucracy has increased the possibility of the 
Holocaust happening, as it holds the capacity to coordinate the goal-oriented behavior of large 
numbers of people, even when the goal is immoral. Bauman states that bureaucracy is capable of 
genocide. But to actually start the process of genocide another feature of modernity must manifest 
itself: a daring plan for a social order that is better, more reasonable and more rational, combined 
with the capacity to develop such plans and the determination to carry them out.163 
 
How did the perpetrators overcome their moral inhibitions against committing violent acts? There 
are three conditions (either alone or in combination) for this: the violence is authorized (by official 
orders from the competent authorities), the acts have a routine character (by means of 
predetermined acts and clearly defined roles) and the victims of the violence are dehumanized (by 
                                               
161 Bauman (1989), p. 28. 
162 This view has been criticized, for example by Pinker, who stated that the idea that the Holocaust was a product of 
the Enlightenment is ludicrous. Pinker argued that the Nazi ideology was in fact antirational, championing ideals 
of a vital, spontaneous life, unhindered by compromises or dilemmas. Pinker, (2011), p. 782-783. It should be 
noted here that making something possible (Bauman’s point) is different from a direct causal relation in the sense 
of A being the product of B (Pinker’s view).  
163 Bauman (1989), p. 136. 
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ideological definitions and indoctrination).164 It is central to this overcoming of moral inhibitions 
that the individual moral is supplanted by a moral of obedience to the organization. The individual 
feels that they are part of a larger organization in which their superiors relieve them from their 
moral responsibility, as long as the individual acts in accordance with the organizational rules and 
framework and the orders of their superiors. Bauman quoted Hilberg: 
 
“One should realize that most participants of the genocide did not shoot at Jewish children 
with rifles or turn on the gas in the gas chambers. Most bureaucrats wrote memos, drew 
up blueprints, made telephone calls and attended conferences. From behind their desks, 
they wiped out an entire nation.”165  
 
It was difficult to pinpoint the causal relationship between their deeds and the genocide. Little evil 
was seen in the natural human impulse to worry no more than strictly necessary – and thereby 
abstain from examining the long chain of cause and effect right up to its last connection. 
 
Distance is an important aspect in modern society. There is significant distance between the 
intention and the practical act and the space in between is filled with many small acts and 
insignificant actors. The ‘person in between’ hampers the sight of the actor on the effects of his 
own behavior.  
 
“Without first-hand knowledge of their behavior even the best people live in a moral 
vacuum; the abstract recognition of evil is neither a reliable guide nor an adequate motive. 
We should not be surprised if immense and largely unintentional cruelties are committed 
by people of good will. Remarkably enough, we are not incapable of recognizing evil deeds 
or great injustice as such. We are surprised, however, that this could have taken place 
while each of us performed completely innocent acts. … It is hard to accept that often there 
is no person or group who designed or caused all of this. It is even harder to realize how 
our own behavior has indirectly contributed to the inflicting of pain.”166  
 
Dehumanization is an important aspect in overcoming moral inhibitions to commit violent acts. 
Bauman showed that making the victim invisible (putting him at a distance) greatly enhances the 
capacity to inflict pain and suffering. The dehumanization starts when the objects on which the 
bureaucratic organization directs its attention can be reduced to a number of quantitative measures. 
If people, like other objects of bureaucratic government, can be reduced to featureless proportions, 
they lose their distinguishing characteristics. They are already dehumanized in such a way that the 
language that is used to describe them protects the people who speak it from any ethical 
implications.  
 
“People, things, events are ‘programmed’; they are ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’, feedback loops, 
variables, percentages, processes, etc., until every contact with concrete situations has 
become abstract. Then all that is left are charts, collections of statistics, print copies.”167 
 
Only people can be the object of ethical statements. Once people are reduced to numbers, they lose 
this capacity.168  
                                               
164 Bauman (1989), p. 42. The point of dehumanization is also an important point for Adams and Balfour, which will 
be discussed later in this paragraph.  
165 Bauman (1989), p. 45. 
166 Bauman (1989), p. 46. This too is an important point in Unmasking Administrative Evil.  
167 Bauman (1989), p. 146-147. 
168 Bauman (1989), p. 132. 
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Bauman referred extensively to the famous Milgram experiment169, in which participants were 
asked to deliver electric shocks to experimental subjects to see how far they would be prepared to 
go. The Milgram experiment showed several conclusions that were relevant for Bauman’s subject 
matter: 
1) Cruelty holds little, if any, connection to the personal characteristics of the 
perpetrators, but is strongly correlated with relationships of authority and submission. 
Power and obedience are important variables here. 
2) Inhumanity is a matter of social relations. If these relations are rationalized and 
technically perfected, so is the capacity for, and the efficiency of, the social production 
of inhumanity.   
3) The willingness to commit cruelties is directly related to the distance of the 
perpetrator from the victim: the farther away, the more willing. This is enhanced if the 
victim belongs to a group of people in which he can be depersonalized. It is 
psychologically easy to ignore responsibility if you are but a small part of a larger 
chain that delivers an evil deed and situated some distance from where the eventual 
consequences of the act come to the surface.170 
 
Bauman states that the organization as a whole thus serves as an instrument to erase responsibility. 
The causal connections between coordinated actions are masked. It is the fact that they are masked 
that makes them so effective.171 Bauman acknowledges that the fact that the Holocaust is a 
modern phenomenon does not mean that modernity is the Holocaust. The Holocaust is a by-
product of the modern urge to create a completely designed, fully controlled world only when 
that urge becomes uncontrollable and goes adrift. In most cases modernity is prevented from 
doing this as pluralism smothers its ambitions. Absolute power is a precondition for these kinds 
of genocide. When thinking about ways to combat this seemingly unstoppable dynamic of events, 
Bauman pleads strongly for true pluralism and a viable democracy. Disagreeing with one another 
and being open to criticism are crucial for this.   
 
 
2.7.1.3. What psychologists say about evil: Baron-Cohen  
 
In his book ‘The science of evil’, psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen attempts to gain a deeper 
understanding of cruelty and evil. He argues that a lack of empathy is crucial to this 
understanding. Both social and biological determinants for such a lack of empathy are examined 
in his book. Empathy is defined as follows: 
 
“Empathy is our ability to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling and to 
respond to their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion.”172  
 
Empathy, then, needs both recognition and response. Empathy is not only focusing on your own 
interest, but also on other people’s interests. Baron-Cohen states that evil is an unscientific term 
and tried to redefine ‘evil’ in terms of ‘empathy’.  
 
                                               
169 Again, Adams and Balfour followed up on this in Unmasking Administrative Evil. 
170 Bauman (1989), p. 188-196. 
171 Bauman (1989), p. 198. 
172 Baron-Cohen (2011), p. 16. 
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“Evil is treated as incomprehensible, a topic that cannot be dealt with because the scale 
of the horror is so great that nothing can convey its enormity.”173  
 
The phrase ‘because he was evil’ in fact offers no explanation of behavior at all. Baron-Cohen 
looks at empathy erosion, which arises from people turning other people into objects. 
Dehumanization is important in this line of thinking. If organization is seen as the focal point, 
one could conclude from the work of Baron-Cohen that empathy is also crucial for government: 
an inward focused and self-absorbed government is more likely to be capable of evil than one 
which really has deeply engrained thought for the interests of its citizens in its organizational 
DNA. In his book ‘The better angels of our nature’, Pinker named empathy as one of the four 
‘better angels’ that can steer humans away from violence. Pinker added that the importance of 
empathy should not be overrated: empathy, like love, is not all you need. Reason, self-control 
and moral sense are also necessary.174 
 
 
2.7.1.4. What a multidisciplinary approach says about evil: Jurkiewicz  
 
It is not only philosophers, theologians or psychologists that concern themselves with evil – the 
subject has become the concern of interdisciplinary cooperation between social scientists. The 
concept of organizational evil is discussed extensively in ‘The foundations of organizational evil’, 
an important book collating the views of scientists from different disciplines. Jurkiewicz, who 
edited the book, states that the shared view in the book was that organizational evil should be 
attributed to a complex interaction of individuals, organizations and environmental factors.175 
Jurkiewicz and Grossman define organizational evil as “the institutionalization of a set of 
principles whose purpose is knowingly to harm individuals, with disregard for consequences 
beyond those that would cause immediate repercussions to the evil-doer.”176 This form of evil is 
deeply engrained within the fabric of the organization and its culture. An organization can be called 
‘evil’ if the majority of the policies, practices, programs and reward systems (which together form 
the organizational culture) aim to cause harm to others in order to obtain short-term gains for the 
organization.  
 
Jurkiewicz and Grossman point out that organizational culture is made through the reinforcing of 
policies, the behavior of leaders, the reward structures and collective activities. All this is brought 
together into an identity, or as they call it an ‘organizational personality’. The set of moral 
principles that guides the members of the organization is the ethic of the organization. It is argued 
that the ethic of evil develops in the way that an ethic of benevolence develops. With clear 
reference to Arendt’s ‘banality of evil’, Jurkiewicz and Grossman gave the following view on how 
organizational evil develops:  
 
“This banality is arguably the most frightening aspect of evil. There is no one 
transformative moment to which we can point but, rather, an incremental shift from right 
or wrong that is barely perceptible on a day-to-day basis. It is difficult to recognize evil 
separate from an organization’s history. If evil seeped into an organization suddenly, it, 
like all change initiatives, would likely be vigorously rejected.”177 
 
                                               
173 Baron-Cohen (2011), p. 5. 
174 Pinker (2011), p. 698-720. 
175 Jurkiewicz (2012), p. x. 
176 Jurkiewicz (2012), p. 3. 
177 Jurkiewicz (2012), p. 3. 
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This incremental process is consistent with the lessons learned about the ‘slippery slope’ in the 
research on integrity violations discussed earlier in this chapter. As with Bauman and Baron-
Cohen, subjects such as dehumanization and lack of empathy are seen here as essential for evil.  
 
The focus on organizational culture holds valuable thoughts: 
 
“Organizational culture exerts powerful influence over individual behavior, because of 
both the reward structure and humans’ need to belong, but also significantly because the 
individual looks to those around him or her to determine what is right and what is 
wrong.”178 
 
There are also bright sides to this. The opportunity to turn things around in the organizational 
culture is present. Policies, programs and reward systems can also be geared towards creating non-
evil work environments. And for this, accountability, transparency and disclosure are necessary.  
 
For many, this analysis will still be troublesome. The intentionality that is included in the concept 
of organizational evil is difficult to grasp. How can an organization have intentions? Surely 
individuals have intentions, but how can intentions by organizations be proven, especially when 
such intentions are set on doing evil, bringing harm to others? As already noted, organizational 
scientists and criminologists have included psychological elements in their study of organizations. 
Clearly, Jurkiewicz and her fellow authors believe that a psychological approach is both possible 
and necessary for understanding the dynamics within organizations. Without it, it would be 
difficult to explain how an organization that starts out with decent people harboring good intentions 
can develop into an organization that harms people for its own benefit. It should be added that this 
line of thought is susceptible to making ethical judgments instead of offering factual descriptions 
and analysis of organizational behavior. There is a vulnerability here that is comparable to the one 
in state crime literature discussed earlier. In any case, it should be clear from what went before that 
over the last two decades the subject of evil has become an important issue, not just for specialists 
on ethics, but increasingly also for social scientists who have an interest in organizational behavior.  
 
 
2.7.2. Evil: a definition  
 
The previous paragraph has shown that evil is a major subject in many disciplines. Evil is inherent 
in the human condition, where good and evil coexist. In their award-winning book ‘Unmasking 
administrative evil’, Adams and Balfour introduced a new concept to the science of public 
administration: administrative evil. Adams and Balfour argue that looking at history inevitably 
means recognizing evil. Evil is defined by Adams and Balfour as “actions of human beings that 
unjustly or needlessly inflict pain and suffering and death on other human beings”, although it 
is added that evil is a subject that goes beyond easy definition or understanding.179  
 
References to Machiavelli and Sartre were made when discussing the problem of dirty hands. 
The dirty hands choice means that one inflicts knowingly and deliberately (hopefully limited) 
pain and suffering on others, for a good reason – for the greater good of the polity.180 This has 
also been named ‘necessary evil’ by some. Administrative evil is different because the culture 
of technical rationality effectively removes ethical issues from the picture altogether, in such a way 
that a judgment on the degrees of ‘good’ will not even be made. Because of the masked character 
                                               
178 Jurkiewicz (2012), p. 12. 
179 Adams and Balfour, (2009), p. 3. 
180 Adams and Balfour, (2009), p. 9-10. 
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of administrative evil, the question of ethics simply does not enter into the equation. Support for 
this argument can be found in the famous, yet still controversial, study Hannah Arendt made of 
the trial of Adolf Eichmann.181  
 
“That such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc 
than all the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, are inherent in man -- that was, 
in fact, the lesson one could learn in Jerusalem. But it was a lesson, neither an 
explanation of the phenomenon nor a theory about it.”182  
 
In cases of evil, there is, in one way or another, a reference to the goals or the intentions of the 
perpetrator of some wrongful or illegal act. In this way, the problematic aspect of ‘administrative 
evil’ is that perpetrators are not aware that they are doing anything wrong.  
 
“Because administrative evil is typically ‘masked’, no one has to accept an overt 
invitation to commit an evil act, because such invitations are almost never made. Rather, 
it may come in the form of an expert or technical role, couched in appropriate language, 
or it may even come packaged as a good and worthy project (moral inversion). Evil then 
occurs along another continuum: from acts that are committed in relative ignorance to 
those that are knowing and deliberate acts of evil (masked and unmasked). Individuals 
and groups can engage in evil acts without recognizing the consequences of their 
behavior, or when convinced their actions are justified or serve the greater good.”183 
 
In the perspective that is adopted here, evil must be connected somehow to the goals or intentions 
of the governmental organization in question. This is because evil is also strongly connected to 
moral issues, in which the word ‘evil’ describes behavior or opinions that lack moral quality. 
To lack knowledge (of goals or intentions) and still be evil would appear contradictory for 
many.184 It should be noted that Adams and Balfour included the words ‘knowingly and 
deliberately’ in their definition of evil in the first edition of their book. They change this in the 
second edition to ‘actions of human beings that unjustly or needlessly inflict pain and suffering 
and death on other human beings’.  
 
The question then is what to do with deliberate, outright acts of evil. These are situations in which 
there is an element of wanting the evil to happen. The element of ‘knowingly and deliberately’ 
seems more applicable to the common understanding of evil in society and seems to go beyond 
administrative evil. In this dissertation, the focus is on administrative evil.  
 
 
2.7.3. Administrative evil: a definition  
 
Adams and Balfour defined administrative evil as follows:  
 
“Administrative evil may be masked in many different ways, but the common characteristic 
is that people can engage in acts of evil without being aware that they are in fact doing 
                                               
181 As evidenced by the motion picture ‘Hannah Arendt’ (2013), which focused mostly on the controversy surrounding 
her report on the Eichmann-trial and the impact it had on Arendt’s life. The movie critics regretted that her ideas 
did not receive a comparable amount of attention in the movie. http://www.nrc.nl/breedbeeld/2013/05/02/critici-
over-hannah-arendt-mooie-lofzang-maar-er-zit-veel-meer-in/ (Date last accessed: 19-05-2013)  
182 Arendt (1963), p. 12. 
183 Adams (2011), p. 277. 
184 That is not to say that Adams and Balfour do not have a viable point in saying that evil of which one is not aware 
might even be worse than ‘regular’ evil, but for use of the term ‘evil’ I would like to stay a bit closer to the public 
meaning of the terminology. 
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anything at all wrong. Indeed, ordinary people may simply be acting appropriately in their 
organizational role – in essence, just doing what those around them would agree they 
should be doing – and at the same time be participating in what a critical and reasonable 
observer, usually well after the fact, would call evil. Even worse, under conditions of what 
we call moral inversion, in which something evil has been redefined convincingly as good, 
ordinary people can all too easily engage in acts of administrative evil while believing that 
what they are doing is not only correct but, in fact, good.”185  
 
On a closer look, administrative evil then consists of several key elements:  
  
x people engage in acts of evil 
x perpetrators are not aware that they are doing anything wrong 
x it is masked (less easily recognized as evil) 
x there can be moral inversion: something evil is presented as something that is 
actually good 
The basic difference between evil as understood throughout human history and administrative 
evil is that administrative evil is less easily recognized as evil. Three reasons for this difference 
are given: 
 
x there is a tendency to un-name evil, because the concept does not fit in with the 
modern scientific-analytical mindset.  
x the structure of organization can play a role, particularly when it comes to 
diffusing individual responsibility and the compartmentalized accomplishment 
of role expectations in order to perform work on a daily basis.  
x the culture of technical rationality has narrowed formulation and 
implementation of public policy, so that moral inversions are more likely.186  
 
 
2.7.4. Administrative evil: an explanation, responses and masking 
 
In ‘Unmasking administrative evil,’ explaining wrongdoing by government and examining 
government response to such wrongdoings are interwoven. There is no rigid line or distinction 
between the two. This is because the crucial characteristic of administrative evil is that it is 
masked and the removal of the mask involves recognition of wrong doing with a concomitant 
response to that recognition. The authors point out that unmasking is frequently fraught with 
difficulties. Nevertheless, several factors were mentioned as relevant to the masking of 
administrative evil in the first place: 
 
1) distance (time and space) 
Next to perspective, distance in terms of both time and space matters. It is more difficult to identify 
evil in one’s own historical time period and one’s own city, province or country.  
 
“Both distance and perspective are powerful constituents of the mask of administrative evil. 
Naming any evil that American public administrators have done, even many years ago, is 
made more difficult because we have no distance from our own culture and profession. To 
recognize administrative evil in our own time is most problematic of all, because we have 
neither distance nor perspective without an explicit and somewhat difficult effort to create 
                                               
185 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 4. 
186 Adams and Balfour, (2009), p. 4-5. 
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them (critical reflexivity). There will be no easy agreement, on the part of at least some 
readers, with our diagnosis. Unmasking administrative evil in our time and in our culture 
is fraught with difficulty because in essence, we wear the mask.”187  
 
2) object-relations psychology: scapegoating 
Good and evil are present in all of us; they are part of the human condition. In psychology this 
is recognized, for example in Freud’s claim that there is no such thing as eradicating evil. 
Object-relations psychology understands aggression and other emotions as relationships with 
‘objects’ (in most cases other humans). A clear manifestation is hating those we love the most. 
Such a psychic contradiction is defused through what is called ‘splitting’. Splitting allows 
contradictory feelings to co-exist, albeit separately, in the human consciousness. The good 
aspect is kept internally and the bad aspect is split off and projected outward to some external 
person (the object). The tendency to split off unwelcome and negative feelings can be seen in 
individual as well as group behavior. In group behavior, scapegoating is a way of diminishing 
our own responsibility. Problems are resolved psychologically by disliking the scapegoat and 
uniting with others against it. These psychological tendencies hold strong potential for 
destroying perceived enemies.188  
 
3) perspective  
Unmasking administrative evil is not easy. The perspective from which evil is most often 
recognized, is that of the victim. This often makes for what Baumeister calls the ‘myth of pure 
evil’. This is partly due to the fact that modern culture shows tendencies, exacerbated by mass 
media, to present moral questions in black and white: all good or all bad. Criminals are wholly evil 
and heroes should be wholly good.189 Since moral questions are cast in absolute terms, the 
possibility of reversing the image is enlarged considerably.  
 
The perspective of the victim often differs greatly from that of the perpetrator. This is called the 
‘magnitude gap’. From the victim’s perspective, most often in hindsight, evil can be clearly 
identified. From the perpetrator’s perspective, however, it is often a problem to identify it. From 
that perspective, a given act might not perhaps be especially good, or might even be evil, but by 
taking other factors such as prior injustices into consideration perpetrators can often easily produce 
rationales and justifications for their acts. According to Adams and Balfour, ‘moral 
disengagement’ is important for the ‘magnitude gap’. Research has shown that moral standards 
and self-control can be switched on and off in different ways. There are several ways of doing this: 
moral inversion, distance, using euphemisms (language) and dehumanization.190 Perspective is 
therefore of vital importance in masking administrative evil.  
 
4) language 
The use of technical language or euphemisms often masks what is really going on and provides 
for emotional distance towards sensitive issues. ‘Collateral damage’ from bombing raids is a 
euphemism for killing civilian non-combatants. The Germans called the transportation to the 
death camps ‘evacuation’ and the genocide itself was infamously called the ‘final solution’. 
‘Resettlement’ or ‘labor in the East’ is another well-known example. Language is used here to 
                                               
187 Adams and Balfour, (2004), p. 18. In the third edition, different wordings are used: Adams and Balfour, (2009), p. 15-
16. 
188 Adams and Balfour, (2009), p. 14-15. 
189 Also see Pinker, (2011), p. 602. 
190 Moral disengagement was added in the third edition of the book by Adams and Balfour. Although the switching off 
of moral compasses is certainly interesting, I find it conceptually confusing that the description of the ways in 
which this works is mixed with the other concepts Adams and Balfour had already introduced, like moral inversion, 
distance, language and dehumanization. For this reason, I have not chosen to use moral disengagement as a 
separate masking factor. Adams and Balfour, (2009), p. 17. 
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convince people that these activities are not evil but necessary solutions. Language therefore 
often masks administrative evil.191  
 
5) dehumanization 
Doing evil unto others is easier when the other is seen as ‘not normal’, unlike the majority. 
People who are the object of the evil act are sometimes defined as less than human, rather as 
for example bugs or roaches (a classic moral inversion). It is necessary that the objects of the 
act are distanced using language, by making them ‘numbers’, ‘things’ or calling them inhuman. 
Dehumanization is thus also a mask for administrative evil. Clearly, this masking factor (just 
like ‘distance’) owes its existence to the previous work of Bauman.  
 
6) technical rationality 
Technical rationality is a central theme for Adams and Balfour when explaining administrative 
evil. Technical rationality refers to a way of thinking and living (a culture) that emphasizes the 
scientific-analytic mindset and the belief in technological progress.  
 
“A central theme of the modern age is the emphasis on the value of technical rationality 
and the attendant narrowing of the concepts of reason, professionalism, ethics and 
politics. When linked to bureaucracy and organization, the result can be an 
unintentional tendency toward compliance to authority, and the elevation of technical 
progress and processes over human values and dignity.”192 
 
In western society it is often assumed that an individual freely and independently chooses a 
particular way of acting. This individualistic approach often neglects the fact that group and 
organizational dynamics play a very important role in determining human behavior. In contrast 
to the scientific-analytical mindset, the authors state that societies and cultures are in fact human 
artifacts, created and enacted by human activity. All human organizations, including social and 
political institutions, are therefore social constructions. That does not mean that these 
organizations are always the result of a rational choice, but more typically they emerge and 
develop incrementally over a long period of time.  
 
This refers back to Bauman’s observations on technical rationality: 
 
“The technician does not know why he works and he usually doesn’t care. He works 
because he has tools that enable him to carry out a certain task, to complete a new order. 
There is no tempting goal, but there is pressure from an engine coming from behind that 
does not tolerate the machine to come to a stop.”193 
 
In essence, it is claimed by Adams and Balfour that most deeds of administrative evil do not 
emanate from individual wicked and seductive leaders on the outside, nor from exceptional 
psychopaths for that matter, but are in fact engrained and intertwined in the daily operations of 
public administration (a social construction), waiting to start a route down the proverbial slippery 
slope. It is often not a question of a clear-cut decision that has to be taken on ethical issues, but 
instead a succession of smaller, more ambiguous choices are made that, taken all together, add up 
to evil consequences. The individual personalization of evil as opposed to understanding the social 
construction of evil, provides yet another mask for administrative evil. 
 
                                               
191 Adams and Balfour, (2009), p. 18. 
192 Adams and Balfour, (2009), p. xxxv. 
193 Bauman (1989), p. 147. 
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It is argued that people in the modern age have lost their familiar anchors. They experience 
uncertainty and look for direction and shelter. Organizations and societies can be seen as 
‘holding environments’ or ‘containers’. The holding environment is like a family that manages 
the emotional issues of its members. If this works well, negative and aggressive tendencies are 
diminished. However, organizations, institutions and countries can also be holding 
environments for evil. Splitting is the mechanism present here. Especially when one is seeking 
direction, it is possible that groups or organizations manage emotional issues by projecting 
negative emotions outwards and scapegoating others. At that point, moral inversion and 
administrative evil are just around the corner.  
 
 
2.7.5. Criticism of ‘Unmasking administrative evil’  
 
‘Unmasking administrative evil’ has stirred up many emotions and both praise and criticism. 
Perrow has criticized what he calls an ‘indiscriminate attack’ on technical rationality, wondering 
whether Adams and Balfour would prefer irrationality to take over in governmental organizations. 
He finds the book vague and rhetorical at times, but praises the introduction of the analytical 
concept of administrative evil as something which organizational theory had not been willing to 
confront up until that point. Perrow notes that the focus of the analysis was an organizational one: 
 
“It will be an organizational explanation, not one of thuggery, criminality, greed, power, 
lust and stupidity, all qualities of individuals, not organizations. Their essential insight is 
that organizational practices are at the root of a good part of these crimes (though I would 
think not the tribal warfare with primitive weapons in Rwanda). Organizations construct 
mental worlds for us, and selective cognitive processes are set in motion which screen out 
other cognitions.”194   
 
Adams and Balfour reacted by acknowledging that technical rationality in public administration 
has brought much good to society and that they did not mean that public administration is 
inherently evil by any measure. However, Adams and Balfour argued that notwithstanding its 
benefits, technical rationality had also given room for the creation of the masks of administrative 
evil.195 
 
The fiercest critique of ‘Unmasking administrative evil’ has come from Dubnick. Dubnick finds 
the book contains much rhetoric, vague definitions and an overall absence of recognition for 
standards of scholarship: Colorful examples are not the same as convincing proof for arguments.  
 
“It is an award winning book. But it is also a book that challenges some fundamental 
standards of scholarship in a way that can only do harm to our field.”196 
 
Dubnick criticizes the historical approach taken by the authors, the way the concepts are defined 
and the lack of empirical evidence. He goes on to question their motives, speculating that Adams 
and Balfour’s desire to reach a large audience has led to a  
 
“Faustian pact that paid dividends, but at a significant cost in terms of scholarly 
credibility”.197  
                                               
194 Browder, Perrow, Adams and Balfour (2000), p. 176. 
195 Browder, Perrow, Adams and Balfour (2000), p. 176-177. 
196 Dubnick (2000), p. 472. 
197 Dubnick (2000), p. 472. 
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Vickers retorts by questioning the rigor of Dubnick’s positivism and his reliance on ‘if-then’ logic 
in asserting that credible claims call for qualifiers and warrants. Instead, Vickers states that modern 
social science should not accept classic positivist, empirical research as the definitive set of 
‘standards of credible scholarship’. In Vickers’ view, Adams and Balfour were right to also 
embrace interpretative, critical and postmodern perspectives in their work. Vickers argues that 
Adams and Balfour offer the essence of scholarship: new ideas and vantage points.198 Locke 
responds to Dubnick by stating that it is the professional kiss of death in the academic world to 
call the work ‘popular literature’ and to question whether it is really scholarship. Locke finds that 
this was precisely the problem for many years in the study of public administration, which often 
found it easier to steer away from untidy social phenomena and messy social problems. 
 
“One reads Adams and Balfour’s work, and the reaction of Dubnick to it, and is reminded 
of the oft-repeated observation that if contemporary social scientists had been present at 
the crucifixion, they would have wanted to count the number of nails used in the cross 
before determining whether the event had any social significance.”199  
 
Koven joins Dubnick in questioning the scientific validity of the work by Adams and Balfour. 
He focuses mainly on the concept of evil, which he finds to be an empty box. Besides that, 
Koven also believes the work undermines the core ethos of governance, such as neutral 
professionalism and democratic accountability: 
 
“Attributing the label of evil to administrators elevates their importance to a position 
not prescribed by the pioneers of the field. Furthermore, the ascription of evil unfairly 
condemns administrators for implementing policy not of their making. It is consistent 
with Reagan’s theme that “government is the problem.” Connotations of evil help 
perpetuate the negative stereotypes of imperious bureaucrats described in the 
literature.”200 
 
This is another recurring point of criticism. Not only is the book unscientific, it also fuels 
indiscriminate government bashing. What the critiques by Koven and Dubnick have in common 
is that they are triggered by the word ‘evil’ and its religious connotation as well as the 
assumption that such a word can only be described as unscientific.  
 
It should be conceded that the definition of evil given by Adams and Balfour is a broad one that 
could be found to apply to many cases. It is nevertheless also a critique that fails to recognize 
the deeper layers of the analysis by Adams and Balfour of administrative evil and the delicate 
and complicated ways in which this administrative evil is masked. The masking is hardly ever 
mentioned in the critiques, even though this is a central point in the book. As for the government 
bashing, Adams and Balfour point out that when studying genocide and administrative evil, 
inevitably states are recognized as major perpetrators. That does not mean that we should not 
appreciate highly all the good work that is being done daily in public administration by 
dedicated and benevolent people. Looking at government with a critical stance is essential then, 
not for bashing government but rather for preventing disasters from taking place.201 
 
 
                                               
198 Vickers (2000), p. 478. 
199 Locke (2000), p. 480. 
200 Koven (2012), p. 90. 
201 Adams and Balfour (2000), p. 481. 
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2.7.6. Content of this dissertation in relation to the subject  
 
Definitions 
 
 
Evil: actions of human beings that unjustly or needlessly inflict pain and suffering and death 
on other human beings 
Administrative evil:  
 people engage in acts of evil 
 perpetrators are not aware that they are doing anything wrong 
 it is masked (less easily recognized as evil) 
 it involves moral inversion: something evil is presented as something that is 
actually good 
 
 
Explanatory factors 
Adams and Balfour do not really formulate explanatory factors for administrative evil, but they 
spend some time explaining how the dynamics of administrative evil evolve. Explanatory 
factors will therefore not be offered here although it seems clear that technical rationality (one 
of the masking factors) would probably be an important explanation that Adams and Balfour 
would offer.  
 
Factors relevant to response 
The way administrative evil is masked is illustrated extensively by naming the masking factors. 
These masking factors differ from factors relevant to response that were formulated in 
discussing bodies of knowledge, but they can offer important insights into why and how certain 
responses by government take shape or rather do not take shape (since the clear view of what 
is happening is being masked). To unmask administrative evil it is necessary to look at whether 
the factors that contribute to the masking of administrative evil are present. Therefore, when 
examining cases for this dissertation, the masking factors inset will be taken into account. 
 
 
1) distance (both time and space) 
2) object-relations psychology/scapegoating (splitting mechanism) 
3) perspective (victim or perpetrator: myth of pure evil and the ‘magnitude gap’) 
4) language 
5) dehumanization 
6) ‘technical rationality’ 
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3. Research design  
 
 
3.1.  Introduction  
 
In the previous chapters, many relevant theories have been discussed, all of which have specific 
merits and useful insights. These insights should be viewed as input for the research design that 
will be described in the following paragraphs. As part of this, the central research questions will 
be formulated. This will be followed by the criteria for the selection of case studies, definition 
of terms to be used, and an outline of the ground between error and evil. The limitations of the 
study will be explained and a description of the research method given. 
 
 
3.2.  Central research questions  
 
There is already much research on topics such as state crime, the legal aspects of rule breaking 
by governments and on public integrity. Factual research on topics such as rule breaking by 
governments and administrative evil is rarer. As the theory of ‘Unmasking administrative evil’ 
has not yet been extensively tested in case study research, the Netherlands is one of the first 
countries where this will happen. In addition, there appears to be no other research that aims to 
give an overview of several cases of death or serious injury connected to government in the 
Netherlands, as opposed to research that focuses on single cases only.  
 
The question arises of what really happens when things go wrong: What can we learn about the 
causes and backgrounds, and about the coping mechanisms in place? What evidence can be 
found for attributing the wrongdoing to either error or evil, or to something in between? The 
second question is how governmental organizations respond when things have gone wrong and 
why they respond as they do. Sometimes, the events following a disaster are viewed as a 
‘disaster after a disaster’.202 What can be said about this? Are there common characteristics in 
the way governmental organizations react to fatal accidents and are there patterns or 
mechanisms that recur?  
 
All this leads to the following central research questions: 
 
1) Why and how does governmental behavior in the Netherlands lead to the deaths 
or serious injury of human beings? 
2) How do governmental organizations in the Netherlands respond to these cases 
and why do they respond in that way?  
 
Governmental organizations have already been defined as decision-making institutions in 
public life, from national government to local municipalities, whose members or staff are 
elected or appointed as public officeholders, whose budgets are funded largely by public 
revenue and audited by public bodies and whose activities would be accountable to the 
legislature or other public bodies. In this dissertation, the governmental behavior that is 
examined is the behavior by the governmental organizations involved in the cases themselves, 
for example the behavior by the Ministry of Defense in the case of the AP-23 and Spijkers. 
Governmental behavior encompasses both action and lack of action, both omission and 
commission. 
                                               
202 Raad voor het openbaar bestuur (2012), p.14. 
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To answer the central research questions, case studies will be made of five cases in which behavior 
by governmental organizations in the Netherlands has possibly led directly or indirectly to deaths 
or serious injuries. 
 
 
3.3.  Criteria for cases of death and serious injury  
 
In order to explore the ground between error and evil, the choice has been made to examine cases 
in which there can be little or no debate about the outcome, in the sense that at least something had 
gone very wrong: cases with extremely serious consequences. It can scarcely be contested that the 
most serious possible consequence of governmental action is the loss of human life and serious 
injuries to human beings. The starting point for this dissertation therefore lay in cases with one 
common denominator: There were deaths or serious injuries involved.203  
 
In all cases that were selected, the following criteria had to be met at the start204 of the research 
project: 
1) possible involvement of governmental organizations:  
a. directly by actively causing the deaths or serious injuries or  
b. indirectly by failing to act adequately, neglecting their duties or by facilitating 
harmful behavior by others.  
2) consequences (one or more deaths or serious injuries) that were evident at the start of 
the research. Cases that did not involve death or serious injury were not selected. Serious 
injuries are limited here to physical injuries, usually requiring hospital treatment. Slight 
injury or physical discomfort are excluded. Psychological injuries are also excluded, 
since it is often difficult to establish beyond doubt that these occur. Clearly, these 
accidents can have traumatic effects on the people involved, but it would go too far for 
this research project to investigate this more deeply.  
3) prior indication that death or serious injury was caused by violation of laws, regulations 
or some ethical standards. In the selection of cases, it should be clear that legally 
authorized violence by government, such as the lawful use of force by police or army, 
is not included. The monopoly of force that government holds is taken into 
consideration here. War actions in which people are killed for instance, such as the 
Dutch mission in Uruzgan, are by definition excluded from this research. On the other 
hand, if international or national law were breached and as a result people were killed 
or seriously injured, these kinds of cases might have been eligible for selection.  
 
 
3.4.  Definitions and the terrain between error and evil  
 
In the previous chapter, the most important elements in each body of knowledge have been 
defined. When assessing where a specific case sits in the space between error and evil, these 
definitions will be applied. To answer the first research question on how and why governmental 
behavior can lead to deaths and serious injuries, a list of issues was compiled, as well as a list of 
relevant explanatory factors, both drawn from the material in Chapter 2. The factors that were 
relevant to government response will be taken into account and used as a basis for answering the 
second research question.  
                                               
203 This common denominator is in line with the definition of evil that is given by Adams and Balfour: ‘actions of human 
beings that unjustly or needlessly inflict pain and suffering and death on other human beings’. 
204 The definitive selection of cases was decided upon in 2007, so the judgment whether these criteria were fulfilled 
in individual cases was made based on the available information and insights at that time.  
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The question then is: what are the main points to focus on? Through which lens should these cases 
be viewed? As stipulated before, the main questions for this dissertation are the how (mechanisms 
that are present) and the why (explanations for behavior) of government involvement in the death 
or serious injury of citizens.  
 
Opportunities, motives, masking and reacting 
Criminologists have a straightforward proposition when it comes to explaining why criminal acts 
happen: opportunity and motive. As previously noted, research on organizational crime205 and rule 
breaking by governments concludes that a combination of motives and opportunities explains 
deviant behavior, and indeed this combination appears in the bodies of knowledge discussed. For 
that reason, the combination of motives and opportunities has been chosen as a theoretical base to 
move forward with. However, the theory of administrative evil offers a different perspective, as 
described by Adams and Balfour. The factors involved in masking combine to blur our clear 
understanding of the causes and mechanisms that are in place when evil acts happen, obscuring 
both the factors that explain evil acts happening (most notably when it comes to technical 
rationality) and the factors that help us understand governmental response.  
 
It seems that there is a variety of topics to explore further in each case that will be examined: 
opportunities, motives, masking and factors relevant to the response.  
 
The analytical framework within which each case will be examined consists of the following 
elements:  
 
1) What happened: 
a. a brief introduction to the case: the subject matter, and why the case belongs 
somewhere between error and evil  
b. summary of the facts of the case itself:  
1) timeline of events 
2) case characteristics 
 
Case characteristics 
damage  
deaths and serious injuries   
damage compensation paid  
nature of the act   
nature of the connection between the 
governmental organization and the deaths and 
serious injuries 
 
what rules are broken  
sanctions   
political consequences  
disciplinary sanctions  
sanctions concerning criminal law  
measures taken for the future/lessons learned  
number of official investigations/reports on the 
case 
 
                                               
205 It should be mentioned that as discussed in the paragraph on reactions to organizational crime, a third factor – 
neutralization - is sometimes distinguished. Since this is relevant to reaction by government bodies, which are 
also analyzed, this element is taken into account when examining reactions.  
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number of years from start of the case till finish 
or present 
 
 
2) Why it happened: explaining the deaths and serious injuries 
a. opportunities:  
1) organizational structure and division of responsibilities  
2) organizational culture  
3) the political system and the relationships with corporate partners and 
society 
4) rules, regulations and procedures 
b. primary motives:  
1) rational choice (e.g. a rational choice to commit an act is taken after 
weighing all the options) 
2) ignorance (e.g. errors due to not knowing the relevant rules or due to lack 
of professionalism) or  
3) unwillingness (e.g. governmental organizations who feel that they are 
confronted by rules that are impossible to carry out because of wicked 
dilemma’s) 
c. secondary motives:  
1) financial concerns (cutting costs, staying within budget, avoiding claims, 
etc.) 
2) the position of the governmental organization and its public image  
3) preferring another norm than the law strives for (for example 
employment over environmental concerns) 
4) demands by politicians, citizens, special interest groups and media 
d. forms of masking: 
1) distance in time and space: Is our perspective blurred by a lack of 
distance from one’s own country, culture and time? 
2) object-relations psychology/scapegoating (splitting mechanism): Does 
the government body involved try to point to another party as the 
responsible actor – the scapegoat? 
3) perspective (victim or perpetrator: the myth of pure evil and the 
‘magnitude gap’). From whose perspective is the government act being 
seen? 
4) language: Is language used to cover up the true nature of the 
governmental act?  
5) dehumanization: Are subjects put at distance by defining them as 
‘numbers’, ‘things’ or calling them inhuman? 
6) a form of ‘technical rationality’: Can the behavior by the government 
body involved be seen as ‘technical rationality’ in the sense that 
technical progress and processes are elevated over human values and 
dignity? 
 
3) How governmental organizations react in these cases and why 
1) Language: 
External language: How does the governmental organization involved 
communicate publicly about the case and about the people involved? 
What language is used in press releases, letters to parliament and 
responses to reports, etc.? 
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Internal language: What language is used internally (as can be deduced 
from internal memorandums, letters and leaked documents, as well as 
information from interviews with civil servants and politicians)? 
2) Strategy: If available, information about possible considerations, 
alternatives that have been considered, dilemmas and interventions is 
analyzed. The aim is to find out what strategy, if any, has been used to 
handle the case by the government agency involved.  
 
4) Location in the space between error and evil, and conclusions 
1) How can the role of the governmental organization in the deaths or serious 
injuries be classified (its position between error and evil)? 
2) Conclusion on the central research questions 
The analytical framework aims to fully reflect the exploratory character of the case studies. The 
aim is not to conduct quantitative analysis here (‘there is 43.7% of administrative evil in case X’), 
but rather to include elements in the research design that emanate from well-developed bodies of 
knowledge and can help to understand complex phenomena within governmental organizations. 
The bodies of knowledge present different theories that deal with different levels of variables.  
The sociologist James S. Coleman has developed a model for dealing with different levels in 
connection with what he called the ‘micro-to macro-problem’: Moving from the individual 
level, where observations are made, to the systemic level, where the problem of interest lies. 
Coleman feels this problem is pervasive in the social sciences.206 Coleman’s model is concerned 
with making the proper transition from micro to macro. ‘Macro’ refers to societal systems (such 
as families, cities, corporations, schools or a society) and ‘micro’ refers to individuals (although 
it should be noted that for example corporate actors can also be situated on the micro-level).207 
This modelling of micro-macro links is rooted in research in which sociology is seen as a 
discipline guided by problem and theory, where construction of theories is aimed at explaining 
social phenomena.208 The objective in this modelling is to find out more about the deeper lying 
mechanisms.209 A different approach is adopted by Bourdieu, whose theory of action is 
concerned with linking the otherwise isolated factors of micro (concerning individuals), meso 
(concerning organizations) and macro (concerning society or systems as a whole). Bourdieu 
introduces the concept of ‘habitus’ as a mediating link between social structure (macro) and 
individual action (macro). Organizational narratives can be used to investigate the 
organizational ‘habitus’.210 Both approaches are more intricate than can be outlined here, and 
each has its own merits. The choice has been made here to work with a synthesis that has been 
drawn from the selected bodies of knowledge. This synthesis ranges across different levels and 
connects them when analyzing the cases. All this is done to provide a better understanding of 
the relevant phenomena in these cases and to find out more about possible mechanisms at work. 
 
  
3.5.  Limiting the object of study  
 
In the revised edition of ‘Unmasking administrative evil’, Adams and Balfour argue that 
administrative evil is not limited to the public sector (critics of the book had argued that it was 
an indiscriminate attack on the public sector and fostered ‘bureaucrat bashing’), but also applies 
                                               
206 Coleman (1987), p. 154. 
207 Raub, Buskens and Van Assen (2011), p. 4. 
208 Raub, Buskens and Van Assen (2011), p. 2. 
209 Leeuw (2008), p. 19 and Astbury and Leeuw (2010), p. 368. 
210 De Graaf (2007), p. 547-553 and Huberts (1998), p. 35.  
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to the private or semi-public sphere.211 For this dissertation, the focus lies on the public sector. 
Studying the private sector in addition would necessitate more background study and 
description of the mechanisms and characteristics of the private sector. This would over-
complicate the analysis and make comparisons between cases more difficult. If the role of 
private companies is relevant in the selected cases it will be discussed. A further choice was to 
focus on public administration in the Netherlands. Although some of the cases (such as the case 
of the Probo Koala) have a broader international context, public administration in the 
Netherlands holds enough material for research. Broadening the case study selection to other 
countries would create problems with research resources.  
 
 
3.6.  Research methods  
 
Case studies focus on understanding the dynamics present within single settings and can 
concern single or multiple cases. According to Yin, the need for case study research comes 
from the desire to understand complex social phenomena.212 In general, case studies are the 
preferred method when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are posed. The choice was made here for what 
Yin called an embedded, multiple case design.213 Embedded means that different units of analysis 
can be entered into the equation, for example different levels within the same organization. Case 
studies can be explanatory, but can also be exploratory or descriptive.  
  
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
- investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
 when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.  
The case study inquiry  
- copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of 
evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another 
result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis.”214 
 
Eisenhardt has developed her own approach to case study research.215 She builds on the work 
of others before her, such as Glaser and Strauss, Yin, Miles and Huberman. Contrary to Yin, 
Eisenhardt advocates more explorative case studies, where theory does not guide data 
collection, but where data collection guides theory. The order is thus reversed, in that theory 
building takes place based on the data collection and analysis that is carried out first.216  
 
Eisenhardt has given an extensive description of the process of building theory from case study 
research.217 In essence, this process will be followed in this dissertation.  
 
Getting started 
The first step is to define the research questions and the central research questions have been 
formulated earlier in this chapter. Some a priori constructs were introduced in Chapter 2: 
                                               
211 Adams and Balfour (2004). p. 8. 
212 Yin (2003), p. 1-2. 
213 Yin (2003), p. 53. 
214 Yin (2003), p. 13 
215 Eisenhardt (1989), p. 534. 
216 Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), p. 25. 
217 Eisenhardt (1989), p. 533. 
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Constructs such as error management, integrity, state crime and administrative evil were 
described and defined. There are no prior theories or hypotheses formulated here, although 
clearly the bodies of knowledge around these constructs have given some theoretical 
background which should be helpful when analyzing the cases. As Eisenhardt put it: 
 
“Finally and most importantly, theory-building research is begun as close as possible 
to the ideal of no theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test. Admittedly, it is 
impossible to achieve this ideal of a clean theoretical slate. Nonetheless, attempting to 
approach this ideal is important because preordained theoretical perspectives or 
propositions may bias and limit the findings. Thus, investigators should formulate a 
research problem and possibly specify some potentially important variables, with some 
reference to extant literature. However, they should avoid thinking about specific 
relationships between variables and theories as much as possible, especially at the 
outset of the process.”218 
 
Selecting cases 
The objective was to study a number of cases which have had a large impact on Dutch society 
in general, and public administration in particular. To determine which cases were most 
suitable, an expert panel of scholars in Dutch public administration219 was asked to identify the 
most important cases of deaths and serious injuries in the (recent) history of Dutch government 
(1995 to 2007). Of the ten cases emerging from a joint discussion and after a brief check for 
major omissions, five cases were selected to be the basis for further research.220  
 
The incidents happened from 1995 onwards.221 The following were selected: 
 
1. The Catshuis fire  
2. The fire brigade divers who drowned in Utrecht, Urk and Terneuzen (in fact three 
separate cases, but with possibly comparable settings and concerning the same kind    
of victims, fire brigade divers) 
3. Probo Koala 
4. The case of the AP-23 land mines and Fred Spijkers 
5. The Schiphol detention center fire 
 
Crafting instruments and protocols 
Eisenhardt and Yin both emphasize the importance of using different data collection methods, 
since this will lead to triangulation of evidence. In this dissertation, several data collection 
methods have been used. Scientific literature on the subject was studied in order to find relevant 
theories and possible new angles on the research subject, and this was the case when examining 
the bodies of knowledge associated with the concepts introduced in Chapter 2, as well as with 
the individual case studies. The question here is how we can find out what is already known 
from research. In recent years, attention has been growing for the use of systematic reviews. 
The logic of such reviews is that it is useful to look at evidence from earlier research and that it 
                                               
218 Eisenhardt (1989), p. 536. 
219 The panel consisted of the members at that time of the research group Quality of Governance at the VU University 
of Amsterdam, present at a meeting that took place on June 11, 2007 at the VU University Amsterdam. 
220 A total of 10 cases were initially considered. The other cases that were considered but which were not selected 
for various reasons were: the fall of Bosnian muslim enclave in Srebrenica (where the Dutch army had troops 
under the UN flag) in 1995, the disaster with the Hercules Army airplane in 1996, the explosion of a fireworks 
factory in Enschede in 2000, the café fire in Volendam in 2001 and the collapse of a stairway in Utrecht which 
killed one person and injured 20 in 2006. An important point for selection was that the cases that were selected 
were all still going on at the time of selection.  
221 With one exception, the case of the AP-23 land mines and Fred Spijkers which in fact started in 1983. 
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is important that these reviews are done well. Gough, Oliver and Thomas define a systematic 
review as “a review of the research literature using systematic and explicit accountable 
methods.”222 Three key activities are involved in systematic reviews:  
 
“Identifying and describing the relevant research (‘mapping the research’), critically 
appraising research reports in a systematic manner, and bringing together the findings 
into a coherent statement, known as synthesis.”223 
 
Several approaches to reviewing are identified by Gough, Oliver and Thomas: 
 
- Rapid reviews, which are carried out when time and resources are (very) limited 
- EPPI-Centre reviews, which can emphasize social constructionism by investigating the 
assumptions and theoretical stances held by the authors of primary studies 
- ‘What works’-reviews, which focus on the use of empirical data to test causal 
hypotheses within agreed conceptual frameworks 
- Critical interpretive synthesis (CIS), which is defined as “a method of synthesis that 
generates a coherent and illuminating theory of a body of evidence that is based on a 
detailed critical study of the theoretical contribution of that evidence.” 224 Focus is on a 
critical examination of underlying research traditions  
- Meta-narrative review, which focuses, like CIS, on possible differences in research 
studies by looking at underlying research traditions. Focus in this review is not on 
individual studies, but on the ‘storyline’ of a research tradition that unfolds over time 
- Realist synthesis is not so much concerned with which interventions work, but instead 
focuses on which mechanisms work in which context.225  
 
As shown before, the subject of this dissertation extends over different boundaries and research 
disciplines. The aim here has not been to provide an extensive review of all the existing 
literature on the research matter in its entirety. To be sure, the literature concerning the selected 
bodies of knowledge has been screened carefully. Although many of the typical features 
underlying a systematic review are represented in the way this dissertation has been carried 
out226, it would go too far to call this a full-fledged systematic review in all aspects as described 
by Gough, Oliver and Thomas. The way the search for relevant literature has been conducted 
here comes closest to the ‘realist’ approach, since the overall intention of such an approach is 
to create a model, based on configurations of context-mechanism-outcome (CMO), of how and 
why programs work. This synthesis is not defined by topic boundaries and can range across a 
wide area, while it is meant to identify different situations where the same mechanism is at 
work. In this dissertation, a synthesis has been made of the existing literature from the selected 
bodies of knowledge, which forms the basis for the research design. A multi-method approach 
is followed227 and cases are described extensively in accordance with the theoretical framework, 
paying a lot of attention to context and mechanisms at work.228  
 
In a practical sense, literature concerning the bodies of knowledge has been searched in a variety 
of ways. The following were used most frequently: searching articles and books in the databases 
                                               
222 Gough, Oliver and Thomas (2012), p. 5. 
223 Gough, Oliver and Thomas (2012), p. 5. 
224 Gough, Oliver and Thomas (2012), p. 258. 
225 Gough, Oliver and Thomas (2012), p. 39-44. 
226 Leeuw and Vaessen (2009), p. 41. 
227 Leeuw and Vaessen (2009), p.35-39. 
228 Kleemans, Klein Haarhuis, Leeuw and Ooyen-Houben, van (2007), p. 500-501. 
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of the VU University library system and the library system of the Ministry of Security and 
Justice, internet search machines (Google Scholar, Google, Wikipedia), newspapers (including 
their websites), social media (Twitter, Flipboard, LinkedIn), following up on literature 
suggestions by interviewees, fellow researchers and colleagues, and using the snowball method 
(both backward and forward) for references listed in articles and books.  
 
A limited effort was made to gather some basic statistical data about the number of deaths and 
serious injuries caused by Dutch governmental organizations. For the case studies, semi-
structured interviews were carried out to gain deeper insight into the underlying reasons for 
behavior by governmental organizations.  
 
For each case study, the following sources were used to collect information about the case: 
1. All relevant investigations that have been publicized (for example by investigative 
committees, inspections, Safety Council, etc.). 
2. All of the documents published by city councils, the House of Representatives or 
other democratic institutions 
3. Books and articles about the case 
4. Documents released either on account of the Wob (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur), 
the law that regulates the right of access to documents held by the public 
administration, or on account of the Dutch Data Protection Act (Wbp), as well as 
documents from archives 
5. Websites of the parties involved (media, interest groups, ministries, municipalities 
etc.) 
6. Newspaper and magazine articles 
 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the cases, background interviews with 23 people 
were conducted, with four to five interviews carried out for each case study. A standard list of 
questions was developed for these semi-structured interviews: Some questions were invariably 
included in the interview, but the choice was made not to adhere dogmatically to one structure, 
as acquiring a deeper understanding of each case required some variation in the questioning. 
Interview reports were sent to the respondents for verification. The final concepts of the 
individual case study reports were also sent to the respondents for factual verification. The 
interviews provided invaluable information about the cases, but also helped in understanding 
the bigger picture. Interviewees are not quoted directly in the case studies. The analysis of the 
cases and the conclusions that have been reached are the sole responsibility of the author and 
therefore can in no way be seen as the opinion of any of the people interviewed. A list of those 
interviewed is given in Appendix A. Although Eisenhardt’s idea of multiple investigators has 
some merit, the idea was not deployed and all the limitations of having a single researcher were 
accepted at the outset. 
 
Entering the field 
Data analysis and data collection have indeed been carried out in overlapping phases in this 
dissertation. Although field notes have not been kept, ongoing discussion about the course of 
the project has taken place throughout the process. There have not been alterations to the data 
collection methods used after the original selection, as other methods proved valuable in 
practice. The interview protocols have also been changed over time, as insights grew into what 
really mattered in these cases.  
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Analyzing data 
In this dissertation, both within-case analysis and cross-case analysis were carried out. The 
within-case analysis was carried out using the research framework described earlier. This was 
integrated into the case study design. For each case, the research framework will be outlined: 
What can be said about the opportunities, motives, masks and responses? The elements of the 
model will be described for each case. When this has been done, it should be possible to answer 
both the research questions. In the structure chosen for reporting the case studies, the elements 
taken from the bodies of knowledge are used. These are combined with the structure deployed 
to give factual information about each case. After the within-case analysis, the results of these 
analyses are used for the cross-case analysis, given in Chapter 9.  
 
Shaping hypotheses, enfolding literature and reaching closure 
These last steps in the process of building theories from case studies have been integrated into 
the concluding chapter where possible relations between variables will be explored, presented 
in the light of the literature reviewed and where conclusions will be reached.  
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4. The Catshuis fire  
 
 
4.1.  Introduction  
 
“Suddenly, I saw fire on the floor near the right foreside of the gas heater. There were 
little blue flames. Very rapidly the fire went around the room. The floor and the wall 
hangings caught fire very quickly, it all happened in a split second.”229 
 
Saturday morning, 8 AM, May 15, 2004. Two painters, Aart de Lijster and Mohammed Abdel 
Salam were at work in the Catshuis, the official residence of the Dutch Prime Minister. The 
task at hand was to remove a wax layer from a floor. To do this, the painters applied thinner (a 
substance that had been forbidden for indoor use in the Netherlands since the year 2000). Abdel 
Salam saw that the floor was burning and in a split second he managed to get away from the 
scene. Aart de Lijster could not get out and died as a result of the explosion that followed. A 
large part of the lower floor of the Catshuis was destroyed by the fire and other parts suffered 
considerable damage from smoke and water.  
 
Soon after, several questions arose: What caused the fire? Was it indeed the thinner, as the first 
analysis by the fire brigade had said? And if so, who ordered the use of thinner? Was it the 
painters’ own initiative? Or was it his employers’ initiative, painting company De Goede? Or 
were the Ministry of General Affairs (hereafter AZ)230 and the Government Buildings Agency 
(Rijksgebouwendienst, hereafter RGD) responsible?  
 
In the years that followed, the public debate on these events continued, with the accusation of 
a cover-up by the State growing louder as time went by. The question here is what was really 
going on, how we can understand what happened and how, and why, governmental actors 
behaved and reacted as they did. That is the focus of this case study. 
 
The first part of the case study contains a factual timeline of relevant events in the case of the 
Catshuis fire. Two subjects are covered at greater length as they play an important role 
throughout the case: the technical cause of the fire and knowledge of the use of thinner. Case 
characteristics will then be presented briefly, followed by possible explanations. After that, the 
responses of the governmental organizations involved will be explored and conclusions will be 
drawn about where this particular case is to be located between error and evil. 
 
 
4.2.  Summary of the facts  
 
4.2.1. Timeline of events  
 
March 10, 2004 
Painting company De Goede submitted a written tender for several painting jobs that were to 
be done in the Catshuis. Among these jobs were the wooden floors of the Catshuis. There had 
been problems with maintaining these floors in good condition. The RGD was not satisfied with 
the job that had been done by the company that had originally treated the floors and asked De 
Goede to fix it. The invitation to tender mentioned that sample units had been treated in the 
bathrooms and the toilets, in accordance with the technical working specification that had been 
                                               
229 TNO-rapport, 2005, p. 385. 
230 The Ministry of General Affairs (Algemene Zaken in Dutch) is the Ministry of the Dutch Prime Minister.  
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drawn up by a firm called Caparol on January 29, 2004.231 Several steps for treating the floors 
were outlined: soaking the wax layer and removing as much of the layer as possible, followed 
by mechanical sanding and applying a coating. De Goede Painting indicated in the written 
tender that it would take into account the relevant safety demands contained in the rules and 
regulations on labor conditions as well as environmental demands. De Goede added for the 
record that both the principals and the company carrying out the work were responsible for 
adhering to these legal demands.232  
 
May 15, 2004 
Early Saturday morning, the two painters were at work in the Herenkamer, one of the rooms in 
the Catshuis. The deadline for finishing the job had been set for June 1, 2004. They were 
working on the weekend because part of the Catshuis was once again in use on weekdays after 
the previous renovation had been more or less finished. A second possible reason for working 
on the weekend was that on June 1, 2004, the Netherlands would take on its role as chairman 
of the European Union for the following half year. The Prime Minister was therefore about to 
receive a number of government leaders and for this reason the Catshuis would have to be in 
perfect shape.  
 
A fire broke out that killed painter Aart de Lijster (at the age of 49). His colleague Abdel Salam 
and a civil servant from the Catshuis, custodian Giesbers, escaped just in time. The Catshuis 
was partly destroyed and suffered considerable damage. After the fire, a criminal investigation 
was begun under the auspices of the Public Prosecution and carried out by the Royal 
Marechaussee and the Labor Inspectorate.  
 
May 18, 2004 
Jan de Wit, member of the House of Representatives for the Socialist Party, posed a set of 
questions about the Catshuis fire, inquiring about the cause of the accident.  
 
June 3, 2004 
The Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), Sybilla Dekker, in 
response to the questions posed by De Wit, referred to the criminal investigation that had been 
started, pledging to inform the House of Representatives as soon as possible. 
 
June 17, 2004 
TNO conducted an investigation in the Catshuis itself. The RGD had hired Crawford & 
Company to advise them about the civil damage claim against the painting company. The 
Center for Fire Safety of TNO was then recommended by Crawford & Company to investigate 
the circumstances of the Catshuis fire. 
 
December 22, 2004  
The FNV Builders Union released a press statement, in which they called upon the authorities 
to make the files of the investigation about this labor accident public. The FNV claimed that 
more than seven months after the accident this was long overdue. Questions about the use of 
thinner and about the responsibility of the RGD were raised.233   
 
 
                                               
231 It should be noted here that Caparol’s working scheme did not mention the use of thinner.  
232 http://media.rtl.nl/web/components/actueel/rtlnieuws/psp/extra/2007/CatshuisOnderzoek.pdf (date last accessed: 
24-08-2013) 
233 http://www.nieuwsbank.nl/inp/2005/08/17/F029.htm (date last accessed: 23-08-2013) 
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January 5, 2005 
Member of the House of Representatives De Wit reminded the minister of VROM of the 
questions he posed about the matter. 
 
January 27, 2005 
The Minister of VROM replied to the second set of questions by referring to the criminal 
investigation, stating it had not been concluded yet and that she would inform the House of 
Representatives as soon as possible. Journalists of RTL News (a Dutch television channel) 
decided to investigate the Catshuis fire.  
 
May 13, 2005 
Member of the House of Representatives De Wit reminded the minister of VROM of the 
questions he posed about the matter, inquiring why he had not received any real answer within 
a year. 
 
June 9, 2005 
The Minister of VROM replied to the third set of questions by referring to the criminal 
investigation again, stating that the amount of time needed for the Public Prosecution to make 
a decision about prosecuting the case depended on many different factors, such as the 
complexity of the case and the preliminary inquiry that had taken place.  
 
October 24, 2005 
The criminal investigation into the Catshuis fire was completed and closed.  
 
December 22, 2005 
The Public Prosecution released a press statement, in which it announced that it would 
prosecute De Goede Painting. The company was suspected of having violated the Labor 
Conditions Act in that, through its actions, it had endangered the life and health of its 
employees. During the investigation it was established that at the time of the fire, the painters 
in the Catshuis were working with paint thinner to remove a wax layer of the wooden floor. 
More than 65 liters of this thinner were used, although the indoor use of this substance was 
forbidden. There were insufficient measures taken to prevent fire or explosion.234  
 
March 16, 2006 
The widow of De Lijster and the FNV Builders Union filed a complaint at the Court of Appeal 
against the Public Prosecution for not prosecuting the State in this case. 
 
March 20, 2006 
The Criminal Court in Amsterdam sentenced the painter’s company, De Goede Painting, to a 
fine of € 15.000 for violating the Labor Conditions Act by allowing the painters to use thinner 
for removing the wax layer. The court noted that it had mitigated the sentence because serious 
question marks should be added to the activities of the other parties involved, notably AZ and 
the RGD.  
 
“It must surely be the case that, as well as the suspect, the civil servants involved from 
the RGD and the Ministry of AZ must have been aware of the use of thinner by the 
suspect. It is striking that the principal (the RGD) in the four weeks that the painters 
worked on this project in the Catshuis, did not conduct a single check on these activities. 
                                               
234 http://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuws-_en/@130381/schildersbedrijf/ (date last accessed: 29-10-2010) 
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At the very least it seems that the other parties involved, if they did not already possess 
knowledge about the use of thinner by the suspect, simply did not want to know about 
it.” 235 
 
March 23, 2006 
Member of the House of Representatives De Wit asked questions about the verdict of the 
Criminal Court.  
 
May 16, 2006 
Minister of Social Affairs and Employment Piet Hein Donner answered De Wit’s questions 
about the verdict. Donner stated that the investigation of the Labor Inspectorate and the Royal 
Marechaussee offered, in the opinion of the Public Prosecution, no basis to conclude that 
(officials of) the RGD and the Ministry of AZ were guilty of offenses.236 
 
June 8, 2006 
RTL News made several requests based on the Wob (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur), the law 
that regulates the right of access to documents held by the public administration. The requests 
concerned the role of the civil servants from AZ and the RGD. The Ministry of AZ replied that 
the requested documents were not available. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
replied that all of the documents related to the criminal investigation had been handed over to 
the Public Prosecution and that there were no other documents available. The Ministry of 
VROM also replied that there were no other documents.  
 
August 10, 2006 
At the request of the widow of the deceased painter, a civil claim for damages was made against 
the State. In this case, there was a preliminary examination of witnesses by the court. The court 
in this context allowed the widow’s lawyer to hear the employees of the RGD and AZ that had 
been most involved, but limited this hearing to the question whether “the State expressly has 
commissioned the painter, when removing the lacquer, to use thinner in a manner that is 
contrary to the Health and Safety Requirements”.237  
 
September 1, 2006 
On this day, a fire safety permit was given to the Catshuis. At the time of the fire, the Catshuis 
did not have such a permit.   
 
September 11, 2006 
The Catshuis was reopened for regular use after the damage from the fire had been repaired. 
 
February 28, 2007 
The Court of Appeal rejected the complaint of the widow De Lijster and the Dutch Union for 
Builders that the Public Prosecution had not prosecuted the State in this case. The Court 
concluded that it had not been shown that civil servants from AZ or the RGD knew about the 
use of thinner for removing the wax layer from the floors in the Catshuis.238  
                                               
235 LJN: AV5904, Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 09/755062-04. 
236 RTL News in its reconstruction is very critical of this statement by Donner, stating that the reader should pay more 
attention to what is not being said: It is not being said that there were no suspicions, evidence, or testimony (as 
the confidential case file showed). Nothing is said either about whether the Labor Inspectorate and the Royal 
Marechaussee did see such a basis. It also says nothing about whether officials did or did not know of the use of 
thinner. Donner merely stated that the judicial investigation into the question who can be held criminally liable for 
the accident, has been dealt with. 
237 Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, February 26, 2008, 55-3982. 
238 Decision by the Court of Appeal concerning the written complaint by the widow De Lijster and the FNV, Appendix 
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June 28, 2007  
The State and painting company De Goede signed a settlement agreement, in which the State 
declared it was satisfied with the redemption paid by the painting company for the damage 
suffered by the State. It was clear that the painting company could not pay compensation for all 
of the damage (around € 5.7 million239), so the State settled for a substantially lower amount. 
The possibility that the company would go bankrupt was taken into account when taking this 
decision.240  
 
November 2, 2007 
The Minister of Housing, Neighborhoods and Integration, Vogelaar, decided on the appeal filed 
by RTL News in the Wob-case against the earlier refusal to hand over relevant documents in 
the case of the Catshuis fire to RTL News. The decision upheld the refusal in large part, but 
also publicized several documents RTL News asked for.241   
 
January 31, 2008 
The Minister of Justice sent a letter to the Chairman of the Board of Procurators General242 in 
which he requested an investigation into the case of the Catshuis fire. In this letter, several news 
reports by RTL News were mentioned that should be investigated. An important question was 
whether information was withheld from the Public Prosecution and the question whether civil 
servants knew about the use of thinner was also included. Acting under the authority of a public 
prosecutor, the National Police Internal Investigations Department (hereafter the 
Rijksrecherche) started Operation Treecreeper, an extensive factual investigation into the 
matter.243   
 
February 24, 2008 
The presiding judge in the criminal court case, Stemker Köster, wrote a letter to an employee 
of the FNV Builders Union, Verhoef, stating that the questions about the role of the RGD and 
AZ posed by the criminal court deserved a further answer.244  
 
February 26, 2008 
The House of Representatives held a debate about the Catshuis fire. During the debate, Prime 
Minister Balkenende called on all those with knowledge about the Catshuis fire to report to the 
Rijksrecherche, in order to get the truth out on the table.  
 
March 9, 2008 
The Cabinet of the Prime Minister received a letter from forensic technical expert Peter Reijman 
                                               
7, http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/wob-verzoeken/2007/11/02/brand-catshuis-beslissing-
op-bezwaar.html (date last accessed: 23-08-2013)   
239 Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, June 23, 2009, TK 98 98-7808. 
240 Confidential memorandum by the legal department of the RGD to the Minister of VROM, June 8, 2004, JA 2004 
011465. Appendix 8, http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/wob-verzoeken/2007/11/02/brand-
catshuis-beslissing-op-bezwaar.html (date last accessed: 23-08-2013) 
241 http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/wob-verzoeken/2007/11/02/brand-catshuis-beslissing-op-
bezwaar.html (date last accessed: 23-08-2013) 
242 In more popular terms: the head of the organization of the Dutch Public Prosecution.  
243 Since this was not a criminal investigation, their powers were relatively limited. Witnesses were not under oath   
      when answering questions.  
244 In my opinion, this letter should be viewed with some amazement. It is highly unusual for judges who have given 
a verdict to later involve themselves in any way in the follow up of the case, in any other way than in their official 
capacity as judge. In the letter Stemker Koster wrote that he could not comment on the case precisely because 
of his involvement as a judge in the case. Notwithstanding, he went on to point out the questions raised by the 
verdict and asked rhetorically whether these questions deserved an answer. The question then, in my view, is: 
why write the letter in the first place? This letter added yet another dimension to the dynamics involved in this 
case. 
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from TNO. In this letter Reijman pointed out that in 2005 he had written an expert report about 
the Catshuis fire. He indicated that the cause of the fire was substantially different from the 
version that had been taken for granted until then, most notably with regard to the role of the 
wall hangings.  
 
May 2008 
The chief public prosecutor in Rotterdam, in a letter to the secretaries-general of the ministries 
concerned, demanded the guarantee that all documents relating to the fire would be handed over 
to the investigators of the Rijksrecherche.245  
 
January 2009 
The Rijksrecherche finished its report on the Catshuis fire.246  
 
The conclusions of the report were: 
1) It had not been shown that civil servants knew about the use of thinner for the 
treatment of the floors in the Catshuis 
2) There is no proof of the existence of a memorandum from the general director of 
the Labor Inspectorate, Uijlenbroek, to the top civil servants and ministers of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, in which knowledge of thinner was 
mentioned.247  
3) The investigation showed that no application for a fire safety permit for the Catshuis 
had been submitted although it should have been. This was deemed relevant, 
because the application for such a permit would probably have led to the discovery 
that the wall hangings were not sufficiently repellant to fire.  
4) The investigators found a preliminary draft report by TNO (ordered by the RGD) 
that described the influence of the wall hangings on the development of the fire. A 
report offering a second opinion by a Belgian expert institute showed that the role 
of the wall hangings was indeed relevant. At the time, the TNO report had not been 
presented to the Public Prosecution, and considering its relevance, it should have 
been.  
5) The Public Prosecution in The Hague, which handled the criminal court case, 
confirmed that they would have wanted to have the TNO report at its disposal when 
making their own judgment of the case, as it held relevant information. In the end, 
this would not have led to a different decision on prosecuting the case, nor would it 
have led to the prosecution of anyone other than the painting company.248 
 
February 2009 
According to Prime Minister Balkenende, civil servants informed him for the first time in 
February 2009 of the existence of the TNO report.249  
                                               
245 http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catshuisbrand (date last accessed: 23-08-2013) 
246 Three detectives worked on the case for almost a year, regularly aided by an analyst and by a fourth colleague 
for the last three months. More than 70 people were interviewed. During the course of the investigation, several 
people stated that they would only make statements if they were guaranteed anonymity. This was refused by the 
Rijksrecherche for, as they put it, “reasons of knowledge. The content and the truthfulness of a statement could 
not be checked at all or be checked sufficiently, if it is not known who makes the statement, what his or her position 
is or was, and on what grounds the statement is based.” In total, a pile of paper files five meters high was 
assembled by the Rijksrecherche during the investigation. Rapportage oriënterend onderzoek Catshuisbrand, 
sent to the Minister of Justice by the Chairman of the Board of Procurators General on April 27, 2009 
(PaG/BJZ/28441), p. 4. Hereafter Rijksrecherche-report. 
247 Also see the letter Uijlenbroek wrote on February 10, 2009 to the director of Legislation, Administrative and 
Legal affairs of the Ministry of SZW, which was published on the site of RTL. 
http://media.rtl.nl/media/actueel/rtlnieuws/2009/Uijlenbroek.pdf (date last accessed: 23-08-2013) 
248Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2008–2009, 31 700 VI, nr. 127, p. 2-3. 
249 Balkenende himself said this during the debate on June 23, 2009, in response to questions about when he was 
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June 5, 2009 
The report of the Rijksrecherche concerning the fire in the Catshuis was sent to the House of 
Representatives under condition of confidentiality.  
 
June 12, 2009 
In his regular weekly press conference, Prime Minister Balkenende said that he had no doubt 
that the decisions by his civil servants concerning the Catshuis fire were in accordance with the 
demands of integrity. Balkenende was referring to the decision taken at the time not to hand 
over the TNO report concerning the wall hangings to the Public Prosecution. According to 
Balkenende, the reason for this was that the report was ‘unripe’ and that he had not been 
informed himself. In hindsight he regretted that the report was not handed over to the Public 
Prosecution, even though it was only a preliminary report. However, the Prime Minister said 
that the role of the state advocate would be looked at in more detail. The state advocate would 
assumedly be criticized by the Rijksrecherche because he did not want to cooperate fully. 
Balkenende had assumed that everyone had fully cooperated as he had requested.250 
 
June 16, 2009 
The House of Representatives held an emergency debate about the Catshuis fire in light of the 
report by the Rijksrecherche, speaking mostly of the conditions of confidentiality and the 
question whether all necessary information had been collected, in anticipation of the debate a 
week later in which the entire case would be discussed. The Minister of Justice, Ernst Hirsch 
Ballin, pointed out that it was highly exceptional that a complete report by the Rijksrecherche 
be placed at the disposal of parliament, albeit under condition of confidentiality.  
 
June 21, 2009 
In an open letter to the press, Reijman responded to the claim that his report was ‘incomplete’. 
He gave his view on the investigation and stated that he stood by his conclusions on the role of 
the wall hangings.251 
 
June 23, 2009 
The House of Representatives held a plenary meeting about the government’s response to the 
Rijksrecherche’s investigation. Balkenende stated that the actions of the civil servants in this 
case should be characterized as “inaccurate, incorrect and incomplete”. The debate led to four 
motions. There were three motions from the opposition parties, calling for a full reconstruction 
of the fire, a parliamentary inquiry and recognition of the shared responsibility of the State for 
the fire. These three motions did not gather enough votes to be passed. The fourth motion was 
from a government party, the PvdA. It called for a protocol concerning the way expert reports 
were dealt with by the State, measures for care and awareness in the proper use of e-mail, and 
a protocol concerning cooperation with the Public Prosecution in cases in which the State is 
involved, as well as other measures for enhancing the learning experience. This motion received 
enough votes to be accepted.252 253 
                                               
first told of the existence of the TNO report. Member of the House of Representatives Pechtold at that time asked 
Balkenende about the letter written by Reijman that was sent to the Prime Minister on March 8, 2008. Balkenende 
stated that he had indeed received the letter and that it struck him that Reijman wrote that thinner was not the 
main cause of the fire, because Balkenende had always assumed that thinner was the main cause. Balkenende 
added that he did not take this further, as the Rijksrecherche was starting its investigation and he did not want to 
interfere with this. 
250 http://www.depers.nl/binnenland/314338/Geen-twijfel-over-integriteit.html (date last accessed: 29-10-2010) 
251 http://vorige.nrc.nl/multimedia/archive/00232/Brandonderzoek_Cats_232320a.pdf (date last accessed: 23-08-
2013) 
252 http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catshuisbrand (date last accessed: 23-08-2013) 
253 Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, June 23, 2009, TK 98-7814. 
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June 24, 2009 
The widow’s lawyer, Van der Biezen, announced that he would demand financial compensation 
from the State for the widow. He stated that if the State would not come up with a proposal by 
itself, he would start a civil law suit. He added that he expected the Prime Minister to be willing 
to talk to the widow about this matter.254 
 
October 29, 2009 
The Board of Review of the Dutch Bar ruled that the state advocate did not violate the 
professional rules and regulations for lawyers in this case.255  
 
December 19, 2009 
The Dutch State made an agreement with the widow of painter Aart de Lijster, paying her 
compensation. The amount of the compensation and the contents of the agreement were not 
disclosed, but the widow was quoted as saying: 
 
“I can say that I am satisfied with it and that I consider it vindication for my husband, 
who has always been blamed unjustly. The money will never stop us missing him and I 
won’t get my husband back with it. But there is at least a better future now for our 
children.”256  
 
The agreement was also reason for RTL News to stop its ongoing investigation into the matter 
and to cease the remaining WOB procedures.257 The Government Information Service (RVD) 
stated that the payment of the compensation did not constitute an admission of guilt on the part 
of the State.  
 
 
4.2.2. The technical cause of the fire  
 
The Royal Marechaussee concluded in its investigation, completed in October 2005, that the 
use of thinner and the fact that the room was insufficiently ventilated (the windows could not 
be opened) caused a highly explosive mixture of gas to develop. This mixture was brought to 
explosion point by a burning pilot light in the gas heater. The expert from the Labor Inspectorate 
had come to a similar conclusion, with two additions: The climate system in the Catshuis had 
enhanced the development of an ideally explosive mixture and the wall hangings, which must 
have been saturated from the flammable fumes, added to the speed with which the fire spread. 
It is remarkable that this last conclusion did not receive much attention at that time. Later, in 
the debate about the Catshuis fire, Minister Van der Laan specifically pointed out that the Labor 
Inspectorate had already mentioned the role of the wall hangings in its report.258  
 
On June 17, 2004, TNO (represented by fire safety expert Reijman) had conducted an 
investigation in the Catshuis itself. At that time, remnants of the fire had been removed from 
the scene. In spite of that, it was possible to assess the general development of the fire. Also, 
the gas control element of the gas heater in the Herenkamer had been dismantled and was no 
longer on site. It turned out that this had been secured by the expert bureau I-TEK, which had 
                                               
254 Algemeen Dagblad, June 25, 2009, p. 8. Catshuisbrand: Weduwe wil geld zien van de overheid. 
255 http://www.rtl.nl/(/actueel/rtlnieuws/binnenland/)/components/actueel/rtlnieuws/2009/10_oktober/29/binnenland/rap  
port-catshuisbrand-mocht-in-la.xml (date last accessed: 29-10-2010) 
256 De Telegraaf, December 19, 2009, p. 3. Staat compenseert Catshuis-weduwe. 
257http://www.rtl.nl/(/actueel/rtlnieuws/binnenland/)/components/actueel/rtlnieuws/2009/12_december/18/binnenland/s
chadevergoeding-voor-weduwe-catshuisbrand.xml (date last accessed: 29-10-2010) 
258 Tweede Kamer, 23 juni 2009, TK 98 98-7805. 
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been hired by Aegon to investigate the damage. On January 11, 2005, the RGD handed over 
this gas control element to TNO. A conversation also took place between I-TEK and TNO on 
January 20, 2005. TNO requested the research report from I-TEK, and the report was received 
by TNO on May 14, 2005. On March 10, 2005, TNO received technical information from 
Boley, the firm that supplied the gas heater. It is remarkable that every step in this investigation 
took so much time. As for the wall hangings, it was revealed that all the walls in the Herenkamer 
were covered in hangings. When Reijman investigated the scene, only one small strip of wall 
hanging was present, right behind the opened door of the room.  
 
Reijman concluded that the fire was caused by the thinner the painters used. According to 
Reijman, sparks from a wall socket had caused the detonation and it was impossible for the 
pilot light to be the cause. According to Reijman, the wall hangings possibly played an 
important role and, to a significant degree, could have been responsible for the extent of the 
damage and the nature of the painter’s injury.259 In a meeting on June 24, 2005, at the office of 
the state advocate, it was concluded that Reijman was unaware that the pilot flame was burning 
and that the gas heater could be lit by remote control. In his letter to NRC Handelsblad, Reijman 
stated that after receiving this information during the meeting, he had promised to adapt his 
conclusions concerning this point in the final version of the report. Shortly after the meeting, 
TNO received 20 small strips of the wall hanging, all of them too small to be useful for further 
examination into their inflammability. TNO added that the composition of the other substances 
that were present in the Herenkamer made it plausible that these were at least as inflammable 
as the strip of the wall hanging that was examined by Reijman. This was discussed in a second 
meeting on June 29, 2005. In this meeting it was decided that further activities in the 
investigation would cease and Reijman was reminded of his oath of secrecy. Several days later 
Reijman received an email from the state advocate saying that the draft report would not be 
made into a final report and that the invoice could be sent by TNO. Reijman stated in his letter 
that he found this unsatisfactory, but abided by the wish of the principal and closed the file.260 
The fact that there had been only one strip of wall hanging examined was one of the reasons 
that Prime Minister Balkenende, the state advocate and others later called the report ‘unripe’.  
 
The public prosecutor who led the investigation by the Rijksrecherche ordered an independent 
second opinion report to be made about the TNO report, in order to determine whether the 
preliminary TNO report did indeed contain all the relevant information. This research was 
carried out by WFR Gent, a Belgian institute. They confirmed that the preliminary report 
contained the relevant information, especially concerning the role of the wall hangings. They 
also noted that some of the findings of TNO were mistaken and were at that time ‘unripe’:  
 
“The conclusions are insufficiently substantiated and are based on assumptions and 
statements. This could possibly be explained by the fact that this was a preliminary 
report. It remains unclear if this would have been complemented in the official end 
report.”261   

The Rijksrecherche concluded that, from the evidence presented by the experts involved, it was 
possible to state that the wall hangings played a significant part; the flashover of the fire 
happened more quickly because of them. It was added that: 
 
“It is impossible to determine whether the painter would have survived the fire if the 
                                               
259 Rijksrecherche-report, p. 10-11.  
260 http://vorige.nrc.nl/multimedia/archive/00232/Brandonderzoek_Cats_232320a.pdf (date last accessed: 23-08-2013) 
261 Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, 23 juni 2009, TK 98-7795 
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wall hangings had been treated with fire repellant substances. The fact remains that the 
use of large quantities of thinner indoors has been the cause of the fire and has been 
important for the development of the fire.”262  
 
 
4.2.3. Knowledge of the use of thinner  
 
Witnesses have reported that on the weekends, there was a very strong smell from the thinner. 
The custodian of the Catshuis, Giesbers, declared several times that the smell was very clearly 
present in the building: 
  
“The first time, about three weeks ago, I sat in the kitchen and smelled what seemed like 
nail polish remover. This was also what I smelled Saturday. This smell was in the entire 
building and could be smelled all day.”263  
 
A similar statement was made by painter Abdel Salam. Apparently, several people declared that 
the use of thinner was De Lijster’s own initiative. The RGD and AZ had stated that De Goede 
deviated from the scheme of work designed by Caparol without giving them notice. A total of 
65 liters of thinner was used and an order for the 65 liters was found in the administrative 
records of the painting company.  
 
There is one witness, Peter Egbars, who has declared that several people from the RGD and AZ 
were aware of the use of thinner before the fire took place. Egbars worked for the RGD and 
was involved as an assistant designer for the renovation of the Catshuis. He worked at the 
Catshuis until May 1, 2004. He emphasized that everything that happened in the Catshuis was 
discussed beforehand and that therefore there was no other possibility than that others were 
aware of the use of thinner.  
 
“I can tell you that it all had to happen quickly. We started with a test in the bathrooms. 
It all had to happen so fast because of the European presidency of the Netherlands. The 
painter, Aart de Lijster, told me that the balsam layer on the floor had to be removed 
with thinner. All of the people involved knew that thinner was used to remove the layer. 
I am talking of Peter Korkers of the Ministry of General Affairs, Louis van der Heijden 
from the RGD and the people from painting company De Goede, Aart de Lijster and 
Pieter Hans de Goede. I am certain that the use of thinner did not happen at De Lijster’s 
own initiative. I have just told you that it was decided upon in a meeting. The smell of 
thinner is very clearly recognizable, so they must have smelled it.”264  
 
All the other people who were supposedly involved have denied that the use of thinner was 
discussed at any meeting. The Rijksrecherche concluded about Egbars’ statement: 
 
“However, he has no proof for this and he has never been present at a meeting where 
this was discussed. In the verdict by the criminal court, in the media and in statements 
made by several persons, it has often been said that there is no other possibility than 
                                               
262 Rijksrecherche-report, p. 15. 
263 Appendix 8, from the documents RTL News publicized, Proces-verbaal 410400213, p. 10-11. 
http://media.rtl.nl/web/components/actueel/rtlnieuws/psp/extra/2007/CatshuisOnderzoek.pdf (date last accessed: 23-
08-2013) 
264 Decision by the Court of Appeal concerning the written complaint by the widow De Lijster and the FNV, Appendix 
 7, http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/wob-verzoeken/2007/11/02/brand-catshuis-beslissing-op-
bezwaar.html (date last accessed: 23-08-2013)   
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that civil servants must have known beforehand of the use of thinner for treating the 
floors. Many of those who carried out the criminal investigation in 2004 also have the 
impression that there must have been knowledge by civil servants; nobody however, has 
been able to back that feeling up with actual facts.”265  
 
The reasons usually given for this assumption were that at the Catshuis all actions were 
discussed beforehand, and that there had been many people present in the Catshuis during the 
renovation. All those involved in the commissioning of the painting, and all of the people who 
were present before and during the painting activities in the Catshuis, were questioned by the 
Rijksrecherche. Nobody said they were actually present at a meeting where the thinner was 
discussed or that they had heard from anyone else that they attended such a meeting. The 
Rijksrecherche added that the civil servants who were supervising the renovation did come to 
the Catshuis, but did not enter the premises very often.266 The Court of Appeal, in its decision 
of 2007 on the written complaint filed by the widow De Lijster and the FNV Builders Union, 
considered that it could not be established that either Korkers or Van der Heijden had been 
present while the painters were at work and could have detected the use of thinner that way. 
The work took place only on the weekends. On weekends, only the presence of custodian 
Giesbers could be established and it had become clear that he was not involved in the 
commissioning of the activities or in the actual carrying out of these activities.267  
 
To conclude: There is no convincing proof that civil servants from the RGD and AZ knew about 
the thinner. What can be concluded is that if it is true that no one from the RGD and AZ knew 
about the use of thinner, a cascade of coincidences has taken place. The lack of supervision on 
the activities of the painters has been condemned by the criminal court in its verdict. If AZ and 
the RGD did not know what happened, according to the court it should at least have been in 
their mind (of the painting company as well as RGD and AZ) to check how the job was being 
handled. There is a different way of looking at this: a professional painting company with a 
good track record was hired for the job and it is not inconceivable that the principals from the 
RGD and AZ would not check on the weekends how the job was being done. How many 
companies or citizens keep a continuous close watch on painters when their building or house 
is being painted? Assumptions by the criminal court, and by other persons involved, that AZ 
and the RGD knew about the use of thinner have not been proven.  
 
 
4.2.4. Case characteristics  
 
Damage  
deaths and serious injuries  One death 
damage compensation paid Damage compensation was paid by the State to the 
widow De Lijster, the exact amount was not disclosed. 
An unconfirmed report from RTL stated that the 
amount was around  
€ 200.000.268  
nature of the act   
                                               
265 Rijksrecherche-report, p. 7. 
266 Rijksrecherche-report, p. 8.  
267 It should be noted that the decision of the Court of Appeal from 2007 did not mention in any way the role of the wall 
hangings.    
268http://www.rtl.nl/(/actueel/rtlnieuws/binnenland/)/components/actueel/rtlnieuws/2009/12_december/18/binnenland
/schadevergoeding-voor-weduwe-catshuisbrand.xml (date last accessed: 29-10-2010) 
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nature of the connection between 
the governmental organization 
and the deaths and serious 
injuries 
The government in this case ordered work by a private 
company: AZ and the RGD served as principals for the 
work that painting company De Goede carried out.  
what rules are broken The use of thinner by painting company De Goede 
constituted a violation of the Labor Conditions Act.  
 
The Catshuis did not possess a fire safety permit, 
which was mandatory under municipal regulations.  
sanctions   
political consequences None  
disciplinary sanctions None  
sanctions concerning criminal 
law 
The painting company, De Goede B.V., was sentenced 
to a fine of € 15.000 for violating the Labor Conditions 
Act. The State was not prosecuted and a complaint 
about this was turned down by the Court of Appeal.  
measures taken for the 
future/lessons learned 
In the final debate in the House of Representatives on 
this subject, the Prime Minister announced two 
measures that would be taken as follow up to this 
affair: 
1) The policy on integrity of the national civil 
service would be complemented by measures to 
ensure an accurate and careful use of the 
instrument of e-mail, specifically to make clear 
what types of discussion are suitable for e-mail 
and to confirm that explicit and accurate 
consultation of the political leadership is 
required. 
2) The cabinet would order a protocol for dealing 
with expert reports and advice from experts.  
number of official investigations 
/ reports on the case 
Seven investigations/reports: 
Police and Public Prosecution, Labor Inspectorate and 
Royal Marechaussee,  
I-TEK, TNO, WFR Gent, RTL News and 
Rijksrecherche. 
number of years from start of the 
case till finish or present 
More than five years (from the fire in May 2004 to the 
payment of compensation to the widow in December 
2009).  
 
 
4.3.  Why: explaining the deaths and serious injuries  
 
There are four different factors to explore further in each of the case studies: opportunities, 
motives, masking and relevant factors for response.  
 
4.3.1. Opportunities  
 
4.3.1.1. Organizational structure and division of responsibilities  
 
The RGD provides accommodation for government departments, independent administrative 
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bodies and international organizations. During the years of the Catshuis fire investigations, the 
RGD was part of the Ministry of VROM. Today it is part of the Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations. The real estate portfolio of the RGD is very diverse. It ranges from office 
buildings to laboratories, from ruins to palaces and from prisons to museums.269 
 
The Ministry of General Affairs (AZ) is the Ministry of the Prime Minister. It cannot be 
compared in size to the other ministries, as it is by far the smallest. AZ includes the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Government Information Service and the Office of the Netherlands 
Scientific Council for Government Policy. 
 
In this case the Labor Inspectorate (which falls under the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment), the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecution (including the Rijksrecherche) 
also played significant roles when it came to the investigations into the fire. The ministries 
involved consulted frequently with each other. 
 
For this specific case, the organizational structure was not complex. The division of 
responsibilities was not complex either: The RGD was responsible for the aspects relating to 
the building, AZ was involved primarily on behalf of the interests of the Prime Minister. The 
RGD ordered painting company De Goede to conduct the painting activities in the Catshuis. 
None of this was fuzzy or complex. In this sense, the aspect of organizational structure and the 
division of responsibilities cannot be considered a significant opportunity.  
 
 
4.3.1.2. Organizational culture  
 
The RGD had a natural focus on constructing buildings and maintaining them for the right price 
and for the right quality. The organization was business oriented and not geared up for operating 
in a politically sensitive environment. This can be detected in the emphasis on averting liability 
and claims, and was by far the more natural way of looking at things within the RGD than 
making judgments about the way such a case could run within the realm of media and politics. 
The amount of money involved (estimates range from four to eight million euro) was not 
particularly large for the RGD, but it appears that the special dynamics of this case caught many 
at the RGD by surprise. The Ministry of AZ is a small ministry, with high level advisors to the 
Prime Minister. The culture is said to be highly professional, with an emphasis on political 
sensitivity and hard work. 
 
 
4.3.1.3. The political system and the relations with corporate partners and 
society  
 
In this case, the connection to the political system has much to do with the location of the fire: It 
is the residence of the Prime Minister. Members of the House of Representatives asked critical 
questions for many years about this case. While it is only normal for them to inquire about such 
an incident, the political aspect should be taken into account here. For opposition parties this was 
also an opportunity to question the Prime Minister about the way he handled the case. At the time, 
Balkenende was frequently criticized for what his opponents called a lack of political leadership. 
It could be argued that this case was judged on its own merits, but the political implications were 
constantly looming in the background. The civil servants certainly anticipated this, judging from 
                                               
269 http://international.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=37576 (date last accessed: 28-10-2010) 
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internal memos about potential political risks.   
 
The widow of Aart de Lijster was supported by the FNV Builders Union. RTL News was very 
active in the case to find evidence of a possible cover-up. In particular, members of the Socialist 
Party (SP), De Wit and Ulenbelt, were also on this track and asked a series of questions on the 
subject in the House of Representatives. Somehow, whether formally or informally, a lobby that 
centered on the widow took shape. This lobby was formed by the FNV, RTL News, the SP and 
the widow’s lawyer and aimed to ‘prove’ the dubious role the State had presumably played in this 
case. The response to this lobby from the government seems to have been a defensive one, mostly 
to prevent political and financial damage. Balkenende felt emotionally involved in the case, 
because the fire happened in his residence.  
 
“Having come to the end of this debate I again thank the members of the House for the 
debate and for their alertness. I really hope that this debate can contribute to the end of 
a discussion, however difficult that is. I know that not everyone in the House has the 
same thoughts on this subject. I would like to say that was happened then is in my mind 
every day and touches me deeply. It may be the case that we have different thoughts on 
the subject of joint liability, but one thing does bind us: the sorrow, the grief and perhaps 
even the rage.”270  
 
What effect this emotional attachment of Balkenende had on the way the case developed is difficult 
to say.  
 
It took five and a half years for the case to be concluded. The final debate in the House of 
Representatives ended with a public scolding by Balkenende of the civil servants involved, their 
actions labeled inaccurate, incorrect and incomplete. Balkenende added that he wished he had been 
aware at an earlier stage of concerns about possible damage so that he could have taken decisions 
for himself. It is not known what exactly took place in the communication between Balkenende 
and his civil servants behind closed doors, but it is clear that the debate was a bitter pill to swallow 
for all involved.  
  
In this case, the relationship with corporate partners concerns that between painting company De 
Goede and the RGD. In response to a confidential internal memorandum about the handling of the 
civil damage claim the State had filed against painting company De Goede, the minister of VROM 
Dekker agreed with the proposed strategy (not claiming full compensation, as it would probably 
turn the company bankrupt). On the memorandum she added the following words: 
 
“Agreed. Considering the preliminary phase in which De Goede always did a fine job and 
the dramatic situation, I find the second option realistic.”271  
 
The painting company regularly worked for the State and apparently, up until that point, to the 
State’s full satisfaction. The company continues to function. De Goede Painting is a medium size 
painting and maintenance company with offices in Vlaardingen and Dordrecht and more than 100 
employees.272  
 
 
                                               
270 Tweede Kamer, 23 juni 2009, TK 98 98-7820.  
271 Confidential internal memorandum from the RGD to the Minister of VROM, June 8, 2004, JA 2004 011 465 
(document published in response to the WOB-request by RTL News on November 2, 2007, appendix 8). 
272 http://www.degoedeschilders.nl/home/ (date last accessed: 23-08-2013) 
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4.3.1.4. Rules, regulations and procedures  
 
In the case of the Catshuis fire, the rules, regulations and procedures were in general fairly clear to 
the parties involved. It does not seem in this case that a multitude of complex rules and regulations 
caused problems. Nevertheless, some observations about the rules, regulations and procedures can 
be made, specifically about the fire safety permit and the Wob.  
 
The Catshuis did not possess a fire safety permit. Although AZ and the RGD disputed that such 
a permit was needed, the Rijksrecherche in its investigation concluded that, on the basis of 
municipal regulations, the fire safety permit was indeed mandatory and should have been 
applied for in 2003.273 If this application had been made, in all likelihood the fire brigade would 
have had specific requirements on the degree to which the wall hangings should be fire 
repellant.  
 
There have been many procedures involved in the Wob requests to publicize government 
documents, many of which were handed over by RTL News. It seems that there were big dilemmas 
in this area. The constant claims of a cover-up in the media put pressure on the government to 
release certain documents, but on the other hand there were legal limitations and other 
considerations to be taken into account. For example, it is clear that criminal investigation by the 
Public Prosecution should not be hampered by the publication of documents concerning the fire. 
Total openness at an early stage can conflict with the interests of a proper criminal investigation. 
Also, the possibility of creating a precedent when publicizing a document is taken into account: 
What will be the consequence for daily communications between civil servants and their ministers 
if they must take into account that certain information will become public? On the other hand, 
publication of documents is often required by the Wob and openness is something that government 
prides itself on. It is also clear that the long time it took for the criminal investigation to be finished, 
for technical investigations to be completed and for questions from the House of Representatives 
to be answered, strengthened the public imagination (whether justified or not) that government 
might have something to conceal in this case.  
 
As Balkenende said in the debate, it is a dilemma for government as to how it can possibly prove 
that certain documents do not exist: Should government have to prove its own innocence when 
responding to claims and assumptions by others? When documents were in fact given, there was 
speculation in the media that not everything had been released, or that the given information was 
not trustworthy. To a large degree, this is a question of trust. It should come as no surprise that a 
relationship of trust between government, parliament and media has come under pressure here.  
 
 
4.4. Motives  
 
4.4.1. Primary motives 
 
Three primary motives have been identified before:  
 
a. rational choice (e.g. a rational choice to commit an act is taken after weighing all 
  the options) 
b. ignorance (e.g. errors due to not knowing the relevant rules or due to lack of 
  professionalism) or  
                                               
273 Rijksrecherche-report, p. 13-15. 
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c. unwillingness (e.g. governmental organizations who feel that they are faced by 
rules that are impossible to implement because of wicked dilemmas) 
 
The question here is what causes can be identified that led to the death of the painter. Clearly, the 
fire was primarily caused by the use of thinner. Other factors were relevant, such as the wall 
hangings, the lack of ventilation because the windows would not open, and the lack of a fire safety 
permit. The fire, then, was caused by error. The use of a dangerous substance such as thinner is a 
form of ignorance, although it should be added that an element of bad luck could very well have 
played a role (a possible spark from the pilot flame of the gas heater). A lack of professionalism 
on the part of the painting company can be identified in this specific case, in the sense that the 
relevant rules and procedures were ignored by the painting company and insufficient measures had 
been taken to prevent possible hazards.  
 
Rational choice might have been present in the actions of the painting company, in the sense that 
they might have been afraid of not finishing their work in time and therefore decided to use thinner, 
but this is to speculate on their motives, and no reliable information concerning their reasons for 
using thinner has been available. Rational choice cannot be viewed as an important cause, neither 
in the actions of the painting company nor the actions of the governmental organizations involved. 
 
Unwillingness to follow the rules cannot be seen in the actions of government connected to the 
cause of the fire. As mentioned before, there were indeed some wicked dilemmas for government 
to face (such as the dilemma between openness and legal and practical restrictions), but these 
cannot be seen as motives for the behavior over the events that led to the fire. There has been no 
convincing proof for the popular theory that AZ and the RGD ordered the painting company to 
use thinner in order to finish the job in time for the EU presidency of the Netherlands that year.  
 
 
4.4.2. Secondary motives  
 
a. financial concerns (cutting costs, staying within budget, avoiding claims, etc.) 
 
After the painter died, the governmental organizations involved were indeed preoccupied with 
financial concerns. The position of the State in legal cases and fears for joint liability were 
explicitly mentioned in internal memorandums which outlined the concerns of the State in this 
particular case. Before the painter died, financial concerns by government did not seem to play a 
large role here.  
 
b. the position of the governmental organization and its public image  
 
In this case, a popular frame has been that the use of thinner was ordered because the Catshuis had 
to be ready for the start of the Dutch EU presidency, which was to start weeks later. On the basis 
of this research, it can only be concluded that no proof has been found that the government ordered 
the use of thinner. Although it has been argued that the accident in the Catshuis came about because 
of the importance of the EU presidency for Prime Minister Balkenende and the consequent 
pressure that was supposedly laid upon the painting company by AZ and the RGD, compelling 
evidence for this view has not been found. Consequently, it cannot be concluded that the position 
of the governmental organization formed a relevant motive in this matter.  
 
c. preferring another norm than the law strives for (for example employment over 
environmental concerns) 
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In this case, there has not been much debate about whether the legal norms (such as those for fire 
safety) were the right ones to comply with. It should be concluded that this was not a relevant 
motive in this case. 
 
d. demands by politicians, citizens, special interest groups and media 
 
A possible motive is that governmental organizations took the wrong decisions because of 
demands by politicians, citizens, special interest groups and media. However, as argued before, 
there has been no proof that government ordered the use of thinner, or pressured the painting 
company to act irresponsibly. The hypothesis that the governmental organizations involved put 
heavy pressure on the painting company to use a forbidden substance in order to finish the job 
more quickly than legally possible, should be refuted.  
 
 
4.5. Masking  
 
Adams and Balfour argue that a characteristic of administrative evil is that it is masked, in the 
sense that there are many factors preventing us from identifying what is really going on and judging 
whether that constitutes administrative evil or not. In the following section, these factors are briefly 
described and subsequently analyzed in relation to this case. 
 
 
4.5.1. Distance in time and space  
 
The perspective from which the case was viewed was an exclusively Dutch affair, with no 
international aspects. International interest in the case was limited. Distance in space is relevant 
here, since it is probably more difficult to recognize administrative evil in one’s own country. 
Distance in time seems particularly relevant. The fire took place in 2004. The ‘end’ of the case, 
as far as can be determined at this time, was in December 2009, when the widow received 
compensation from the State. After that, RTL News announced that it had withdrawn the 
remaining Wob requests and that it considered the case to be closed. What is striking about the 
case of the Catshuis fire is that, at first, the real facts were very slow to come to light. The 
criminal investigation started right after the fire in May 2004, but the decision to prosecute the 
painting company became public on December 22, 2005. In such a high profile case, one and a 
half years just to come to a prosecution decision, is a remarkably long time. Although the Public 
Prosecution is of course independent and should be able to make its own decisions in cases like 
this, the very long period the investigation took begs the question whether the Public 
Prosecution managed its priorities all that well here. The same goes for the handling by the 
Court of Appeal of the complaint that the widow filed against the Public Prosecution for not 
prosecuting the RGD and the Ministry of AZ. The complaint was filed on March 16, 2006 and 
the Court turned down the complaint on February 28, 2007, almost a year later. The technical 
investigations also took a very long time. Some things might have been complicated, but on the 
other hand it seems strange that TNO had to wait for such long periods for technical information 
about the gas heater, the strips of the wall hangings and the report by I-TEK, sometimes for up 
to half a year or even three quarters of a year after starting its research. The many Wob requests 
have been mentioned already, and all took time. The House of Representatives asked many 
questions, but the answers came very slowly.  
 
The case of the Catshuis fire has taken a period of five and a half years, a very long period for 
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unraveling the truth about a single fire that took place in one room in a building, killing one 
person. It could be argued that technical and criminal research simply take time and that 
therefore questions by parliament could not be answered sooner. But this was not a fire in just 
any building. This was a fire in the house of the Prime Minister. In such a situation, in which 
every single civil servant involved must have sensed the significance of the matter, it is strange 
that too little effort seems to have been made to speed up the process and to inform parliament 
and the public more swiftly about the exact causes and circumstances of the fire. On the other 
hand, it should also be noted that in the public eye, over time, it was assumed there was a cover-
up, and it was believed that the government had ordered the use of thinner. The haste of the 
painters because of the coming Dutch presidency of the European Union often served as an 
argument, as did the assumption that ‘they must have known’. Over time, this too has been 
proved to be wrong. The changing perspective thus works its wonders in different ways. To 
conclude: In this case, clearly our perspective was blurred by the passage of time.  
 
 
4.5.2. Object-relations psychology/scapegoating (splitting mechanism)  
 
The position of painter Aart de Lijster is relevant here. The criminal court considered amongst 
other things that the painting company unjustly tried to shift the blame for the use of thinner to 
its own staff, painter De Lijster and his colleague. The fact that the painting company had the 
order for 65 liter of thinner in its administration should be borne in mind.  
  
As far as the governmental organizations are concerned, it is clear that they have always denied 
knowledge of the use of thinner. It should be added that there do not seem to be explicit 
statements by the State that the painter himself was the only one to blame. In the public debate, 
it has often been argued that De Lijster served as the scapegoat for the government, which tried 
to cover up its own role. Direct statements by governmental organizations that seem to 
scapegoat De Lijster personally have not been found, but the state has pointed to the painting 
company (and so also indirectly to De Lijster) as the responsible actor.  
 
 
4.5.3. Perspective  
 
The perspective from which evil is most often recognized is that of the victim. This often makes 
for the ‘myth of pure evil’. This is partly due to the fact that modern culture shows tendencies, 
exacerbated by mass media, to present moral questions in black and white: all good or all bad. 
Criminals are wholly evil and heroes should be wholly good. Since moral questions are cast in 
absolute terms, the possibility of reversing the image is considerably expanded.  
 
The victim in the case of the Catshuis fire is painter Aart de Lijster and with him his wife and 
children. On August 29, 2009 De Telegraaf published an interview with the widow of De 
Lijster, titled ‘Struggle against the cover-up’. In the interview, the widow described how her 
husband would home from his work at the Catshuis with garbage bags full of rags soaked in 
thinner.  
 
“Aart underestimated it. If he had known how dangerous that stuff was, he never would 
have done it.”274 
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The widow said in the interview that she had struggled for years to bring what really happened 
on the day of the fire into the open. She described how her daughter came home and told her 
that the newspapers claimed that it was all her father’s fault because he worked with thinner.  
 
“There was a court case against the painting company. Aart was blamed for everything. 
It was suggested that he would have decided to use thinner on his own initiative. That is 
the greatest nonsense that there is. Just like his colleagues, Aart had to show his passport 
on arrival at the Catshuis every day. Which materials and tools went inside was 
recorded meticulously.”275  
 
In reaction to the way the government handled the case (especially concerning the TNO report 
about the role of the wall hangings), she concluded: 
 
“I don’t understand how they can have the heart to do what they did. The State makes 
the laws, but they themselves do whatever they like. Balkenende included, he, too, is 
responsible. I could have accepted this if the government had admitted that this was a 
terrible accident, that they had made a mistake and if they would have helped me 
afterwards. Balkenende won’t even apologize. I’m left here to sort it out on my own with 
my children…”276 
 
It seems likely that talks with the widow and her advisors had been started sometime after the 
debate in the House of Representatives in order to reach a settlement. As the widow’s words 
quoted reveal, she was certainly angry about what she considered a lack of empathy on the part 
of the government, not least Prime Minister Balkenende. Although much could be said about 
why the whole case took such a long period of time and about who was responsible for that, 
there must have been sympathy for the widow who had lost her husband, and for her desire for 
justice, understanding and an admission of what went wrong. And in the early years of the case, 
concern for the widow and her family might have been evident in the Government’s response 
in some way or other. Consider these words the Prime Minister wrote to the House of 
Representatives on June 5, 2009: 
 
“On behalf of the colleagues, I would first like to repeat what I have emphasized already 
several times before in debates with your House, namely that our thoughts continue to 
go out to the victim, his widow and the family. The fact that all the investigations have 
stretched out over a number of years after the accident, will no doubt have burdened the 
widow and her family.”277 
 
Nevertheless, the communication with the widow was clearly not managed in such a way that 
her feelings and needs were dealt with in what she believed to be a satisfactory manner. It is 
not unthinkable that a different strategy by the State, allowing them to talk with her out of the 
spotlight and to show more compassion and understanding, would have been more successful 
than allowing the formal rules, political and financial considerations to dominate. Three to four 
months later, a settlement was reached that the widow found satisfactory and considered to be 
vindication for her late husband. No further publicity was given to the contents of the settlement 
and the amount of money involved.  
 
In the ‘magnitude gap’ discussed earlier, the perspective of the victim often differs greatly from 
                                               
275 ‘Strijd tegen doofpot’, De Telegraaf, August 29, 2009. 
276 ‘Strijd tegen doofpot’, De Telegraaf, August 29, 2009. 
277 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2008–2009, 31 700 VI, nr. 127, p. 1. 
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that of the perpetrator. From the victim’s perspective, most often in hindsight, evil can be clearly 
identified. From the perpetrator’s perspective, however, it is not so easily identified. They may 
agree that the act was perhaps not a good one, or even that it was evil, but taking other factors, 
such as prior injustices, into account, perpetrators often easily produce rationales and justifications 
for their acts.  
 
As noted, there has been no legal proof that civil servants knew about the use of thinner. What is 
recognized, however, is that civil servants did produce rationales and justifications for their actions 
and that the civil servants in this case, as well as Prime Minister Balkenende, were sometimes cast 
as the villains. For instance on the evening news on Balkenende’s last day in office, the Catshuis 
fire was prominently featured as one of the failures of his eight-year period as prime minister. 
Clearly, the civil servants, politicians and lawyers involved have a different experience of the 
same event and therefore different views. From each perspective the truth might be clear cut 
and it is not always appropriate to question the sincerity of either party. But it does seem, 
nevertheless, that the distorting feature of perspective is at work in this case.  
 
 
4.5.4. Language  
 
In this case, language is important for its legal implications. The fear of claims for financial 
compensation caused sensitivity amongst the governmental organizations involved about the 
language used to describe the incident. It appears as if all words have been weighed by legal 
experts to determine whether they would hold risks for the financial position of the State. The 
language that was used publicly by governmental organizations at times differed substantially 
from the words that were used internally. ‘Openness’ was supplanted by ‘political and financial 
risks’.  
 
An interesting anecdote illustrates how significant a precise choice of words can be. Prime 
Minister Balkenende used the phrase ‘inaccurate, incorrect and incomplete’ to describe the 
investigation by civil servants into the Catshuis fire. Politically responsible for the civil service, 
condemning them was tantamount to condemning himself. The choice of words was critical. A 
newspaper article a week after the debate pointed out that the words ‘inaccurate, incorrect and 
incomplete’ were exactly the same words used almost ten years earlier when the current 
opposition were in power. They were used in the context of mistakes made by two ministers in 
relation to the cargo plane crash in the Bijlmer in Amsterdam. Both were allowed to carry on 
as ministers. By the time of the Catshuis fire, their parties were in opposition and had they 
called for a motion of censure on Balkenende, he would have pointed out that exactly the same 
terminology had been applied to the ministers of their own party with impunity.278  
 
 
4.5.5. Dehumanization  
 
The victim in this case was not depersonalized in any way, nor is he spoken of in a 
dehumanizing way. Whether or not one believes in the existence of a cover-up, it is hard to 
argue that dehumanization of anybody took place in this case. 
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4.5.6. Technical rationality  
 
In the case of the Catshuis fire, there seems to be a clear form of technical rationality. Prime 
Minister Balkenende concluded that his civil servants had acted inaccurately, incorrectly and 
incompletely. The word ‘incomplete’ is significant: 
 
“Incomplete because civil servants and the state advocate looked only at the civil 
interests of the State. That has proved to be a too limited perspective in this case. What 
should have weighed heavier were the broader public interest and the research interest 
of the public prosecutor. It may be necessary for the State in civil proceedings to deal 
differently with the other party than the way individuals and businesses treat each other 
in civil cases.”279 
 
This analysis by Balkenende reveals a possible mechanism behind the actions in this case. Many 
of the actions taken were approached with a limited perspective: the fear of compensation 
claims and the fear for political damage to the Prime Minister. The civil servants involved, 
Balkenende declared, did all this out of the best intentions: They wanted to serve the interests 
of the State. Balkenende understood this, but publicly declared his anger that the civil servants 
involved had not put him in a position to make the overall decision about the way the case 
should be handled. Obviously, Balkenende had a role as political leader in this: He should have 
been sharper in his management of the case. It appears that for years the government, with 
Prime Minister Balkenende as its leader and primarily responsible, failed to show empathy and 
understanding towards the widow. Instead of a focus on legal and financial concerns, had the 
path of a personal meeting with the other party been chosen sooner and empathy shown at an 
earlier stage, this might have changed the dynamics of the case and perhaps led to a different 
outcome.  
  
Many in the governmental organizations involved carried on with their normal routines. 
Individually, they most often took rational courses of action. However, what seems lacking here 
is a total overview of the case and a proper judgment at strategic level about how it should be 
handled. Although there appears to have been frequent consultation between the ministries 
involved, a breakthrough in the case was only reached after five and a half years. The negative 
political and financial outcome that had been feared for the most part, in fact, materialized. 
 
Here, the financial perspective and the initial stance taken by the State at some points (most 
notably the handling of the TNO report) outweighed the provision of complete and truthful 
information to the public. It seems fair to conclude that the way the State behaved in this case 
was correct for the most part, but, at least at a crucial point, it can be described as elevating 
technical processes over human values and dignity. 
 
 
4.6. Response of the governmental organizations involved  
 
4.6.1. Language  
 
In this case, many internal documents have been published in some way, giving us an insight 
in the way the governmental organizations involved spoke about this case. There are some 
notable differences between the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’ language.  
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4.6.2. External language  
 
Eventually, in the public debate about the case, the words ‘cover-up’ came to dominate the 
discussion. In the public’s view, the government was trying to blame the painter who had died 
for the fire, while trying to cover up its own part. It was claimed that AZ and the RGD must 
have ordered the use of thinner, because they wanted to get quick results in time for the 
European presidency of the Netherlands. The ruling by the criminal court in The Hague added 
to the public feeling that something fishy was going on: It was assumed that either the 
government knew about it, or that it had consciously turned a blind eye to the way the painting 
company handled the job.  
 
The public response of the government seemed to deny this and maintain that they were being 
open and transparent. To illustrate this, let us look at three examples of responses by 
government to claims of cover-up. On March 24, 2006, the RGD reacted to both the ruling in 
the criminal court case against the painting company De Goede and to the media coverage in a 
statement to the press: 
 
“In some media, especially, the motivation of the court concerning the assumed 
knowledge of the officials involved was singled out and presented as an established fact. 
From own research and based on the file that the RGD received from the Public 
Prosecution, it has not been shown that this presumed knowledge was actually present. 
The RGD draws attention to the press statement of the Public Prosecution of December 
23, 2005. It says: “The inquiry has shown no evidence that the RGD as principal of the 
painting ordered or knew that in the Catshuis the prohibited substance was used and in 
the wrong way applied. There is therefore no basis for bringing the Government 
Buildings Agency to prosecution.”280  
 
On November 21, 2007, RTL News reported that a whistleblower made a declaration to a notary 
to the effect that the top of the RGD and AZ intervened and prevented the government from 
having to justify itself to the court. The RGD did not recognize this picture of events, a 
spokeswoman said. The RGD gave the order to remove a wax layer from the floor in the 
Catshuis, but did not order the use of thinner, according to her. The RGD distanced itself from 
what RTL called ‘cover-up activities’. “We exercised openness.”281 The Rijksrecherche in her 
investigation did not find any confirmation for the declaration by the whistleblower. 
 
Prime Minister Balkenende said this in the debate in the House of Representatives on February 
28, 2008:  
 
“I wish to express that we have in various ways rendered an account of what has 
happened in this case since 2004. In response to various questions, we have displayed 
complete openness to the House about all the facts and circumstances concerning the 
fire and the investigations that followed it, each time to the best of our ability. We have 
done so while taking into consideration the restraint that is appropriate when a judicial 
investigation is pending and within the limits that form the context of the Wob. We have 
done that up till now and naturally we will continue to do so. I point in this context to 
the fairly exceptional step to give the House access to the entire research files under 
condition of confidentiality. We seem to be caught in an impasse in the sense that over 
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and over again assumptions are expressed about activities which might have occurred 
and documents that might have been produced, while we ourselves have not traced these 
activities and the documents have not been found. Then we find ourselves in a difficult 
situation. We need to convince the House that something is not there, the existence – or 
possible existence - of which the House is apparently convinced of. I find difficult the 
suggestion that the Cabinet obscures the truth. I point out once again that the many 
anonymous suggestions that pop up, were in no way confirmed by the extensive criminal 
investigation, of which the House has been fully informed. The Court of Appeal has seen 
no basis in the files to order the prosecution of the civil servants involved. The 
government, however, constantly finds itself in the position of having to prove its own 
innocence. ”282   
 
Balkenende went on to say that the reports by RTL News that information about the 
involvement of civil servants with the use of forbidden substances was being withheld from the 
Public Prosecution, had prompted the government to request the Public Prosecution (and 
consequently the Rijksrecherche) to investigate the matter further.  
 
These responses can be characterized as follows: The process is open and transparent, but with 
respect for the limitations that criminal investigations and regulations naturally pose to 
complete openness. The key word in the response that the government gave was ‘openness’. As 
the response by Balkenende showed, there was some frustration within the governmental 
organizations involved that they were not believed by the media. As the case developed further 
in the manner it did, this critical stance of the media and the House of Representatives did not 
change, rather the contrary happened. It can be argued that the vow of ‘openness’ did not make 
any headway, perhaps in a way confirming the ‘mission impossible’ position that Balkenende 
had signaled when it came to the State having to prove its own innocence. To illustrate this, let 
us look at the words of a member of the opposition in the House of Representatives, Pechtold 
(a liberal democrat) during the final debate on the case: 
 
“This is quite something! This is about the rule of confidence which the House of 
Representatives is entitled to. As a member of the House, I do not want to be asking 
questions for four years about leaked information and researchers who blew the whistle. 
When the Labor Party says that this is ‘indigestible’ - I share that characterization – 
what does that say about the atmosphere at the Department of AZ? What does it say 
when the prime minister - let me put it in my own words – is made to look like a fool 
because he asks everyone to ‘come forward with information?’ Miss Timmer: that 
information was at that moment right behind him in a drawer, beyond the reach of the 
Wob, beyond the capacity of the House. Now this information is made available under 
condition of confidentiality. I cannot even quote it from here! And that after four 
years.”283 
 
 
4.6.3. Internal language  
 
In an e-mail message dated May 30, 2005, from a legal advisor from the RGD to the state 
advocate’s office, the sensitivity of the TNO report is illustrated: 
 
“I have just been told by [undisclosed source] that at strategic level at both the RGD as 
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well as the Ministry of AZ, they do not feel very good about the presence of a report by 
TNO in which seemingly blunt conclusions are drawn that for an important part are 
based on assumptions and statements. The uncomfortable feeling exists that the report 
or the contents will come out in the open at some time and will cause damage to the 
Minister and or the Prime Minister. I can try to explain to you what is meant by that, but 
I think that your political antenna is sufficiently developed to make that explanation 
unnecessary. For this reason I want to urge you to come up with the memorandum as 
soon as possible. Not in order to ‘keep a lid on the cover-up’, but to be able to clarify, 
if circumstances should demand it, that the TNO report, considering its assumptions and 
premises, would be delayed until more information is available with which the 
provisional report can be completed.”284 
 
It should be noted here that it later turned out that this report was ‘delayed’ for more than three 
years. Apparently, the civil servants involved were aware of the public debate about the 
supposed cover-up, but were also very apprehensive about possible political damage. This point 
was mentioned again in an internal memo on June 27, 2005 from a civil servant at AZ to the 
secretary-general, in which the TNO report was also mentioned. More specifically, it was stated 
that there was a shared conclusion that the thinner was the cause of the fire, but that TNO had 
also mentioned the impact of the wall hangings. Apparently, this was referred to in conversation 
as ‘the Volendam effect’.285 The memo also stated: 
 
“Next to, among other things, an ethical aspect, the political risks are also increasing, 
in light of the constant attention of the House of Representatives and the FNV Builders 
Union.” 286 
 
It is interesting to note that an ethical aspect is mentioned here too, although it is not explained 
further. That same day, an e-mail to several people involved contained an overview of the state 
of affairs. It mentioned that the Director-General of the RGD was in favor of sending the TNO 
report to the Public Prosecution. It was also stated that there were no rules for impregnating the 
wall hangings, since the Catshuis is not a public building. The conclusion was that no rules 
were violated and that the wrongful use of thinner remained the most important cause for the 
fire. The secretary-general of AZ, Kuijken, wrote on a printed version of this mail that it was 
time to inform certain people (assumedly the director of the RVD, Van der Wulp) of this matter 
in person, he adds ‘not by e-mail’.287  
 
In a meeting on June 29, 2005, at the office of the state advocate, the TNO report was discussed. 
RGD, AZ and Peter Reijman were also present. In the written summary of the meeting, it was 
stated that all present realized that the content of the preliminary report was very sensitive. The 
content could be relevant for the criminal case against the painting company, but it was claimed 
that the people present were not competent to judge if this were the case. It further stated:  
 
“There can be no ‘cover-up’ of this preliminary report. At the same time, the people 
present agree that the report is ‘unripe’. […] Based on the objections against the 
preliminary report the people present conclude that it does not make sense to send the 
current version of the report to the Public Prosecution. The risk is too great that the 
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preliminary report will start to have a life of its own, while the nature of the research 
that was carried out does not justify such a course of events. Internal confidentiality is 
therefore an absolute necessity.”288 
 
The meeting was concluded with the statement that it would be better to look at the report again 
after the information from the Public Prosecution would become available.   
 
To conclude: The internal language focused on minimizing the political and financial damage 
as well as on keeping at least some things out of the public domain. Civil servants are certainly 
expected to advise ministers about possible political and financial risks, but it is striking that 
these considerations seem to play such an important role here. To conclude: ‘Openness’ was 
certainly not the key word in internal discussions, rather ‘confidentiality’ and ‘sensitivity’ seem 
to have been more important ‘buzz words’. 
 
 
4.6.4. Strategy  
 
In an e-mail from the Ministry of VROM dated June 27, 2005, the TNO report was discussed 
as follows: 
 
“If the story of TNO is correct – and they will critically examine their own wording – 
then that is a very grave matter, most of all for the deceased painter, but also for: 
- the criminal proceedings: will we bring the TNO report to attention, if the Public 
Prosecution or the counterparty does not suggest this? 
- the civil law procedure: the position concerning the damage claim could be 
  different now 
- the new wall hangings: go through with it provided they are of high quality as 
far as fire safety is concerned, and impregnated as well, or of another design 
(time and costs?).”289   
 
A written addition on the printed e-mail stated that there was an ethical aspect involved, 
specifically that it is common that technical reports are mutually exchanged between both 
parties and that the RGD already possessed the reports made by the counterparty. The e-mail 
concluded with the advice to discuss this matter with the minister of VROM in the RGD-staff 
meeting and stated that the secretary-general of AZ would be informed about it as well. The 
answers to these questions have become clear over the years. The Public Prosecution was at the 
time not informed about the TNO report and the civil law question with the painting company 
was dealt with in June 2007, a couple of years before the TNO report finally became public. 
From this email, it becomes clear that there was some attention paid to the fate of the painter 
and to safety in the Catshuis (a decision is asked for on new wall hangings, albeit paying 
attention to time and costs), but it is also clear that the criminal proceedings and the civil law 
procedure (and consequently the financial interests of the state) were drawn into the equation 
here.  
 
On February 10, 2009, an internal memorandum was written by Houtzagers, the state advocate. 
Houtzagers cited several arguments for the decision not to send the TNO report to the Public 
Prosecution. Firstly, the OM had not handed over its own files concerning this case to the State 
                                               
288 http://media.rtl.nl/media/actueel/rtlnieuws/2009/01_geheime_memorandum.pdf (date last accessed: 23-08-2013) 
289 http://media.rtl.nl/media/actueel/rtlnieuws/2009/03_paniek_op_vrom.pdf (date last accessed: 23-08-2013) 
 
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
92 
 
and had treated the State just like any other party. Secondly, it was difficult to imagine that in 
the reports the role of the wall hangings had not received attention. Thirdly, the preliminary 
report was ‘unripe’ and thus it would have been odd to send the Public Prosecution a report 
when its usefulness was already in question. Fourthly, the information concerning the wall 
hangings was deemed irrelevant to the question whether the painting company had violated 
Labor Conditions Act. And finally, the report by Reijman took place in the light of a discussion 
between the State and the painting company on the civil law grounds for paying for the damage. 
If such a report - as ‘unripe’ as it was - were to be made public, this could give the painting 
company an argument to claim that the damage was partly the State’s own fault. Houtzagers 
concluded that no mistake was made by not insisting on informing the Public Prosecution about 
the TNO report, but: 
 
“Looking back, with the knowledge of now and also in the light of the investigation by 
the Rijksrecherche, another decision would perhaps have been wiser.”290  
 
In retrospect, the last line is a classic understatement. To respond briefly to the arguments: 
Firstly, the State should be treated just like any other party. That is how it should be in a 
constitutional state. Secondly, the role of the wall hangings was indeed mentioned in the report 
by the Labor Inspectorate, but this had not received any significant attention from anybody. 
RGD, AZ and the state advocate were well aware of it, otherwise why would they be so 
distressed by the TNO report? Thirdly, it can be concluded that several parts of the report were 
incomplete or incorrect, but in the end the Belgian second opinion confirmed that the role of 
the wall hangings was indeed relevant. Fourthly, the judgment whether the TNO report was 
relevant to the criminal court case against the painting company was obviously not for the RGD, 
AZ or the state advocate to decide, but concerns the prosecution of a subject – by its nature the 
sole responsibility of the Public Prosecution, which in the Dutch system makes its decision to 
prosecute entirely independently. The final argument closes the case: Publicizing the report 
would indeed have given arguments that the damage was partly the fault of the State. It should 
be conceded that the wall hangings were not the cause of the fire; the direct cause was the 
thinner, with some uncertainty about the exact source of the detonation, which could be the gas 
heater or, more unlikely, the wall sockets or something else. However, the experts (both TNO 
and the Belgian experts) have concluded that the wall hangings made the fire spread faster. That 
would probably have led to an even more complicated discussion on the liability for the fire, 
but this was by all means relevant information. The painting company De Goede was put in a 
disadvantaged position in the civil law case because the role of the wall hangings was not 
exposed at this stage. 
 
The government’s strategy was mixed. Instances of real openness were obscured by attempts 
to downplay the role of the State and keep confidential those documents which might have been 
damaging. Many questions were answered correctly, but some important information 
consciously omitted in reports to parliament, the courts and the parties involved.  
 
Examining the factors found earlier to be relevant to government response, it becomes clear 
that neither an error management culture aimed at learning from mistakes nor an ideal process 
for reacting to integrity violations were in place here. The typical responses to organizational 
crime were present for the most part, such as reference to higher loyalties and denial of the 
criminal character of the act. The typical responses to rule breaking by governments displayed 
here included referring to the complex situation the government found itself in and the denial 
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of integrity breaches. Although theory of state crime points out that the state itself can define 
what is criminal, in this case it appears that independent law enforcement mechanisms actually 
performed independently, often criticizing governmental behavior. Pointing to other 
responsible parties is found in most responses by government to the events surrounding the 
Catshuis fire. Of course, many factors that were mentioned in the bodies of knowledge did not 
apply, for example denial of the occurrence of damage, denial of victimhood and ‘condemning 
the condemners’. But on balance, it is fair to say that government has reacted in line with the 
theories from the bodies of knowledge: Denial of its own misbehavior and blaming others is 
found more frequently than an open attitude that focuses on organizational learning.   
 
 
4.7. Position in the space between error and evil  
 
4.7.1. Error  
 
Errors were defined as deviations between the intended and actual outcome of an action, where 
(1) the deviation is unintentional and; (2) the error maker should have known better, implying 
that the error was potentially avoidable. In the case of the Catshuis fire, it seems clear that the 
fire was caused by error. The intended outcome of the use of thinner was to remove the wax 
layer from the floor in the Herenkamer, so that the floor could be treated further. The actual 
outcome was the fire that killed Aart de Lijster. Obviously, this was unintentional but it 
happened in goal-directed action: action aimed at treating the floors to make them presentable. 
The error maker, painting company De Goede, should have known better. They certainly knew 
that the indoor use of thinner was forbidden, therefore dangerous, and requiring safety 
precautions that were not taken. Whatever the source of detonation – the gas pilot light or the 
electric spark, both of which involved an element of bad luck – the painters were not sufficiently 
protected against it. The error (or the bad luck for that matter) was avoidable.  
 
It is relevant for the role that governmental organizations played here, that error should be 
clearly distinguished from its consequences. It was highly debated whether the civil servants 
from AZ and the RGD knew about the use of thinner, but it must be concluded from all the 
research that there has been no convincing proof for this. It can be established however, that 
the error (the use of thinner) might have had different consequences if other errors had not been 
made by the governmental organizations involved: failure to make the wall hangings in the 
Catshuis fire repellent, failure to have windows that would open to allow proper ventilation and 
the failure to obtain a fire safety certificate. There is no certainty that the painter would have 
survived had these been in place but a sequence of errors and coincidences seems to have 
occurred here that turned out to have fatal consequences. 
 
 
4.7.2. Rule breaking by government  
 
Rule-breaking governmental organizations were defined earlier as governmental organizations 
that violate rules or standards while carrying out their responsibilities. In the case of the 
Catshuis fire, the rule breaking was principally the use of thinner which was in violation of the 
Labor Conditions Act. It is clear that painting company De Goede violated these rules. Despite 
suspicions and assumptions, there has not been proof that governmental organizations (AZ and 
the RGD) or their civil servants were aware of the forbidden use of thinner. The rules that were 
broken by government concerned the fact that the Catshuis did not possess a fire safety 
certificate. This situation, as stated by the Rijksrecherche (although debated by the RGD and 
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the Ministry of AZ), constituted a breach of administrative law. 
 
 
4.7.3. Integrity and corruption  
 
Corruption, whether understood as bribing or nepotism, has not been found in this case. 
Integrity was defined earlier as the quality of acting in accordance with relevant moral values, 
norms and rules. The subject of integrity was discussed by Prime Minister Balkenende in the 
final debate in the House of Representatives on the Catshuis fire. He stated that he did not want 
to qualify the actions of the civil servants involved as a breach of integrity, but that he did 
consider those actions to be inaccurate, incorrect and incomplete. Integrity was not at stake 
here, he stated, because the people involved had the intention of protecting the interests of the 
State and its ministers.291 If we compare this line of reasoning with the definition of integrity 
adopted here, (acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms and rules), there is an 
awkwardness. It might be thought that merely trying to serve the interests of the State will 
protect from a breach of integrity. Later in the debate, Balkenende comes back to this point: 
 
“I myself have the conviction, as I also said at the press conference and as I said again 
today, that people were speaking for the interests of the State. That is why I would not 
like to highlight the theme of integrity and that I refuse to say that officials did not act 
with integrity. If at some point you say: my Minister may have problems because of this, 
then that is still pretty well meant. That the Minister is not helped by that one bit and is 
actually troubled by it, is annoying. I am troubled by it now, I say plainly. But I also said 
that I approach these officials, not from a viewpoint of integrity, but from this stance: 
This approach was incorrect, inaccurate and incomplete. I cannot say it more 
clearly.”292 
 
What Balkenende does here is to link integrity to ‘meaning well’. The first problem here is that 
it is quite debatable whether these intentions were in fact good at all times. Balkenende himself 
indicated in the debate that the word ‘incomplete’ referred to the fact that his civil servants and 
the state advocate took a too limited viewpoint into account: the civil law interests of the State 
(the financial risks of having to pay compensation and the risk of setting a precedent). The care 
for victims and for complete and truthful reporting to the public were not seen as paramount as 
they should have been. There may be some understanding of governmental organizations who 
primarily fear paying financial compensation, but more might be expected from them. In fact 
Balkenende admitted that this stance was, in the end, not in the best interest of the State.  
 
A second problem with this line of reasoning is that it could imply that certain political motives 
are an indication of good intentions. It seems legitimate that civil servants to some degree want 
to protect their Minister, but Balkenende himself also indicated that this was the wrong way to 
protect him and that he would have preferred to have known the full facts and make decisions 
himself. Good intentions, whether from a financial or political perspective, are fine, but they do 
not imply that integrity was not breached in any way. A third problem concerned the 
consequences for the other parties involved: the painting company and the widow were both 
disadvantaged by the actions of the State, most specifically by the TNO report on the role of 
the wall hangings being withheld from the public debate for a long period of time.   
 
It is clear that at least some of the actions of the civil servants involved were not in accordance 
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with relevant moral values and norms specifically when it came to disclosure of the TNO report. 
Balkenende condemned this and apologized with the by now infamous three words (‘inaccurate, 
incorrect and incomplete’). Whilst one may accept the accuracy of that comment, it remains 
that there were also breaches of integrity. 
 
 
4.7.4. Organizational crime  
 
The first issue here is that of criminalization: Can the governmental behavior in the selected 
case study be defined as criminal? Did the actions violate existing criminal law? The answer 
here is clear: The Court of Appeals rejected the complaint that the State should have been 
prosecuted for its role in the Catshuis fire. And nothing in the report from the Rijksrecherche 
suggested this should have been otherwise: Knowledge of the use of thinner was not proven. 
The information about the role of the wall hangings that came into the public domain much 
later would not have changed this: The Public Prosecution stated that the information from the 
TNO report would not have led to a different prosecution decision. The conclusion should be 
that the governmental behavior in this case cannot be defined as criminal. The Catshuis fire is 
not a case of organizational crime. Nor is there evidence in this case of white collar crime, a 
crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation. 
The director of the painting company was not prosecuted as a private person, it was the company 
that was convicted for violating the Labor Conditions Act. The criminal act committed by the 
painting company could be described as corporate crime. The verdict by the criminal court and the 
later research all showed that there was convincing proof for this. It should be added that the role 
of the wall hangings and the lack of a fire permit were not included in the court case against the 
painting company and the influence of these elements on the verdict can only be guessed at. This 
case should not just be about the role of the painting company, which received most of the blame 
when the complete picture shows that responsibility might be shared. What is clear is that the 
components of corporate crime are seen in the Catshuis,  
 
 
4.7.5. State crime  
 
State crime was defined earlier as illegal or socially injurious acts of omission or commission 
by individuals in an institution of political governance for the attainment of state or state 
agencies operational goals. Again, it should be pointed out that it has not been established that 
the governmental organizations involved committed any criminal act. If there had been proof 
that the RGD and AZ ordered the painters to use thinner, this would have qualified as an illegal 
act of commission by the individuals from the institutions of political governance (RGD and 
AZ) for the attainment of a state agency’s operational goals. Likewise, if the RGD and AZ did 
not order the use of thinner, but were aware of its use beforehand and had condoned it, this 
would have been an illegal (or at least socially injurious) act of omission. Examining the 
description ‘socially injurious acts of omission’ could lead to another line of reasoning, but this, 
too, would be based on unproven assumptions. There is no sufficient basis to conclude that this 
was a case of state crime.  
 
 
4.7.6. Administrative evil  
 
First of all, is there evil? Evil is defined by Adams and Balfour as “actions of human beings 
that unjustly or needlessly inflict pain and suffering and death on other human beings”. In the 
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case of the Catshuis fire, it has been recognized that there has been no convincing legal proof 
that the government ordered the use of thinner. If they had done so, one could have argued that 
they took unacceptable risks for the safety of the painters. But this has not been established and 
so it cannot be concluded that the State engaged in acts that meet the definition of evil advanced 
here. There can, and should be, criticism of the actions of the State in withholding important 
information from the Public Prosecution, the courts, the parliament, the parties involved and 
the public, but this does not qualify as evil according to our definition. If ‘evil’ cannot be 
substantiated, administrative evil does not come into play, even if we might have expected 
different behavior from the government. 
 
 
4.8. Conclusions  
 
The question why and how governmental behavior in this case led to the death of the painter is not 
easily answered. In the public eye, the case of the Catshuis fire is often seen as a cover-up by a 
government which shirked its responsibility for the fire. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish 
clearly which conclusions can be backed up by the facts that are known in this case. The 
investigations showed that the fire was not caused by actions ordered by the State, but through the 
use of thinner, for which the painting company carried responsibility. The painting company was 
convicted in court, while the Court of Appeal upheld the decision by the Public Prosecution not to 
prosecute the State. From the evidence, it seems clear that if thinner had not been used, the fire 
would not have happened. However, this is not the complete story. It is true that the State was 
responsible for the wall hangings which added to the speed with which the fire spread. But even 
if the governmental organizations involved had made the wall hangings fire repellant 
beforehand, there is still no certainty that the painter would have survived the fire. The State 
also did not possess a fire safety permit, which might have led to better preventive measures 
(although this, too, cannot be said with complete certainty). The information about the impact of 
the wall hangings, mentioned in the report by TNO, came out only after the painting company was 
convicted, something which understandably still frustrates the painting company.  
 
Concluding: This was a clear case of error. This was an avoidable error by the painting 
company, and in combination with some bad luck, it had terrible consequences. These 
consequences could have been mitigated if the governmental organizations had not made some 
errors of their own. Integrity breaches can be identified, but these cannot be said to include the 
direct cause of the fire. Governmental organizations have not been held criminally responsible. 
The fact that the painting company was convicted makes it possible to conclude that this was a 
form of corporate crime, although it should be clear that the painting company did not intend 
this accident to happen. Rule breaking by government, state crime and administrative evil do 
not seem to apply to the case of the Catshuis fire.  
 
The second research question was how the governmental organizations involved responded to 
the events in this case and why they responded in this way. The responses of the governmental 
organizations seem to have been motivated too much by political and financial concerns. 
Although the evidence does not show that government itself should be held responsible for the 
direct cause of the fire, it can be concluded that the governmental organizations have made life 
very difficult for everybody, themselves included. The defensive and secretive stance that was 
adopted led to years of heated debate. It is true that government sometimes finds itself with its 
hands tied because of legal restrictions and certainly, there is logic to concluding any criminal 
investigations before answering all the questions. That is how it often works in the 
constitutional state. However, the wish to avoid political and financial damage seemed 
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paramount in many considerations. In some instances, evasive answers to parliament and press 
were given and many Wob requests were also refused in this case. 
 
In several instances, a defensive stance was preferred to openness, even though there were 
instances of openness, for example the exceptional act of placing a report by the Rijksrecherche 
at the disposal of the House of Representatives. In the end, the greatest fears were realized. 
Prime Minister Balkenende was politically damaged and was haunted by the case for years. His 
record was seen to be blemished. In this political arena, Balkenende saw no option but to give 
a very serious public reprimand to his own civil servants for their actions. The financial damage 
is also considerable. In the end, the widow received compensation from the State and the State 
also settled with the painting company. Additionally, considerable costs were involved in four 
and a half years of legal proceedings, expert reports, answering questions from the House of 
Representatives and all of the Wob-procedures. A Wob request by RTL News revealed that the 
costs to the State of hiring the state advocate for the duration of the entire affair amounted to 
 € 209.340. This only included the costs for the state advocate, not for hiring technical expertise, 
internal legal advice, paying compensation to the widow, etc.293 It is reasonable to conclude that 
the unknown costs for this case were several times higher. Of course the State itself was a victim 
of the fire, since the Catshuis could not be used for a very long time and the financial damage 
for repairing the Catshuis amounted to millions of euros. Fear of political and financial damage 
served the government badly in this case. If openness had been exercised from the start, 
foreseeably the damage to the government would have been much less, politically, and certainly 
to its public image. 
  
“Meanwhile I am not primarily concerned with the cause of the fire anymore, but how 
this was handled politically and administratively. This is the question tonight: What kind 
of government do we want?”294 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                               
293http://www.rtl.nl/(/actueel/rtlnieuws/binnenland/)/components/actueel/rtlnieuws/2011/10_oktober/31/binnenland/D
oofpotten_en_hoofdpijndossiers_kosten_overheid_miljoenen.xml (date last accessed: 23-08-2013) 
294 Alexander Pechtold during the final debate on the fire, Tweede Kamer, Handelingen, 23 juni 2009, TK 98-7787 
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5. Death by drowning: the case of three fire brigade divers  
 
 
“Your world collapses, you're full of questions about guilt and at the same time 
there are many investigations and legal issues that demand your attention. Yet, 
throughout that there is that other side and the reason why I am here: What can 
we learn from this?”295 
 
Jeroen Meijering, fire brigade commander Terneuzen  
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
On July 13, 2001, fire brigade diver William Brouwer (35) took part in a diving exercise in the 
Kernhaven in the city of Utrecht. During the diving exercise Brouwer got into trouble. After 
six attempts by his colleagues to rescue him failed, they finally got him out of the water and 
attempts were made to resuscitate him. Brouwer was taken in critical condition to the Utrecht 
Medical Center, where he died on July 17, 2001. 
 
On March 22, 2007, fire brigade diver Lubbert Romkes (24) took part in a diving exercise in 
the harbor of the town of Urk. The diver from Urk got stuck during the exercise and was taken 
ashore, where attempts at resuscitation were made by colleagues and first aid services. He died 
in the hospital in Zwolle. 
 
On March 12, 2008, fire brigade diver Wim Matthijssen (38) was diving as part of a police 
search of the canal from Gent to Terneuzen. During the dive, Matthijssen got into trouble. After 
several attempts to rescue him failed, he was brought ashore. Attempts by colleagues to 
resuscitate Matthijssen had no effect and he died the same night in the hospital of Gent.  
 
From 2000 till 2010, a total of eight serious accidents concerning fire brigade divers took place, 
of which three (the ones described above) proved to be fatal.296 That seems a relatively high 
rate in a total of around 1200 fire brigade divers.297 298 
 
The questions here are what was going on, how we can understand what happened and why 
governmental actors behaved and reacted as they did. This case study is different from the 
others, in the sense that three individual cases are taken together. Some technical detail on fire 
brigade diving will help with a better understanding of the cases but the case study does not aim 
primarily to contribute to a debate on making fire brigade diving safer. Rather, the focus is on 
                                               
295 Verslag Symposium Veiligheid brandweerduiken October 30, 2008, p. 3.  
http://www.brandweernederland.nl/nieuwe-homepage/nieuwsindexen/nieuw-bkn/@3890/verslag_symposium/ (date 
last accessed: 28-12-2013). 
296 From 1946 to 2008, in repressive actions, a total of 79 firemen in the Netherlands died in action, because of 
causes such as falling, collapses, explosions, traffic, smoke, fire, drowning and other causes. During action other 
than in case of fire, 10 persons died, 6 of which (including the three in the cases examined here) died because of 
drowning. These figures are not based on exact registrations, but on reported accidents during repressive action. 
Accidents during exercising are not taken into account in this figure, so the actual number could be higher. Dutch 
Safety Board (2009), p. 109. 
297 http://www.rtvutrecht.nl/nieuws/232180 (date last accessed: 25-12-2013) and Labor Inspectorate (2009), p. 5.  
298 It is difficult to find international statistics on drowned fire brigade divers. Just as an indication: in the United 
      States, there were 12 fatal accidents recorded from 1998 to 2010 for fire brigade divers.  
http://www2a.cdc.gov/NIOSHfirefighterface/state.asp?state=ALL&Incident_Year=ALL&Medical_Related=ALL&T
rauma_Related=0029&Submit=Submit (date last accessed: 28-12-2013). 
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the organizational level: understanding why organizations behaved as they did with a view to 
learning from this. 
 
The first part of each case study contains a factual timeline of relevant events for that case. The 
first case (Utrecht) is described in more detail than the following two, in order to give the reader 
a more detailed look into the practice of fire brigade diving. Case characteristics will then be 
presented briefly. After that, possible explanations will be explored, followed by a description 
of the responses of the governmental organizations involved. Finally, conclusions will be drawn 
concerning where the events are located in the space between error and evil  
 
 
5.2.  Summary of the facts 
 
5.2.1. Timeline of events 
 
Utrecht 
 
July 13, 2001 
The diving team of the Utrecht fire brigade started a diving exercise in the Kernhaven. It was 
common practice in Utrecht that divers who had received their diplomas as fire brigade divers 
were only operationally deployed after they had also gained experience in a number of practical 
exercises. One of the necessary exercises concerned diving in fast-flowing water. The location 
in the Kernhaven near the UNA power plant had been used for this purpose for many years 
without significant problems. Prior to the exercise, the underwater path was not examined. Such 
a prior examination did not belong to the regular procedures and was seldom carried out for any 
exercise. William Brouwer had passed the exam to become a fire brigade diver in the spring of 
2001. This was to be his first practice swim in fast flowing water. Before Brouwer went into 
the water the diving team leader told him that there was ‘a difficulty’ ahead in the underwater 
path that he had to follow, but he was not told what that difficulty was. The difficulty was a 
threshold at the start of the path. Several meters from the threshold along the path there was a 
dirt trap, there to prevent trash from floating into the harbor. What the diving team leader did 
not know at that time was that there were several other obstacles in the water as well, the biggest 
of which was a large empty metal reel with protrusions.  
 
Besides the reel, there were also several large concrete objects and a long, thin metal pipe along 
the path that Brouwer was to follow. He was attached to a signal line, which was held by the 
diving team leader. He entered the water and dove against the strong current, downwards over 
the threshold. The diving team leader, holding the signal line, walked with him until he reached 
the dirt trap. After initially staying close to the quay, for unknown reasons Brouwer deviated 
from his path to the middle of the canal. Further along, he reached the edge of the quay again. 
At that time there was almost 30 meters of signal line in the water and the diving team leader, 
by his own account, could barely feel the diver’s movements. Brouwer returned to his path after 
the signal that was agreed upon, three jerks upon the signal line. Once more he deviated from 
the path to the middle. Suddenly, the diving team leader saw him come up to the surface and 
the team leader called out to the reserve diver. Brouwer went straight down and came back up 
again right away. The diving team leader saw Brouwer pulling his mask from his face and 
disappearing into the water again. He shouted to him to pull his life jacket. The diving team 
leader then jumped into the water in order to inflate Brouwer’s life jacket. In doing so, the signal 
line and the accompanying barrel ended up in the water. As Brouwer almost came up to the 
surface, the diving team leader managed to grab him, but as a result of the strong current they 
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were both drawn underwater. Another diver who jumped into the water did not manage to pull 
Brouwer to the surface and had to let him go. Brouwer disappeared under water. The diving 
team leader gave the order to send for an ambulance. The signal line had been fished out of the 
water by then. Right after these rescue efforts, the reserve diver was sent into the water. This 
attempt failed, as the reserve diver’s mask turned out to be defective and water got into it.  
 
At the next rescue attempt, another diver was ordered to cut Brouwer loose, hold him and not 
let go. The diver followed the signal line and found out that it went through the metal reel. He 
cut the signal line, as it later turned out two meters from Brouwer’s wrist. He then tried to follow 
the path towards Brouwer. His colleagues at the quay saw the other part of the signal line go 
loose, thought that Brouwer had been found and pulled the diver, without him asking for it, by 
his own signal line towards the surface. The diver had to let go of the line that was still 
connected to Brouwer and came back up to the surface. Immediately, this diver made yet 
another rescue attempt. At the same time, the reserve diver was searching under water. The first 
diver did not realize that the reserve diver was in the water as well. When they met in the water, 
the first diver thought he had found Brouwer and tried to pull at the life jacket of his colleague. 
They started to wrestle and eventually both divers came up again. The colleagues at the quay 
then thought they saw Brouwer float out of the harbor and the reserve diver was directed to the 
end of the channel. This turned out to be a false alarm (a barrel and a glove were found) and the 
search went on in the original location. The reserve diver went down, found Brouwer in the 
metal reel and brought him up again. From the time that Brouwer got into trouble until he was 
pulled out of the water, approximately ten minutes had passed. Back upon the quay, Brouwer 
was no longer breathing. His colleagues started resuscitation, awaiting the ambulance that had 
been alarmed. The ambulance crew took over as they arrived and, after Brouwer showed some 
signs of life, he was brought to the Utrecht Medical Center.299  
 
Several investigations into the accident started: The police and the Labor Inspectorate started a 
criminal investigation and the fire Utrecht brigade appointed an internal committee to 
investigate the events (this is mandatory under these circumstances due to the Labor Conditions 
Act).300  
 
July 17, 2001 
William Brouwer died in hospital.  
 
August 1, 2001 
A preliminary report was given by the internal committee of the Utrecht fire brigade. 
 
November 7, 2001 
The internal committee of the Utrecht fire brigade presented its final report on the matter to the 
Commander of the Utrecht fire brigade and to the chairman of the works council.  
 
January 10, 2002 
A news report appeared on RTV Utrecht, stating that clarity would soon be available about the 
death of William Brouwer. It was reported that the Public Prosecution was working on the final 
version of its report and that the mayor of Utrecht, Brouwer-Korf, regularly spoke with the 
Public Prosecution because she felt it was all taking a very long time.301  
                                               
299 This reconstruction of the accident is based on the report by the fire brigade Utrecht, paragraph 2, and on the 
report by the POS Inspectorate, p. 5-6.  
300 Article 9 sub 1 of the Labor Conditions Act. 
301 http://www.rtvutrecht.nl/nieuws/58840 (date last accessed: 24-12-2013). 
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February 1, 2002 
RTV Utrecht reported that the reports concerning the incident would not be out in the open until 
the end of March 2002.302  
 
February 27, 2002  
Green Left councilor Giesbers handed in written questions about the matter. He demanded more 
clarity about the causes of the incident and asked for openness about the reports that had been 
compiled. He especially asked for more openness with regard to the internal report by the 
Utrecht fire brigade, which had been finished for quite a while but to that date had not been 
published.  
 
March 8, 2002 
The municipality of Utrecht published the report by the internal committee of the fire brigade 
Utrecht. The report began by naming a number of aspects that made the accident remarkable: 
 
- “The exercise took place on a site that had been used for practice for years, in fast-
flowing (approximately one meter per second), but relatively shallow (between two 
and three meters) of water; 
- The diver, diving supervisor and the backup diver were trained according to 
national standards and deemed suitable for their task; 
- Diving took place with commonly used scuba gear, in good condition; 
- The particular exercise was a standard practice that had never yielded problems; 
- When he got into trouble, Brouwer did not use the various options available to him 
to save himself; 
- There was plenty of potential (divers and support staff) on the spot for a quick 
rescue; 
- Six rescue efforts were in vain, at the seventh attempt Brouwer was out of the 
water.”303 
 
The internal committee drew several conclusions about the accident: The exercise did not 
comply with the applicable safety requirements, procedures for rescue and cooperation were 
missing, there was a lack of coordination and effectiveness during the rescue attempts, the 
attention to emergency procedures for divers in trouble was insufficient, the possible dangers 
of the diving mask had not been acknowledged sufficiently and the maintenance system for the 
diving equipment did not function as it should have.304 
 
June 14, 2002 
The Labor Inspectorate concluded that the Utrecht fire brigade, in its handling of the fatal diving 
accident, had committed several breaches of the Labor Conditions Act.305 
 
December 12, 2002 
An analysis of the incident by the Public Order and Safety Inspectorate (POS Inspectorate)306 
pointed to several shortcomings by the Utrecht fire brigade. The Inspectorate did not conduct 
its own investigation, as investigations had been started by the Utrecht fire brigade, the Labor 
Inspectorate and the Public Prosecution. However, the arrangement had been made that the 
                                               
302 http://www.rtvutrecht.nl/nieuws/58426 (date last accessed: 24-12-2013). 
303 Interne commissie Brandweer Utrecht, (2001), paragraph 1.1.   
304 Interne commissie Brandweer Utrecht, (2001), paragraph 8. 
305 http://www.rtvutrecht.nl/nieuws/58078 (date last accessed: 25-12-2013) 
306 The POS Inspectorate no longer exists, it has become part of the Inspectorate of Security and Justice. 
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Inspectorate would be informed of the findings of the internal committee of the fire brigade 
Utrecht, in order to form its own judgment of events. The analysis was presented as an addition 
to the analysis of the internal committee of the Utrecht fire brigade. 
 
The POS Inspectorate criticized several aspects of the diving action. The inadequate 
information that was given to a relatively inexperienced diver posed problems: The diver only 
received a general warning that there was an obstacle ahead. As a result, he might have thought 
that any obstacle that he encountered (including the metal reel, of which the diving team leader 
was unaware) was part of the exercise and was meant to test him. This was compounded by the 
fact that the underwater route had not been examined before the exercise started. The 
Inspectorate further wondered why the reserve diver did not go straight into the water when 
Brouwer came up for the first time and removed his mask. It was also unclear why the diving 
team leader went into the water, dragging the signal line with him. The Inspectorate regretted 
that there was so little information available about these questions. Finally, the Inspectorate 
also noted that policy on fire brigade diving seemed to have a low priority for the Ministry of 
the Interior and Kingdom Relations, which at the time was responsible for the fire brigades. 
The development of new policies was remarkably slow, important evaluation documents had 
been largely forgotten and repeated recommendations for improving safety had been ignored, 
according to the Inspectorate.307  
 
January 10, 2003 
RTV Utrecht reported that the family of William Brouwer was urging the Public Prosecution 
to make more haste with its investigation. The Public Prosecution had recently changed the 
prosecutor in charge of the investigation, causing an extra delay.308 That same day, mayor 
Brouwer-Korf also expressed her frustration that the criminal investigation had not been 
concluded yet, almost a year and a half after the drowning of William Brouwer.309  
 
March 10, 2003 
A news report stated that the Public Prosecution would request the Utrecht fire brigade to make 
available a report that criticized its internal organization. The report had been ordered by the 
fire brigade itself and contained sharp criticism of the management of the fire brigade. It was 
claimed that the report also mentioned ‘a culture of covering up’. The Public Prosecution did 
not say anything about its significance for the investigation into the diving accident.310   
 
June 2, 2003 
The Public Prosecution prosecuted the municipality of Utrecht for its role in the diving accident. 
The municipality was charged with culpable homicide and violation of the Labor Conditions 
Act. The charge of culpable homicide was unique as, prior to this, governmental organizations 
that faced criminal prosecution had been charged mainly with violations of environmental and 
labor laws.  
 
July 9, 2003 
The Criminal Court in Utrecht convicted the municipality of Utrecht of culpable homicide and 
fined the municipality of Utrecht € 18.000 (€ 6.000 of which conditional) and two years’ 
probation for its role in the diving accident. In its verdict, the Criminal Court denied the 
                                               
307 POS Inspectorate, (2002), p. 15. 
308 http://www.rtvutrecht.nl/nieuws/61782 (date last accessed: 25-12-2013) 
309 http://www.rtvutrecht.nl/nieuws/61791 (date last accessed: 25-12-2013) 
310 http://www.rtvutrecht.nl/nieuws/62344 (date last accessed: 25-12-2013) 
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municipality’s claim for immunity on grounds of the Pikmeer-arrest. According to the Pikmeer-
arrest, governmental organizations cannot be prosecuted for activities performed in the course 
of exclusive government tasks. In this case, the Court ruled that training and education of the 
fire brigade divers was not exclusively a government task, because it was deemed possible that 
private organizations also undertake that task. The fact that there were no private organizations 
that actually offered these activities, did not alter the judgment.  
 
The Court pointed out that similar (although not fatal) incidents in 1998 involving fire brigade 
divers in Amsterdam and Zutphen did not lead to adequate action being taken to improve 
training and education of fire brigade personnel. The Court stated that the municipality had 
allowed an inexperienced and not yet deployable fire brigade diver to participate in a physically 
and mentally demanding diving exercise without having received training geared to those 
specific conditions. The training was deemed inadequate, the municipality lacked good maps 
of the locations, and there was a lack of education about intervention in unforeseen (emergency) 
situations that might arise during training. All of this meant those who were directly involved 
in the incident reacted in a less professional manner than was required by the circumstances. 
According to the Court, the municipality provided an insufficient care framework and 
conditions for its fire fighters, with the result that it could not prevent a fire brigade diver dying 
as a result of an exercise. The Court ended by stating that the verdict was intended to 
demonstrate to society that government is not blameless when it has committed a serious 
offense.311  
 
July 11, 2003 
The municipality of Utrecht announced that they would appeal the decision by the Criminal 
Court. Mayor Brouwer-Korf stated that as a result of this verdict, the fire brigade would no 
longer be allowed to practice under circumstances where risk attached. She felt that this meant 
that the risks would shift from the practice situation to real life rescue situations.312 
 
July 14, 2003 
Reportedly, the majority of the City Council of Utrecht disagreed with the decision by the 
College of Mayor and Aldermen to appeal the decision by the Criminal Court.313  
 
August 27, 2003 
A day before the planned debate with the City Council, the College of Mayor and Aldermen 
announced that it had withdrawn its appeal.314  
 
August 28, 2003 
The city council of Utrecht held a debate on the diving accident. Most parties were unhappy 
with the decision to appeal the verdict. The mayor indicated that the decision to appeal had been 
made to keep all options open, as the appeal had to be filed within two weeks of the verdict. A 
small number of parties thought it was incomprehensible that the appeal was to be withdrawn 
again later. The mayor indicated that the shift in opinion was caused by a promise earlier that 
week by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to publish guidelines on exercising 
by fire brigade divers. Green Left and the Christian Union tabled a motion of censure against 
the acts of the mayor but only got further support from D66 and was therefore not granted.315   
                                               
311 Criminal Court Utrecht, July 9, 2003, LJN: AH9535, Rechtbank Utrecht, 16/205277-02. 
312 http://www.nbdc.nl/cms/show/id=492546/contentid=35225 (date last accessed: 25-12-2013) 
313 http://www.rtvutrecht.nl/nieuws/63416 (date last accessed: 25-12-2013) 
314 http://www.rtvutrecht.nl/nieuws/63869 (date last accessed: 25-12-2013) 
315 Published on www.utrechtsnieuwsblad.nl, August 29, 2003, 
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Urk316 
 
March 22, 2007 
The diving team of the fire brigade in Urk prepared for a scheduled diving exercise in the harbor 
of Urk. There was a short briefing, in which the practice leader indicated that special attention 
would be given that evening to safety aspects. The purpose of the evening’s exercise was the 
rescue of a victim from a sunken car wreck. Earlier, the diving practice leader and some helpers 
had maneuvered a car into the water. This was a stripped car from which the harmful 
components had been removed. A dummy resembling a possible victim was placed on the 
driver’s seat and a barrel containing fake chemicals on the passenger seat.  
Around 19.50 hours, Lubbert Romkes dove into the water. Communication equipment (a sort 
of microphone) was wired through the signal line, which connected the diver to the diving 
practice leader. Communication was also possible by jerking the signal line. Romkes had been 
in the water for around 20 minutes when he indicated that he had trouble breathing. The diving 
exercise leader told Romkes to use the reserve compressed air and to come back up again. 
Romkes indicated that he would do so. Still ignorant of the situation underwater, the diving 
exercise leader began to withdraw the signal line in order to bring the diver back. After a few 
meters of the signal line had come in, it was apparent that it was now vertical, at which point 
the withdrawal of the signal line was stopped. The diving exercise leader then saw air bubbles 
in the water (probably because the diver’s mask came off) and contact was lost. He immediately 
started the emergency procedure, by shouting ‘diver in trouble’. At first, some of those present 
thought this was part of the exercise. Even in the control room, it was not clear whether this 
was the case.317  
The emergency procedure meant that the reserve diver should go into the water and that 
emergency services, such as ambulance, police and a second diving team would be warned and 
summoned to the spot. The practice leader did this using the radiotelephone. Within a minute, 
after safety checks had been carried out, the reserve diver was in the water. By using the signal 
line, he was able to locate Romkes quickly. Noticing that the signal line went underneath the 
car wreck and that it was stuck, he swam across the car and found Romkes unconscious and 
lying on the ground without a mask. He removed the signal line from Romkes and managed to 
take him back up to the surface again where he was carried up to the quay with some difficulty. 
The trouble had arisen because the back shields of the divers had been weighted with 5 kilos of 
lead. The reserve diver threw off his lead belt and filled his dry pack with air from his 
compressed air cylinder. Romkes received artificial respiration and attempts to resuscitate him 
were made. The ambulance drove him to the hospital in Zwolle, where, later that evening, his 
death as a result of the diving accident was confirmed. Investigations were immediately started 
by the police and the Labor Inspectorate.318  
 
 
                                               
http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/1401/ad/integration/nmc/frameset/varia/kobala_article.dhtml?artid=1748403 (date last 
accessed: 25-12-2013) 
316 Urk used to be an island and is now a municipality. In 1942 the Northeastpolder was drained, but to the 
Inhabitants of Urk the island feeling is still alive, they live for example not in Urk but on Urk. Urk can be described as 
the best parish in the Netherlands. It is a very close and closed community. The local dialect, Urk, is extremely vital 
and is different from the other dialects in the area. Urk has the largest fishing fleet in the Netherlands. 
http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urk (date last accessed: 25-12-2013) 
317 The Labor Inspectorate noted that in order to prevent this misunderstanding, it is common practice to shout ‘no  
play’ when this happens. Labor Inspectorate (2008), p. 4. 
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March 24, 2007 
The National Forensic Institute concluded that the cause of death was indeed drowning. 
 
October 16, 2007 
The Evangelical Broadcasting Service (EO) made an episode of the show ‘I miss you’ (in which 
relatives speak of loved ones who have passed away) that was dedicated to Lubbert Romkes. 
The widow of Romkes, her father and colleagues spoke about Romkes’ life and his love for his 
work as a volunteer fire fighter.  
 
June 18, 2008 
The Public Prosecution announced that nobody would be prosecuted for the diving accident in 
Urk. The investigation had concluded that no individual errors had been made that could have 
led to the accident. But it was added that the municipality of Urk was still under investigation 
for breaching the Labor Conditions Act and that at that time, the municipality (as employer for 
the voluntary fire brigade) was still considered a suspect.319 Eventually, the municipality of Urk 
accepted a fine of € 7.500 for breaching several articles of the Labor Conditions Act.320  
 
June 9, 2008 
The Labor Inspectorate issued its report on the Urk diving accident criticizing, among other 
things, the organization of fire brigade diving in Urk.  
 
 
Terneuzen 
 
March 11, 2008 
The diving team of the fire brigade in Terneuzen received a request from the police to undertake 
a diving mission on account of a criminal investigation. The police were searching for a car and 
had reason to believe that the car could be found in the canal that runs from Gent to Terneuzen.  
 
March 12, 2008 
The diving action was planned in the morning. The strategy was to use the signal line to locate 
the vehicle. Once the signal line hit the vehicle, the diver would realize this and be able to find 
the vehicle.321 During the diving effort, fire brigade diver Wim Matthijssen got into trouble. 
Towards the end of his dive, he indicated that he was having trouble breathing. He came up to 
the surface shortly and appeared to be in a panic. He disappeared under water a couple of times, 
and did not take the option of creating more floating capacity but removed his diving mask. 
Matthijssen disappeared under water and did not return. The emergency procedure was initiated 
by the diving team leader and the reserve diver went into the water to try to save his colleague. 
The reserve diver did not reach the spot where Matthijssen had disappeared. The signal line had 
become stuck during Matthijssen’s dive, making it impossible to haul the diver back by means 
of the signal line. A rescue attempt from the fire brigade boat failed because of the strong wind. 
Another diver went into the water and found Matthijssen, who had been under water by then 
for approximately 18 minutes.322 A minute later, the ambulance arrived. Attempts by colleagues 
and ambulance personnel to resuscitate Matthijssen had no effect. Matthijssen died the same 
night in the hospital of Gent. The section report by the Public Prosecution indicated that, in all 
                                               
319 http://www.om.nl/algemene_onderdelen/uitgebreid_zoeken/@133822/geen_individuele/ (date last accessed: 25-
12-2013) 
320 http://vorige.nrc.nl/binnenland/article1908932.ece/Duiker_Wim_zat_aan_de_verkeerde_seinlijn (date last 
accessed: 25-12-2013)  
321 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 25. 
322 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 5 and p. 23-30. 
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probability, the cause of death was drowning.323  
  
March 13, 2008 
A team composed of the police, the Public Prosecution and the Labor Inspectorate began an 
investigation into the accident. The POS Inspectorate eventually participated in this 
investigation, but stopped when it became clear that the Public Safety Board had also begun an 
investigation into the accident. The POS Inspectorate went on to work on a systematical 
analysis of the safety of fire brigade diving. The municipality of Terneuzen also produced an 
internal report about the accident, which was not published. Awaiting the results of the 
investigations, the municipality decided to place the fire brigade diving team on a non-active 
status.324  
 
November 24, 2008 
The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations sent the POS Inspectorate’s report 
‘Considering the Safety of fire brigade diving’ to the House of Representatives. Together with 
the NVBR (the Dutch Association of Fire Brigades and Disaster Relief), and after consultation 
with the Labor Inspectorate, the POS Inspectorate published a report on the Dutch safety system 
for fire brigade diving. Several subjects were studied in detail – risk analysis, using the lead 
belt and procedures for rising to the surface in emergency, use of compressed air, maximum 
diving time, reserve diver, signal line, the education and training of diving personnel, 
operational management and controlled safety management – and were coupled with 
recommendations for improvement in daily practice.325 
 
April 2, 2009 
The municipality of Terneuzen agreed to a proposal from the Public Prosecution for a fine of 
 €20.000 for its role in the diving accident. The Public Prosecution and the Labor Inspectorate 
had found several breaches of the Labor Conditions Act in the way the fire brigade in Terneuzen 
had operated: 
- The fire brigade divers had been given insufficient information about the diving 
activities, making the risks of the situation at the site unclear; 
- A clear instruction for the divers was missing; 
- The divers had received insufficient instruction in how to save themselves in 
emergency situations. Instructions for the operational use of the life vest, the 
emergency compressed air equipment and the diving mask were therefore not 
sufficiently clear; 
- No calculation of the amount of compressed air needed was made, as a result of 
which the divers had to switch to emergency cylinders earlier than was laid down 
by safety norms; 
- The propeller blade of the outboard motor of the fire brigade boat was not covered, 
thereby posing a danger for the divers. This hampered the rescue mission that was 
carried out for the diver; 
- Because of the lack of an adequate administration, there was no overview of the 
training and skill level of the divers and, as a result, supervisors were not alerted in 
time that some divers did not meet the requirements for the exercise nor that the 
validity of diplomas had been wrongly extended;   
- There was lack of clarity within the municipality about who was responsible for 
supervising compliance on safety regulations; 
                                               
323 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 30. 
324 Municipality Terneuzen (2010), p. 2.  
325 POS Inspectorate, (2008). 
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- The fire brigade in Terneuzen had not taken into account in its Labor Conditions 
policy the points raised after the earlier fatal diving accidents in Utrecht and Urk.326 
 
The public prosecutor, D’Anjou, remarked that the municipality and the fire brigade ‘had taken 
things too lightly’ when it came to guaranteeing safety and following procedures. Although the 
breach of the Labor Conditions Act constituted a criminal act, the Public Prosecution 
recommended a fine because at the time of the accident, improvement of procedures was 
already underway. D’Anjou remarked that that was an important argument not to bring the case 
before a criminal court.327  
 
April 14, 2009 
Questions were asked in the city council of Terneuzen about the mayor’s decision to accept a 
fine and not bring the case before a criminal court.  
 
April 16, 2009 
In response to the questions by the city council, the college of mayor and aldermen indicated it 
accepted the fine in order to avoid a long and expensive legal battle in court. 
 
October 16, 2009 
The Dutch Safety Board presented its report on the diving incident.328 
 
July 6, 2010 
The college of mayor and aldermen of Terneuzen send their final analysis on the diving accident 
to the city council. The report concluded by advising to deploy the fire brigade diving team in 
Terneuzen once more, pending a decision by the board of the Zeeland safety region, due to start 
on July 1, 2011.329  
 
September 28, 2011 
The Dutch broadcasting corporation NOS reported that the number of diving teams in the 
Netherlands had dropped from 95 in 2010 to 64 in 2011. It was also reported that 52 people had 
been rescued during the previous year in water accidents, 31 of whom had been rescued by a 
fire brigade diving team. In comparison: During that year there were approximately between 
85 and 100 fatalities in water accidents.  
 
There were reports that the diving accidents in Utrecht, Terneuzen and Urk had given rise to 
reconsiderations in the safety regions about whether a diving team was a necessity. The NOS 
claimed that a diving team on average had cost € 80.000 a year. Many safety regions had started 
to look at other options, such as water surface rescue teams, in order to reduce their spending. 
The association of fire brigade volunteers warned that the chances of being saved by a diving 
team were diminishing, and predicted that in a few years, there would be no diving teams left. 
They pointed out that the safety regions were the ones making the decisions about diving teams 
and were negatively influenced by the fact that fire brigade diving was not mandatory under the 
Law on the safety regions.330  
 
                                               
326 http://www.om.nl/algemene_onderdelen/uitgebreid_zoeken/@150462/transactie_gemeente/ (date last 
accessed: 25-12-2013) 
327 http://vorige.nrc.nl/binnenland/article2201347.ece/Terneuzen_in_de_fout_bij_duikongeval (date last accessed: 
25-12-2013) 
328 The conclusions of this report will be discussed in paragraph 5.3.1. 
329 Municipality Terneuzen (2010), p. 14. 
330 http://nos.nl/artikel/276832-steeds-minder-duikteams-brandweer.html (date last accessed: 25-12-2013) 
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5.2.2. Case characteristics  
 
Utrecht 
Damage  
deaths and serious injuries  One death 
damage compensation paid None  
nature of the act   
nature of the connection 
between the governmental 
organization and the deaths and 
serious injuries 
Employer: The diver who died was employed by the 
fire brigade, which falls under the authority of the 
municipality.  
what rules are broken Labor Conditions Act (several articles) and Criminal 
Code article 307 (culpable homicide) 
sanctions   
political consequences None  
disciplinary sanctions None 
sanctions concerning criminal 
law 
The municipality of Utrecht was convicted of culpable 
homicide and given a fine of € 18.000 (of which €6.000 
was conditional) and two years’ probation. 
measures taken for the 
future/lessons learned 
On both local and national level, several measures were 
taken.  
 
Utrecht: 
A coordinating officer for fire brigade diving was 
appointed and a labor conditions co-coordinator were 
appointed. A labor conditions safety plan was made, a 
fixed procedure for diving, and a fixed procedure for 
the maintenance of diving equipment were designed. 
The training for fire brigade divers in Utrecht was 
redesigned in accordance with the national Guideline 
for Practicing, Exercising was strictly limited to 
designated and well-described exercise locations and a 
fixed emergency procedure for ‘assisting a colleague’ 
was implemented for the entire region. 
 
 
National: 
A special project team, Fire Brigade Diving, was set 
up. Its task was to raise national awareness of the 
conclusions and recommendations of the reports on this 
incident.331  
number of official 
investigations/reports on the 
case 
4: 
Police and Public Prosecution, internal committee fire 
brigade Utrecht, Labor Inspectorate and POS 
Inspectorate  
number of years from start of 
the case till finish or present 
Two years 
 
                                               
331 All of these measures are mentioned in: POS Inspectorate, (2002), p. 13. 
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Urk 
Damage  
deaths and serious injuries  One death  
damage compensation paid None  
nature of the act   
nature of the connection 
between the governmental 
organization and the deaths and 
serious injuries 
Employer: The diver who died was employed by the 
fire brigade, which falls under the authority of the 
municipality. 
what rules are broken  Labor Conditions Act (several articles) 
sanctions   
political consequences None 
disciplinary sanctions None 
sanctions concerning criminal 
law 
The Public Prosecution decided not to prosecute 
anyone for the death of the diver. The Public 
Prosecution proposed a fine of € 7.500 for breaching 
the Labor Conditions Act and this accepted by the 
municipality of Urk. 
measures taken for the 
future/lessons learned 
For Urk, there is little information available on this 
point. It is clear that most measures on a national level 
were taken after the accident in Terneuzen.  
number of official 
investigations/reports on the 
case 
2: 
Police and Public Prosecution, Labor Inspectorate 
number of years from start of 
the case till finish or present 
One 
 
Terneuzen 
Damage  
deaths and serious injuries  One death 
damage compensation paid None  
nature of the act   
nature of the connection 
between the governmental 
organization and the deaths and 
serious injuries 
Employer: The diver who died was employed by the 
fire brigade, which falls under the authority of the 
municipality. 
what rules are broken  Labor Conditions Act (several articles) 
sanctions   
political consequences None 
disciplinary sanctions None 
sanctions concerning criminal 
law 
The Public Prosecution proposed a fine of € 20.000 for 
breaching the Labor Conditions Act and this was 
accepted by the municipality of Terneuzen.   
measures taken for the 
future/lessons learned 
The requirements for being awarded the fire brigade 
diving diploma were made more stringent. The 
percentage of examinees that passed the exam dropped 
from around 90% to a mere 25%332, extra materials 
were bought, safety equipment was improved, 
                                               
332 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 8-9. 
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manpower was increased and more express attention 
was devoted to working procedures within the fire 
brigade.333  
number of official 
investigations/reports on the 
case 
3:  
Police and Public Prosecution combined with the Labor 
Inspectorate, an internal report by the municipality of 
Terneuzen and a report by the Dutch Safety Board  
number of years from start of 
the case till finish or present 
Two 
 
 
5.3.  Why: explaining the deaths and serious injuries  
 
There are four different factors to explore further in each case: opportunities, motives, masking 
and relevant factors for response (this last factor will be discussed later in this chapter). First, the 
shared causes that were identified in these three cases will be discussed.  
 
 
5.3.1. Shared causes  
 
From what went before, it should be clear that there have been several reports about the three 
fatal diving accidents as well as reports giving an overview of the entire system of fire brigade 
diving in the Netherlands. Taken together, they identify a large number of causes of the 
accidents, and make a comparable number of recommendations for the future.  
 
The Dutch Safety Board in its report remarked that the three accidents had many causes in 
common. The report identified a number of direct causes that the incidents had in common: 
 
- Problems with the use of the signal line 
- Not using emergency measures to create floating capacity, such as the use of the trim 
vest and casting off the lead belt 
- Removal of the diving mask 
- Insufficient deployment of the reserve diver 
The following indirect or underlying causes were also identified by the Board: 
- Inadequate system of risk inventory and evaluation (RI&E) 
- Inadequate system of practicing 
- Inadequate system of learning and improving diving safety 
- Inadequate organization, in the sense that an informal way of working was dominant; 
- Inadequate compliance with procedures.334 
 
What is abundantly clear is that in none of the cases, was one single cause responsible for the 
accident. Invariably, it was a complex combination of causes. Some of these causes were 
confirmed by all parties, others provoked discussion between the parties involved. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, direct causes were more easily acknowledged than indirect causes. 
 
In order to get at least some overview, the following table is given. In this table, the causes that 
                                               
333http://www.terneuzen.nl/Actueel_Nieuws/Nieuws/Archief_2009/Oktober_november_december/Vierde_rapportag
e_over_duikongeval (date last accessed: 10-8-2011) 
 
334 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 72.  
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were identified in the main reports concerning these accidents are categorized. Per category, it 
is indicated whether the report signaled the corresponding cause.  
 
Table 5.1. Causes identified in the main reports 
 
Report  Internal 
committee 
Utrecht 
District 
Court 
Utrecht 
Labor 
Inspectorate  
(Urk) 
 
Public 
Order and 
Safety 
Inspectorate 
Dutch 
Safety 
Board 
(Terneuzen)  
Labor 
Inspectorate 
 
Year of report 2001 2003 2008 2008 2009 2009 
       
Conclusion       
Exercise was 
unsafe / poorly 
organized (no 
location maps or 
prior 
investigation) 
● ● ● ● ●  
Inexperience of 
diver not taken 
into account 
enough 
 ● ●    
Lack of training 
in self-saving 
measures during 
emergencies 
● ● ● ● ● ● 
Procedures 
missing or lack 
of attention for 
emergency 
situations 
● ● ● ● ● ● 
Lack of 
coordination 
and 
effectiveness 
during rescue 
attempts (for 
example role 
reserve diver) 
●  ●  ●  
Defective 
material / 
technical 
failures (sinking 
signal line, 
dangers of the 
diving masks, 
lack of 
compressed air, 
lead belts, etc.) 
●  ●  ●  
Training and 
education not 
sufficient 
● ● ● ● ● ● 
Underestimation 
of risks / lack of 
risk 
management 
● ● ● ● ● ● 
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Limited 
exchange 
between fire 
brigades / lack 
of learning from 
accidents 
● ● ● ● ● ● 
The lack of 
good central 
guidelines and 
legal framework 
   ● ● ● 
Insufficient 
national 
coordination 
and lack of 
uniformity 
nationally 
   ● ● ● 
Organizational 
culture 
concerning 
safety 
awareness and 
procedural 
discipline 
● ● ● ● ● ● 
 
The table makes clear that the three accidents have several causes in common, making the cases 
very easily compared with each other. It is no exaggeration to say that the main causes for the 
accident were generally the same in every case. 
 
 
5.3.2. Opportunities 
 
5.3.2.1. Organizational structure and division of responsibilities 
 
Organizational structure 
In the Netherlands, municipalities have traditionally been responsible for the fire brigades. Many 
tasks were mandated to the fire brigade commander, but the mayor held political responsibility. 
The mayor was in command for the ‘warm’ duties (concerning emergency situations that occur in 
case of fire); the college of mayor and aldermen was responsible for the ‘cold’ duties (policy, 
planning, permits, education and so on).335 The large majority of municipalities had their own fire 
brigades though some had joined together in regional organizations or were dependent on other 
municipalities’ fire brigades. There were around 1200 fire brigade divers in the Dutch fire brigades 
in 2009, in a total of almost 27.000 firemen. The tasks of the fire brigade can be summed up as 
follows: 
1) fire 
2) help at accidents 
3) attendance at accidents/dangerous substance incidents 
4) water accidents. 
 
For some time, fire brigades received little attention from the Dutch government, especially in 
comparison to the police. But in recent times the fire brigades have redressed this imbalance, for 
example by improving training. Budgeting for the fire brigades has often been problematic and 
                                               
335 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 21-22. 
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this is one of the reasons that the volunteer system plays such a significant part in the Netherlands. 
Of the 27.000 firemen, 5.400 were professionals and the rest were volunteer firemen. The 
volunteers have to adhere to the same standards and they receive the same training as professionals. 
In the systematic analysis of fire brigade diving that the POS Inspectorate carried out, it was noted 
that some fire brigades were seriously considering creating fire brigade diving teams from 
people who had been recruited and trained specifically for the purpose. These people would not 
be deployed on the other tasks of firemen. In so doing they would reduce the pressure on them 
for training and exercise.336  
 
The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations indicated in response to the report by the 
Safety Board that it is the responsibility of municipalities and/or safety regions whether or not 
they want to have their own fire brigade diving team.337 As mentioned before, the number of 
diving teams is rapidly declining, probably also for financial reasons. But the fact that it is not 
mandatory for municipalities to have diving team does not help. The Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations may be motivated not to make this task mandatory because mandatory 
diving teams would give safety regions a strong argument for claiming money from the national 
government to support them. 
 
The recording of successful rescues is a recent development (2011), so in the past it has been 
difficult to prove the effectiveness and efficiency of the investment in the diving teams. And 
the diving accidents have made mayors and fire brigade commanders more sensitive to all the 
costly requirements (selection, training, equipment, organization, etc.) that come with having a 
fire brigade diving team in a safety region.  
 
In some regions, so called ‘surface rescue teams’ have been introduced. These teams focus on 
the rescue of people who are still on the surface of the water. It is as yet unclear what the 
requirements and regulations are for these teams will be. For example, it appears that there is 
not yet a risk inventory and evaluation (RI&E) for these activities, which should give cause for 
questions about the safety of these activities. A surface rescue mission involving a car in the 
water can be dangerous, as the risk of getting stuck in the car is a realistic one. Specific expertise 
remains necessary in such cases. In places that no longer have fire brigade diving teams 
solutions are sought by starting surface rescue teams or strengthening cooperation with other 
regional diving teams, with the police, with Rescue Brigades or with Marine divers. The decline 
of the number of fire brigade diving teams has led to concerns over the areas to be covered by 
divers with the proper expertise. If the area to be covered becomes too large for the numbers of 
available divers, the goals of rapid deployment can no longer be met, with possible 
consequences for the people who accidentally end up in the water.  
 
Utrecht 
The fire brigade diving team in Utrecht in 2001 had around 30 firemen who were deployable 
as fire brigade divers or diving team leaders. In this area there are several lakes, canals in the 
inner city, the Amsterdam-Rijn canal, the river Vecht, and some other waters. Deployment in 
fast flowing water, such as the Kromme Rijn, and in case of assistance in the Lek, is also 
possible.338 
 
                                               
336 POS Inspectorate (October 2008), p. 133. Amsterdam is an example of a municipality with such a dedicated team, 
it should be added that that team has a relatively large number of diving missions each year, around 300, while 
other regions only have 25 missions each year. 
337 TK 2009/2010, 26956, nr. 70, letter April 8, 2010. 
338 Interne commissie Brandweer Utrecht, (2001), paragraph 4.1. 
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Urk 
At the start of 2007, the fire brigade diving team in Urk consisted of six divers. The municipality 
of Urk covered an area of approximately 11.54 km ² and 98.36 km ² of water.339 In the province 
of Flevoland, only the municipalities of Almere, Lelystad and Urk had fire brigade diving 
teams.340  
 
Terneuzen 
The fire brigade in Terneuzen had 10 different locations within its own organization. The fire 
brigade cared for the 55.000 inhabitants of Terneuzen and covered 4950 hectares of water. Since 
the end of 2005, Terneuzen has had a fire brigade diving team, that in March 2008 consisted of 12 
divers, 7 of which were diving team leaders. Three of the twelve divers were also diving 
instructors. The fire brigade commander was also part of the diving team. The diving team 
consisted of 5 professionals and 7 volunteers.341  
 
Division of responsibilities 
Often, it was not clear who was responsible for which task. For instance, the internal committee 
of the fire brigade in Utrecht concluded that the organization of the diving task was complex. Many 
persons were involved and the division of responsibilities was deemed unclear. Many aspects (such 
as training, exercising, development of procedures and maintaining risk analyses) were arranged 
in an informal way. Consequently, policy development and the safeguarding of quality for fire 
brigade diving were poor.342  
 
The Dutch Safety Board pointed to several organizational problems within the Terneuzen fire 
brigade: 
   
“Prior to March 2008 the Terneuzen fire brigade has not been able to adequately organize 
and safeguard the preparedness of the diving team members. There was not one single 
point of contact for all diving related issues within the Terneuzen fire brigade; the 
responsibility for diving was spread over several persons.”343 
 
The Safety Board concluded that the management control mechanisms were seriously failing and 
also severely criticized the ‘we’ll take it as it comes’ approach that the fire brigade Terneuzen 
adopted (according to the Safety Board), stating that much more preparation and organizational 
control were needed. The Board concluded that the organizational conditions for creating a safe 
environment for the fire brigade divers were not present before the diving team became 
operational.  
 
The Labor Inspectorate concluded that clear guidance from the municipalities to the fire brigade 
was often missing. The municipality often did not have a vision of its own and was missing clear 
policies on the fire brigade’s diving tasks. That was an important reason why every fire brigade 
adopted its own approach, often building on a tradition dating back years, differing from town to 
town. Fire brigades also indicated that they experienced little guidance from the national level of 
the firemen’s organizations, the VNG or the Ministry.344 
 
                                               
339 December 31, 2010, source: CBS. 
340 Annual Report 2007 of the fire brigade Urk, p. 49. 
341 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 22 and p. 63. 
342 Interne commissie Brandweer Utrecht, (2001), paragraph 4.7. 
343 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 7. 
344 Labor Inspectorate (2009), p. 16. 
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One of the measures that seems to have won popularity after the diving accidents is the 
appointment of a diving coordinator. Several municipalities have done this (Utrecht and Terneuzen 
for example) and the NVBR has also appointed a national fire brigade diving coordinator. 
 
In a debate with the city council on the diving accident, the mayor of Utrecht, Brouwer-Korf, 
acknowledged that there had been serious organizational problems: 
 
“It was known to me, even before I started here as mayor, that the organization of the 
Utrecht fire brigade was extraordinary weak.”345 
 
She added that a new fire commander had been appointed and that an intensive effort was being 
made to improve the organization.  
 
Regionalization 
In response to the organizational problems that had been identified, the Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations, amongst others, indicated that they expected improvements to arise from the 
ongoing process of regionalization: the forming of the so called ‘safety regions’ in disaster relief 
and crisis control. These safety regions involve regional rather than local management. In 2012, 
the Dutch Senate passed a law confirming that all the responsibilities of the fire brigade should be 
transferred from the municipalities to the safety regions. The date for this mandatory 
implementation was January 1, 2014, thus doing away with municipal fire brigades.346  
 
To conclude: The organization of the fire brigades came ‘under fire’ for all sorts of problems – 
unclear division of responsibilities, lack of structure, failing management, wrong priorities and 
insufficient coordination.  
 
 
5.3.2.2. Organizational culture  
 
In December 2004, a report by the POS Inspectorate called ‘Safety awareness of fire brigade 
personnel’ had been published, reviewing whether the fire brigades had learned from earlier 
accidents. The answer the Inspectorate gave was a loud and clear ‘no’: For the sake of safety, they 
could and should have learned much more from their own actions.  
 
“The culture and the nature of the fire brigade organization, both psychologically (tough) 
as well as organizational (volunteers), hamper a natural continuing learning process.”347 
 
In the report the researchers identified what they saw as a ‘fight culture’ within the fire brigade, 
with a reference to the military accents the fire brigades possess. The system of hierarchy and 
ranks bears a resemblance to the military system, as do the military-style uniforms. There are 
attack plans for fighting the fire. The fire is the enemy who must be beaten. Firemen should 
have no fear of this enemy, fear means losing face. This toughness reflected what, to some, is 
still a ‘macho culture’. A fire brigade commander was quoted as follows: 
 
                                               
345 Minutes of meeting of the City Council of Utrecht, August 28, 2003, p. 41. 
346 http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2012/09/25/taken-brandweer-definitief-van-gemeenten-naar-veiligheidsregio-
s%5B2%5D.html (date last accessed: 25-12-2013). 
347 POS Inspectorate (2004), p. 38. 
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“Firemen put everything out of sight as soon as there is fire. That includes their personal 
safety. It happens to me, too. There’s a kind of primal urge within me, all I can see is the 
fire and that has to be put out.”348 
 
The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, when presenting the report to the House of 
Representatives, emphasized that changing the organizational culture was a long term process. He 
anticipated improvements because of new regulations for fire brigade personnel and because of 
the regionalization (the forming of the safety regions).349 The POS Inspectorate drew attention to 
a skeptical attitude to diving accidents in other fire brigades. Firemen seemed to have the strong 
conviction that it wouldn’t happen to them since they always dove safely. This attitude 
prevented them learning from other accidents. A casual approach to rules and regulations was 
also noticeable in other responsibilities such as disaster relief.350 Simon van der Doorn of the 
POS Inspectorate commented: 
 
“It is always possible to think of a reason not to follow a regulation. After all, regulations 
are not popular.”351 
 
Fire brigade divers seemed to have had a somewhat special reputation within the organization of 
the fire brigades: being a diver brought a certain status along with it. Divers were often 
characterized as tough and forceful figures, who emphasized action over words. Within the fire 
brigade, a ‘family culture’ still seems present, in which ties between colleagues are seen as very 
important and there often is somewhat of a general dislike for rules and managers. The 
organizational culture also shows itself in the way that procedures and safe working methods are 
viewed. For example, the Risk Inventory and Evaluation (RI&E) was most often seen as 
unnecessary, bothersome and time consuming administrative fuss. The culture was described by 
the Labor Inspectorate as one of ‘getting on with it, no whining!’352 
  
There is a remarkable difference in the perception of the organizational culture between the 
external organizations involved (first and foremost the inspectorates) and the fire brigades 
themselves. The fire brigades and their employees seem to stress that their culture is aimed at what 
is really important and what works. If rules are not followed, this often concerns an administrative 
problem rather than a real safety problem. In this view, the culture is also one of strong ties between 
the firemen, who have to be able to trust their colleagues in emergency situations.  
 
 
5.3.2.3. The political system and the relations with corporate partners and 
society  
 
Fire brigade diving falls within the public sphere. Nevertheless, the criminal court judging the 
Utrecht diving accident had already concluded that it need not belong exclusively to government. 
The training and education of fire brigade divers could also be done by private partners. Could this 
hold true not only for training and education, but also for diving itself? The fire brigades are often 
quick to point out that their type of diving is different from regular sport diving (more stress 
situations, time pressure, lack of clear sight underwater, possible obstacles in the water). But since 
                                               
348 POS Inspectorate (2004), p. 101. 
349 TK 2004/2005, 26596, nr. 30, p. 2-5. 
350 POS Inspectorate (October 2008), p. 25. 
351 http://www.duikforum.nl/duik-nieuws/24038-vrijblijvendheid-leidde-tot-duikongevallen.html (date last accessed: 25-
12-2013) 
352 Labor Inspectorate (2009), p. 9. 
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several fire brigade diving teams have been dissolved, solutions have to be found. So far, private 
diving teams have not replaced fire brigade divers anywhere. Can they offer an alternative? This 
is the only relevance of the corporate sector to the analysis in hand. On a political level, the balance 
between safety and efficiency is the important consideration and this is where the political 
discussion has focused.  
 
Necessity of fire brigade diving teams 
In November 2008, after receiving reports on the diving accidents, the Minister of the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations stated that fire brigade diving teams remain necessary: 
 
“The fire brigade is the only organization that is capable of getting divers at the scene 
at any moment and on time in order to perform lifesaving duties. The extra physical 
safety that the fire brigade thus provides represents an important added value for 
society. However, this added value must be delivered in a context that is safe for the fire 
brigade divers.”353 
 
The Dutch Safety Board criticized this viewpoint: it felt that ‘getting divers at the scene at any 
moment and on time in order to perform lifesaving duties’ was in contradiction with 
guaranteeing a safe setting for fire brigade divers. The political goal seemed to imply 
guaranteed presence by fire brigade divers in all Dutch municipalities that had waters. The 
Safety Board deemed this unrealistic: At the time no such presence existed. Tension between 
national policy and local practice hinged on three things: 
1. the time allowed for a diving team to reach the place of the rescue mission is a 
maximum of 15 minutes 
2. volunteers and professionals within the fire brigade have to adhere to the same 
standards and receive the same education and training and that applies also to fire 
brigade diving.  
3. exercising for fire brigade divers is mandatory: 300 minutes of exercise under 
water, divided over 10 dives a year.354  
 
Attaining these nationally set goals has created ludicrous local situations. For example, an 
inspector from the Labor Inspectorate found out that some local training plans were based on 
reaching the diploma requirement of 300 minutes underwater using a peculiar method: simply 
lying on the bottom of the swimming pool in order to reach this time limit.355   
The Safety Board concluded that a firm political decision had to be made by each municipality 
about whether they could provide a safe context for fire brigade diving. The same conclusion 
was reached by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The opposing view – held 
by those politically responsible for the local teams – is that risk is an integral part of the work 
of divers. It cannot be eliminated. The question should be how to provide a setting for the divers 
that is as safe as possible – and how that can be balanced with considerations of efficiency. 
 
Efficiency and safety 
There are no aggregate figures to show how often diving teams go into action. In Terneuzen it was 
approximately twice each year. This means that the ratio of exercising to deployment will be high. 
Efficiency is also a key issue in the deployment of personnel. Some fire brigades work with an on-
                                               
353 TK 2008/2009, 26596, nr. 65, p. 3. 
354 The Board added that this is a heavy load for the fire brigade, as it means that they have to practice with both 
volunteers and professionals every two weeks. This is quite a lot if one realizes that usually only four practice 
evenings a month are available, apart from the fact that diving is just one of the exercises firemen have to 
undertake on top of their basic firemen tasks. Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 14. 
355 Labor Inspectorate (2009), p. 10. 
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call duty system (divers have to be present at designated times, which they know beforehand), 
others work with what is called a free inflow system. In the last system, divers can be called in for 
duty at any time. This means they are constantly on alert, even if, for example, a volunteer fireman 
has had a long working day in his regular day job. For safety reasons, the on-call duty system 
seems to be preferable because the fireman can make sure that he is well prepared and rested. 
However, many fire brigades indicate that financial arguments have forced them to choose the free 
inflow system, simply on grounds of cost.356 
 
Municipalities and fire brigades have criticized instances in which they felt the balance has shifted 
in the wrong direction. As already seen, mayor Brouwer-Korf of Utrecht originally criticized the 
verdict of the criminal court in the Utrecht case because, as a result of it, the fire brigade was 
forbidden practice under risky circumstances.357 Another repercussion in 2009 saw hundreds of 
fire brigade divers unable to be deployed in operations because they had not passed their 
examinations. (The standards for the exams had been become much stricter after the Terneuzen 
diving accident.) Approximately 10 diving teams consequently suffered a shortfall in operational 
divers.358  
 
Political discussion 
Only the incident in Utrecht has triggered political debate, and even that has been limited. It is 
interesting to quote the political judgment that mayor Brouwer-Korf gave during the debate 
with the city council: 
“Mr. Abrahamse wondered what the political judgment of the College of Mayor and 
Aldermen is in this case. The College has said that it should just take the loss: The case 
is bad enough and therefore the College will not appeal the verdict just to debate 
responsibility. The College will ensure that the fire brigade service will be brought up 
to the appropriate standard and the rules for diving in the Netherlands will be made 
‘rock solid’ so that no mistakes can be made. However, we cannot guarantee that there 
will never be an accident again. No one can guarantee that. As an employer however, 
we are bound to ensure that working conditions are optimal.”359 
 
As noted earlier, a motion of censure against the acts of the mayor by Green Left and the 
Christian Union got further support only from D66 and was therefore not granted.360 The 
mayor’s performance was generally well received. At her farewell as mayor of Utrecht, the 
oldest member of the city council, Van Rooij (D’66), spoke the following words: 
 
“You have shown that you are able to push in the desired direction. You turned a 
dramatic diving accident that happened to the fire brigade, into an opportunity to 
implement structural change in the fire brigade. Of course the city council kept 
complaining when, afterwards, the working hours of the fire brigade were under 
discussion. You told the council this, too. At the same time your door was always open 
for us.”361 
 
Brouwer-Korf, who attached particular importance to the fire brigade in her time as mayor, indeed 
                                               
356 Labor Inspectorate (2009), p. 16. 
357 http://www.nbdc.nl/cms/show/id=492546/contentid=35225 (date last accessed: 25-12-2013) 
358 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 9.  
359 Minutes of meeting of the City Council of Utrecht, August 28, 2003, p. 42. 
360 Published on www.utrechtsnieuwsblad.nl, August 29, 2003, 
http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/1401/ad/integration/nmc/frameset/varia/kobala_article.dhtml?artid=1748403 (date last 
accessed: 25-12-2013) 
361 Minutes meeting City Council of Utrecht, December 20, 2007, p. 9. 
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pushed for reforms and action within the fire brigade, trying to learn from this experience as much 
as possible. The difficulty for the mayors involved is that they find themselves between two stools: 
responding to criticism and defending their own personnel.   
 
To conclude: Political aspects do not seem paramount in these cases. At a local level there is debate 
on the balance between efficiency and safety and a wider debate about whether municipalities 
should run their own fire brigade diving teams. 
 
 
5.3.2.4. Rules, regulations and procedures  
 
Rules and regulations 
In most reports on the diving accidents, there is sharp criticism of the existing framework of rules 
and regulations for fire brigade diving. The general judgment is that the rules and regulations are 
often ambiguous or even contradictory and leave too much to the discretion of individual fire 
brigades and firemen. 362 The municipalities involved have all declared that the lack of clarity in 
the legal framework was a relevant factor for explaining the diving accident.  
 
In any case, it is clear that there was an abundance of rules. To give an indication of the number 
of rules, the following table lists the rules and regulations that were identified for the Terneuzen 
diving accident.   
 
Table 5.2. Applicable legal framework, guidelines and procedure fire brigade Terneuzen363 
 
Fire brigade laws and regulations 
 
Fire Brigade Act 1985 
Decree firefighting personnel 
Examination Regulations 1995 fire divers 
Examination Regulations 2004 diving supervisor 
 
Labor law 
 
Labor Conditions Act 
Labor Conditions Decree 
Labor Conditions Regulations 
Labor Conditions policy guidelines 
Several Labor Conditions circular letters 
 
Sector regulations 
 
Guideline “Combating Water Accidents by the Fire Brigade” 
Model instruction Fire Brigade Diving 
Guideline “Taking stock of safety aspects in repressive action” 
Guideline ‘Practicing’. 
 
Regional and local elaborations of laws and regulations 
                                               
362 See for example the report by the Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 9-10. 
363 Based on Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 31-39. 
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Fire brigade policy plan 2003-2006 Terneuzen 
 
Procedure diving regional fire brigade Zeeland 
 
Procedure Diving team Terneuzen 
Working Instruction WO 5681 Terneuzen 
 
A more detailed analysis of the rules and regulation is given in the report of the POS Inspectorate. 
The POS Inspectorate noted that technical developments in fire brigade diving had taken off 
over the last decades. These developments had spread over the different fire brigades and had 
been included in national training and examinations. Where new developments had to be 
addressed it happened mainly where dedicated volunteers used their own time to adjust 
guidelines and instructions. National coordination was therefore problematic. In response to 
this, regulatory requirements seem to be formulated very broadly.  
 
“Partly because of this there are large differences between fire brigades in the actual 
safety of their fire brigade diving. Most persons involved in the systematic analysis have 
expressed their amazement about the lack of uniformity and have named more uniformity 
as an import condition for improvement.”364 
 
The POS Inspectorate went on to plead for a generally accepted framework for safe fire brigade 
diving, with less room for deviation. Firemen still kept a relaxed attitude towards adhering to the 
rules, but paradoxically they also indicated that they needed unambiguous rules and regulations. 
In the opinion of the inspectorate, convincing the fire brigade divers was therefore paramount when 
implementing improvements, but there was also a need greater strictness. The relationship between 
being a professional and working in accordance with safety regulations should be made clearer.365 
 
The Labor Inspectorate indicated in 2009 that there was confusion among fire brigade divers 
over which rules applied: the Guideline “Combating Water Accidents by the Fire Brigade”, the 
Fire Brigade Act 1985 or the Labor Conditions Act. It should be pointed out here that the 
Guideline was developed by the fire brigade diving organizations themselves and many fire 
brigades considered their own Guideline to be paramount, even though it had no legal status. 
There were inconsistencies between the Fire Brigade Act 1985 and the Labor Conditions Act 
on several points (such as the organization of the supervision and the description of positions) 
and some of the demands of the Guideline actually contradicted the Labor Conditions Act.366  
 
The Guideline “Combating Water Accidents by the Fire Brigade” describes itself as expert 
advice for shaping fire brigade diving at municipal or regional level. The Guideline requires 
local implementation and gives a framework for it. It contains the following interesting remark 
on the importance of good administration: 
 
“It is, partly in light of the legal position of the employer in case of accidents,  
very important that this implementation, especially when deviating from the Guideline, 
is well documented. Particular attention should be given to the way in which safety, in 
another manner than as set forth in the Guideline, will yet be guaranteed.”367 
                                               
364 POS Inspectorate (October 2008), p. 6. 
365 POS Inspectorate (October 2008), p. 7 and p. 14. 
366 Labor Inspectorate (2009), p. 15. 
367 NVBR (2008), p. 9. 
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As of 2012, cooperation between the fire brigades and the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment led to a specific regulatory framework for fire brigade diving on the subject of 
labor conditions.  
 
Procedures  
From the reports it has become clear that procedures in the fire brigades were often not followed 
and were often seen as cumbersome, instead of being necessary instruments in a professional and 
safe environment. Terneuzen can serve as an example: Information about the amount of training 
delivered to divers was spread across three different systems. This information was never 
aggregated and no comparison of actual training with the relevant norms took place. Logbooks 
were incomplete because training information and diving schedules were missing. The actual 
training participation was observed, according to the instructors, but no records were held. The 
people involved believed the diving team to be well trained because of the content of the exercises. 
However, the Board stated that it could not verify quality, as exercise reports, management reports 
or reports by external experts or organizations simply did not exist. 
 
A risk inventory and evaluation (RI&E) is mandatory for all fire brigades under the Labor 
Conditions Act, but the Labor Inspectorate found out that 95% of the fire brigades they investigated 
were non-compliant. There was no RI&E at all, the RI&E was not specific for fire brigade diving, 
plans were missing, instructions for the local situation were missing or a clear division of 
responsibilities was missing. A model RI&E has by now been developed for fire brigade diving. 
Still quite a task to develop such an RI&E, it is less time consuming and costly than before. 
However, what really matters in the opinion of the firemen is that in actual practice safety is 
guaranteed, something which most of them firmly believed was already the case.368 
 
To conclude: Both the framework of rules and regulations (lots of rules, but not enough clarity and 
too much room for deviation) and the applicable procedures (often missing or incomplete, and 
seen as a hindrance rather than a professional instrument for ensuring safety) provided the 
opportunity that was needed for things to go wrong the way they did.  
 
 
5.3.3. Motives  
 
5.3.3.1. Primary motives  
 
Three primary motives have been identified before:  
 
a. rational choice (e.g. a rational choice to commit an act is taken after weighing all the 
options) 
b. ignorance (e.g. errors due to not knowing the relevant rules or due to lack of 
professionalism) or  
c. unwillingness (e.g. governmental organizations who feel that they are confronted by 
rules that are impossible to carry out because of difficult dilemmas) 
 
Rational choice seems absent as a motive in these cases. Clearly, nobody made a deliberate choice 
to commit a dangerous act. What can be said is that not enough measures were taken to prevent 
these things from happening. This has in large part to do with organizational issues. Of course, 
technical problems were directly relevant sometimes, but organizational problems stand out here. 
                                               
368 Labor Inspectorate (2009), p. 9. 
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These problems had nothing to do with a calculated outcome of a process in which all the options 
were weighed. Rather, the criticism was that things went along without deliberate choices, without 
overview, without risk calculation, etc.  
 
Ignorance however, played a major part, as a lack of professionalism was detected in all three 
cases. The Terneuzen case can serve as an illustration. All of the members of the diving team in 
Terneuzen possessed the required diplomas for fire brigade diver, but further investigation showed 
that the validity of the diplomas of 7 of the 12 divers had unwarranted extension. The diploma of 
the deceased diver had also been prolonged unjustly. The reason was that these divers had not 
reached the required 300 minutes of underwater practice. The four diplomas for diving team leader 
within the team also turned out to be invalid. In Terneuzen there had been a lack of practice, and 
surfacing during an emergency, self-saving procedures and lifesaving techniques for reserve divers 
had been insufficiently rehearsed.369 This lack of professionalism is not something for which 
only the fire brigade in Terneuzen should be held to account: 
 
“The Board notes that the fire brigade is not aware that deeper and more detailed diving 
expertise was needed to practice emergency situations, particularly for proper exercise 
of self-rescue and rescue of a diver in distress. This was particularly true for the diving 
instructors. The fire brigade of Terneuzen cannot be reproached for this lack of 
knowledge in the view of the Board, because by following the initial training and 
examination they should have been able to count on the fact that the specialist diving 
knowledge with the right depth was being offered. Those involved, according to the 
Board, have been unable to qualitatively judge their own proficiency.”370 
 
The cases of Utrecht and Urk showed similar problems. Training and education were problematic, 
insufficient preparation went into exercises, working procedures were not there or were not clear, 
risks were not inventoried and the rules and regulations were not clear to most parties involved. 
 
Unwillingness can also be detected in these cases. As outlined before, the fire brigade divers 
viewed many of the rules and regulations as bureaucratic nuisances with little value for maintaining 
safety. Certainly, this general attitude and the organizational culture that is connected to this, 
played a part in the events surrounding the diving accidents. However, it would go too far to say 
that unwillingness by the fire brigades to follow the rules was the most important motive here.  
 
 
5.3.3.2. Secondary motives  
 
a. financial concerns (cutting costs, staying within budget, avoiding claims, etc.) 
 
As mentioned before, there is pressure on fire brigades to cut costs and stay within budget. The 
balance between safety and efficiency is a precarious one. If safety were the only concern, training 
and capacity would not be a problem. As it is, a balance has to be found. Clearly, financial concerns 
play a role here, although this does not automatically mean that saving money was the main motive 
behind what happened here. The errors that were made cannot all be attributed to a lack of funding. 
Providing additional funding is not the only way ahead, and this is important since budgets are 
under pressure. Fire brigade diving teams have started to count how many rescues they have made, 
which is a good way to show the added value of having a fire brigade diving team in operation. 
 
                                               
369 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 6-7.  
370 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 64. 
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b. the position of the governmental organization and its public image  
 
It is somewhat difficult to assess whether concern for the position of the governmental organization 
and its public image played an important role here. Clearly, it did not play a role in the causes of 
the accidents but can be said to have played a role in the response to them, as might be expected 
in any fatal accident involving any responsible organization.  
 
c. preferring another norm than the law strives for (for example employment over 
environmental concerns) 
 
This can be connected to what was said before about unwillingness. Rules were often seen as 
bureaucratic, administrative nuisances without real value for guaranteeing safety. Other norms 
were preferred then, although it should be stressed that while safety is the norm that the law strives 
for, it was also the norm that in practice the fire brigade divers strove for, at least in their own 
perception. 
 
d. demands by politicians, citizens, special interest groups and media 
 
As described before, it seemed as if the culture within the fire brigade diving teams was internally 
oriented, with little concern for pressure from the outside world. It does not appear that demands 
by external groups would have been very influential on the daily operations, although pressure on 
budgets and limitations on capacity did play some part. 
 
 
5.3.4. Masking  
 
Adams and Balfour argue that a characteristic of administrative evil is that it is masked, in the 
sense that there are many factors preventing us from identifying what is really going on and judging 
whether it constitutes administrative evil or not. In the following sections, these factors are 
described briefly and subsequently analyzed for significance in this case. 
 
 
5.3.4.1. Distance in time and space  
 
Clearly, perspectives are influenced by time and space. A lack of distance in space seems 
present here. The perspective of one’s own region or one’s own team is most often adopted. 
Distance in time is relevant here, too, and is often used as an argument. Back then things were 
in order, with today’s knowledge things might have been different. To illustrate this, a short 
dialogue in a debate in the City Council of Utrecht concerning the diving accident is quoted 
here: 
 
“Mr. Giesberts (Green Left): If the College knew that the Guideline was not being 
implemented in 2001, is it possible then to say that exercising should be called 
irresponsible? 
Mrs. Brouwer-Korf (mayor): With the knowledge we had then we thought the exercising 
was responsible. With what we know now, after the diving accident and the fact that in 
two other places there were near-accidents, my thinking is different. 
Mr. Zijlstra (VVD): What is the new knowledge that makes the difference?   
Mrs. Brouwer-Korf (mayor): The knowledge that a terrible accident took place and that 
it formed the motive for the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to change 
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the Guideline. Therefore I am not alone in this one.”371 
 
 
5.3.4.2.  Object-relations psychology/scapegoating (splitting mechanism) 
 
Certainly, none of the accidents had just one simple cause or one individual who could be held 
solely responsible for what happened. Nevertheless, it seems that responsibility for the 
accidents was not easily assumed. What is striking is that the municipalities and fire brigades 
have sometimes responded to criticism from the inspectorates by bouncing the ball back. An 
illustration is the response of the VNG and the NVBR to the (admittedly very critical) report 
by the Labor Inspectorate, in which they advised the inspectorate to rethink its role and step 
away from the sideline. Or another example: The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment were often criticized by 
municipalities for the legal and procedural framework for fire brigade diving, which was 
commonly seen as ambiguous, vague and sometimes contradictory.  
 
It should be noted that none of the people involved tried to point to the victim (the deceased 
diver) as the possible scapegoat; all parties refrained from such an approach. But that is 
something different than actually taking the blame publicly. Only with great reluctance were 
mistakes admitted and it was not uncommon to reproach other parties. Taken together, there 
was quite a lot of finger pointing going on here. Mostly this was between governing bodies at 
different levels: local, national or inspectorates. Governing bodies on the same level generally 
agree with each other, scapegoating goes upward or downward.  
 
 
5.3.4.3. Perspective 
 
As mentioned before, the perspective from which evil is most often recognized, is that of the 
victim. This often makes for the ‘myth of pure evil’. This is partly due to the fact that modern 
culture shows tendencies, exacerbated by mass media, to present moral questions in black and 
white: all good or all bad. What is remarkable in this case is that in comparison to the other 
cases, media interest in these diving accidents has been relatively limited. This might initially 
have been explained by the local character of the accidents, but even after the third accident, 
the national character of the events did not receive much coverage either. 
 
In the reports of the inspectorates, there is little to be found about the attention that was given 
to the victims and their relatives.372 Focus was very much on the ‘perpetrators’, the fire brigade 
organizations and the municipalities. Whereas in other cases discussions about damage claims 
for the victims took up some time, such claims seem absent in the cases of the firemen who 
drowned. Lack of publicity about the incidents does not necessarily mean that there was no 
attention paid to the victims or their relatives. It appears more likely that these contacts took 
place outside of the spotlights, and probably rightly so. Another factor to be taken into account 
is that there seems to be a solid system in place for providing extra insurance for brigade 
personnel and their relatives in the case of fatal accidents. It would go too far to say that anybody 
was portrayed in the media as a villain. What is striking is the common desire to find one single 
actor or one single cause responsible for the accident. The headline in NRC Handelsblad in a 
news article about the POS Inspectorate’s report is telling. ‘Too much room for discretion led 
                                               
371 Minutes of meeting of the City Council of Utrecht, August 28, 2003, p. 6. 
372 It should be noted that the municipalities and fire brigades in all three cases did mention the relatives of the victims 
on several occasions. 
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to diving accidents.’ If one reads the rest of the article, it becomes clear that the inspectorate in 
fact found a set of many different causes, complexly intertwined with each other. The headline 
‘Complex combination of all sorts of different causes led to diving accidents’ would be more 
accurate, but perhaps not as attractive from a publisher’s point of view. Another example is the 
remark made by the mayor of Terneuzen that unfortunately the report by the Dutch Safety Board 
did not point to a direct cause for the diving accident.373 
 
The perspective of the victim often differs greatly from that of the perpetrator. This is called the 
‘magnitude gap’. From the victim’s perspective, most often in hindsight, evil can be clearly 
identified. From the perpetrator’s perspective, however, it is often a problem to identify evil. In 
these cases, the victim’s perspective is seldom heard. It is also interesting to note once again but 
in the context of perspective, that there is no criticism of the victims. This seems to be part of an 
honor code not to smear the memory of the deceased and to show respect to the families who have 
had to suffer the dramatic loss of their loved ones. For example, the Dutch Safety Board maintains 
as an internal guideline that criticism should never be aimed at individuals working within 
organizations, the ‘street level bureaucrats’. Instead, the organization as a whole and its political 
leaders and top level management should be targeted. Clearly, this is an approach that can be 
understood and respected. Nevertheless, the recommendations concerning improving the safety of 
fire brigade diving should also look at the individual character traits of divers, their psychological 
and physical well-being and their individual skill level and professionalism. In the field of fire 
brigade diving, there is growing attention to the importance of the psychological aspects of fire 
brigade diving. In this line of thinking, selection of the right type of divers (‘not the macho type, 
but people with realistic expectations and fears’) is crucial for improving the safety. Research into 
the way stress influences divers is also being taken seriously. How does someone react when 
suddenly they can no longer breathe? It is difficult to remain calm and professional under such 
circumstances. This goes beyond training and impinges on the selection mechanisms for divers.   
 
The perpetrator’s perspective shows the classic ‘magnitude gap’. The perspective might be 
characterized as follows: ‘things might have gone better, but at the time procedures seemed to be 
in place. Many problems only appeared on paper and in reality things were handled better. 
Nevertheless, improvements can be made and in fact had already begun to happen.’ 
 
 
5.3.4.4. Language  
 
The use of technical language or euphemisms often masks what is really going on and provides 
for emotional distance from sensitive issues. Language is therefore a classic mask of 
wrongdoing or administrative evil. It is striking to see how the municipalities talk about some 
aspects of these cases, particularly in relation to the violations of the Labor Conditions Act, 
euphemisms (‘this is only a ‘paper problem’) and ambiguous language are used. The reaction 
to the report by the Labor Inspectorate is telling in this aspect.  
 
Nevertheless, wording is often chosen in such a way that no direct admission of guilt or liability 
can be deduced from it. The following written remarks by a Terneuzen city councilor can serve 
as an illustration of the gap between policymakers and the general public as it comes to the 
choice of words: 
 
                                               
373http://www.terneuzen.nl/Actueel_Nieuws/Nieuws/Archief_2009/Oktober_november_december/Vierde_rapportag
e_over_duikongeval (date last accessed: 10-8-2011) 
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 “The Press Release of April 2 this year was headlined ‘No demonstrable cause of diving 
accidents’. This in itself is true, but it is also true that another headline would have been 
equally appropriate: ‘City violated the Labor Conditions Act on several 
occasions.’ But no, very euphemistically it is written in the Press Release: “The 
Terneuzen fire brigade has therefore made efforts over the past year in practicing, 
organization, equipment and procedures.” This, even though much could have been 
learned much earlier of the accidents in Utrecht in 2001 and Urk in 2007. The masking 
of events continues. The report of the meeting of Board and Means on April 2 this year 
shows that the head of the fire brigade spoke in a concealing way of a ‘settlement 
proposal’, as if both the municipality and the Public Prosecution had given in a little. A 
fine is an opportunity to avoid prosecution in court. In this case the municipality 
repeatedly failed to comply with regulations as a result of which, in short, it knows or 
reasonably should know that lives could have been jeopardized.”374 
 
The College of Mayor and Aldermen replied by stating that the reason for accepting the 
proposal by the Public Prosecution was that the municipality wanted to prevent the start of a 
long and expensive legal battle (which, including appeal, could last two or three years). The 
College added that this was not in the best interest of the relatives of the diver, the employees 
who were involved or their own organization.375  
 
 
5.3.4.5. Dehumanization  
 
It is essential that subjects are put at a distance through language, by making them ‘numbers’, 
‘things’ or calling them inhuman. To quote from Zygmunt Bauman again: 
 
“People, things, events are ‘programmed’; they are ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’, feedback loops, 
variables, percentages, processes, etc., until every contact with concrete situations has 
become abstract. Then all that is left are charts, collections of statistics, print copies.”376 
 
In the case of the firemen who drowned, this seems to be difficult to pinpoint. There is a great 
deal of attention to procedures from the inspectorates, but it cannot be said that subjects are put 
at greater distance in a dehumanizing way. Despite the lack of discussion about the victims it 
certainly seems exaggerated to talk of dehumanization here.  
 
 
5.3.4.6. Technical rationality  
 
What is seen in these diving accidents seems contrary to what is expected in technical 
rationality, where processes are elevated over human dignity. In these cases, processes are 
largely ignored and individual preferences are given scope, relatively speaking.  
 
“The lack of a shared, factual image can quickly lead to partial solutions whose effects 
on the system as a whole and the security aspects thereof, remain unclear. Because of 
this, there is too little thought outside their own framework. Other unsafe conditions may 
                                               
374 Questions by city councilor Freeke of Terneuzen, April 14, 2009, answers by College of Mayor and Aldermen, April 
16, 2009. 
375 Questions by city councilor Freeke of Terneuzen, April 14, 2009, answers by College of Mayor and Aldermen, April 
16, 2009. 
376 Bauman (1989), p. 146-147. 
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continue for a long time, even despite accidents. In this way, the views of an individual 
can determine the way of working in a fire brigade diving team, and one's own 
experiences especially - or even the lack thereof – are decisive for the perception of 
security and whether and when something is improved in a fire brigade.”377  
 
The inspectorate went on to conclude that the lack of a shared ‘complete picture’ of fire brigade 
diving also had consequences on a national level. The inspectorate found numerous opinions 
and assumptions, but these were coupled with a surprisingly low factual awareness. Objective 
and factual information was needed, then, to make improvements on a national scale in a 
reasonable amount of time.378  
 
It seems then that fire brigade diving teams have operated as if they were ‘in a world of their 
own’. Of course there were still many aspects that were part of a procedure and that were 
regulated, but the common analysis here is that there should have been stricter application of 
procedures. Technical progress and processes then do not seem to be elevated over human 
dignity here. On the contrary, firemen often complain about the bureaucratic procedures that 
they have to face. What is recognizable in technical rationality is that processes become routine 
and that people seem to stop thinking about it. This is a real danger which in fact materialized 
in these cases. This should be clear from what went before, a final quote from the committee 
that investigated the diving accident in Utrecht sums it up well:  
 
 “Good, effective and safe exercising seems a structural weakness of the Utrecht fire 
brigade. Many exercises like the current one, are based on tradition. People simply 
stopped thinking about it.”379  
 
 
5.4. Response of the governmental organizations involved  
 
5.4.1. Internal language  
 
There are few internal documents available for these three cases. And in comparison with the 
other cases in this dissertation, attention from the media has been relatively limited. The media 
interest in the cases of the drowned fire brigade divers came mostly from the local media. 
Neither journalists nor scientists have launched large-scale investigations to find out more about 
internal considerations. This could also be connected to the fact that none of the accidents have 
really led to serious political problems for the authorities involved (perhaps with the minor 
exception of Utrecht, where a motion of censure was defeated in the city council).  
 
 
5.4.2. External language  
 
Utrecht 
 
There was criticism about the way the College of Mayor and Aldermen of Utrecht responded 
to the case on several occasions. A city councilor indicated that she had trouble with the 
approach of the municipality: 
 
                                               
377 POS Inspectorate (October 2008), p. 22. 
378 POS Inspectorate (October 2008), p. 23. 
379 Interne commissie Brandweer Utrecht, (2001), paragraph 8. 
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“Ms. Spit (PvdA): First, as I already pointed out, there is a difference in the reaction 
right after the accident, in which self-critical and decisive intervention took place and 
the press release we received immediately after the court decision. Today again, it is 
only at the end of her presentation that the mayor comes to the fact  
that she and the municipality deplore and regret the accident. In the press release I 
actually find nothing of the sort. It states only that it is unfortunate that it took two years 
before a verdict was announced, and that some statements of the court were not entirely 
clear. The mayor's press release focused entirely on the future and the diving practices. 
This first aspect is what I missed in the reaction. I find it very significant that the mayor’s 
story tonight ended with her expression that she takes responsibility as an employer.”380 
 
During the debate, discussion also came round to the critical report concerning the organization 
of the Utrecht fire brigade, “Brandweer Utrecht, de brand meester?” Mayor Brouwer did not 
release the report, stating this was a consequence of the fact that the College of Mayor and 
Aldermen held responsibility for some matters under the dual system that regulates the 
relationship between city council and College. In the evening, the mayor commented on the 
stance of the municipality: 
 
“We were open, honest and uninhibited.”381  
 
It is also interesting to note what the internal committee of the Utrecht fire brigade remarked 
about communication with the media: 
 
“The contacts with the media went through their own press officer. Immediately after 
the accident there was a press release. In the local press, attention to the accident and 
the death of William was given in a restrained manner. The regional radio and TV 
station found cause in the interim report of the internal committee to suggest more than 
that the report made public. Reaction was given by means of a press release with a 
neutral response.”382 
 
The report by the internal committee of the fire brigade Utrecht was published because the 
mayor did not want to wait any longer for the results of the investigations by the Labor 
Inspectorate and the Public Prosecution, for which she had asked repeatedly. Because the 
conclusions from the internal investigation also made measures at a national level for the 
improvement of diver safety necessary, the mayor felt it was not responsible to hold the report 
back any longer.383  
 
Urk 
The fire commander of Urk, in reaction to the news that nobody would be prosecuted for the 
events of the diving accident, stated that his fire brigade had everything under control, the only 
problem in his view was that this was difficult to prove because of flaws in the administration.384 
 
In its annual report over 2007, the fire brigade of Urk noted the following: 
 
                                               
380 Minutes of meeting of the City Council of Utrecht, August 28, 2003, (afternoon), p. 46. 
381 Minutes of meeting of the City Council of Utrecht, August 28, 2003, (evening), p. 5. 
382 Interne commissie Brandweer Utrecht, (2001), paragraph 7.3.   
383 Answers by College of Mayor and Aldermen to questions by Utrecht city councilor Giesbers, March 12, 2002, sv 
2002, nr.19.docv6(<auteur>).  
384 http://www.destentor.nl/regio/flevoland/1539058/OM-vervolgt-niemand-voor-duikongeval-op-Urk.ece (date last 
accessed: 25-12-2013)  
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
130 
 
“The Labor Inspectorate during its investigation found 20 so-called violations of the 
regulations on labor conditions (of which one is coupled to the demand of the Labor 
Inspectorate to draft a written practicing schedule for the divers), which will be undone 
by means of plan by the fire brigade in the course of the year. The greater part of these 
violations has an administrative character and none of these points actually had 
anything to do with the diving accident or could, had they been different, have prevented 
the accident. The fire brigade simply does not have certain things on paper and must 
still do so.”385  
 
Terneuzen 
Meijering, fire brigade commander of Terneuzen said the following about what happens to a 
fire brigade that loses a fire brigade diver: 
  
“Your world collapses, you’re full of guilt questions and at the same time there are many 
investigations, including legal issues that are demanding. Yet, throughout that there is 
that other side and the reason why I am here: What can we learn from this? How can 
these dreadful things be prevented? Once a fire brigade is forced to deal with a fatality 
there are many parties, ‘a mutual chain’, who all want something: the Inspectorate, 
public prosecutor, the NVBR and so on.” 
 
Meijering also indicated that the POS Inspectorate should stand closer to the fire brigades, not 
with a ‘slap on the wrist’ but by indicating why something is wrong and how to improve this. 
He urged fire brigade divers to be critical towards themselves, each other and management. He 
advocated pride in one’s profession, but also urged keeping an open and critical view.386 
 
The first response by the mayor of Terneuzen, Lonink, on the day of the accident to the press 
was to say that Matthijssen was a very experienced diver.  
 
“We don’t know the cause of the incident. All procedures, such as for example 
connecting the diver through a line to a second person on the shore, were well executed. 
Nevertheless he could have gotten into trouble. Or maybe he became unwell. It is still a 
guess as to what the cause might have been.”387 
 
A press statement by the mayor in response to the report of the Dutch Safety Board started as 
follows: 
 
“Unfortunately, first and foremost for Wim’s relatives and all other people involved, this 
report too does not point to a direct cause for the diving accident.”388 
 
He went on to say that the report held valuable recommendations for the future, although it 
focused a lot on indirect circumstances. He concluded by summing up the measures that had 
already been taken by the municipality to improve things. These measures were taken, he 
stressed, both before and after the accident: extra materials were bought, safety equipment and 
manpower were added and there was more express attention to working procedures within the 
fire brigade.  
                                               
385 Annual Report 2007 of the fire brigade Urk, p. 5. 
386 Verslag Symposium Veiligheid brandweerduiken 301008, p. 3. 
387 http://www.pzc.nl/regio/zeeland/2808303/Duiker-is-42jarige-Terneuzenaar.ece (date last accessed: 25-12-2013) 
388http://www.terneuzen.nl/Actueel_Nieuws/Nieuws/Archief_2009/Oktober_november_december/Vierde_rapportag
e_over_duikongeval (date last accessed: 10-8-2011) 
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In July 2010, the College of Mayor and Aldermen sent its final analysis of the accident to the 
City Council. The municipality of Terneuzen stated in this analysis that the absence of a clear 
legal framework is characteristic of fire brigade diving, making it an important point to improve. 
The municipality pointed to the recommendation of the Dutch Safety Board to make one 
framework for both legal and organizational aspects available to municipalities and safety 
regions. The municipality expressed its disappointment in the limited response by the Minister 
of the Interior and Kingdom Relations on this point and mentioned the efforts by the VNG389 
and the Dutch association of mayors to make a governmental framework for considering safety 
aspects of fire brigade diving.390 
 
The Dutch Safety Board had concluded that the municipality of Terneuzen did not have its 
organization of the fire brigade diving in order. The response of the municipality was as follows: 
 
“In retrospect we can indeed conclude that at the start of the fire brigade diving team a 
few things could and (possibly) should have been filled in differently. But we emphasize 
that this is wisdom after the fact. At the time the choice was made for deployment of a 
fire brigade diving team, there were, as also concluded by the Dutch Safety Board, no 
clear examples or guidelines available for setting up a diving team. With the knowledge 
of then, the diving team was organized in the safest way possible.” 
 
This is an argument that has been seen before: ‘knowing what we knew then’.  
 
Clearly, an accident like this and all the investigations that followed it, laid a heavy burden on 
the municipal organization: 
 
“The number of conclusions and recommendations with which we, as a municipality, 
are confronted after the diving accident, is enormous. A great number of these regarded 
the way in which we as a municipal organization have dealt with the fire brigade diving. 
We have cooperated in all investigations and we have reacted to all points very 
seriously.”391 
 
The municipality concluded that they would follow all new developments, but indicated that up 
to that point they had taken all measures that were reasonably possible. The municipality also 
remarked that fire brigade diving will always entail risks. Excluding all risks was seen as 
impossible, but the employer and the employee had a mutual obligation to do everything 
possible to avoid risks.392 
 
It is interesting to study the response of the NVBR and the fire brigades to the report by the 
Labor Inspectorate concerning the inspections of most of the fire brigade diving teams. The 
NVBR expressed its surprise at the way the Labor Inspectorate carried out its investigation, 
because in its view the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and the Ministry of the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations had agreed years ago that fire brigade diving is a specific 
profession, that cannot be compared to other diving disciplines such as underwater welders or 
deep sea divers. That agreement it said, had not been translated into the rules and regulations 
concerning labor conditions, as a consequence of which the wrong standards were used by the 
Labor Inspectorate when carrying out its investigation. The fire brigades were infuriated by the 
                                               
389 The VNG is the Association of Dutch Municipalities.  
390 Gemeente Terneuzen (2010), p. 5. 
391 Gemeente Terneuzen (2010), p. 11. 
392 Gemeente Terneuzen (2010), p. 13. 
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report. They felt the specific character of fire brigade diving had not been taken into account by 
the Labor Inspectorate and, moreover, the Labor Inspectorate began its inspections merely a 
month after the results from the systematical reflection by the POS Inspectorate and the NVBR 
were published, leaving fire brigades little time for implementation. Apparently the expertise 
of the Labor Inspectorate when it came to fire brigade diving was questioned within the fire 
brigade field. A spokesman for the NVBR, Wevers, said:  
 
“We foresee problems with the ‘administrative approach’ the Labor Inspectorate is 
following for fire brigade diving. The safety of civilians and the safety of the diver are 
absolutely not better off with this approach by the Labor Inspectorate.”393 
 
The VNG (the Dutch Association of Municipalities) shared the NVBR’s criticism and pleaded 
with the Labor Inspectorate to rethink its role: 
 
“With the release of this report, the Labor Inspectorate seems to opt for a position on 
the sideline of the fire brigade field. In our opinion, there is too much focus on the ‘paper 
reality’ of the Labor Conditions Law and the regulations connected to the law 
and too little on encouraging desired safety behavior. Precisely at that point there is a 
need for a Labor Inspectorate that sparkles, comes up with good examples and takes 
initiatives with authority to help improve organization and culture.”394 
 
Notwithstanding all that went before, it should be acknowledged here that the accident in 
Terneuzen (the third fatal accident) was followed by real reforms, which demonstrated concern 
for learning from the accidents and improving safety. 
 
 
5.4.3. Strategy  
 
Concrete strategies for dealing with these cases are not easy to distinguish, although it seems 
clear that the responses by the politicians involved do not seem very different from what might 
be expected in cases of fatal accidents in other sectors. From their external communications, an 
impression is gained that the fire brigade diving teams are internally oriented and for the most 
part have escaped public attention. As a result of this inward culture, such strategies as were in 
place have tended to point to the role of other parties on different government levels (national 
government, inspections) in connection to the complicated legal framework that was in place. 
At the same time there has often been concern to learn from the accidents, for the benefit of the 
organizations involved and others. 
 
Looking back to factors relevant to response that were found within the various bodies of 
knowledge, it becomes clear that there was no sign of an error management culture aimed at 
learning from errors immediately after these accidents. However, since the accident in Utrecht, 
there has been attention to improving guidelines, and the accident in Terneuzen led to a wide 
scale movement aimed at improving safety. This took some time, but it is certainly an example 
of error management lessons brought into practice.  
 
Opponents could say that what happened was in fact an example of the ‘risk rule reflex’, since 
                                               
393 http://www.brandweernederland.nl/algemene_onderdelen/bovenbalk/zoeken-0/zoeken/@8554/verbazing_over/ 
(date last accessed: 25-12-2013) 
394 Letter VNG to the Labor Inspectorate, Reaction to the report ‘Risico’s bij duiken door de brandweer’, April 21, 
2010, p.3. 
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procedures and regulations were made tighter after the accident in Terneuzen. However, all 
analyses emphasized the importance of realizing improvements in daily practice and culture, 
more than in rules and procedures. Such changes are more difficult to measure and implement 
and will probably vary between organizations. Communicating about errors and sharing 
knowledge has been further institutionalized in fire brigade diving as a result of the accidents. 
In these cases, discussion has often been about what risks are acceptable in the business. The 
debate about the desirability of having a fire brigade diving team started from that point and 
this is certainly something the advocates of risk management would applaud.  
 
The ideal response to possible integrity violations would admit that preventive measures clearly 
were not executed well enough in these cases. It should be noted that independent investigations 
were made here in all cases. These investigations appear to have been prompt and thorough, 
though the investigation of Utrecht by the Public Prosecution proceeded slightly more slowly 
than the others. Whereas in other case studies one investigation was invariably followed up by 
another one, in these cases the investigations seem to have laid down definitive and widely 
accepted conclusions about the accidents involved. The accidents eventually led to rethinking 
the role of fire brigade diving teams, albeit perhaps not in a direction desired by all. What is 
noticeable is that struggles between the victims and government seem to have been absent in 
these cases, perhaps this – and the lack of media attention - offers an explanation for the 
investigative reports not being highly contested as in other case studies.  
 
Some of the typical responses to organizational crime were present, but not in each instance. 
These responses involved not so much denying the severity of the act, as denying culpability 
for the act: Responsibilities were shifted to others and the condemners were sometimes 
condemned (think back to the responses to inspection reports). The typical responses to rule 
breaking by governments found here included shocked reaction to prosecution, references to 
the complex situation the government found itself in, pointing to laws, policies and funding by 
national government and denying integrity breaches. Rule breaking was found often and the 
expected responses followed in these cases. Although it is in line with theory of state crime that 
the State itself can define what is criminal, in this case it appears that independent law 
enforcement mechanisms indeed performed independently, often criticizing governmental 
behavior. Denial of its own possible criminal involvement and pointing to other responsible 
parties is found in most responses by government here.  
 
These three cases display a mix of responses. The finger pointing, references to complex legal 
situations and denial are undoubtedly there, but so are the more positive responses of swift 
investigation and learning from the mistakes made. The lack of media attention and the absence 
of combatant parties possibly helped achieve this.  
 
 
5.5. Placing in the space between error and evil, and conclusion 
 
5.5.1. Error  
 
Errors were defined as deviations between the intended and actual outcome of an action, that 
are (1) unintentional and where (2) the error maker should have known better, implying that the 
error was potentially avoidable. Error should also be clearly distinguished from its 
consequences. The conclusion of the internal committee of the fire brigade Utrecht reads like a 
text book example of error: 
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“The committee has come to the conclusion, based on the collected data, that everyone 
both before and during the incident endeavored to the limit in order to prevent the fatal 
outcome. This might create the impression that everything went well and that the 
outcome is due only to fate. Upon detailed examination of the data, the committee rejects 
that idea. Indeed, both before and during the accident things actually went wrong. The 
cause of this accident cannot be sought in one place. There is a chain of factors which 
led collectively to the creation of the accident and the fatal outcome. None of these 
factors can be seen as the cause of the accident or the explanation for the fatal outcome. 
However, virtually all of these factors can be traced to human activity. One consequence 
of this reasoning is that it is impossible to lay the guilt on anyone for the accident with 
William. If the discussion turns to guilt, it appears that this guilt is shared by many. 
Almost all the factors which together caused the accident, in hindsight show no deviation 
from the usual pattern; for a long time they had been part of the accepted situation. But 
together they worsened the danger that already existed for any inexperienced diver who 
got stuck in that place.”395 
 
The committee reached the conclusion that there had not been conscious wrongdoing or 
negligence by individuals, but that organizational root causes on both national and local level 
made the accident possible. Nevertheless, the committee also noted that this did not release the 
people involved from responsibility for their actions and for using their common sense.396 What 
went for Utrecht, also goes for Urk and Terneuzen. It is also clear that there is often a demanding 
environment for fire brigades who want to adhere to all the relevant rules and regulations. The 
Dutch Safety Board in its report stated that it was acutely aware of the fact that implementation 
of all expert advice and guidelines is not an easy task.397 The ‘Donner-argument’ (in which he 
questioned what we can reasonably expect from governmental organizations in complex times 
with detailed legal frameworks and endless obligations to all kinds of parties) applies here. This 
case in many ways exemplifies the arguments of the risk management approach that was 
outlined before: There is no such thing as risk free fire brigade diving and energy should be 
aimed at dealing realistically with possible risks. In fact, methods of error management have 
been advocated for fire brigade diving teams by the Safety Board398 and the POS Inspectorate.399 
To conclude: The analysis of the causes of the diving accidents fits well with the definition of 
error: The errors were unintentional, occurred in goal-oriented action and were potentially 
avoidable.  
 
 
5.5.2. Rule breaking by governments 
 
Rule breaking governmental organizations were defined before as governmental organizations 
that violate rules or standards while executing their responsibilities. The rule breaking here 
regards lack of compliance by the municipalities and their fire brigades with the Labor 
Conditions Act and the underlying regulations. In 2009, the Labor Inspectorate inspected almost 
all fire brigade diving teams. The Labor Conditions Act and the regulations that are based on 
this act were very often violated: The inspectors found 317 breaches of the Labor Conditions 
Act in 75 fire brigades. Only one fire brigade showed no breaches of the law. As a result, a 
                                               
395 Interne commissie Brandweer Utrecht, (2001), paragraph 5. 
396 Interne commissie Brandweer Utrecht, (2001), paragraph 8. 
397 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 70. 
398 Dutch Safety Board (2009), p. 88. 
399 POS Inspectorate (October 2008), p. 29-30. 
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large number of administrative fines were imposed by the Labor Inspectorate.400 
 
Certainly, the VNG and the NVBR objected to the approach the Labor Inspectorate took here, 
stating that the inspectorate did not take into account that different norms should be set for fire 
brigade diving, as it could not be compared to the type of diving which those norms normally 
covered. Nevertheless, these were all violations of the Labor Conditions Act. This is not to 
suggest that all of these rules would become obsolete under new legislation: They covered many 
aspects deemed necessary for the safety of all divers. The rules not being comprehensive does 
not absolve the governing bodies involved: They did indeed break the rules. 
 
 
5.5.3. Organizational crime 
 
The first question is that of criminalization: Can the governmental behavior in the selected case 
study be defined as criminal? The municipality of Utrecht was convicted for culpable homicide, 
a clear violation of criminal law. The other municipalities, Urk and Terneuzen, both accepted 
fines for their violations of the Labor Conditions Act. The run of events in Utrecht does not 
appear to be very different from the cases in Urk and Terneuzen. In fact, the similarities between 
the cases are striking. Therefore, it could be argued that the Public Prosecution would have had 
a strong case had they decided to prosecute the municipalities of Urk and Terneuzen. There is 
reason then to conclude that in all three cases, this could be called organizational crime. That 
is certainly true for the violation of the Labor Conditions Act and it might even be argued for 
the culpable homicide, although admittedly this is speculating on a rather complicated legal 
debate. White collar crime, implying a crime committed by a person of respectability and high 
social status in the course of his occupation, does not fit the bill here. Corporate crime referring to 
corporations or private organizations involved in criminal activities is not applicable in any of 
these cases as there is little or no involvement of private organizations.  
 
 
5.5.4. Integrity violations  
 
Integrity has been defined as the quality of acting in accordance with relevant moral values, 
norms and rules. It is clear there was non-compliance here, especially with the rules concerning 
labor conditions and in that sense there may be violation of integrity. On the other hand, the 
question is more about professionalism and the routines that evolved into an unsafe way of 
working than that than about moral integrity. In a literal sense there may have been violation of 
integrity – norms were not upheld – but it is not a judgment that would immediately be applied 
in these cases.  
 
 
5.5.5. State crime  
 
State crime was defined before as illegal or socially injurious acts of omission or commission 
by individuals in an institution of political governance, for the attainment of state or state 
agencies’ operational goals. If we examine the elements of the definition of state crime, it is 
clear that there were indeed illegal acts in these three cases, namely the violations of the Labor 
Conditions Act. It is hard to identify any individuals in these acts, they seem to be forms of 
action that are woven into the organizational patterns. Providing a safe setting is something that 
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is the primary responsibility of the organization (in which individuals must of course fulfill 
their own role correctly). It is far fetched to say that the fire brigade diving team should be 
considered an institution of political governance, but it is part of a governmental organization. 
The deaths of the divers cannot be attributed to acts that were undertaken in pursuit of state 
goals and so this case does not meet the normal definition of state crime.  
   
 
5.5.6. Administrative evil  
 
First of all, is there evil? Evil is defined by Adams and Balfour as “actions of human beings 
that unjustly or needlessly inflict pain and suffering and death on other human beings”.  
  
x People engage in acts of evil 
One could argue that the lack of adequate prevention as well as the lack of an adequate 
immediate response by the organization and the people in it caused the death of the fire brigade 
divers. These actions that inflicted the death of the divers involved were indeed unjust, as in all 
three cases rules and regulations were violated (specifically those on labor conditions). They 
were also needless, as they could very well have been avoided. 
 
x Perpetrators are not aware that they are doing anything wrong.  
 
“The common characteristic is that people can engage in acts of evil without being aware 
that they are in fact doing anything at all wrong. Indeed, ordinary people may simply be 
acting appropriately in their organizational role – in essence, just doing what those around 
them would agree they should be doing – and at the same time be participating in what a 
critical and reasonable observer, usually well after the fact, would call evil.”401 
 
This certainly seems true, as none of the people involved deliberately undertook evil acts or 
even dangerous actions. This is reflected in the discussion of the organizational culture and the 
clash of views between the inspectorates and the fire brigades. Convinced they had a safe 
working environment, the fire brigades saw the incident as a case of bad luck while the 
inspectorate held that organizational routines had become lackluster and provided for what 
would at some point inevitably lead to serious accidents.  
 
x It is masked (less easily recognized as evil) 
The basic difference between evil as understood throughout human history and administrative 
evil is that administrative evil is less easily recognized as evil. Three reasons for this difference 
are given: 
- there is a tendency to un-name evil, because it does not fit in with the modern 
scientific-analytical mindset.  
- the structure of organization can play a role, particularly when it comes to diffusing 
individual responsibility and the compartmentalized accomplishment of role 
expectations in order to perform work on a daily basis.  
- the culture of technical rationality has narrowed formulation and implementation of 
public policy, so that moral inversions are more likely.402 
 
These reasons apply here. As seen earlier, many of the masking factors are relevant here.  
                                               
401 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 4. 
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x There can be moral inversion: Something evil is presented as something that is 
actually good 
This masking device was not used here. Nobody actually presented the accidents as something 
beneficial. Although they led to improved safety measures, a good outcome from a bad situation 
is not moral inversion. 
 
 
5.5.7. Conclusions  
 
The conclusion about why and how these diving accidents happened must be that, in all three 
cases, several causes combined. It is appropriate to differentiate direct causes (defective 
materials, mistakes made during rescue actions and so on) and indirect causes, such as lack of 
administration, lack of risk analysis, etc. What stands out is that these accidents were not mere 
coincidences, but revealed serious organizational problems within the Dutch fire brigade diving 
teams. Poor organization was the reason the criminal court convicted the municipality of 
Utrecht for culpable homicide, a unique conviction for a Dutch governing body. The fact that 
very similar accidents took place twice afterwards, posed serious questions about the 
organizations. Organizational culture is important here, as well as the legal and procedural 
framework. These two aspects, appear to represent conflicting ‘schools of thought’ within this 
field. These problems are compounded by the difficulty of finding a balance between measures 
that are either desirable or necessary for reasons of safety, and efficiency considerations. In a 
perfect world, all risks can be banished, but in real life, resources and time are not unlimited 
and this produces a demanding climate for fire brigade diving. Many of the errors can be viewed 
in this light and it is with some restriction that we should bear judgment on the actions of these 
often dedicated public organizations and their employees. Certainly, it is not possible to ascribe 
blame to individuals for the tragic events that occurred here.  
 
The second research question concerns the responses of the governing bodies involved. What 
is remarkable here is the fact that learning from the accidents was so notoriously slow. In several 
reports, the reporting inspectorate asked why measures were not taken sooner and why findings 
from earlier accidents were not picked up on. The Labor Inspectorate for example noted that in 
2006 it had performed several inspections, which showed many things were wrong with fire 
brigade diving, especially in the organization of diving exercises. The number of accidents since 
those inspections did not drop, and in 2007 and 2008 two fire brigade divers died when 
performing their tasks. To say the least, this indicates slow learning on the part of the fire 
brigades. But to be fair: The Labor Inspectorate also indicated that later controls (after the initial 
inspections) showed that many fire brigades had taken the criticism seriously and made progress 
in addressing the problems and improving safety. 403 After the Terneuzen case, more focused 
attention was given to the problems and many measures for improvement were adopted. 
Exercising and training has been improved greatly, with more stringent requirements than 
before. The lack of learning was true for the Utrecht case, but in the end, also for the Terneuzen 
case and the Safety Board reached that conclusion. The case in Urk received the least attention, 
but the internal culture seems to have played a big part in this case. In the end, the conclusion 
leads back again to organization.  
 
It is likely that the organizational challenges will persist. But a promising development is the 
growing attention to psychological factors, both in selection and training. This brings a greater 
focus on the psychological and physical health of the individuals, and their ability to deal with 
                                               
403 Labor Inspectorate (2009), p. 5 and p. 19. 
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stress under difficult circumstances. This focus on changing behavior and culture as well as 
selection and training might prove more promising than merely strengthening rules and 
procedures.  
 
The responses of governmental organizations to these cases were wide and varied. Learning 
from errors and shirking of responsibilities were seen. The inward organizational culture, the 
lack of media attention and the absence of struggle with the (relatives of the) victims all played 
a role in determining the dynamics of these responses. Clearly, these accidents had large 
impacts on all the organizations involved. Immediately following the loss of a colleague, the 
organizations faced investigation. Being prosecuted is still something unfamiliar to 
governmental organizations and the circumstances are not conducive to learning immediately 
from errors. To their credit, action for improvement was taken in many fire brigades, although 
probably not in all of them. But it remains true, that the fire brigade diving teams, if they are 
maintained, will always face the challenge of finding the right balance between safety and 
efficiency.  
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6. The case of the Probo Koala  
 
 
 “Nobody wanted this.”404 
 
Alderman Marijke Vos, September 19, 2006. 
 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
Let us go back to July 4, 2006. It is a sweltering hot day in the harbor of Amsterdam. Four men 
(two civil servants from the municipality of Amsterdam and two men from a company working 
in the Amsterdam harbor) meet that night to discuss an urgent problem. The atmosphere is tense 
and the decision to be taken involves the considerable interests of the parties involved. The 
problem has already been the subject of extensive debate for two days, and solutions of all 
possible kinds sought, until this moment to no avail. At first, it had appeared as if business 
would go on as usual, but it seems that within a short period of time things became more 
complicated and a real dilemma emerged. Finally, the men reach a decision. 
 
This case study focuses on that decision and analyzes the situation in a much broader context. 
What happened, both before and after the decision, and what went wrong? The shortened 
version of the story is as follows. An oil tanker, the Probo Koala, needed to get rid of its waste 
material and presented it for processing at Amsterdam harbor on July 2, 2006. The Dutch 
authorities at first halted the full unloading of the waste pending tests on some of it, and the 
waste was eventually returned to the Probo Koala. On July 5 it continued its journey. The 
contaminated waste from the Probo Koala was eventually dumped at various sites in and around 
Abidjan, the capital of Ivory Coast, on August 19 and 20, 2006, allegedly causing the deaths of 
several people (reports vary from 10 to 17), many more to be hospitalized, and thousands 
(estimates ranging from 20,000 up to 100,000) to seek medical treatment.  
 
The public conclusion on all of this was consistent with the slogan Greenpeace painted on the 
Probo Koala: ‘Europe poisons Africa’ and this remained the dominant ‘frame’ for the years 
immediately following the dumping of the waste. However, a second, in many ways 
contradictory story has emerged. This storyline tells us that people in Ivory Coast flocked to 
hospital because they were offered free medical care, not because they were suffering from the 
Probo Koala’s waste. In fact, it is claimed that no one could have died as a result of the waste 
material from the Probo Koala and that false accusations have been made in order to pump up 
the drama in this case.  
 
How should we look at the roles that the different actors in this ‘environmental drama’ have 
played in order to separate fact from fiction? And why are there so many intensely dissenting 
opinions on how to judge the case of the Probo Koala? The case of the Probo Koala is a very 
complex one, spanning several countries, a multitude of relevant actors and years of research 
on its many different aspects. The focus of this case study lies on the role of governmental 
organizations in the Netherlands.  
 
                                               
404http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/wob-verzoeken/2007/02/19/probo-
koala/20070219-wob-probokoala-bijlage-20-5.pdf (date last accessed: 28-12-2013) 
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A factual timeline of relevant events will be followed by a short discussion on the question of 
causality: Did the dumping of the waste material from the Probo Koala lead to death and serious 
injuries? Case characteristics will then be presented briefly, followed by an exploration of 
possible explanations for what happened and a description of the responses of the governmental 
organizations. Finally, conclusions will be drawn about the space between error and evil in this 
particular case.   
 
 
6.2. Summary of the facts  
 
6.2.1. Timeline of events  
 
Figure 6.1. Route of the Probo Koala 
 
 405 
 
 
 
                                               
405 This picture of the route of the Probo Koala was taken from the website of the NRC: 
http://www.nrc.nl/binnenland/article2545993.ece/Aangifte_tegen_Trafigura_wegens_beiuml_nvloeding_getuigen 
(Date last accessed: 18-02-2013). The red arrows refer to the date of arrival, the blue arrows to the date of 
departure. 
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2006 
 
April 11 – June 26  
The Probo Koala was an oil tanker, which went into service in 1989 and was registered in 
Panama. In 2006 the ship was owned by Prime Marine Management in Athens (Greece). It was 
chartered by Trafigura, a Swiss trading company with its head office in the Netherlands. 
Trafigura is the world’s third largest independent oil trader. The company, measured by 
turnover, is bigger than the Dutch multinational companies Unilever, Philips, Heineken and 
Akzo Nobel.406 Falcon Navigation, located in Athens (Greece) was responsible for the daily 
management of the ship and crew and got orders from authorized personnel working at 
Trafigura. 
 
The Probo Koala at that time was located near Gibraltar and served as a sort of ‘mobile holding 
station’ for crude oil. Shipments of gasoline and oil were being loaded on and off the ship. On 
April 11, May 19 and June 18 loads of Nafta were delivered by three small tankers from the 
United States and were supposedly blended with other substances to make gasoline. The waste 
that resulted from this chemical process was stored on board the Probo Koala. On June 20 
Trafigura asked Amsterdam Port Services (APS), a company specializing in separating water 
from oil, to name a price for disposal of so-called ‘slops’ of the Probo Koala. Slops normally 
consist of dirty water used for cleaning the ship’s gasoline tanks. APS offered to take care of 
the slops for € 12.000.  
 
July 2 – July 5 
On July 2, the Probo Koala docked in the harbor of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 
Approximately 250 m3 of slops (out of a total of 554 m3 that were to be handled) were pumped 
into the lighter Main VII (a vessel for collecting these kinds of materials) of APS. The transfer 
was stopped because the Main VII was full, because of other loads it had already taken on. 
Company staff reported an enormous stench coming from the waste. Samples of the slops were 
taken.  
 
July 3, 2006, was a very hot day in Amsterdam with temperatures in excess of 30° Celsius. That 
morning, the fire brigade received notice from the central alarm that a ‘stench incident’ had 
taken place in the harbor. The police and the fire brigade went to the site and APS notified the 
inspector on duty from the Environmental and Construction Supervisory Agency (Dienst Milieu 
en Bouwtoezicht (hereafter DMB)) of the Municipality of Amsterdam. The inspector asked for 
the installation of APS to be shut down to prevent the stench from spreading. APS did not 
possess a permit for processing these kinds of contaminated slops and asked Afvalstoffen 
Terminal Moerdijk (ATM), a company that specialized in the disposal of chemical waste, if 
they could process the slops. ATM tendered for the disposal of the waste, based on the samples 
it received, for much more than originally planned: The initial offer had been €20 per m3, the 
new offer by ATM was €1000 per m3 (the Probo Koala needed a total of 554 m3 to be 
processed). Trafigura judged this to be far too expensive and asked for the slops to be returned 
so that they could be processed ‘at next convenient opportunity’.  
 
That day and during the days that followed, a multitude of Dutch government agencies at 
different levels (local and national) were involved in the deliberations on what to do. Port State 
Control of the Inspection for Transport, Public Works and Water Management (IVW) advised 
                                               
406 Trafigura is the world’s third largest independent oil trader and the second largest independent trader in the non- 
ferrous concentrates market. Turnover of US$ 122 billion in 2011. http://www.trafigura.com/about_us/key_facts.aspx 
(date last accessed: 24-9-2012) and Vink, p. 17. 
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
142 
 
DMB that under the Marpol-treaty407, there was no legal basis for preventing the ship from 
taking back the slops and offering them for processing in another harbor, since the holding 
capacity on board was sufficient and the owner of the goods had a free choice in this.  
 
The environmental police (IMT) took samples of the slops and sent them to the Dutch Forensic 
Institute (NFI), together with the samples already taken by APS. Late in the evening, an 
anonymous fax was sent to Harbor Amsterdam stating that the 250 cubic meters of slops that 
were given off by the Probo Koala to APS were heavily contaminated. The author expressed 
the fear that, for financial reasons, the slops would ‘disappear’ during the journey to the next 
harbor and urged the inspection to check whether the slops were still on board. The author 
claimed anonymity was necessary as he feared for his job if it were to be known that he had 
reported this.408 In the late evening internal consultations within DMB continued, right up to 
the level of deputy director. 
 
On July 4, there appeared to be a deadlock in the situation. The DMB wanted to forbid the 
return of the slops to the Probo Koala. APS feared that the ship would leave without the slops 
and that APS would have to pay for the time that the ship stayed in the harbor, € 35.000 per 
day.409 In a fax sent to DMB at 13.14 hours, APS stated that they had not accepted the slops, 
but that if they did not pump them back into the ship, APS would face a large financial claim 
from Trafigura. APS said this unacceptable and delivered an ultimatum to DMB to state its 
position. Under this time pressure, several consultations followed. The Ministry of VROM 
(Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment) had indicated that this was a matter for the 
VROM Inspectorate. The head of the environmental license division of DMB had contact with 
the specialist on waste materials from the VROM Inspectorate. She stated that she had no 
solution, but she did raise questions about the acceptance of the slops, saying that this was an 
unusual incident that APS should have given notice of (which indeed they had done).   
 
At 16.00 hours, DMB stated that it would not be allowed to pump back the slops. During that 
afternoon, it became clear that the exact results from the samples of the slops would be known 
significantly later than originally thought: not in a day, but possibly only at the end of the week 
or even later. During the course of the day, DMB was becoming increasingly doubtful that it 
was legally possible to prohibit the pumping back of the slops. The central question in all 
exchanges was whether APS had ‘processed’ the slops and ‘accepted’ them or not. If APS had 
not accepted the slops, DMB felt they had no legal basis to prohibit the pumping back.  
 
On the evening of July 4, a special meeting was organized in the harbor with the director and 
an employee from APS and two representatives of the municipality of Amsterdam, from DMB, 
the head of the Environmental Inspection Division and the head of the unit Waste processing 
substances. DMB intended to have the slops processed by AVR Rijnmond which was capable 
of processing the slops. APS’s permit excluded the possibility of processing contaminated slops 
such as the ones in question.  
 
DMB wanted to ensure that APS had good intentions. They posed APS the following question: 
If permission were given to pump back the slops and it turned out later that technically APS 
                                               
407 The Marpol-treaty is the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships.  
408 The fax itself was published among many other documents on February 19, 2007, as a result of the Wob-request by 
Trafigura. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/wob-verzoeken/2007/02/19/probo-koala.html, 
appendix 56 (date last accessed: 28-12-2013). Also see VROM Inspectorate, Probo Koala in Amsterdam: Feitenrelaas 
en relevante wetgeving, October 31, 2006, p. 23, published in: Tweede Kamer, 2006-2007, 22343, nr. 146.  
409 VROM Inspectorate, Probo Koala in Amsterdam: Feitenrelaas en relevante wetgeving, October 31, 2006, p. 30, 
published in: Tweede Kamer, 2006-2007, 22343, nr. 146. 
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
143 
 
had processed and accepted the slops, would APS be willing to pay a fine worth half the costs 
of the processing of the slops (that would amount to € 125.000)? APS agreed, under the 
condition that an independent assessment would be made. This point of agreement was later 
rejected by the director of DMB, because the arrangement was considered not to be possible, 
legally. 
 
In the end, on the grounds of the legal advice given to them, DMB concluded that prohibiting 
the pumping back of the slops was illegitimate. DMB felt that they could not prove that 
processing of the slops had taken place. The matter was complicated further by the fact that the 
results of the samples of the slops were not available. According to the Hulshof Committee, 
several considerations were important here:  
 
- the urgency of the matter 
- there were no recent legal issues with APS and smooth talks about a new license 
for APS,  
- the police investigation would not be hampered, because the NFI had been able to 
take samples. If something turned out to be wrong, APS could be prosecuted after 
all, 
- notification to Port State Control could prevent the slops from ‘going over the 
fence’ at open sea, 
- none of the organizations involved had indicated any alternatives for processing the 
slops, for example at the government’s expense.410 
 
During the morning of July 5, the slops were pumped back to the Probo Koala. The police and 
the Public Prosecution were notified of the decision to pump them back. The Probo Koala left 
Amsterdam in the afternoon and was allowed to continue its journey to Paldiski, Estonia. 
 
July 9 – July 13 
The Probo Koala arrived at Paldiski, Estonia. Port State Control in Amsterdam notified Port 
State Control Estonia about the incident with the Probo Koala. Port State Control Estonia 
carried out a control. No irregularities were registered. The Probo Koala took Russian oil 
products on board and headed towards Nigeria on July 13.  
 
July 12 
A small, newly-created company called Compagnie Tommy was given a license by the 
Transport Ministry of Ivory Coast for cleaning out passing tankers. No license was given for 
waste disposal.411 
  
August 1 
The Probo Koala stopped at Nigerian capital Lagos in order to unload 36.000 m³ of ‘diesel fuel’, 
according to Trafigura, Prime Marine Management and the captain (while giving evidence to 
the Estonian police). The Nigerian authorities have stated that the ship was not authorized to 
enter the port or unload.412  
 
 
                                               
410 Hulshof Committee, Feitenverslag Probo Koala te Amsterdam, p. 12-13. It might be added here that the Hulshof 
Committee in her report qualifies these reasons as insufficient, except for the last one, which is deemed to be a 
difficult problem to solve. All the other reasons ignored the fact that consideration for the environmental law (Wet 
Milieubeheer) should have prevailed here, according to the Committee.  
411 Africa Confidential, 6 October 2006, Vol. 47, No. 20, p. 5. 
412 CIEDT/DA (2007), p. 27. 
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August 15 
The Dutch police informed Trafigura that the slops of the Probo Koala should be treated as 
chemical waste and demanded to see discharge records for the slops.413 
 
August 19 – August 22 
The Probo Koala arrived in Abidjan on August 19. Through its subsidiary, Puma Energy Côte 
d’Ivoire, and with the assistance of WAIBS its shipping agent in Abidjan, Trafigura had 
arranged unloading and treatment of its slop waste by Compagnie Tommy. Compagnie Tommy 
had made an offer of $ 30 per m3 for waste falling under the MARPOL Convention and $ 35 
per m3 for so-called chemical slops, after which Trafigura instructed shipping agent WAIBS to 
make arrangements for the discharge of the waste and to coordinate this operation with 
Compagnie Tommy.414 Compagnie Tommy rented twelve trucks, which dumped the waste 
from the Probo Koala at various sites in the District of Abidjan between the evening of August 
19 and the morning of August 20, 2006.415 The waste was dumped near a garbage belt, 
Akouédo. Local residents reacted furiously and blocked the site of the garbage belt. The drivers 
of the tank cars that held the waste, panicked and proceeded to dump the waste haphazardly at 
various sites in Abidjan. On August 21, the Centre Ivorien Antipollution made a formal demand 
to immobilize the ship. On August 22, despite the request of the Center, the Probo Koala left 
Ivory Coast and headed for Europe. During the weeks that followed, more and more people 
allegedly suffered nausea and a rumor went around that the waste materials from the Probo 
Koala were radioactive. Inhabitants of the area threw up barricades and accused the government 
of corruption. The government called on people with medical complaints to report to the 
hospital. 
 
September 5 
A rumor was spread that two girls, aged four and nine, had died as a result of the dumped waste 
material from the Probo Koala.416 
 
September 6 
Ivory Coast’s Prime Minister Banny handed in the resignation of his cabinet after mass protests 
against the dumping of the toxic waste from the Probo Koala. President Laurent Gagbo accepted 
the resignation although ten days later the cabinet came back into office.417  
 
September 8 
The Dutch Public Prosecution started an investigation into events concerning the Probo Koala 
in Amsterdam. A spokesman for Trafigura claimed that the company had adhered to all 
applicable laws and regulations and stated that the receiving and processing company in Ivory 
Coast (Compagnie Tommy) was a certified company.  
 
September 18 
Shortly after it became apparent that the dumping of the waste from the Probo Koala had led to 
all sorts of problems, two Trafigura executives, Claude Dauphin and Jean-Pierre Valentini, 
travelled to Abidjan. They were arrested on September 18, four days after their arrival, and 
were held in Abidjan’s Maca prison, charged with breaking Ivory Coast’s laws against 
poisoning. 
                                               
413 Amnesty International and Greenpeace Netherlands (2012), p. 11. 
414 To bring back to remembrance: Dutch company ATM had offered € 1000 per m3. 
415 Ibeanu (2009), p. 14. 
416 Vink (2011), p. 12. 
417 Vink (2011), p. 12. 
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September 26 
Greenpeace reported Trafigura, APS and civil servants of DMB to the police for their part in 
the events surrounding the Probo Koala. Greenpeace hoped that reporting it would mean the 
tanker being detained so that future offenses could be prevented and evidence for the police 
investigation could be secured on board of the ship. Ivory Coast made a request to Estonia, 
where the Probo Koala was located at that time, to detain the ship. 
 
September 27 
Estonia placed an embargo on the Probo Koala after the Public Prosecution started a judicial 
investigation there. The authorities contended that the ship transported waste materials that 
showed similarities to the contaminated waste materials that were dumped in Ivory Coast. 
Trafigura contended that this was a different shipment.  
 
September 28 
European Commissioner Dimas went to Estonia’s Paldiski harbor on a fact-finding mission and 
was quoted in a press release saying that:  
 
“It is shocking that toxic waste from Europe reached the Ivory Coast causing so much 
human suffering and damage to the environment. We have European waste shipment 
regulations which ban such export, but apparently the law was broken.”418 
 
October 4 
Karel Knip, a Dutch journalist from the NRC, wrote an article called ‘More drama than 
toxicity’. In the article, he claimed that there was no proof for any deaths caused by the waste 
from the Probo Koala. The gases and vapors that were held responsible for the toxicity, could 
probably not accumulate in lethal concentrations. The smell must have been enormous because 
of the mercaptans present in the waste, but:  
 
“That thousands of inhabitants of Abidjan became unwell or even ill from the stench and 
therefore reported to a hospital, is logical. Perhaps the promise of free medicines and 
care also played a role. But the question is whether the heavy environmental pollution 
was in fact a ‘toxic drama’.”419  
 
October 10 
The Probo Koala was allowed to leave Estonia. There was no clarity about the research into the 
contents of the shipment. The Ivorians who came to Estonia to inspect the ship, had collected 
material for the criminal investigation that was to be conducted in their country.  
 
October 16 
The waste was transported to France for further processing.  
 
October 31 
The Dutch State Secretary of VROM send a report made by the VROM Inspectorate concerning 
the Probo Koala case to the House of Representatives, with the condition that it was 
confidential.420 The report contained a factual description of the case and an overview of 
applicable rules and regulations. 
                                               
418 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1272&format=HTML (date last accessed: 28-12-
2013) 
419 http://vorige.nrc.nl/wetenschap/article1729505.ece (date last accessed: 28-12-2013) 
420 VROM Inspectorate (2006). 
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November 11 
UK legal firm Leigh Day & Co, representing the alleged victims of the dumping of the waste 
in Ivory Coast, filed a £100 million lawsuit against Trafigura in the High Court in London. 
Martyn Day of Leigh, Day & Co stated that Trafigura should be held accountable for the deaths 
and injuries that occurred. In response, Trafigura announced a few days later that it had started 
libel proceedings against Martyn Day.421 
 
 November 15 
An Ivorian government report (a national committee chaired by Mrs. Diakité that had been 
appointed by the Prime Minister on September 15, 2006 to investigate the case) said that 
Trafigura was to blame for the dumping of waste and that Trafigura was aided by Ivorians. The 
committee concluded that Trafigura knew that the nation had no facilities to store such waste 
and knowingly transported the waste from Europe to Abidjan. The report further claimed that 
Compagnie Tommy, which actually dumped the substance, “shows all the signs of being a front 
company set up specifically to handle the Trafigura waste”, and was “established in a period 
between Trafigura’s decision not to pay for expensive waste disposal in Amsterdam and its 
ship's arrival in Abidjan.” The committee also found that officials in the Port of Abidjan and a 
variety of local and national bodies either failed to plug holes in environmental laws or were 
guilty of ignoring laws through corruption.422 The committee’s findings were rejected by 
Trafigura. 
 
December 1 
A report by the independent Hulshof Committee, commissioned by the municipality of 
Amsterdam, concluded among other things that the city was negligent when they allowed 
Trafigura to take waste back on board the Probo Koala.423  
 
December 6 
The State Secretary of VROM sent the Hulshof Committee Report to the House of 
Representatives and also made public the report by the VROM Inspectorate, lifting the 
condition of confidentiality. 
 
2007 
 
February 14 
Trafigura paid $198 million to the Ivorian government. The press statement by Trafigura stated: 
 
“Proper procedures were followed as the slops were removed from the ship, with the 
written authority of the Ivorian government and the routine presence of port and customs 
officials. Consequently, it was unforeseeable that Compagnie Tommy would dump the 
slops at various sites in Abidjan. Their actions were atrocious and illegal. People living 
near these sites were suffering health problems as a result of untreated pollution and 
waste long before Compagnie Tommy arrived with the slops. This is an environmental 
tragedy, but it is not one caused by Trafigura. As a major trading company in West 
Africa, Trafigura believes it has an economic responsibility to the region. It also has 
considerable sympathy for the people of Abidjan and is working with the government to 
                                               
421 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probo_Koala (date last accessed: 28-12-2013) 
422 http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2006-11-23-voa22/319097.html (date last accessed: 28-12-2013) and 
http://www.dechetstoxiques.gouv.ci/enqnat.php (date last accessed: 28-12-2013) 
423 Hulshof Committee (2006). 
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improve their lives. That is why, since an initial protocol agreement was signed on 13 
February 2007, Trafigura has contributed $198 million to the Ivorian government. This 
decision does not represent any admission of liability regarding the Compagnie Tommy 
incident.”424 
 
Around that time, the Ivorian government pledged not to prosecute the company.  
 
February 15 
Subsequently, the imprisoned executives of Trafigura Claude Dauphin, Jean-Pierre Valentini 
and Captain N’Zi Kablan were released from prison.425 A series of protests and resignations of 
Ivorian government officials followed these events.  
 
February 19 
A report by a second committee appointed by the Ivorian government, chaired by Mr. Bogui, 
was presented to the Prime Minister of Ivory Coast. The committee concluded that 
responsibility for the dumping of the waste rested mainly with private companies, firstly with 
Trafigura but also with the captain of Probo Koala, shipping agents BMA and WAIBS, APS 
and Tommy. According to the Committee, public authorities, at least in the Netherlands, 
Estonia and Nigeria, were also partly responsible, as they should have imposed dumping of 
waste ashore. The Committee gave the following summary of what had happened: 
 
“In view of this perverse effect of trade liberalization, northern countries tend to dump 
all types of waste, which are too expensive to recycle, in the South. And this leads them 
to consider developing countries, and Africa in particular, as a natural dumping site. 
Our country, the Côte d'Ivoire, has just had an uncomfortable experience with the Probo 
Koala Affair. The 19th, 20th and 21st August 2006 and the subsequent weeks were a 
real nightmare for the population of Abidjan. Uncontrolled dumping of toxic waste at 
eight sites identified in the District of Abidjan led to extremely serious socio-political 
unrest and caused the resignation of the Government. Damage caused to the health of 
the population (15 deaths, 69 hospitalizations and more than 108,000 consultations 
recorded to date), the national economy and our natural environment was considerable; 
nobody can currently predict what the long-term effects will be, in particular on the 
health of contaminated persons, the soil, contaminated waterways and the food chain in 
general.” 426 
 
2008 
 
October 22 
The criminal court in Ivory Coast sentenced Salomon Ugborugbo, the Nigerian director of 
Compagnie Tommy, to 20 years in prison on a charge of poisoning. A shipping employee, 
Essoin Kouao, who brought Trafigura and Compagnie Tommy together, was sentenced to 5 
years in prison for complicity. Five Ivorians were acquitted from charges in the same trial. 
Neither Trafigura nor its directors were charged.  
 
 
 
                                               
424 Reaction by Trafigura on August 16, 2007, found on their website www.trafigura.com (date last accessed: 20-8-
2010), by now not present anymore. 
425 http://www.trafigura.com/PDF/Trafigura%20&%20The%20Probo%20Koala%20110721%20v2.pdf (date last 
accessed: 20-8-2010), p.14. 
426 CIEDT/DA (2007), p. 2.  
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2009 
 
May 2009 
Trafigura made it known that it would sue the BBC for libel after the BBC program Newsnight 
claimed that Trafigura had knowingly attempted to cover up its role in the dumping of 
dangerous waste in Côte d'Ivoire in 2006. The Guardian newspaper, in September 2009, 
published internal Trafigura emails which, according to The Guardian, showed that the traders 
responsible wanted to make more money with the waste and knew how dangerous the chemicals 
really were.427 
 
July 24 
WSP Environment & Energy (WSP) published a report commissioned by Trafigura following 
a series of environmental investigations at the suspected dump sites in and around Abidjan. 
Aim of the report was to establish if contamination at the sites in Abidjan remained in situ and 
if so, whether it posed any health risks. According to Trafigura, it found none, despite careful 
analysis.428 Given that material equivalent to approximately 18 times the original volume of the 
slops had been removed from the sites, this did not come as a surprise. 
 
September 3 
A report by special UN reporter Ibeanu concerning the case of the Probo Koala was published. 
The United Nations had asked Ibeanu to investigate the Probo Koala case. He visited the 
Netherlands and Ivory Coast and spoke to many of the parties involved. UN reporter Ibeanu 
seemed to support the view that a causal relationship between the dumping of the waste and the 
subsequent deaths and illnesses was present, although he was cautious: 
 
“On the basis of these considerations and taking into account the immediate impact on 
public health and the proximity of some of the dumping sites to areas where affected 
populations resided, the Special Reporter considers that there seems to be strong prima 
facie evidence that the reported deaths and adverse health consequences are related to 
the dumping of the waste from the Probo Koala.”429 
 
September 11 
Trafigura obtained a secret ‘super-injunction’ against The Guardian banning them from 
publishing the contents of the Minton report,430 an internal report that Trafigura had 
commissioned in September 2006 to determine the toxicity of the waste dumped in Abidjan. 
Only a draft version of the report was available, a reason for Trafigura to maintain that the 
conclusions were only preliminary. The super-injunction was lifted on October 16, after uproar 
about whether the super-injunction could prevent The Guardian from publishing an article 
about a parliamentary question on the Minton report. Trafigura abandoned the super-injunction 
in the end, arguing that by that time the Minton report had been publicized widely on the internet 
(at first by Wikileaks).431 
 
 
 
                                               
427 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_09_09_emails.pdf (date last accessed: 20-8-2010) 
428 http://www.trafigura.com/PDF/Trafigura%20&%20The%20Probo%20Koala%20110721%20v2.pdf (date last 
accessed: 20-8-2010), p.16. 
429 Ibeanu (2009), p. 17-18. 
430 Minton (2006). 
431 http://www.trafigura.com/PDF/Trafigura%20&%20The%20Probo%20Koala%20110721%20v2.pdf (date last 
accessed: 20-8-2010),p.19. 
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September 23 
Trafigura published a statement on its website announcing a settlement with legal firm Leigh 
Day &Co, after 20 experts (10 of them appointed by Trafigura, 10 appointed by Leigh Day & 
Co) issued their findings on the nature of the waste materials from the Probo Koala. In short, 
the findings were that the Probo Koala’s slops simply could not have caused deaths, 
miscarriages, stillbirths, birth defects or other serious or long-term injuries. According to 
Trafigura, the libel proceedings that they had brought against Leigh Day & Co were also 
resolved. As a result, Trafigura stated that Leigh Day & Co had agreed to withdraw the 
allegations made on their website on November 8, 2006, and to publish the agreed Joint 
Statement prominently on their website for 21 days. Trafigura went on to express their dismay 
at what they called the ‘trial by media’ initiated by Leigh Day & Co, and subsequently taken 
up by journalists working for the BBC and The Guardian, The Independent, NRK in Norway, 
and De Volkskrant and Greenpeace in Holland amongst others.432 Trafigura paid €33 million to 
Ivorians who claimed to have been injured by the dumping of the waste from the Probo Koala. 
This came down to a bit more than €1000 per person. It should be added that Trafigura has not 
made this report by the twenty experts public, which makes it difficult to determine the exact 
value of the report.  
 
October 19 
An article appeared in NRC Handelsblad, titled “Trafigura's Ivory Coast disaster - not so toxic 
after all.” This article stated that the stench from the remaining mercaptans created a ‘false 
sense of poisoning’ and that Ivory Coast could be dealing with a collective psychosis: 
 
“The problem is the word ‘official’ in ‘official death toll’ has little meaning in the context 
of Ivory Coast. Whoever has witnessed the chaotic response of the Ivory Coast 
authorities, the conditions at the hospitals, and the important-sounding but clumsy 
reports issued by the Ivorians can only come to one conclusion: They will say whatever. 
Any government that calls for victims to register themselves for future compensation 
knows full well they’re going to get a lot of people coming forward. All of this leads to 
one conclusion: It has never been established beyond doubt that the waste from the 
Probo Koala has claimed any victims at all.”433 
 
December 10 
Faced with a libel case that, under British law, could drag on for years and cost millions of 
pounds, the BBC removed a story entitled ‘Dirty Tricks and Toxic Waste in the Ivory Coast’, 
along with the accompanying video, from its website.434  
 
December 15  
The BBC agreed to apologize to Trafigura for the ‘Dirty Tricks’ report, donate £25,000 to 
charity and withdraw any allegation that Trafigura’s waste dumped in Africa had caused deaths. 
                                               
432 http://www.trafigura.com/pdf/Trafigura%20&%20The%20Probo%20Koala%20110721%20v2.pdf (date last 
accessed: 20-8-2010), p. 18-19. 
433 It is interesting to note how far the appreciations of the role of the media differ: Volkskrant-journalist Jeroen 
Trommelen, along with other colleagues, received the Daniel Pearl-prize for investigative journalism for his years 
of reporting the Probo Koala-case. Karel Knip, the author of the NRC-article mentioned here, won the prize for 
the best article of the year-award for articles in the NRC science section. The District Court in its ruling considered 
that Knip had probably received the information from his article from Trafigura, putting the claim by Trafigura that 
he was the only journalist who did not participate in the media hype into a different light.  
434 The video was available again later. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/8260955.stm (date last 
accessed: 28-12-2013) 
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But at the same time, the BBC issued a statement, pointing out that the dumping of the waste 
had led to Trafigura being forced to pay out £30m in compensation to victims.435  
 
2010 
 
March 9 
The Dutch Supreme Court dismissed earlier rulings by the District Court and the Court of 
Appeal in which the public prosecutor had been denied the right to prosecute the municipality 
of Amsterdam for its role in the case and referred the matter back to the District Court. 
 
April 
Robin des Bois and Sherpa, two French NGOs, filed complaints before the European 
Commission against the Netherlands and Estonia for their role in the case, requesting the 
Commission to refer the case to the European Court of Justice. The complaints were turned 
down.436 
 
May 6 
The Guardian made a public apology to Trafigura for an article of April 26, 2010 in which it 
had linked the dumping of slops from the Probo Koala to the deaths, miscarriages and serious 
illnesses of a number of West Africans and referred to the report of the experts.437 
 
June 21 
Several people and organizations who were involved in the Dutch episode of the Probo Koala 
case stood trial before the Dutch criminal court. Earlier, the public prosecutor had decided not 
to prosecute the two individual employees who were originally labeled as suspects, the director 
of DMB and the head of the Environmental Supervision department of DMB.438  
 
July 6 
The Dutch Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeal should review again whether Dauphin, 
President-Director of Trafigura, could be prosecuted for his part in the Probo Koala-case, 
specifically for leading the export of dangerous waste materials. Earlier the criminal court and 
the Court of Appeal had ruled that this was not possible because they considered it highly 
unlikely that a conviction could be reached in this case.  
 
July 23 
The District Court of Amsterdam sentenced Trafigura to a fine of €1.000.000 for the export of 
waste materials to Ivory Coast and the delivery of these waste materials to Amsterdam, while 
concealing the fact that these waste materials were ‘harmful for life or public health’. The court 
did not investigate the subsequent events in Ivory Coast, but limited itself to the events in 
Amsterdam. The captain of the Probo Koala was given a suspended prison sentence of five 
months (and two years’ probation) for co-delivery of the waste materials. He was also found 
guilty of helping to commit forgery. The court considered that the captain acted under pressure 
from his client. An employee of Trafigura was given a suspended sentence of six months (and 
two years’ probation) and a fine of € 25,000 for actually heading up the delivery of the harmful 
                                               
435 This passage concerning the BBC and the Guardian was taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probo_Koala 
(date last accessed: 28-12-2013) 
436 Amnesty International and Greenpeace Netherlands (2012), p. 168. 
437 http://www.trafigura.com/PDF/Trafigura%20&%20The%20Probo%20Koala%20110721%20v2.pdf (date last 
accessed: 20-8-2010) 
438 http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/article505914.ece/Geen_topambtenaren_in_proces_gifschip (date last 
accessed: 28-12-2013) 
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waste materials and concealing their nature. APS and its director were found guilty of violating 
Dutch environmental law by pumping back the hazardous waste into the Probo Koala. 
However, it was found that they could rely on the municipality's consent for pumping back the 
waste and were therefore discharged from prosecution. The court concluded that the 
municipality of Amsterdam deserved immunity from prosecution, stating that the municipality 
had acted as a public body. According to the court, giving permission to pump back the waste 
into the Probo Koala was a task that belonged exclusively to government. 
 
2011 
 
April 12 
The Court of Appeal in The Hague ruled as inadmissible the complaint filed by Greenpeace 
against the decision of the public prosecutor in the Netherlands not to prosecute Trafigura for 
the dumping of illegal waste in the Ivory Coast. The reason given was that the feasibility of the 
prosecution was doubtful as it concerned actions committed abroad by foreign individuals and 
companies. It was added that the legal authorities in Ivory Coast had not lent their cooperation 
to requests by the Dutch Public Prosecution for legal assistance in this case. Finally, Greenpeace 
was not considered a party with a direct interest in the prosecution as prescribed by law.439 
 
October 26 
Dutch publicist Jaffe Vink published a book on the Probo Koala affair, called ‘The toxic ship’.440 
He conceded that it was clear that the waste should never have been dumped in this way. However, 
his main conclusion was that, although it was foul smelling and biting stuff, there was no deadly 
toxic material in the waste. Vink called the case a journalistic scandal, in which he was especially 
critical of the role that De Volkskrant and Greenpeace played. According to Vink, they tried to 
dramatize the events without properly checking the facts of the case.  
 
December 23 
The Court of Appeal in Amsterdam upheld the decision by the District Court and again 
sentenced Trafigura to a fine of $1.000.000. The decisions concerning APS and the municipality 
of Amsterdam were also upheld.  
 
2012 
 
January 30 
The Court of Appeal in Amsterdam ruled that the prosecution of Dauphin, the President- 
Director of Trafigura, should be allowed.441  
 
May 23 
Ivory Coast’s minister of African regional integration, Adama Bictogo, was fired because of 
his alleged role in the disappearance of about $8m from the fund that was established for 
compensating the victims of the Probo Koala. This concerned the $45 million that Trafigura 
had paid as a result of the settlement with Leigh Day & Co for the 30.000 victims in Ivory 
Coast. A police investigation concluded that Bictogo received $1.2m for his mediation efforts, 
which were supposed to ensure that the victims received their compensation. Out of the 30,000, 
it appeared that some 6,000 people were still waiting for their compensation payments.442 
                                               
439 LJN: BQ1012, Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage, K09/0334, April 13, 2011  
440 Vink (2011). 
441 LJN: BV2230, Gerechtshof Amsterdam, R.1115-10, January 30, 2012 
442 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18173363 (date last accessed: 28-12-2013) 
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September 25 
Amnesty International and Greenpeace Netherlands published a report on the case of the Probo 
Koala, called ‘The toxic truth’.443 The report pointed to Trafigura as the main culprit:  
 
“In the absence of effective law enforcement, one company acted to secure corporate 
profit without regard for the human and environmental costs. That company was 
Trafigura.”444 
 
The report also stated that governments failed to protect human rights and to enforce 
environmental law and that Trafigura had managed to avoid prosecution in most cases, 
exploiting jurisdictional uncertainties. 
 
November 16 
The Dutch Public Prosecution and Trafigura reached a settlement to end all cases that were 
pending before the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. This meant according to the Public 
Prosecution that the ruling by the Court of Appeal had become final. Trafigura agreed to not 
only pay the fine of € 1.000.000, but also to pay another € 300.000 ‘as a compensation for the 
assets acquired through the illegal export’. Claude Dauphin agreed to settle by paying € 67.000. 
The amount of € 67.000 was equal to the maximum fine that could be imposed for the illegal 
export of waste. The Public Prosecution agreed to withdraw its appeal in cassation against an 
employee of Trafigura upon payment of € 25.000 by that employee. The Public Prosecution 
stated that it considered the settlement to be: 
 
“a fitting ending to a series of prolonged proceedings. Continuing the proceedings might 
take many more years. The cases will be concluded in a way that makes clear that 
violation of international regulations for hazardous waste will not be tolerated.”445 
 
Trafigura gave its own reaction to the settlement:  
 
“None of the executives of Trafigura have accepted any conviction, nor made any 
admission of liability or guilt as part of this settlement. Trafigura Beheer BV welcomes 
the end to these matters in the Netherlands. There is little doubt that mistakes were made 
and everyone involved would have wanted to see things handled differently. The 
company deeply regrets the impact the Probo Koala incident had – both real and 
perceived. We are always reviewing the way we conduct our business and deliver on 
commitments to the communities in which we operate. This incident provided additional 
impetus and urgency to those reviews and led to the introduction of a robust process of 
continuous review and improvement. Trafigura welcomes today’s settlement as it closes 
a chapter and presents an opportunity to refocus on Trafigura’s continuing and 
substantial commitment to Africa.”446 
 
2013 
 
February 25 
The state secretary of Infrastructure and Environmental Affairs (I&M), Mansveld, reacted to 
                                               
443 Amnesty International and Greenpeace Netherlands (2012). 
444 Amnesty International and Greenpeace Netherlands (2012), p. 3. 
445 http://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuws-persberichten/@159791/trafigura-punishment/ (date last accessed: 28-12- 
2013). 
446 http://www.trafigura.com/1524/amsterdam_settlement_statement_from_trafigura_english.pdf?lang=NL (date last 
accessed: 25-02-2013). 
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the report by Amnesty and Greenpeace by means of a letter to the House of Representatives. 
The response focused on the legal aspects of the recommendations made in the report. The state 
secretary pointed out that the Dutch government had advocated an international ban (through 
the International Maritime Organization) on carrying out production processes on the open sea. 
This ban was then agreed upon and would be implemented on January 1, 2014. She added that 
the question whether the waste substances under discussion here fell under the Basel treaty or 
not would therefore not hold much relevance in the future.447  
 
September 24 
The Supreme Court confirmed the ruling by the Court of Appeal concerning the municipality 
of Amsterdam: The municipality possessed immunity from prosecution in this case, since it 
was acting in accordance with an exclusive government task.448  
 
 
6.2.2. The question of causality 
 
The question of causality has led to considerable debate. Did the dumped waste from the Probo 
Koala cause deaths or serious injuries in Ivory Coast? 
 
The relevance of this question for this case study is obvious. The focus of this dissertation is on 
cases where governmental organizations from the Netherlands are connected to deaths and 
serious injuries. The analysis that initially seemed to dominate was that the waste of the Probo 
Koala did in fact cause deaths and serious injuries. In this view, it was claimed that the dumping 
of toxic waste from the Probo Koala in Ivory Coast caused deaths and serious injuries with 
numbers usually ranging from 10 to 17 deaths and from 20.000 to 100.000 people who needed 
medical care. The opposing view claimed that although it caused an offensive smell and 
possibly nausea, the waste could not have led to the deaths of the people involved.  
 
The relevant connection of the Dutch governmental organizations lies in the way the Dutch 
treated the Probo Koala while it was in Amsterdam. The decision to pump back the slops onto 
the Probo Koala and to allow the ship to leave is the relevant one. Had this decision not been 
taken, none of the events that followed would have taken place.  
 
The Centre Ivorien Antipollution analyzed the waste on August 21, 2006, saying it contained 
high levels of hydrogen sulfide, was toxic and could be fatal if inhaled in high doses. The 
Minton Report, which was commissioned by Trafigura, contained discussion of various harmful 
chemicals “likely to be present” in the waste and noted that some of these “may cause harm at 
some distance”. The report said potential health effects included “burns to the skin, eyes and 
lungs, vomiting, diarrhea, loss of consciousness and death”, and suggested that the high number 
of reported casualties was “consistent with there having been a significant release of hydrogen 
sulfide gas”. The version published on Wikileaks appeared to be a preliminary draft. Trafigura 
has stated that the report was only preliminary and was inaccurate.  
 
Reports in The Guardian, De Volkskrant and on the BBC stated that the analysis by the NFI 
                                               
447http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/02/25/reactie-op-het-rapport-van-
amnesty-international-en-greenpeace-nederland-the-toxic-truth-over-de-probo-koala.html (date last accessed: 
25-02-2013). In the letter, a curious mistake was made: the letter mentioned that the sentence Trafigura received 
from the Court of Appeal was irrevocable, thereby disregarding the settlement of November 16, 2012 between 
the Public Prosecution and Trafigura.  
448 http://www.nu.nl/binnenland/3583690/amsterdam-opnieuw-vrijuit-rond-probo-koala.html (date last accessed: 26-
9-2013).  
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determined that the contents of the tanker had been 528,000 liters of extremely alkaline waste 
constituting 6.8% sulfur, for 3.5% alkyl-thiols and 0.5% hydrogen sulfide. An English 
toxicologist, John Hoskins, member of the Royal Society of Chemistry said to BBC Newsnight 
about this:  
 
“If this waste had been dumped in the center of London, it would have affected millions 
of people.”449  
The analysis of Knip, and later Vink, of the contents of the waste from the Probo Koala contradicts 
this. The gas in the slops that is claimed to give the slops a toxic nature is hydrogen sulfide, a 
colorless gas, with the strong, characteristic smell of rotten eggs. The question is what determines 
whether a substance is toxic. The extent to which a substance is toxic is dependent on the quantity 
and the exposure. Quantity is important: A pinch of salt is fine when eating an egg, but eating a 
plate full of salt will kill you. Exposure to hydrogen sulfide is determined by the distance to the 
source and by breathing in the substance. Circumstances are therefore crucial when determining 
how toxic this waste really was. The number of milligrams of hydrogen sulfide to which one is 
exposed determines the possible consequences. 
 “In short: at 30 mg a cough. Above 375 mg dangerous, above 750 mg life threatening.”450 
Karel Knip from the NRC wrote extensively about the contents of the waste. In October 2006, 
Knip pointed out that the waste had an extreme pH-value and that determined the riskiness of 
the substances. This waste had pH-value of 14. Mercaptans and hydrogen sulfide take on a form 
in this that will not be discharged easily. This means that substances cannot, or only very slowly, 
escape from the waste. If substances escape very slowly, they are, by the time they come out, 
so diluted that they no longer present any danger if inhaled. In summary: There was indeed 
dangerous stuff in the waste, that could not, or could only very slowly be released. The slops 
which were dumped from the Probo Koala were a huge stinky dark gunk and if you were to 
drink it (which is unthinkable in view of what it was like) the chances are it would be lethal.  
Greenpeace spokeswoman Harjono responded to Vink’s book on the Greenpeace website. She 
said that it was a very one-sided book, which ignored the wrongdoings by Trafigura, namely 
the illegal shipment and dumping of dangerous waste in a developing country. She also said 
that the experts Greenpeace had consulted had concluded that there was a possibility that 
hydrogen sulfide had, in fact, been released from the waste. Apart from that, she stated that 
Vink had passed over all the other dangerous substances which had been present in the waste:  
“What about sodium hydroxide, a substance which is very damaging to eyes and lungs. 
On contact with skin blisters occur immediately. In the waste there were also 
hydrocarbons from mineral oil, such as toluene, that, in long-term exposure is harmful 
for the kidneys, lungs and liver. The waste also contained carcinogenic benzene.”451 
About the question whether people had died or not Harjono commented:  
“That there is uncertainty over the precise number of deaths and the effects on humans 
and the environment is merely the result of waste dumping in developing countries. After 
                                               
449 http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2680/Economie/archief/article/detail/333961/2009/05/18/2-600-liter-giftige-stof-in-
gedumpt-afval-van-Probo-Koala.dhtml (date last accessed: 28-12-2013) 
450 Vink (2011), p. 29. 
451 http://www.greenpeace.nl/Nieuws_2011/Trafigura/ (date last accessed: 28-12-2013)  
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dumping the waste at eighteen different places in Abidjan no adequate examination was 
made. If the Trafigura waste had been dumped in the Veluwe452, it would have been a 
different story. Whether there are actually deaths or injuries, is in fact a side issue, 
however harsh that sounds. This is about the risks to humans and the environment that 
Trafigura has deliberately taken by leaving waste behind in a developing country. The 
one-sided argument of Trafigura and Vink, I think, is no more than an attempt to distract 
attention from the terrible atrocity that Trafigura has committed.”453 
In the report by Amnesty International and Greenpeace ‘The toxic truth’, reference is made 
several times in relation to the findings of the Ivorian authorities who had concluded that at least 
15 deaths were connected to the waste.454 The report also mentioned that a toxicologist consulted 
by Amnesty International and Greenpeace had stated that a lower pH-value of 7 or 8 could have 
been reached for some of the waste because of dilution by rainfall and contact with other soil 
ingredients. However, based on the information available, no certainty could be given of how 
long it would take for this to occur.455 The report stated that ‘theoretically at least it is not 
impossible’.456 The report also mentioned that determining the impact of the waste on the 
environment was a near impossibility against a background of poor waste management practice, 
a huge variety of dumping places, poor baseline data on environmental pollution and unresolved 
issues around the exact composition of the waste.457 
The District Court of Amsterdam gave careful consideration to the question whether the waste 
material could be considered harmful to life and health in its verdict of July 23, 2010. In referral 
to the NFI-research concerning the contents of the slops the Court stated the following: 
“Given the fact that the slops contain flammable substances (naphtha), substances that 
may seriously damage the skin (such as sodium hydroxide) and substances that reduce 
the acidity decomposition in (very) toxic mercaptans and hydrogen sulfide, it is in our 
view fair to conclude that this is very dangerous waste. The very fact that the slops 
contain substances which in contact with skin may cause burns, in the opinion of the 
court justifies the conclusion that the slops are harmful to health. The question now is 
whether the substances, after delivery by Trafigura, for the purpose that would 
reasonably be expected, can be considered dangerous to life and / or health. Trafigura 
should have at least kept in mind that employees of the APS would collect the waste 
materials and treat them as they normally would do with petrol tank washings. That is, 
they would take no special security measures related to the corrosive nature of the slops. 
Already because of this, it can be considered that the slops, with the purpose that was 
intended, were dangerous for the health. Whether that risk also materialized is 
irrelevant.”458  
 
The Court went on to conclude that the effects of the emissions of such substances in the 
environment were also serious, although notably not as grave as was previously assumed: There 
was stench at great distances and risk of headache and nausea. The Court concluded that 
Trafigura was aware of the harmfulness of the slops from beginning to end. The District Court 
                                               
452 A Dutch region, known for its beautiful natural environment. 
453 http://www.greenpeace.nl/Nieuws_2011/Trafigura/ (date last accessed: 28-12-2013)   
454 Amnesty International and Greenpeace Netherlands (2012), p. 23. The footnote mentioned that three different 
numbers of deaths (15, 16 and 17) were mentioned by three different Ivorian authorities. 
455 Amnesty International and Greenpeace Netherlands (2012), p. 59. 
456 Amnesty International and Greenpeace Netherlands (2012), p. 218. 
457 Amnesty International and Greenpeace Netherlands (2012), p. 212. 
458 LJN: BN2149, Rechtbank Amsterdam, 13/846003-06 (PROMIS).  
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
156 
 
also paid attention to the claims by Trafigura of a ‘trial by media’: 
 
“It is certain that the dumping of the contents of the slop tanks of the Probo Koala at 
various locations in and around Abidjan, in addition to an extensive stench, led to a 
serious environmental contamination. Further to this, worldwide media attention was 
indeed given to the event, handing the blame to Trafigura, especially since there was 
talk of deaths and injuries caused by the dumping of toxic waste. That has led, partly in 
the Netherlands, as the court considers on the basis of the documents and the trial, to 
inaccurate and indiscriminate reporting.”459 
 
The District Court stated that Trafigura played a large part itself in this situation, by concealing 
information from the media and taking a defensive attitude in the matter, at least during 2006 
and 2007. The Court of Appeal in 2011 confirmed the verdict by the District Court and found 
Trafigura guilty of violating article 174 of the Dutch Penal Code (delivering, selling or buying 
goods that are hazardous for life and/or health, while concealing that hazardous nature): 
 
“On July 2, 2006 in Amsterdam together and in conjunction with another, goods, namely 
waste from cleaning of fuel using sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), have been delivered 
to Amsterdam Port Services BV as tank washings, knowing that they were hazardous 
goods for life and / or health, these waste materials being a complex mixture of water 
with an extreme degree of acidity and an oily liquid (both contaminated with, inter alia, 
sulfides and mercaptides) and the harmful nature (caustic / corrosive and with an 
extreme degree of acidity) of which was concealed for the delivery.” 
 
To conclude: The ruling of the District Court and the Court of Appeal can be considered as the 
most authoritative statement up till this moment, as confidential reports by the NFI, the experts 
hired by Trafigura and others were included in these proceedings. The conclusion then seems 
to be that the waste should be considered hazardous for the health. After all, this is what 
Trafigura was convicted for by both the District Court and the Court of Appeal: The waste could 
cause immediate skin burns, was flammable and could cause headache and nausea. The Court 
is not explicit on the question whether deaths, serious injuries or minor injuries did indeed 
occur, only the possibility is identified. It should be remembered here that these proceedings 
made no judgment about the events in Abidjan, and was limited to the events in Amsterdam. 
 
From the evidence, it seems by now more unlikely that people died from the consequences of 
the waste of the Probo Koala on its own. Convincing evidence for these deaths has not been 
produced. This can also be attributed to the lack of adequate research into the nature of the 
waste at the sites in Abidjan right after the dumping and the lack of reliable evidence from 
coroners concerning the corpses of alleged victims. The best available evidence seems to come 
from the samples that the NFI took. It should be pointed out that it was a professional move by 
DMB to immediately secure samples of the waste and have these analyzed. In its ruling, the 
Dutch courts nevertheless made it abundantly clear that Trafigura gravely neglected the 
concerns of public health and environment. The most realistic conclusion from all of this is that 
we do not know with certainty whether deaths occurred as a direct result of the waste, but it 
seems improbable. We do know that the waste was hazardous for life and/or health. Headaches 
and nausea seem likely. Skin burns could have occurred, but pictures of alleged victims have 
been analyzed to show that these were not skin burns, but pre-existing cases of psoriasis. 
Whether these hazards materialized will remain debatable. 
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6.2.3. Case characteristics  
 
damage  
deaths and serious injuries  The estimates of the number of deaths and injuries vary. 
The UN report by Ibeanu stated: 17 deaths, 30.000 injuries, 
and almost 100,000 that sought medical attention for the 
effects of the waste materials. The opposing view contends 
that no deaths could have occurred as a result of the waste 
and only headaches and nausea were likely. Conclusion 
here: deaths improbable, serious injuries possible/likely, 
injuries confirmed. 
damage compensation paid In 2007, Trafigura contributed €157.6 million to the Ivorian 
government. Trafigura added that the contribution did not 
represent any admission of liability. In 2009, Trafigura paid 
€33 million to the Ivorians who claimed to have been 
injured by the dumping of the waste of the Probo Koala. 
 
The Ivorian Government announced that 101,313 residents 
of Abidjan would each receive around £200. Families of 
alleged victims who died would be entitled to 
approximately £100,000.460  
 
The government of the Netherlands donated € 1 million to 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in 
relation to the incident with the Probo Koala for removing 
the waste and improving the environmental conditions on 
site. The municipality of Amsterdam donated €300.000, the 
national government the balance.   
nature of the act   
nature of the connection 
between the governmental 
organization and the deaths 
and serious injuries 
The Dutch government is involved in several capacities: 
granting a license, inspection, law enforcement but also 
private contracting. The supposed connection with deaths 
and serious injuries (which is still highly debated) lies in 
the decision by Amsterdam to allow the slops to be pumped 
back to the Probo Koala.  
what rules are broken A multitude of laws and regulations is involved in this case. 
These apply at all levels: international, national, provincial 
and local. All have specific impacts.  
According to the Hulshof Committee, the permission given 
by the municipality of Amsterdam to pump back the slops 
into the Probo Koala constituted, a toleration of three 
criminal acts: breaches of article 10.37 of the Law on 
Environmental Control (Wmb), article 5 under 1° and article 
18 under 1° of the EU-regulation on transport of waste 
materials (EVOA) and article 12b, under 1 and possibly 
12c, under 1 Law on prevention of contamination by ships 
(Wvvs). All these are criminal acts based on article 1a, 
                                               
460 http://www.leighday.co.uk/doc.asp?doc=1130&cat=1021 (date last accessed: 17-8-2010) 
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under 1° of the Law on Economic Crimes ( WED).461 APS 
was found by the District Court and the Court of Appeal to 
have violated article 10.37 Wmb, but was discharged from 
prosecution. The municipality of Amsterdam was granted 
immunity for prosecution, so the question whether they 
violated this article was not answered by the Courts.  
sanctions   
political consequences The government of Ivory Coast resigned because of the 
incident with the Probo Koala. A minister of the Ivory 
Coast government was fired in 2012 because of his alleged 
role in embezzling compensation funds for the victims. 
 
In the Netherlands, the case of the Probo Koala is most 
often connected in a negative way with Alderman Vos, but 
no political consequences have been drawn. Vos finished 
her term as alderman and then decided not to return for a 
second term.462 
disciplinary sanctions As far as can be established, in the Netherlands there have 
been no disciplinary sanctions against civil servants 
involved in this case. There was a newspaper report by De 
Telegraaf, claiming that the director of DMB was 
transferred and ‘promoted’ to another job because of this 
affair. The municipality denied there was any connection 
with the case of the Probo Koala.463 
Sanctions concerning 
criminal law 
In Ivory Coast, two directors of Trafigura and another 
employee were held in custody for a period of time. They 
were released as Trafigura reached a €157.6 million 
settlement with the government of Ivory Coast.  
 
In 2008, a court in Ivory Coast sentenced Salomon 
Ugborugbo, the Nigerian director of Compagnie Tommy, to 
20 years in prison on a charge of poisoning. A shipping 
employee who brought Trafigura and Compagnie Tommy 
together was sentenced to 5 years in prison.464 Five Ivorians 
were acquitted of charges in the same trial. 
 
Trafigura was sentenced to a fine of €1.000.000 by the 
Court of Appeal, but appealed the sentence. The captain of 
the Probo Koala was sentenced to a suspended prison 
sentence of five months (two years’ probation). Trafigura 
reached a settlement with the Public Prosecution that ended 
all cases that were pending before the Supreme Court. In 
                                               
461 Hulshof Committee Report (2006), p. 37. 
462 http://www.parool.nl/parool/nl/5/POLITIEK/article/detail/248888/2009/06/18/Wie-beeindigt-het-lijden-van-Marijke-
Vos.dhtml (date last accessed: 28-12-2013) 
463 Article in De Telegraaf, 5 February 2007, ‘Claim bij A’dam na gifdrama’. “Joke Goedhart, the failing director of the 
Environmental and Building Department (DMB), one week after her role in the affair became known, received a 
top job at the helm of all civil servants of the Amsterdam district Zeeburg. This despite the fact that alderman 
Marijke Vos largely handed her the blame for the debacle with the Probo Koala. The alderman herself did not 
draw (political) consequences on account of the case. She found that she could better take action than resign.” 
464 Ugborogbo was reportedly released from prison during the political turmoil in Ivory Coast of 2010, but this release 
has not been confirmed officially. Amnesty International and Greenpeace Netherlands (2012), p. 142. 
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addition to the fine of €1.000.000, Trafigura paid a further 
€300.000. As part of the settlement, the president-director 
of Trafigura had to pay €67.000 and an employee of the 
company had to pay €25.000.  
 
The director of Amsterdam Port Services (APS) and its 
director were found guilty of violation of the Wmb, for the 
pumping back of hazardous waste into the Probo Koala. 
However, it was found that they could rely on the 
municipality's consent to pump back the waste and they 
were therefore discharged from prosecution. The criminal 
court and the Court of Appeal ruled that the municipality of 
Amsterdam deserved immunity from prosecution. 
Measures taken / lessons 
learned 
The municipality of Amsterdam and the national 
government have listed several measures that were taken as 
a consequence of the incident with the Probo Koala: 
1) on a national level, a protocol was developed for 
cooperation and coordination of information 
concerning waste materials form maritime shipping. 
2) a protocol has been developed by the municipality 
of Amsterdam for dealing with unusual incidents 
like this one 
3) an academy for inspectors and law enforcers has 
been established to promote professionalism in this 
field. Also training has been given to the personnel 
in question (at all levels, up to the executive), 
focusing on clear judgment, risk analysis and 
scaling up.465 
4) screening of national environmental rules and 
legislation, including research into the necessity of 
better coordination between regulatory regimes and 
making the rules more suitable for implementation 
and law enforcement466 
5) screening of international environmental rules and 
legislation, such as measures at a European level for 
improving the existing legal frameworks and 
coordination. Research into the phenomenon of 
industrial processing at sea and whether legal 
frameworks should be adapted for that specific 
situation467 
Number of official 
investigations/reports on the 
case 
17 (not limitative): 
 
-Hulshof Committee  
-VROM Inspectorate report 
                                               
465 Measures were listed by the Director of Legal Affairs from the municipality of Amsterdam, Jessica Hoitink, during 
the case before the criminal court of Amsterdam, on June 9, 2010, which I attended. They can also be found in a letter 
to the city council written by the municipality of Amsterdam for a council meeting on December 2, 2009, nr. BD2009- 
006439 (Afronding verbetermaatregelen in het kader van de vervolgstappen naar aanleiding van de gebeurtenissen  
rond de Probo Koala). 
466 Tweede Kamer, 2006-2007, 22343, nr. 169, p. 4. 
467 Tweede Kamer, 2006-2007, 22343, nr. 148, p. 6. 
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-criminal investigation Dutch Public Prosecution  
-CNEDT report national committee Ivory Coast Diakite 
-CIEDT/DA-report international committee Ivory Coast 
Bogui (including an investigation by the European Anti-
Fraud Office (OLAF) which, at the request of the 
CIEDT/DA, looked into the movement of funds that 
supported the dumping of toxic waste in the District of 
Abidjan).  
-criminal investigation Ivory Coast Public Prosecution  
-criminal investigation Estonian Public Prosecution  
- United Nations report Ibeanu 
- Lord Fraser of Carmyllie QC Interim report 
- Lord Fraser of Carmyllie QC Second interim report 
 
Reports on specific issues (not limitative): 
- Minton-report 
- 20 experts-report (hired by Trafigura and Leigh Day & Co) 
- NFI-report 
- Legal issues report De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek  
- Backes second opinion 
-FIDH-LIDHO-MIDH-report concerning human rights 
victims Ivory Coast 
- ‘The toxic ship’ by Vink 
Number of years from start 
of the case till finish or 
present  
6 years  
 
 
6.3. Why: explaining the deaths and serious injuries 
 
There are four different factors to explore further in each case study: opportunities, motives, 
masking and factors relevant to the response (this last factor will be discussed later in this chapter). 
 
It must be made clear initially that to examine all actions by all actors here would be to go beyond 
the scope of this research. On an international level, there were many more organizations 
involved, especially if one looks back on the voyage of the Probo Koala, visiting many different 
countries. The governments of Ivory Coast, Estonia, Great Britain, to name but a few, all played 
a part. For private companies, Trafigura is of course important, and APS and the shipping 
agency ATM should also be mentioned. The United Nations played a part in the follow up in 
many ways, for example through the report by the Special Reporter to the UN, Ibeanu, and 
through the UNEP fund. However, focus in this chapter lies on the role that Dutch governmental 
organizations played. More particularly, the choice is made here to focus on the decision to allow 
the pumping back of the slops into the Probo Koala and let her go, and the actions by governmental 
organizations in relation to that decision.  
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6.3.1. Opportunities  
 
6.3.1.1. Organizational structure and division of responsibilities 
 
Organizational structure 
Many government organizations were involved in this case and many of those seem to have 
been more capable of stopping the Probo Koala from leaving Amsterdam with the contaminated 
slops than they themselves first acknowledged. Nevertheless, a central role seemed to be played 
by DMB, as that was the agency that was asked by APS whether it was permissible to pump 
the slops back into the Probo Koala. DMB was involved both as a supervising authority as well 
as a licensing authority (with different persons from these divisions within DMB involved).  
 
The argument has often been made by the parties involved that these environmental issues are 
very complicated. The legislation involved is complex, often ambiguous and sometimes 
contradictory. The processing of the waste materials (and hence the supervision thereof) also 
requires specialist knowledge and an eye for detail. There are many standardized procedures 
that must be known and a huge data on ship movements that could be scrutinized each day. In 
this scenario, the organizational structure at DMB seems to leave room for individuals 
(professionals) to make key decisions. That makes sense. In such a context, leaving discretion 
to professionals is inevitable. Inspectors, legal advisors and heads of divisions from DMB were 
all involved. The director of DMB seems to have operated from a distance (for instance, she 
was not present at the evening meeting with APS on July 4) and left a lot of operating room to 
her assistant directors. The only intervention on her part that might be recalled is the decision 
she made to block the agreement that APS would pay a large fine if things were later to turn 
out wrong. The politically responsible people (like Alderman Vos) did not play any part in what 
went on during the stay of the Probo Koala in the Netherlands (from July 2 till July 5, 2006).  
 
The people consulted by DMB (from the VROM Inspectorate, IVW, police, Public Prosecution 
for instance) were mostly ‘street level bureaucrats.’ Several reports afterwards concluded that 
this is usually adequate for routine processes. But in a case like this, where suddenly what is 
normal becomes a crisis (the slops caused serious stench nuisance, police and firemen were 
alarmed, the costs for processing the slops became 45 times higher than originally suggested, a 
possible damage claim from a company for large amounts of money loomed), this was not 
deemed to be adequate. In this view, the organization did not adapt in time and failed to scale 
up to the appropriate strategic level for key decision making.  
 
These conclusions seem to represent a ‘wisdom after the fact’ approach. In fact, the civil 
servants involved seemed to have performed their duties with ample professional knowledge 
and with considerable integrity and sensitivity. That the desired outcome was not reached is 
clear, but we should judge the actions of the civil servants with some restraint given what we 
now know. As for the control mechanisms and supervising authorities, many of the supervising 
authorities were actually consulted by DMB. None of them came up with viable solutions for 
the pressured situation that DMB felt it was in. It seems then that whatever went wrong here, it 
cannot be argued that it was due to a lack of control mechanisms in place. Whether these control 
mechanisms functioned as adequately as they should have is another matter.  
 
Division of responsibilities 
DMB (Dienst Milieu en Bouwtoezicht) was the organization within the municipality of 
Amsterdam that was responsible for supervising law enforcement and the granting of licenses 
under the law on environmental control (Wet milieubeheer, Wmb). At the time, there were 
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approximately 18.000 different institutions falling under the authority of DMB and between 
150 and 200 people on its staff. The division that was responsible for granting the permits was 
separate from the division that was responsible for inspection and law enforcement. 
 
Harbor Amsterdam had a Nautical Sector, the head of which was also the Harbor Master of 
Amsterdam. The administrative tasks for, among other things, waste materials from ships (art. 
6 and 6a of the law on prevention of contamination by ships, the Wvvs) were carried out by 
Harbor Amsterdam. The civil servants of the navigation division of the Inspection of Transport, 
Public Works and Water Management (IVW) were responsible for inspecting the compliance 
with the Wvvs and the underlying regulations. If the disposal duties for waste materials from 
ships and cargo residues in the Wvvs are violated, the civil servants of the Inspection for 
Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM), just like those of IVW, are appointed as 
special criminal investigators. The VROM Inspectorate was appointed as supervising authority 
for the observation of the permit for collecting the waste. Furthermore, the VROM Inspectorate 
was responsible for supervising observance of the EU regulations on transport of waste 
materials (EVOA) and the accompanying underlying regulations to EVOA. For collecting 
waste materials from ships, a permit from the Minister of VROM was necessary. The North 
Sea Unit of the Waterpolice Service (KLPD) held the supervision of the Dutch sea area and the 
Dutch part of the Continental Plateau. The Interregional Environmental Team (IMT) of the 
Dutch police focused on supply chain managed forms of environmental crime. This 
superregional team fell under the responsibility of the Functional Prosecution’s Office. The 
Public Prosecution is responsible for the prosecution of criminal acts.468   
 
To conclude: There was not just one kind of organizational structure, there were many. There 
was not one single actor who was responsible for the entire process. This made frequent 
coordination and consultation between agencies an absolute necessity. What is also clear, is that 
there was not a single organization or person who was responsible for maintaining an overall 
view in cases such as this one. This was one of the points of criticism made by the Hulshof 
Committee. However, especially when compared to other cases, it should be argued here that 
DMB in fact coordinated quite a lot of action and attributed much to gaining a greater overview 
of the case. Complications arose because of all the different responsibilities and legal 
competences handed to the different authorities, coupled with a process that should be described 
as the authorities involved ‘passing around the hot potato’.  
 
 
6.3.1.2. Organizational culture  
 
Diederik Samsom, member of the House of Representatives in the debate on December 19, 2006, 
stated that he had missed recommendations concerning issues of organizational culture within the 
relevant inspection agencies. This was an important omission, according to him.469 One point that 
could be mentioned about organizational culture concerns the way the municipality of Amsterdam 
relates to other governmental actors. Amsterdam, as the largest municipality in the Netherlands 
and its capital city, is often described as ‘the republic of Amsterdam’, in the sense that the 
municipality likes doing things in its own way, not paying too much attention to wishes, priorities 
or protocols that the national government or other governmental agencies adhere to. A ‘not 
invented here’ attitude is often ascribed to Amsterdam, and Amsterdam officials often seem to 
cherish this. During the debate on in the City Council on December 20, 2006, city councilor Van 
der Burg (VVD) quoted this in relation to the finding that regulations on a municipal level were 
                                               
468 This description of responsibilities is based on the VROM Inspectorate report (2006), p. 12-15. 
469 Tweede Kamer, 2006-2007, 22343, nr. 153, p. 4. 
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unjustly placed above national law in the case of the Probo Koala. He stated that the City Council 
was partly to blame “because we always think that we can overrule whatever happens in The 
Hague.” On the other hand, it could well be argued that in this specific case, Amsterdam did 
exactly the opposite to what would be expected from the ‘Republic of Amsterdam’, in the sense 
that they tried to involve all possible parties (although notably, the Public Prosecution, whether 
justified or not, felt excluded and surpassed by Amsterdam).  
 
Another important aspect of the culture of the municipality of Amsterdam is its openness. In 
matters of integrity for example, Amsterdam is known for its policy of publicizing every case in 
which breaches of integrity have occurred. This openness seems to have been exercised in the case 
of the Probo Koala. An independent committee (Hulshof) was appointed and it seems that, 
confidentiality was not invoked when convenient. Vos even admitted to errors before any report 
was published. Whether this was a smart move is to be doubted, but it certainly showed an open 
attitude. This contrasts with the approach by the national government (the State Secretary of 
VROM, Van Geel, notably) that at first kept the report by the VROM Inspectorate confidential 
and only reluctantly admitted to shortcomings. Cynically, it seems that the open approach by 
Amsterdam has backfired more than the more defensive approach adopted by other governmental 
actors involved. Vos has arguably suffered most political damage from this case and Amsterdam 
itself was the only governmental actor that was prosecuted for its involvement in this case. 
 
The culture at DMB can be described as putting in place mostly experienced professionals with 
dedication to their jobs, albeit with a lack of administrative rigor. As a consequence of the events 
in this case, Amsterdam has initiated training for DMB personnel. Knowledge of the rules, but 
also creativity, sensitivity and ‘administrative courage’ were all given as elements that should be 
improved. The main focus has been on making proper judgments, to include scaling up at the right 
time. All actions for improvement that stem from the Probo Koala incident have been managed in 
a project that was carried out by the municipality of Amsterdam. In December 2009, it was 
reported to the City Council that all actions had been implemented.  
 
 
6.3.1.3. The political system and the relationships with corporate partners and 
society 
 
Political system 
As for the role politics played here, it seems that the politicians in charge were not involved in the 
decision-making process during those days in July 2006. The Hulshof Committee has concluded 
that there had been no ‘scaling up’ to the political level to inform the alderman in charge before 
crucial decisions in this process were taken. The College of Mayor and Aldermen concluded from 
this that DMB and the Harbor Amsterdam should, in future, be better prepared to recognize the 
seriousness of such a situation. The fact that the alderman was not informed weighed heavily here, 
where DMB was mentioned specifically as an agency which should be particularly expected to 
provide briefings.470  
 
The involvement of the Dutch political system changed radically after the events in Ivory Coast. 
Few environmental cases have received so much political attention in the Netherlands over the 
years. Both the City Council of Amsterdam and the House of Representatives have debated the 
matter extensively, commissioning several independent reports and questioning the respective 
                                               
470 Letter by the College of Mayor and Aldermen of Amsterdam to the City Council, 6 december 2006, Bestuurlijke 
zienswijze van het College van B&W van Amsterdam op het onafhankelijk onderzoeksrapport van de commissie 
Hulshof naar e gang van zaken rond aankomst en vertrek van de Probo Koala in Amsterdam, p.4. 
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aldermen, ministers and state secretaries on numerous occasions. Debate has been lively to say the 
least. 
 
There has been criticism that politicians were not involved in the case. Alderman Vos was quoted 
on television about this. She said the director of DMB told her there was a calamity in the harbor 
with stench nuisance, but nothing more specific than that. “If something is really going on, I will 
hear about it. That is the normal way of things.”471 Later, in a meeting with city councilors, Vos 
said that the director of DMB should have provided a clearer message and that the problem was 
that the seriousness of the situation was not assessed correctly in July 2006. That prompted an 
angry reaction from several members of the City Council of Amsterdam. In the debate in the 
Amsterdam City Council a week later on December 20, 2006, City Councilor Van der Burg 
said: 
 
“It was reported to the alderman that there was a ship in the harbor causing a lot of 
stench nuisance. The alderman reacted, maybe not literally, with: ‘oh’. And she got on 
with business. I asked her why she had not followed up with a question about this 
announcement. Is there something special or is it something I don’t have to do anything 
about, as it concerns normal stench nuisance? That did not happen. The top of DMB 
said nothing, then or later. A week or two later, in the staff meeting, no one said: 
Marijke, do you remember that ship last week that caused so much trouble with that 
terrible stench? It caused quite a fuss and a bailiff was brought in. The costs turned out 
to be 45 times higher than planned and the ship was detained. We got threatening letters 
saying we could face a large claim. Boy, did that cause trouble. But there was none of 
that. Until on September 8 reports came in about the events in the Ivory Coast, nothing 
was said about this matter at all. Even though it was a very exceptional situation that 
we had never experienced before. I wonder if you will get by simply by changing 
procedures, protocols, structures and trainings.”472  
 
In her response to the questions posed by the city councilors, Vos reiterated that she would follow 
many of the conclusions of the Hulshof Committee, that this was a very unusual situation and that 
the rules needed to be changed. She added: 
 
“Decisions have been taken without acknowledging the uniqueness and complexity of the 
situation and there was a failure to scale up or to inform the aldermen concerned before 
these decisions were taken. These judgments by the Committee are accepted by our College 
and that should naturally lead to action. This whole business simply did not go right. I 
blame myself for that and I take responsibility for it.”473 
 
Vos had been a prominent member for Green Left in the House of Representatives before she 
became an alderman. For rival political parties, the Probo Koala case presented a great opportunity 
to target a prominent politician of Green Left for allegedly disregarding the environment and 
harming people in a poor third world country, both of them themes for which Green Left had 
traditionally been a strong advocate. As a member of the House Vos was highly regarded, but in 
the public eye, her time as an alderman was seen as much less successful. The Probo Koala affair 
played a substantial role in this and it continues to be connected to her in a negative way.  
 
It appears from several sides that Vos reacted in a stressed manner when she first had to respond 
                                               
471 Television news show, AT5, 13-12-2006 
472 Raadsnotulen Gemeente Amsterdam 2006, afdeling 2, 20 december 2006, p. 31-32. 
473 Raadsnotulen Gemeente Amsterdam 2006, afdeling 2, 20 december 2006, p. 38. 
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to this case, and that she did not operate consistently during the case. At first she defended the 
actions of her civil servants, but, soon after, she stated that things had not gone right. The view 
within the organization seems to have been that Vos sometimes admitted to things when she should 
not have done so. This also might have put pressure on the relationship with the civil servants, who 
were described as incompetent in official reports and felt aggrieved by this. It seems that Vos was 
genuinely committed to the interests of the environment and the victims of the dumping of the 
waste, but it also seems that from a political point of view she managed this case in a way that 
could be described as somewhat naïve. Remarkably, she suffered a lot more political damage with 
her open, and at times a bit doubtful, style than her colleagues at national level (such as State 
Secretary of VROM Van Geel) did, and who could be said to have consistently taken a defensive 
position throughout the entire case. 
 
Relations with corporate partners and society 
There are no known intricate relationships between Trafigura and Dutch politicians involved in 
the Probo Koala case. For DMB, the relation with APS was probably closer, as APS had received 
a license for its work from DMB. No bonds seemed to have existed that suggested any breach of 
integrity or relationships that were too close. Only one possible exception could be mentioned, but 
should be dismissed straight away: A newspaper report in 2007 stated that the head of the 
Environmental Inspection Division of DMB was under suspicion for allegedly breaking 
environmental laws and for having ‘too intimate’ connections with APS.474 However, this 
suspicion was dropped very quickly as it turned out to be without any factual merit.  
 
During the criminal court trial, the representative of the municipality of Amsterdam was asked if 
it was normal for DMB representatives to hold meetings in the evening in the harbor (referring to 
the meeting with the director of APS on the evening of July 4, 2006). She responded by saying 
that this had happened a few times before, but that it was not a regular practice. In this case, she 
stated, justified interests from third parties, such as APS, could require a swift response, also 
outside of office hours, from the civil servants involved. Considering the threat of a claim by 
Trafigura against APS, in the view of DMB, such a situation pertained.  
 
 
6.3.1.4. Rules, regulations and procedures  
 
The case of the Probo Koala is in part complex because of the large volume of rules and 
regulations that were involved. For the handling of the slops in Amsterdam, many laws and 
regulations have been identified.475 Two important international treaties should also be 
mentioned: firstly, the Marpol treaty, the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships. It was designed to minimize pollution of the seas, including dumping, oil 
and exhaust pollution. Secondly, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. This was designed to reduce the 
movements of hazardous waste between nations, and specifically to prevent transfer of 
hazardous waste from developed to less-developed countries.476 Beyond the 12 mile zone, a 
large opportunity exists for ships and oil companies to begin activities that are forbidden 
elsewhere. Rules beyond the 12 mile zone are less strict and law enforcement is often confined 
to the territorial waters. It is claimed that oil companies use their ships at open sea as oil 
                                               
474 http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/article398487.ece/Duo_weer_vrijgelaten_in_gifzaak_Probo_Koala (date last 
accessed: 28-12-2013)  
475 Hulshof Committee (2006), p. 7-8. 
476 Greenpeace contends that the municipality of Amsterdam mistakenly focused on Marpol, where they should have 
focused on the Basel Convention. 
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refineries able to process waste into cheap gasoline. The resulting product is gasoline that does 
not meet the European quality standards, but is suitable for sale in parts of the world where 
standards are lower and where the prices are lower, for example Africa and other developing 
regions.477  
 
Article 10.37 Wmb was crucial for the Dutch situation and this was the main focus in the 
criminal court case against the municipality of Amsterdam. Violation of this article is a crime 
under Dutch law. The article states that it is forbidden to dispose of dangerous waste materials 
by transferring them to persons or organizations that do not hold a permit for this. The Public 
Prosecution claimed that by pumping back the slops to the Probo Koala (which did not have a 
permit for this), this article was violated. The Hulshof Committee has identified 20 different 
applicable rules and regulations for the Dutch case alone: In addition to Marpol there are three 
EU guidelines, four Dutch laws and twelve Dutch regulations.  
 
Extensive analyses have been made of the applicable legal frameworks in the Probo Koala case. 
The municipality of Amsterdam asked a specialist professor (Backes) for a second opinion on the 
legal conclusions that had been drawn by the Hulshof Committee. The House of Representatives 
hired an independent law firm, De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, to advise on the legal 
ramifications of the case.478 On an international level, considerable legal research has also been 
done, both within the European Union and under the flag of the United Nations.   
 
The Minister of VROM concluded later:  
 
“As a general conclusion [from the screenings of both national and international law and 
regulations], I believe that through the many activities it is shown that law and regulations 
and their implementation are by now of sufficient quality to safeguard the environmental 
interest, which is the purpose of the legislation concerning waste materials from ships. 
Notably there are, after constructive dialogue with various parties on national and local 
level, several improvements to be made to control incidents like the one with the Probo 
Koala, in order to minimize the possibility that this type of incident will occur in the future. 
Many actions for improvement have by now been finished and some of them are still 
ongoing.”479  
 
What is also clear is that this entire case has seen juridification to an almost unbelievable degree. 
It is claimed that Trafigura has had 55 attorneys working on aspects of the case worldwide. The 
number of legal procedures and their complexity added to what could be called a ‘legal swamp’ 
in several ways. The legal department of the municipality of Amsterdam alone had 80 to 90 
case files concerning the Probo Koala case, encompassing meters-long paper files for the case. 
Legal costs for the government in the Netherlands were by any estimate more than half a million 
euro, but it is more likely that millions of euro were involved.  
 
The corresponding routines and procedures were also detailed and complex. This was due to 
several things:  
- the case involved the rules and regulations of many countries. The Probo Koala was 
a Greek-owned (shipping company Prime Marine management Inc.) tanker, flying 
a Panamanian flag, leased by the London branch of a Swiss oil-trading company 
                                               
477 Broadcast on Dutch television: Profiel (KRO/IKON/HO) August 8, 2007. 
478 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006–2007, 22 343, nr. 161. 
479 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2008–2009, 22 343, nr. 208 
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(Trafigura), whose fiscal headquarters are in the Netherlands. The journey of the 
Probo Koala included the Netherlands, Estonia, Nigeria and Ivory Coast. 
- there were also rules and regulations applicable from the European Union 
- beyond the 12 mile zone at sea, international sea laws are applicable. Changing 
these (limited) rules and regulations requires consensus on a broad international 
level 
- the environmental laws involved were often (very) complex and required a high 
degree of specialization and expertise.  
 
 
6.3.2. Motives  
 
6.3.2.1. Primary motives  
 
Three primary motives have been identified before:  
 
a. rational choice (e.g. a rational choice to commit an act is taken after weighing all the 
options) 
b. ignorance (e.g. errors due to not knowing the relevant rules or due to lack of 
professionalism) or  
c. unwillingness (e.g. governmental organizations who feel that they are confronted by 
rules that are impossible to carry out because of wicked dilemmas) 
 
Rational choice can be found in the fact that the authorities made a deliberate and shared 
judgment of the pros and cons of several courses of action. State Secretary Van Geel pointed out 
in a debate that this was not a matter of negligence, but on the contrary that many people had 
constructively sought a solution. Communication was extensive, but he admitted that the result 
was negative. It should be pointed out here that this was by no means an inevitable outcome of 
the process: Had the waste been dumped in the middle of the ocean, no one would have noticed. 
That is to say: in the short term nobody would have died or gotten terribly ill. On the long run 
of course, we all suffer from the polluting of the oceans. That might be called ‘much slower 
evil’. The outcome of these deliberations by several actors can be viewed as a rational choice to 
pump the slops back into the Probo Koala and to release the ship.  
 
Ignorance 
Ignorance was a point that was also covered by the Hulshof Committee. The Committee concluded 
that, in part, there was a lack of professionalism and knowledge on the part of the civil servants 
from DMB. Although the Amsterdam authorities did not have the authority to detain the ship, 
several things went wrong according to the Committee: The pumping back of the slops, although 
prohibited by article 10.37 Wmb, was a mistake that was made because nobody realized that 
considerations of the acceptance of the waste or finance could not play a part in the implementation 
of this article of the law. Also, the applicability of EVOA and articles of the Wvvs was not judged 
correctly by the civil servants involved. The Hulshof Committee made a strong statement on the 
discussion about the applicability of article 10.37 Wmb, saying that there should not be doubt 
within the civil service about the steady and unalterable principle that regulation of a lower degree 
can never invalidate or limit the scope of the law on which that regulation of a lower degree is 
based. From what went before, it should be doubted whether this conclusion should stand. DMB 
had experienced and professional staff. Mistakes were surely made, but to describe the civil 
servants involved as incompetent would be unfactual, considering their actions and experience.  
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The legal analysis that lawyer’s office De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek made for the House of 
Representatives started with the finding that, in a theoretical sense, there is a lot of focus on the 
necessity of cooperation between the supervising agencies that are involved with harbors and 
seafaring ships. Moreover: 
 
“The events concerning the Probo Koala indicate in our opinion that in practice the 
complexity of the rules and regulations and the diffusion of the supervision on those rules 
and regulations, present difficulties for making the right decision. None of the supervising 
agencies seems to have had a complete picture of the facts, the applicable legal framework 
and the available instruments for upholding this framework.”480 
 
Earlier, the Hulshof Committee was faced with the question whether the modus operandi of the 
local governmental agencies involved and the cooperation between them could be considered 
adequate. The Committee answered this with a ‘careful no’: It was not adequate for the special 
circumstances in place here. It probably would be adequate for daily routine matters. The 
Committee went on to say that consequently, the question who is to blame, is difficult to answer. 
The Committee was compelled to say that an unwanted course of affairs more often preludes 
change and improvement within organizations. The Committee stated that: 
 
“The working areas have been carefully outlined and all involved have undoubtedly 
acted to the best of their knowledge and abilities. That the result of all these efforts has 
not been satisfactory is due not so much to the individual employee, but to the fact that 
in the organization of these governmental agencies too little has been reckoned with an 
operation that should have been managed as such in its entirety.”481 
  
The Committee added that at the time (December 2006), four authorities and one private 
company dealt with this operation. That was not problematic for any routine cases, but in the 
case of any irregularity intensive coordination is needed and in fact management by a single 
responsible person is needed. The municipality of Amsterdam in its response acknowledged the 
value of this:  
 
“The Hulshof Committee focuses on this point, not on an individual level, but on an 
insufficient degree of organization at network level, for both the local government and 
national government. That in itself is not new, much earlier research into calamities has 
focused attention on this problem. Our College acknowledges the seriousness of the fact 
that in this case, too, no one really acted from an overall perspective, whether at local 
or national level.”482 
 
This acknowledgement brings into mind the idea raised by Hannah Arendt about ‘rule by 
Nobody’: 
 
“Today we ought to add the latest and perhaps most formidable form of such dominion: 
bureaucracy or the rule of an intricate system of bureaus in which no men, neither one 
nor the best, neither the few nor the many, can be held responsible, and which could be 
properly called rule by Nobody. If, in accord with traditional political thought, we 
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481 Hulshof Committee Report (2006), p. 59-60. 
482 Letter by the College of Mayor and Aldermen of Amsterdam to the City Council, 6 december 2006, Bestuurlijke 
zienswijze van het College van B&W van Amsterdam op het onafhankelijk onderzoeksrapport van de commissie 
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identify tyranny as government that is not held to give account of itself, rule by Nobody 
is clearly the most tyrannical of all, since there is no one left who could even be asked 
to answer for what is being done.”483 
 
In the Probo Koala case, it seems that no one from the Dutch governmental organizations was 
really in charge during those days in July 2006. It should be added that the civil servants from the 
municipality of Amsterdam at least tried to take charge, but were not helped much by the national 
inspectorates. As should be expected, accountability was discussed at length in the democratic 
arena. Examination of the responses of the politically responsible leaders of the governmental 
organizations who were involved showed that none of them felt themselves wholly or even 
primarily responsible for the decision-making process. That might be very plausible from a 
perspective of the individual organization or the individual politician but on the whole this has 
distressing aspects.  
 
Unwillingness can refer to the impossibilities that were posed by the complexity of the rules and 
the situation. The first responses from the governmental organizations involved, both on a national 
level and on a local level, seemed to fall into this category, as the main notion was that because of 
the complex and often contradictory rules, they did not have any room left to decide on a different 
course, even if they had wanted to. Subsequently it was implied that the blame should not be 
handed to the governmental organizations, but to the complex and almost wicked set of rules that 
were in place here. State Secretary Van Geel started his response to the matter by saying that he 
recognized that averting environmental problems in a globalizing world has become extremely 
complex, adding that this is a great concern, whether it involves palm oil, CO2 or waste.484   
 
The complexity of the rules involved was illustrated here before. In an article in Trouw, expert 
on environmental law Vogelezang-Stoute stated that Amsterdam found itself in ‘a legal 
swamp’. She discovered contradictory rules concerning the question of acceptance. A policy 
statement on the term ‘acceptance’ differed from the law, but jurisprudence by the highest 
administrative law court affirmed that the policy statement was actually binding. In short: It 
was understandable that there was confusion in this case.   
 
Ibeanu offered a more critical view. Although he accepted the complexity of the legal 
framework, as well as the uncertainty as to its proper application in the case of the Probo Koala, 
he regretted that none of these provisions were ultimately invoked to prevent the reloading of 
the waste and the departure of the Probo Koala, particularly considering that the captain was 
alleged to have made conflicting claims about the nature of the waste. In the end, it can be 
concluded that reproaches can be made about the domination of legal concerns in the discussion 
as opposed to an approach that was more geared toward finding a better solution for the 
environmental concerns involved.  
 
 
6.3.2.2. Secondary motives  
 
a. financial concerns (cutting costs, staying within budget, avoiding claims, etc.) 
 
As mentioned before, there were consultations made by the municipality of Amsterdam with a 
multitude of governmental organizations. The Hulshof Committee has expressed the view that in 
many consultations, the question ‘who will pay for all this?’ played a part, whether openly or on 
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the background. The subject of a possible damage claim by Trafigura was discussed extensively. 
It turned out that nobody had any funds available nor was there any general fund, whether on a 
local, national or international level, which would cover the costs for the municipality of 
Amsterdam in the case Trafigura were proven right at a later stage. The Hulshof Committee 
concluded that the financial consequences attached to the view that acceptance of the slops had 
taken place, played a large role in the conclusion that such acceptance had not taken place.485 On 
the other hand, Amsterdam is the largest municipality of the Netherlands and considering its 
budget, a claim such as this one could surely have been handled.  
 
In Alderman Vos’s first reaction to the incident, no mention was made of financial arguments. 
Later, during a committee meeting for the City Council on December 13, 2006, Alderman Vos 
stated that she did not deny that financial arguments played a large role, because they did 
indeed. However, this should be viewed in light of the fact that it did not seem legally possible 
to prohibit the pumping back of the slops. In that case, the claim for compensation would have 
been laid on the municipality of Amsterdam. A week later in the City Council she repeated that 
financial arguments played a large part in the eventual decision:  
 
“About this last aspect, a number of important questions have been asked by members 
of this committee. How is it possible that financial arguments played such an important 
part? They did indeed play an important part in the eventual decision. That was not 
good. All of this took place in the light of the laws and regulations on which those 
involved relied. They felt they had nowhere to turn, no other option available. The 
financial arguments did indeed apply pressure, and that was not good.”486 
 
In the report by UN-reporter Ibeanu, this conclusion is also reached: 
  
“As financial considerations appear to have played a key role in the decision to reload the 
waste back on to the Probo Koala, the Special Reporter would like to encourage the 
Netherlands to consider creating a fund or another financing mechanism in the 
implementation of its follow-up initiatives.”487 
 
On this point, it is interesting to note the response given by the Dutch Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations Council concerning the UN Report by Ibeanu on September 17, 2009: 
 
“On the recommendation to consider creating a financial mechanism regarding the 
recycling costs, it has not been established whether financial considerations have 
determined the decision to reload the waste onto the Probo Koala.”488 
 
This is in line with the viewpoint of the municipality of Amsterdam, which denied during the 
criminal court case that these financial considerations played a large part, saying it was something 
to be reckoned with, but not an overriding argument. The Public Prosecution however argued 
that the municipality of Amsterdam was preoccupied with the possibility of liability claims. A 
legal advisor was quoted saying to the representative of the municipality of Amsterdam on that 
July 4th: “I hope this will help you somewhat to avert the claim…” On July 5, the local public 
prosecutor (Spoor) phoned with the director of DMB (Goedhart). The versions differ on what 
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was discussed here. Spoor claimed that Goedhart, confronted with the prosecution’s view that 
the slops should not be allowed to be pumped back into the Probo Koala, exclaimed: “But then 
we get a claim!”489  
 
The perspective of the municipality of Amsterdam is completely different. They focus on the 
legal restriction. According to them, they had no other legal options but to allow the ship to take 
back its waste and leave the harbor. They would have liked to have acted differently, but once 
all other governmental authorities looked away, they had no alternative but to let the ship go. 
In their view, financial considerations did not play a part in the decision-making process. It was 
mentioned that the financial interest of the entrepreneur involved was taken into account, as 
this could and should not be ignored by government.  
 
As for the financial fund, this was a question that was posed to the national government. In a debate 
with the House of Representatives on June 21, 2007, the Minister of VROM, Cramer, stated that 
in theory, every action of law enforcement can lead to claims for compensation, but this does not 
hamper the daily practice of law enforcement. She also stated that the VROM Inspectorate did not 
fear compensation claims, because the law had to be executed. Therefore, she did not consider it 
appropriate to create a special fund. The State Secretary of V&W, Huizinga, added that money 
should play no part in these kinds of situations. The costs of law enforcement for her inspection, 
the IVW, were placed on the budget of the Ministry of V&W, so the IVW could simply do its job. 
She, too, did not favor the creation of a fund.490  
 
All this raises questions. If this financial pressure had not existed, would DMB have allowed 
itself to be pressured into taking a decision about the pumping back of the slops without 
knowing the results from the analysis of the contents of the slops? If time was on the side of 
DMB, is it not probable that they would have taken more time to study the applicable legal 
framework in its entirety (which, to be fair, was indeed complicated, but that would justify even 
further DMB taking more time to take the right decision)? It can be concluded from what went 
before that it seems plausible that financial arguments played at least some role in the decision 
to pump back the slops (the pressure was applied) and to allow the Probo Koala to leave the 
harbor of Amsterdam.  
 
b. the position of the governmental organization and its public image  
 
The municipality of Amsterdam was very concerned with operating in accordance with the law. 
In making the decision to pump back the slops, it does not appear that the position of the 
governmental organization and its public image were a priority. At the time there was absolutely 
no political interest or publicity in relation to the case. That changed after the events in Ivory Coast, 
but in those days in July 2006, the public position of the municipality cannot be said to have been 
a driving factor in decision making.  
 
c. preferring another norm than the law strives for  
 
This motive is an interesting one in this case. Clearly, a lot of attention has been given to the 
legal aspects of this case: Was pumping back of the slops to the Probo Koala prohibited or not? 
This was not by any means an easy puzzle to solve. In this case, these rules were indeed very 
complex and there was considerable time pressure. The fact that a reliable analysis of the 
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contents of the waste would not be available in time provided an additional uncertainty to cope 
with. None of the civil servants involved were satisfied completely with the decision to pump 
back the slops and to let the ship leave the harbor of Amsterdam. There were real concerns for 
the environment, but in the end the difficult conclusion was reached that there was no scope 
within the law to forbid the pumping back of the slops. After many investigations and years of 
heated debate, criticism can be levied that legal concerns dominated the discussion where an 
approach that placed more emphasis on reaching a good environmental solution would have 
been preferable. This should not be connected to unwillingness to follow the law. On the 
contrary, in this case there was a very strong urge to do everything in accordance with the law. 
Looking back, one can say that the environmental concern should have prevailed, but that is to 
be wise after the event.  
 
d. demands by politicians, citizens, special interest groups and media 
 
In this case, a large number of parties were involved. This was a very complex setting in which 
the government body involved had to weigh the interest of many different parties. It should be 
noted that in the days when the decision was made to pump back the slops, these parties were 
either in a business relationship with each other (Trafigura, APS) or the relationship was one of 
law enforcement (the governing bodies involved, Public Prosecution, inspections, etc.). After the 
events in Ivory Coast with the possible consequences for the citizens there, special interest groups 
(like Greenpeace for example) and the media became involved. In the aftermath of the original 
decision to pump back the slops, a dynamics evolved in this case which is interesting in the study 
of environmental cases. The demands by Trafigura and APS probably played a role in the decision 
to pump back the slops, but it appears that the perceived demands of law were the most important 
for the municipality of Amsterdam when they made this decision. After the events in Ivory Coast, 
the demands by all these parties accounted for what seemed like an unstoppable dynamics, in 
which conflicts between many different parties determined the course of events.  
 
 
6.3.3. Masking  
 
Adams and Balfour argued that a characteristic of administrative evil is that it is masked, in the 
sense that there are many factors preventing us from identifying what is really going on and judging 
whether what is going on constitutes administrative evil. In the following part, these factors are 
described briefly and subsequently analyzed for this case. 
 
 
6.3.3.1. Distance in time and space  
 
Distance in space creates a number of different perspectives: the Dutch perspective, the Ivorian 
perspective, the English perspective and so on and all at odds with one another. As evidenced 
throughout this case study, it is almost stunning to see how many facts are highly disputed amongst 
the different parties. It is quite easy to see Trafigura versus Greenpeace, the NRC (Knip) and Vink 
versus De Volkskrant (Trommelen), Trafigura versus the BBC and The Guardian, the municipality 
of Amsterdam versus the Dutch Public Prosecution, Trafigura versus Leigh Day & Co and the 
victims. The disputes seem endless and offer fundamentally differing perspectives on one and the 
same case. It also seems that the discussion of a causal relation between the dumping of the waste 
and the deaths and injuries in the Ivory Coast is a predominantly Dutch discussion that, for the 
most part, has not been taken up in other countries. This might be explained by the fact that 
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Trafigura has its headquarters in the Netherlands and by the fact that criminal court procedures in 
the Netherlands have been more intensive than elsewhere.  
 
Distance in time is a masking perspective that in this case is fundamental to any deeper 
understanding. The decision taken by DMB to allow the slops to be pumped back was one taken 
under considerable time pressure, with important information (the results of the samples taken 
from the waste to establish what exactly the slops consisted of) not available because more time 
was needed for careful analysis. The municipality of Amsterdam or the VROM Inspectorate have 
a point when they stress that they had to make decisions in hours or maybe a few days, when many 
facts were still unknown. The knowledge of the contents of the waste material in 2010 is far 
greater than the limited information that was available in those few hot days in July 2006. Had 
all the knowledge that is now available been available then, things would probably have been 
different. 
 
Over time, it turned out that the waste was dumped in Ivory Coast after a long journey with several 
stops. The understanding of the case immediately after the dumping seems heavily influenced by 
the information available at the time that was flawed by a lack of adequate research. The 
perspective ‘Europe poisons Africa’ sums up this original perspective. As time went by, more and 
more doubts were raised as to the factual correctness of these events. Over time, the perspective 
was changed more and more from many deaths and serious injuries to an environmental crime 
with possible or probable negative health consequences. As time went on, two diametrically 
opposed stories emerged, each holding its own drama. The benefit of hindsight should be 
acknowledged as a serious factor here. Many people and organizations were wearing the mask and 
perhaps some questions will never be answered fully. 
 
 
6.3.3.2. Object-relations psychology/scapegoating (splitting mechanism)  
 
All the actors involved seemed to have struggled to come to grips with their own role in this 
disturbing incident. In the case of the municipality of Amsterdam, the first reaction has been 
that Amsterdam could not be blamed, as they faced an impossible task due to the multitude of 
complex and contradictory rules. It was pointed out that many other government agencies were 
involved and that none of them seemed to be helping out. This was illustrated by the position 
Amsterdam took in the criminal court trial: Why are we being prosecuted, when we were the 
only governmental organization taking action, while the others did nothing?  
 
On a national level, the organizations involved pointed to the supposedly very limited role of 
their own organization and the lack of information and complex rules. Although the national 
government (especially State Secretary Van Geel) continually denied that it, too, participated 
in the finger pointing, if one repeatedly tries to minimize one’s own part and invariably points 
to the role of others, this surely looks a lot like scapegoating. All in all, it seems that not only 
the government, but all actors, both governmental and private, seem to identify a large number 
of other candidates for the blame. Should the captain of the Probo Koala be blamed? Or the 
president director of Trafigura? Or the board of Trafigura? Or individual employees of 
Trafigura? The director of Compagnie Tommy? The government of Ivory Coast? Ivorians who 
abused the opportunity to falsely claim compensation for injuries they did not suffer? And as 
for government agencies in the Netherlands, the director of DMB? Or the other civil servants 
from DMB? Or the IVW? Or the VROM Inspectorate? Or the European Union for making 
incomprehensible rules in the Marpol treaty? And what about political responsibility? 
Aldermen Vos? Or the Dutch State Secretary of VROM? Or his colleague from V&W?  
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There seems to be no clear scapegoating here of just one single organization or individual, 
although it could be argued that relatively speaking, in the Netherlands most blame on a 
governmental level has been handed to Amsterdam and more specifically to Alderman Vos. 
Nevertheless, nearly every single actor tries, often in an indirect fashion and not overtly (as that 
might rebound on them) to point out what others did wrong, while defending their own position. 
We might call it ‘cautious scapegoating’. 
 
 
6.3.3.3. Perspective  
 
The perspective from which evil is most often recognized, is that of the victim, in this case the 
victims in Ivory Coast. This often makes for the ‘myth of pure evil’. In the case of the Probo Koala, 
these sort of black and white discussions are seen, especially in the media. In reports, Trafigura is 
usually cast as the villain: the greedy multinational trying to make an extra buck at the expense of 
the most underprivileged citizens of one of the poorest countries on earth. This indignation also 
hits the governmental organizations involved: The Europeans did not want to get dirty hands with 
this terrible waste, so they decided to let it all go to Africa, regardless of the consequences. ‘Europe 
poisons Africa.’ The rich North versus the poor South. These kind of sharp images seem to exert 
their own influence in the public debate over this.   
 
It is interesting that the second part of the theory also seems to come true. The possibility of 
reversing the image is considerable: The statements Trafigura made about the twenty experts’ 
research and the deal with Leigh Day & Co, coupled with the article in the NRC, could, over time, 
prove to be a ‘game changer’. In the article in the NRC, the picture was indeed reversed: The 
people in Ivory Coast, who were the victims in the original story, were presented as ‘gold seekers’, 
trying to make an extra buck out of the multinational that, as it turns out, was unjustly condemned 
for something that was blown out of proportion. It was just a bad smell. And if they did suffer from 
diseases or serious injuries or worse, it was more likely to stem from the fact that they lived on a 
garbage belt for years anyway. Or was it? The current controversy shows the myth of pure evil in 
both ways. The complexity of the case and the mixed intentions of actors are not readily 
identified and publicized.  
The tendency to dramatize the events is illustrated by Karel Knip of the NRC: 
“There has been almost no medium that has not described the horrors of the disastrous 
chemical accident in moving terms. And has illustrated this with poignant photographs of 
Ivorians full of sores and other skin disorders. The reports were interspersed with 
recordings of pools filled with thick, tar-like goo in which unrecognizable objects were 
slowly sinking. Next to a sign with a skull on it. Or images of men in white suits wearing 
gas masks.”491 
The perspective of the victim often differs greatly from that of the perpetrator. This is called the 
‘magnitude gap’. From the victim’s perspective, most often in hindsight, evil can be clearly 
identified. From the perpetrator’s perspective, however, it is often a problem to identify evil. From 
the perpetrator’s perspective, the act was perhaps not a good one, perhaps even evil, but taking 
into consideration other factors, such as prior injustices, perpetrators often easily produce 
rationales and justifications for their acts. The description of opportunities and motives that has 
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gone before shows that all organizations involved produced their own rationales for explaining 
why they did what they did. In their perspective, there were often no alternatives. If any alternatives 
were identified, there were very plausible reasons (again: in the eye of these organizations 
themselves) why not to choose them.  
 
From any reconstruction, it must be concluded that before the dumping in Ivory Coast, none of the 
governmental actors involved envisioned really terrible things happening. Of course there were 
concerns about what was going to happen with the waste (remember that Port State Control 
Amsterdam kept asking their colleagues in Estonia to be alert to what happened with the waste 
material from the Probo Koala), but it seems unlikely, if not impossible, that any of the 
governmental organizations involved foresaw a form of suffering for human beings as the end 
result of all these activities. Consequently, all governmental organizations seem to feel they are 
under unjustifiable scrutiny over what was a very complex process, which never translated itself 
into a question of life or death. In the perspective of the governmental organizations, they just did 
their job. They admit they could have done it better, but still they probably feel that what was their 
routine work has little or no connection to what later happened in Ivory Coast. The connection is 
simply too distant (if there were any, considering the causality-argument). This then is completely 
in line with what is said about perspective in ‘Unmasking administrative evil.’  
 
 
6.3.3.4. Language  
 
The use of technical language or euphemisms can mask what is really going on and provides 
for emotional distance towards sensitive issues. Language therefore often masks wrongdoing 
or administrative evil. The language used by governmental agencies in this case made the 
decision that was to be taken by governmental organizations (most notably DMB, VROM 
Inspectorate and IVW) one that was predominantly about ‘processing’ the waste, ‘acceptance 
of the slops’ and about applying ‘highly complex rules’. In the decision-making process, words 
seem to focus on legal definitions and financial arguments. Care for the ‘environment’ and, in 
connection with that, care for ‘public health’ and ‘human beings’ is rarely found in the 
discussions during those days in Amsterdam, at least not often on paper. It does seem that DMB 
for example and other government agencies as well had a genuine concern for the environment 
(DMB for example had as an objective in their conversation with APS to have the waste 
processed in the right manner by AVR Rijnmond), but it appears that this concern was not made 
explicit very often. It is difficult to be sure whether this means that such concerns weighed less, 
or that it simply did not come up as often because it was clear for everybody that these concerns 
always mattered.  
 
It is frequently pointed out that the situation was ‘unusual’, even ‘unique’. These keywords 
seem to dominate the first responses by the governmental organizations. Language is used here 
to convince people that the actions by governmental organizations were indeed inevitable: 
There was nothing we could do to prevent this. When later investigations claimed that the wrong 
decision was taken, mistakes were often admitted, but with the addition that this was being done 
‘with today’s knowledge’ and that this was all ‘wisdom after the fact’. The use of language 
often seems to be influenced by fear of admitting either political or criminal guilt.  
 
Language is also an instrument for the struggle between the parties involved and can be used to 
mislead. In ‘The toxic truth’ (the title itself is a way of ‘framing’ the case with language), 
Amnesty and Greenpeace argued that the use of the word ‘slops’ was coined by Trafigura to 
imply that the waste was derived from normal ship operations. This would then imply that the 
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
176 
 
slops were to be covered by the Marpol Convention. Amnesty and Greenpeace argued that the 
correct word to use was ‘waste’, as the waste was the result of illegal caustic washings on board 
the Probo Koala. This would then be covered by the Basel Convention for contaminated waste 
materials.492 
 
 
6.3.3.5. Dehumanization  
 
Doing evil unto others is easier when the other is seen as ‘not normal’, unlike the majority. 
These people are sometimes defined as less than human, for example as bugs or roaches (a 
classic moral inversion). It is essential that subjects are distanced by language, by representing 
them as ‘numbers’, ‘things’ or calling them inhuman. It is clear that all parties involved 
expressed their shock and horror at the events in Ivory Coast and extended their sympathies to 
the victims. Looking back, it seems that this shock and horror could have been very different if 
the first ‘frame’ had not been ‘Europe poisons Africa’ but instead ‘No one could have died from 
this waste, but its dumping was an environmental crime’. It seems more relevant in this case 
that the victims were never in the picture before they fell victim (a word that can be used only 
when one starts from the debated presumption that causality is involved), as no one in 
government foresaw that the contaminated slops would cause serious injuries or even death.  
 
 
6.3.3.6. Technical rationality  
 
It is claimed by Adams and Balfour that most deeds of administrative evil do not emanate from 
individual wicked and seductive leaders on the outside, nor from exceptional psychopaths for that 
matter, but are in fact engrained and intertwined in the daily operations of public administration (a 
social construction), waiting to start a route down the proverbial slippery slope. The Probo Koala 
case seems to fit this description. Think of the routines for dealing with ships loading off waste 
in the harbor, for harbor admission and export laws, etc. The difficulty that bureaucracy has 
with cases that do not fit the mold, is clearly shown here. In the aftermath, the Dutch 
government went to great lengths to stress that this was an unusual situation, for which the 
regular standards were insufficient. The intention here was probably reassurance: Such an event 
is unlikely to happen again. However, on a closer look it seems unnerving. It is precisely when 
unusual things become important that we would want governmental organizations to be able to 
respond in the right way. The response of Amsterdam to the Hulshof Committee on this point 
forms a good illustration: The municipality admitted that nobody stopped to think of the big 
picture.  
 
 
6.4. Response of the governmental organizations involved  
 
6.4.1. Internal language  
 
In this case, not many internal considerations have been leaked or made public through WOB-
publications. It is therefore difficult to conclude what language dominated internally. This is 
different for Trafigura, since the mails that were published by The Guardian and De Volkskrant 
certainly gave more insight into internal considerations that played a role for Trafigura. For the 
governmental bodies involved, there do not seem to be many differences between internal and 
external language as far as can be established here. Analysis of the response by the 
                                               
492 Amnesty International and Greenpeace Netherlands (2012), p. 36. 
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governmental organizations involved should focus more on the external language that was used 
then. 
 
 
6.4.2. External language  
 
Response of Amsterdam 
The initial response of Alderman Vos on September 19, 2006, was as follows: 
 
“The DMB could not stop the Probo Koala from leaving the Amsterdam harbor, as it 
has no authority over ships and their cargo. The DMB was involved in its role as a 
supervising authority. There was no possibility of forbidding the pumping back of the 
slops. All parties involved (DMB, Harbor Amsterdam, the Ministry of VROM, the Public 
Prosecution and the Inspection of V&W) all possessed the same information, concerning 
the fact that there was waste material from the ship involved. The eventual outcome of 
the journey of the Probo Koala is obviously shocking and horrifying. Nobody wanted 
this. Everything should be done to prevent this from happening again. However, 
international and national rules and regulations make this impossible at the moment. 
Therefore I will contact the State Secretary of VROM to see if the rules can be changed 
to prevent the dumping of waste materials from ships.”493   
 
Members of the City Council of Amsterdam reacted angrily to the tone of the statement, as well 
as to the fact that Vos seemed to exonerate her civil servants from blame in her first reaction on 
television. Vos responded by making a public apology:  
 
“I deeply regret that the impression has been given that the civil servants of Amsterdam 
are not to blame, I have not done that properly. It was never my intention to wash my 
hands in innocence ahead of the results of an independent investigation into the 
matter.”494  
 
In December 2006, the Hulshof Committee concluded that the local authorities should have 
prohibited the slops to be redelivered to the Probo Koala. The following response was given by 
the College of Mayor and Aldermen:  
 
“The College of Mayor and Aldermen concludes that with today’s knowledge, it can be 
concluded that the permission for the slops to be redelivered should have been withheld, 
but points to conclusions of the Committee about the very complex and defective rules 
and regulations as well as to the fact that the Committee called the situation ‘unique’, 
as there are no other known cases of pumping back the waste material from ships. In 
this context, the possibility of forbidding the pumping back of the slops was not 
identified. Further, the College takes over recommendations for improvement. Some of 
them will be followed up on at local level, but it is also stressed that for many 
improvements, the national government is responsible.”495 
 
                                               
493http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/wob-verzoeken/2007/02/19/probo-
koala/20070219-wob-probokoala-bijlage-20-5.pdf (date last accessed: 28-12-2013) 
494 De Volkskrant, September 27, 2006 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/article352926.ece/Wethouder_Vos_biedt_excuses_aan_in_gifschip-affaire 
(date last accessed: 28-12-2013) 
495 Letter by the College of Mayor and Aldermen of Amsterdam to the City Council, 6 december 2006, Bestuurlijke 
zienswijze van het College van B&W van Amsterdam op het onafhankelijk onderzoeksrapport van de commissie 
Hulshof naar de gang van zaken rond aankomst en vertrek van de Probo Koala in Amsterdam, p.1. 
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This statement seems to be the only one in which the municipality stated that the permission to 
pump back should have not have been granted by DMB. Ever since this statement, the 
municipality of Amsterdam has always maintained that they had no alternative but to allow the 
slops to be pumped back, since this was the only legal option available to them. The 
municipality frequently pointed out that others, like the Public Prosecution, did have the 
authority to forbid the ship from leaving the harbor. Following these debates, in the next years 
the focus was on showing that measures were being implemented as a result of lessons learned 
in the Probo Koala case. 
 
At the hearing of the criminal court case on June 9, 2010, the representative of the municipality 
of Amsterdam was presented with the opportunity to respond to the charges laid out by the 
Public Prosecution.496 First of all, she stated that all persons involved were deeply touched by 
what happened in Ivory Coast and felt strongly for the sorrow and hurt of the victims there. The 
accusation that the municipality of Amsterdam cooperated in the illegal dumping of waste 
materials was denied. The municipality was, in its own view, the only government body that 
had actually taken action, by initially forbidding the processing of the waste material. The other 
governmental organizations involved had all been consulted, but none of them saw any 
possibility of acting. Concerning the events around the decision to pump back the waste 
materials into the Probo Koala, there were certainly financial interests at stake, but Amsterdam 
claims that the decision to pump back the waste materials was based on the merits of the case, 
not on the financial interests involved. This was an independent decision. It is also the case that 
the financial interests of a third party (in this case Trafigura) did require a swift response by the 
responsible government body. That is why a meeting was arranged on the night of July 4 to 
deal with the matter. The representative of Amsterdam again pointed to the complexity of the 
rules and the issues at hand, to the fact that others did not see possibilities of stopping the ship 
and to the international character of the problem. There was clearly disagreement between the 
Public Prosecution and the municipality on what happened: The Public Prosecution said they 
had always been opposed to giving permission for pumping back. Amsterdam claimed that the 
Public Prosecution never said that pumping back would be a criminal act. Both the police and 
the Public Prosecution claimed that they were totally taken by surprise when they found out 
that the ship had left the harbor and that permission to pump back had been given after all.  
 
Response of the national government 
The response of the national government in the Netherlands focused on the role of the VROM 
Inspectorate and the IVW. The first reaction here was that these inspectorates had not received 
full information and that the rules involved were very complex. A report in De Volkskrant on 
September 18, 2006, stated that the Ministry of VROM rejected the responsibility for the 
decision to allow the ship to leave the harbor of Amsterdam. The VROM Inspectorate gave 
advice on the matter, but formally the matter fell under the authority of the Ministry of V&W, 
according to VROM.497 
 
A member of the House of Representatives, Samsom, took a very critical stance towards the 
State Secretary of VROM in the debate on September 20, 2006. He said that Trafigura were the 
real villains here, but that he was also under the impression that the Dutch government could 
have prevented the disaster from happening and that the State Secretary seemed to want to keep 
a clean sleet. Samsom criticized the VROM Inspectorate especially for telling Amsterdam that 
no permit was required for the Probo Koala to leave the harbor. He was attacked by the State 
                                               
496 I attended the hearing in this case on this day, since it in detail covered the role of the municipality. 
497http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/article350074.ece/Van_Geel_lichtte_Kamer_verkeerd_in_over_schip_met_c
hemisch_afval (date last accessed: 28-12-2013) 
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Secretary for jumping to conclusions and pointing fingers without having the full and correct 
information. In the debate, Samsom reacted as follows:  
 
“My comment in the TV-journal tonight was based on the fact that the spokesman for 
the State Secretary of VROM said two days ago in the newspaper Het Parool: ''The 
VROM Inspection has only been told that this was innocent rinsing water. We were 
completely wrong-footed by that.'' This is throwing the ball very implicitly or even 
explicitly into the court of Amsterdam. That’s what I pointed out. But Amsterdam tried 
to bounce the ball back again and I detested that too.”  
 
State Secretary Van Geel remarked in the debate:  
 
“I insist that I'm extremely disturbed by the way mister Samsom one-sidedly and one-
dimensionally tried to lay the blame on the VROM Inspectorate. That was extremely 
annoying, especially for my civil servants. Myself, I can handle this very well.”498 
 
Samsom continued by asking for further investigation by the State, which State Secretary Van 
Geel at first rejected (“I do not see how I could do that”), because he did not want to interfere 
with the investigation by the Public Prosecution. Van Geel added that he, too, was curious about 
the outcome of that investigation. Eventually, Van Geel, under pressure from a majority of the 
members of the House of Representatives, promised to look into the possibility of further 
research without interfering with the investigation by the Public Prosecution. The end result of 
this was the report by the VROM Inspectorate on the matter, which was sent to the Chamber 
under condition of confidentiality on October 31, 2006. 
 
On December 19, 2006, the House of Representatives held a debate with State Secretary Van 
Geel and the Minister of V&W. By then, the report by the Hulshof Committee had been sent to 
the Chamber and the condition of confidentiality had been lifted from the report by the VROM 
Inspectorate. Van Geel stated that this had been made possible because by now publication 
would not hamper the independent investigation in Amsterdam and the investigation by the 
Public Prosecution would only shed light on some isolated issues, which could be dealt with at 
the appropriate time. 
  
In the debate, Van Geel admitted that the VROM Inspectorate should not have told DMB that 
the Probo Koala should be allowed to leave the harbor. He indicated that the civil servants from 
the VROM Inspectorate took a stance that was too passive, stating that with today’s knowledge, 
they should have asked more questions and should have given advice that was not asked for by 
Amsterdam (concerning the relevant article in the Wmb about transferring dangerous waste 
materials to persons or organizations who do not hold a permit). They correctly answered the 
only question that was put to them, but they should have done more. However, he added, this 
was all wisdom after the fact:  
 
“In July, everything happened within two hours. That was it for the involvement of the 
VROM Inspectorate. I concur with the conclusion from the Hulshof Committee that the 
Wmb was applicable and that Amsterdam should never have given permission to pump 
back the load. That has nothing to do with scapegoating. This concerned a situation that 
had never happened before. In Amsterdam, legal advisors were working on this for three 
long days. That makes it totally different. Can it be expected that individual civil servants 
                                               
498 TK Handelingen, debat 20-9-2006, p. 2-58.  
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grasp the legislation in a split second? Something that has been learned from the 
experiences with the Probo Koala is that this was not a matter of negligence, but on the 
contrary that many people have constructively sought a solution. Communication was 
extensive, but the result was negative.”499 
 
Members of the House of Representatives asked in a debate on June 21, 2007 why it was that 
until that moment no mistakes on the part of the Inspectorate V&W had been admitted. They 
got the following response:  
 
“The State Secretary of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W) 
repeats what is said in different reports, specifically that there was a possibility of the 
Inspectorate V&W stopping the Probo Koala, however only on the basis of firm 
suspicions. These were not there. The question is whether this should be held against 
the inspection. Of course the first reaction is: If only they had taken a better look. On 
the whole, it can be said that the Inspectorate V&W should have been more alert. 
However, this counts not just for the Inspectorate V&W. There were a lot of things they 
did not know: For instance they knew nothing about the anonymous fax and that the 
prize for processing had been raised to twenty times the original prize. Had this been 
known, of course alarm bells would have gone off.”500  
 
 
6.4.3. Strategy  
 
Internal documents from the governing bodies involved that detailed their strategy or reflected 
internal considerations in this case. What happened was unexpected for almost everyone 
involved. After the decision to pump back the slops into the Probo Koala in Amsterdam, more 
than six weeks passed before the waste was dumped in the Ivory Coast. The events that followed 
put great strain on all governmental organizations involved. The national governmental 
organizations adopted an approach in which they defended their actions and only gave in when 
this was unavoidable. The municipality of Amsterdam adopted a legalistic approach, claiming 
that the law did not leave any other option than pumping back the slops. On a political level, a 
consistent strategy was not followed. Instead the position taken ‘moved along’ with the debate 
as it unfolded in the political arena.  
 
Looking back to the factors relevant for response that were found in the section on bodies of 
knowledge, an error management culture aimed at learning from errors did not seem present 
immediately after these accidents. On the other hand, the entire affair has led to several 
measures on all levels aimed at improving the practice of decision making in this area. Several 
lessons have been learned from this case. The ideal response to possible integrity violations in 
this situation would have admitted that preventive measures clearly were not executed well 
enough in these cases. Independent investigations were made (the municipality of Amsterdam 
for example quickly ordered an independent investigation into the matter), but there have been 
so many investigations that it seems clear that none is seen by all parties as the ‘definitive’ 
report. Legal procedures have taken very long and prosecution has been troublesome.  
 
The responses in this case are for the most part very similar to the typical reactions to 
organizational crime, but there is a striking difference. The culpability for the act was certainly 
                                               
499 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006–2007, 22 343, nr. 153, p. 8-9. 
500 Tweede Kamer, 2006–2007, 22 343, nr. 178, p. 6. 
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denied. Responsibilities were shifted to others, the normality and the necessity of the behavior 
was emphasized and the condemners were condemned (in fact, most parties condemned many 
of the other parties, since no one really agreed with one another). The striking thing is that the 
governmental organizations (the municipality of Amsterdam and the national governmental 
organizations involved) did not deny the severity of what happened. There was no argument 
from government that the damage did not occur and the governments did not argue that deaths 
or serious injuries could not have taken place as a result of the dumping of the waste from the 
Probo Koala. As indicated before, there were signals at an early stage that the question of 
causality could be viewed in a different light (think back to the Knip’s article of October 4, 
2006), but none of the governmental organizations involved made any attempt to make use of 
these kinds of arguments. In retrospect, it seems such an attempt would not have been without 
merit. One can only speculate as to the motives not to use this ‘opportunity’ for response, but it 
should be kept in mind that the public opinion held by the vast majority of people was (and to 
a large degree probably still is) that the dumping of the waste caused deaths and serious injuries 
in Ivory Coast. In such a climate, public opinion might also have held that it was not up to the 
government to claim there was no causal relationship, but to await the court proceedings. 
Whatever the motives were, the choice not to question causality was important in the dynamics 
of this case. What would have happened if government, too, had claimed that causality could 
not be accepted here? 
 
The typical responses to rule breaking by governments were all found in this case. There were 
shock reactions after prosecution, references to the complex situation the government found 
itself in, a citing of laws, policies and funding by national government, claims that 
governmental behavior in light of the difficult circumstances was necessary, and admission of 
mistakes while simultaneously adding that lessons had already been learned. The responses 
here are textbook examples of the responses by rule-breaking governmental organizations.   
 
Determining responsibility on the part of government for what happened in this case is very 
difficult indeed. In line with the assumptions from state crime literature, the State is composed 
of many organizations with segmented tasks and responsibilities (think back to the consultation 
of the various governmental agencies by DMB). It is in line with theory from state crime that 
the state itself can define what is criminal. The fact that the State cannot be prosecuted at all 
and that the municipality of Amsterdam in this case was granted immunity from prosecution by 
the courts made it more difficult to get a clear assessment of the role of government. Whereas 
there have been clear judgments of the actions of Trafigura and APS, the actions by the 
municipality and the State have not been the subject of critical analysis by the courts. This has 
left some questions unanswered: If Amsterdam had not been granted immunity, would the 
verdict have been acquittal or conviction? And what would this mean for decision making by 
governmental organizations in these kinds of situations in the future?   
 
 
6.5. Placing in the realm between error and evil  
 
6.5.1. Error management  
 
Errors were defined as deviations between the intended and actual outcome of an action, that 
are (1) unintentional and where (2) the error maker should have known better, implying that the 
error was potentially avoidable. The case of the Probo Koala seems to exemplify such error in 
many important ways. There certainly were deviations between the intended and actual 
outcome of the action to pump back the slops and allow the ship to leave. The intended outcome 
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was that the waste would be processed somewhere else. The actual outcome was that the waste 
was not processed in the right way, and that the illegal dumping of the toxic waste in Ivory 
Coast caused considerable environmental damage and possibly serious injuries. Financially, 
although no claim for compensation had to be paid to Trafigura or APS, the municipality was 
hit in many different ways: legal costs for all the legal procedures501, costs for the independent 
investigation, lengthy political debates and a voluntary donation to the UNEP fund for the 
victims in Ivory Coast502 to name but a few. These deviations were certainly unintentional: No 
one could, or should, believe that any intention was involved on the part of the DMB as to the 
eventual outcome in Ivory Coast. A goal directed action was at stake here: Let the waste be 
processed in the right way and let us not hinder the business of this company. The error maker, 
DMB, some might argue, should indeed have known better. In this view, this error was 
potentially avoidable. Others would point out that Amsterdam vigorously searched for 
alternatives, was abandoned by its fellow governmental partners and had few possibilities (or 
none) for doing anything other than what they ended up doing.  
 
The conclusions of several investigations (the Hulshof Committee, the report by UN-reporter 
Ibeanu, the report by De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek) often mentioned the words ‘error’ and 
‘complexity’ to describe what went wrong. Errors that were mentioned are the incorrect 
assessment that was supposedly made of the legal situation, the failure to scale up the decision 
making, the insufficient cooperation between governmental agencies and the lack of 
information sharing. It should be noted however that the incompetence of the agencies involved 
seems to have been exaggerated. The DMB employees seem to have been professional and 
experienced civil servants who did their utmost to achieve the desired outcome. What does 
stand out is that from a greater overview, no one escalated the decision in order to reach the 
desired outcome (the protection of the environment getting priority over the business interest 
of the company involved). Who should be blamed for that is to be debated, but government 
does have that responsibility. All these aspects mentioned are common factors for those familiar 
with the literature on error management.  
 
Error should also be clearly distinguished from its consequences. Here the error is the decision 
to pump back the slops and to allow the Probo Koala to leave the harbor. The consequences are 
still debated, as the debate around causality shows. Nevertheless, it is clear that several errors 
were made in this case. The admission of this, and the projects for improvement that started 
afterwards are a positive asset in error management: promoting learning from mistakes in order 
to arrive at error prevention instead of error control or management. 
 
 
6.5.2. Integrity and corruption  
 
There are no relevant signs of corruption or clear conflicts of interest here concerning the way 
the Dutch governmental organizations operated. As far as integrity is concerned, it can be 
debated whether all actions of DMB or other governmental organizations were completely in 
accordance with relevant moral values, norms and rules. However, the facts shown in this case 
study do not support any case for doubting the integrity of the civil servants in question. It 
should be concluded that in that terrain between error and evil, as far as the Dutch government 
is concerned the Probo Koala case does not contain serious breaches of integrity or cases of 
                                               
501 As costs for legal advice and procedures are concerned, a report on this subject indicated that just for the period 
from the events from August 2006 until January 1, 2007, these costs for the Probo Koala case that were made on 
behalf of DMB alone amounted to €130.000. 
502 It might be pointed out that the €300.000 that Amsterdam donated would probably have covered all or most of the 
claim for compensation by Trafigura, assuming this claim had it been awarded in a court case. 
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corruption. Whether this goes for the Ivorian government could be more doubtful, illustrated 
by the arrest of a cabinet minister for embezzling funds which were meant for the victims of 
the Probo Koala dumping.503 
 
 
6.5.3. Organizational crime  
 
The question of criminalization is important. Can the governmental behavior in the selected 
case study be defined as criminal, meaning that the behavior constitutes a violation of existing 
criminal law? It is debatable whether this is the case. Amsterdam was granted immunity from 
prosecution by both the District Court and the Court of Appeal. This was a formal move and 
meant that the courts did not speak out on the question whether the behavior by Amsterdam 
could be considered a violation of criminal law. The Public Prosecution had argued that the 
decision to allow the pumping back of the waste constituted a violation of criminal law. In many 
ways, it is unsatisfying that the criminal court only gave a technical ruling on the case (with 
reference to the immunity of the municipality from prosecution). Particularly in a complicated 
case like this, it would have been of great significance for the court to have given a ruling on 
the behavior of the municipality of Amsterdam. The disagreement between Public Prosecution 
and Amsterdam would have been weighed and resolved by an independent court. Since such a 
judgment is lacking, the discussion has not reached a form of closure, a dissatisfying result for 
the people involved. The fact that only the organization was prosecuted and not the individual 
civil servants points to the fact that this was indeed an action that was decided upon at an 
organizational level. The facts of the case illustrate this, as many different organizations were 
involved and there did not seem to be one person who was really in charge.  
 
White collar crime, implying a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status 
in the course of his occupation, does not seem to fit the bill here when regarding the activities of 
DMB or other governmental organizations in the Netherlands. The actions of Trafigura could 
obviously be referred to as corporate crime. They were sentenced to a fine of €1.000.000 for the 
delivery of waste materials to Amsterdam while concealing the fact that these waste materials 
were ‘harmful for life or public health’. The term could also be applied to APS as APS and its 
director were found guilty of violating the Wmb by pumping back hazardous waste into the 
Probo Koala. However, it was found that they were able to rely on the municipality's consent 
to pump back the waste and they were therefore discharged from prosecution. It can be 
concluded that there is corporate crime here, since Trafigura was convicted in several instances by 
the Dutch courts and finally accepted a penalty of the highest possible fine for its offense. 
 
To conclude: Since neither the State nor the municipality of Amsterdam has been convicted for 
any crime, organizational crime on the part of the Dutch government cannot be proven here. As 
we have seen in the case study, there are more aspects involved than the criminal aspect. However, 
it can be concluded that the case of the Probo Koala involves corporate crime.  
 
 
6.5.4. Rule breaking by governments  
 
Rule breaking governmental organizations have already been defined as governmental 
organizations that violate rules or standards in the course of executing their responsibilities. The 
criminal court case presented evidence to determine whether DMB could be classified as a rule 
                                               
503 Then again, it should be mentioned that this particular instance was not investigated further here, perhaps the 
distance in space distorts my own perspective here as well.  
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breaking body. The rules that were allegedly broken were environmental rules and regulations, 
the violation of which also constitutes a criminal offense. The complicated question about the 
legal possibility of prosecuting governmental organizations is interesting. Criminal law systems 
have traditionally focused on determining the individual liability of crime perpetrators. 
Collective or organizational liability for crimes is at odds with the roots of traditional western 
law enforcement settings. In this context, the idea of the state or government is even more 
problematic. Under Dutch jurisprudence, municipalities can be prosecuted under the condition 
that the act involved does not concern a task which is the exclusive domain of the government 
(Pikmeer-arrest). However, the State (under which the VROM Inspectorate and the Inspection 
V&W fall) is immune to prosecution under all circumstances (Volkel arrest). In this particular 
case, Amsterdam has claimed that it should be immune to prosecution as the function it was 
enacting should be considered exclusively governmental, At the same time it contended that if 
such immunity were not to be granted their actions could not be considered criminal acts in any 
case. The fact that the municipality was being prosecuted caused shock and frustration on the 
part of Amsterdam’s civil servants because the municipality was being prosecuted by the very 
partners with which they had been cooperating. The civil servants felt this was made worse by 
their feeling of having been abandoned by the other governmental agencies involved. This also 
led them to question why Amsterdam was the only government agency being prosecuted. The 
relationship Amsterdam has with the Public Prosecution in this case is a difficult one. To 
conclude, many of the observations in the research on rule breaking by governments ring true 
in the Probo Koala case, but Amsterdam has not been convicted under criminal law, so it cannot 
be concluded that rule breaking by government has taken place. 
 
 
6.5.5. State crime  
 
State crime was defined before as illegal or socially injurious acts of omission or commission 
by individuals in an institution of political governance for the attainment of a state’s or state 
agency’s operational goals. Whether Amsterdam’s decision to pump back the slops and allow 
the ship to leave was illegal was not judged by the Dutch court that granted immunity to the 
municipality. It is therefore debatable whether government performed any illegal actions. There 
may be less discussion of whether the effect of the decision was socially injurious (if causality 
is accepted, the victims in Ivory Coast should be mentioned here, but even without accepting 
that argument the environmental pollution that was caused by the dumping of the waste was 
injurious.) The governmental behavior involved both omission in failing to take appropriate 
action and commission in the decision to pump back the slops. This was done by individuals 
acting within an institution of political governance (DMB as an agency within the municipality 
of Amsterdam). The question is whether the attainment of the state agency’s operational goals 
(in this case those of DMB) was at stake here. If the financial wellbeing of the organization is 
seen as an important organizational goal, one might argue this. On the other hand, the DMB is 
an agency for the protection of environmental goals. In this way, it could be argued that the 
actions (specifically the pumping back of the slops and the decision to let the Probo Koala leave 
the harbor) were actually opposed to the organizational goals. If anything, it certainly does not 
seem as if this were a premeditated form of state crime in order to attain a preset goal by DMB. 
Nearer to the point, things unfolded in a way that for DMB was not advantageous at all and in 
the end they decided upon what could be considered the ‘lesser evil’. Arguments might be made 
in some ways that all the criteria for state crime fit the case of the Probo Koala, but none of 
them seem to capture the essence of this case.  
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6.5.6. Administrative evil  
 
First of all, is there evil here? Evil is defined by Adams and Balfour as “actions of human beings 
that unjustly or needlessly inflict pain and suffering and death on other human beings”. The 
discussion about causality is crucial for any judgment on these points. The most realistic answer 
is that we do not know for sure if deaths occurred, but that it seems improbable. Serious injuries 
are more likely. Consider the conviction of the court of Trafigura for exporting goods while 
concealing that they were dangerous for life and or health. There were actions (dumping of 
toxic waste) of human beings (the people and organizations of the Probo Koala, Trafigura, 
Compagnie Tommy and the government agencies involved in Ivory Coast and the Netherlands 
as well as APS and others) that unjustly (environmental laws such as the EVOA and the Dutch 
Law on Environmental Control (Wmb) were broken) and needlessly (for a higher price, the 
waste could have been handled without damage to people or the environment) inflict pain and 
suffering and death on other human beings (deaths are clearly debatable, pain and suffering 
seems likely from the evidence). 
 
As pointed out, administrative evil consists of several key elements:  
  
- people engage in acts of evil.  
 
While the reference to deaths might not be applicable in this case, there seems to have been 
pain and suffering. It should be clear that if what happened were determined an act of evil, the 
first responsibility, measured by the rulings of the Dutch courts and the following transaction 
between the Public Prosecution and Trafigura, would lie with the private companies involved 
(Trafigura and Compagnie Tommy) that irresponsibly took the risk that the waste would be 
processed in a way that was harmful to human beings and the environment.  
 
- perpetrators are not aware that they are doing anything wrong.  
 
This is something that can be debated. As Marijke Vos put it: ‘Nobody wanted this.’ The 
argument can be made that in the case of the Dutch government agencies and APS a form of 
technical rationality has been present. The organizations and individuals all concentrated on 
their own specific task, performed some routine operations and did not stop to see the bigger 
picture. This is actually the analysis of the Hulshof Committee that was later underlined by 
Amsterdam and VROM. No central coordination existed and nobody stopped to think of the 
possible consequences in the long run. The final outcome was most likely not desired by any 
of the Dutch participants in this situation. That brings us a lot nearer to the argument of 
administrative evil: 
 
“The common characteristic is that people can engage in acts of evil without being aware 
that they are in fact doing anything at all wrong. Indeed, ordinary people may simply be 
acting appropriately in their organizational role – in essence, just doing what those around 
them would agree they should be doing – and at the same time be participating in what a 
critical and reasonable observer, usually well after the fact, would call evil.”504 
 
The idea that the Dutch authorities were not aware that they were doing anything wrong can 
also be viewed from another perspective. In this view, someone made the rational choice that 
letting the ship go was a matter of ‘choosing the lesser evil’. Nevertheless, it can be argued that, 
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at least in part Dutch government organizations were not aware that they were doing anything 
wrong. This coincides with the Amsterdam argument that the rules were so complex and 
ambiguous that the incident could not have been prevented. 
 
- it is masked (less easily recognized as evil) 
 
The basic difference between evil as understood throughout human history and administrative 
evil is that administrative evil is less easily recognized as evil. Three reasons for this difference 
are given: 
- there is a tendency to un-name evil, because it does not fit with the modern 
scientific-analytical mindset.  
- the structure of organization can play a role, particularly when it comes to diffusing 
individual responsibility and the compartmentalized performance of role in order to 
perform work on a daily basis.  
- the culture of technical rationality has narrowed the formulation and 
implementation of public policy, so that moral inversions are more likely.505 
 
The un-naming of evil is something that can be found here, at least on the part of the main 
suspect Trafigura. As quoted before, Trafigura stated that “people living near these sites were 
suffering health problems as a result of untreated pollution and waste long before Compagnie 
Tommy arrived with the slops.”506 The structure of organization also plays an important role. A 
multitude of people at different levels was involved in the deliberations about this case.  
 
From the earlier analysis of masking, it can be established that it was involved in this case. At 
the time, the consequences of what seemed to be normal daily business with a somewhat 
unusual component (the pumping back of waste into a tanker is reputed to be unprecedented in 
the Netherlands) actually only became apparent after the Probo Koala’s waste was dumped in 
Ivory Coast. After this happened, many would probably have agreed that something evil had 
happened initially, but this insight was not readily available when the Probo Koala left 
Amsterdam to continue its journey. Over time, another story has emerged in which the 
occurrence of deaths has been seriously questioned. To conclude: There is no reason to state 
that evil was indeed present. If it was, it was masked and perhaps still is.  
 
- there can be moral inversion: Something evil is presented as something that is 
actually good 
 
That does not seem to be the case here, although one could examine the language used to point 
out that the Netherlands is a significant contributor to the UNEP Trust Fund (€1.000.000, of 
which €300.000 was donated by Amsterdam).  
 
“The Netherlands will continue on humanitarian grounds to support international and 
national efforts to negate the effects of dumping of toxic and dangerous products and 
wastes as it has done in the past.”507  
 
If one assumes that the toxic waste of the Probo Koala caused the deaths and injuries in Abidjan, 
and that the municipality of Amsterdam played a part that was in some aspects instrumental to 
                                               
505 Adams and Balfour, (2009), p. 4-5. 
506 http://www.africaspeaks.com/reasoning/index.php?topic=4804.0 (date last accessed: 19-2-2014) 
507 Letter of the municipality of Amsterdam to members of the City Council, Rapport VN-reporter over Probo Koala 
en bestuurlijke reactie, September 25, 2009. 
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the events that followed, the statement above can be seen as moral inversion. The use of 
language is also interesting here: ‘support’ is given, but followed by the statement that this 
support should certainly not be seen as an acceptance of liability. It might similarly be argued 
that the statements made by Trafigura about their ‘donation’ to Ivory Coast also display moral 
inversion. On the whole, the case is certainly not presented as something good by any of the 
governmental agencies involved. On the contrary, all of them eventually recognized that this 
was a dark episode for all concerned.  
 
To conclude: Several important aspects of administrative evil can be found in this case, but 
ascribing evil to government seems far-fetched. The governmental organizations involved did 
not recognize that they were doing anything wrong at all, but coupling all of this with the 
technical rationality that seems to have ruled the actions of the governmental organizations, 
makes for a strong argument that some of the theoretical notions of administrative evil are 
indeed present in this case.  
 
 
6.5.7. The placing in the realm between error and evil  
 
Which position does the case of the Probo Koala occupy in the terrain between error and evil? 
That is contested. It should be pointed out first that government was not the prime actor here, 
not the agent that caused serious injuries and other damage. The first actor responsible seems 
to be the private organization involved, as evidenced by the conviction of Trafigura in the court 
case in Amsterdam. The issue for the municipality and the other governmental organizations 
involved is that they could and should have prevented these events from happening, but it 
should be clear that this is an indirect relationship as far as causality is concerned. Bearing in 
mind these restrictions, the governmental behavior in this case can still be assessed. The 
strongest arguments can be made to see the action as either error or administrative evil and not 
something in between. 
 
There are some convincing arguments for error: miscommunication, lack of coordination and 
complex rules certainly played a part here. The argument about what can reasonably be 
expected of a governmental organization is raised here several times. It seems clear that Vos 
was right when she said that nobody wanted the incident to happen but that in itself is a 
characteristic of administrative evil. It can be argued that here was a process in which routine 
activities and technical rationality made an (unforeseen and unintended) evil outcome 
materialize. The masking conditions were all in place and in many ways, the mask has come 
off over the years. In July 2006, in one moment government, knowingly or unknowingly, took 
the risk that negative environmental effects could take place as a result of their decision to pump 
back the slops and allow the Probo Koala to leave.  
 
 
6.6. Conclusions  
 
Over time, two diametrically opposed stories have emerged. After careful analysis of this case, 
it is striking that nearly every single fact is contested by the parties involved. Disagreement is 
widespread. Trafigura contradicts Greenpeace, De Volkskrant contradicts the NRC and the 
Public Prosecution contradicts the municipality of Amsterdam. For every fact or opinion, there 
are several sides trying to influence the way the story is framed. That should be kept in mind 
when reaching a conclusion on the two main questions:  
- why and how governmental behavior has led to deaths or serious injuries 
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- and how governmental organizations have reacted to the case and why they reacted 
that way. 
 
What happened on that night in July 2006 and what went wrong as far as governmental 
organizations in the Netherlands were concerned?  
 
It is fascinating that this was a case in which many governmental agencies were consulted about 
a solution and rational calculations were made about all possible options. Nevertheless, the 
decision that was reached came under heavy scrutiny later. Would the case have generated such 
enormous attention had it been clear and accepted by all parties that no deaths could have 
occurred as a result of the illegal dumping of the waste? In that case, it would have been a 
serious environmental crime but not one with deathly consequences. Taking this one step 
further, if the Probo Koala had dumped this waste in the middle of the ocean probably no one 
would have known and the whole case would have gone unnoticed.  
 
Did people die as a result of the waste? We do not know with certainty whether this is the case, 
but it seems improbable. We do know that the waste was hazardous for life and/or health and 
that headaches and nausea would have been likely. Skin burns could have occurred, but pictures 
of alleged victims have been analyzed to show that these were not skin burns, but pre-existing 
cases of psoriasis. Whether these hazards materialized will probably remain a question of 
intense debate and it may never be fully resolved. 
 
The decision on that evening of July 4, 2006, seemed to be dominated by legal considerations, 
although there were concerns for ‘the environment’ as well. Perhaps it is not realistic to expect 
that every step in a process of handling waste materials from tankers in a harbor should be 
connected to a clean environment and public health. On the other hand, these are societal goals 
that the governmental organizations involved are expected to uphold. Indeed, it seems that 
DMB showed genuine concern for this, but came to the conclusion that they had no legal 
alternatives but to allow the slops to be pumped back. There are indications that financial 
considerations played a part, but it is not proven definitively that this was the main argument 
for the municipality making its decision. 
 
Legal restrictions seemed to dominate the debate. This is understandable from the viewpoint of 
the civil servants involved and considering the extensive efforts they made to try to reach a 
different outcome. Nor should we underestimate the significance of a private actor being held 
primarily responsible. Nevertheless, it does seem that no one was able to reach a decision that 
would have been desirable from a broader perspective. On a deeper level, it can be said that the 
governmental organization involved (DMB) was doing its regular, routine task, for which 
bureaucratic routines were normally sufficient. Confronted with special new circumstances the 
bureaucracy in place proved to be inflexible. There was a failure to escalate the decision- 
making process to the strategic and political level, there was confusion as to the legal aspects 
of the case, lack of creativity in finding a solution, an overview was missing and long term 
societal interests were not weighed in the right way. On the other hand, DMB had experienced 
and professional staff. Mistakes were surely made, but to describe the experienced civil servants 
involved as incompetent would be inaccurate.  
 
How did governmental organizations react and why was that? 
What is also fascinating is how governmental organizations (and more specifically the 
politicians involved) reacted after the first reports about the events in Ivory Coast came in. It 
appeared that Alderman Vos of Amsterdam changed her line several times, first defending the 
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decisions made then admitting that those decisions were wrong. This led to a lot of public 
criticism of the alderman, though political motives may very well also have played a role here. 
On a national level, politicians and governmental organizations adopted a consistent approach 
in which aspects such as the legal complexities, the uniqueness and time constraints of the 
situation were mentioned and in which responsibilities by others were presented as more 
significant than the governmental organization’s own responsibility. This somewhat defensive 
approach appears to have led to less trouble than the more open, but sometimes wavering 
response by Amsterdam. It is remarkable to see that the debate in the Netherlands about whether 
deaths actually occurred as a result of the waste dumping has not come into play in the public 
judgment of the role that Vos and the municipality of Amsterdam have played.  
 
Over the years there seems to be a pattern in the responses of the governmental organizations 
involved in this case. The first response by all governmental organizations was that something 
terrible had happened, but that they could not be blamed. The rules were complicated and if 
anyone had done something wrong it was probably another agency. Confronted with public 
criticism, the politicians involved gave in somewhat. Once the independent reports were issued, 
they gave in a little more, although always pointing out that others could also be blamed and 
that possibly the investigators were mistaken on some points. Openness was not a characteristic 
of the positions taken, though there were some positive exceptions (most often the municipality 
of Amsterdam). In the end, all governmental organizations debated the subject and devoted 
many resources to the case. The legal procedures lasted years before a settlement was reached. 
The mechanism in place might be described as incremental defensiveness: In response to cases 
of death and serious injuries, governmental organizations adopt defensive positions in which, 
step by step, they reluctantly give in to criticism and calls for improvement in a long, costly and 
slow process. 
 
In essence, this incremental defensiveness either constitutes an effort to mask what 
governmental organizations have done or makes a contribution, purposefully or not, to the 
masking that was already going on. As the case evolved, the mask was gradually removed both 
by investigative committees as well as the media. Virtually all the masking mechanisms that 
were identified in the theoretical framework were present in this case. Looking over all the 
public responses by governmental organizations in the Netherlands in connection with this case, 
it does seem likely that fear for political, legal (prosecution) or financial damage played a large 
role in the choices that were made. 
 
On a positive note, all the governmental organizations involved have up with long term projects 
for improvements and many improvements have indeed been realized as a result of this case. 
Pumping back polluted waste material is probably something no governmental organization in 
the Netherlands will do again without some very serious consideration for environmental and 
public health interests. In the end, it could be said that this case was like everyone watching a 
movie that was going from bad to worse but nobody felt in a position to stop it unfolding to its 
unwanted climax. Nobody may have ruled, but it is also true that ‘nobody wanted this.’   
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7. The Schiphol detention center fire  
 
 
“Late at night they are watching eleven, twelve television screens and suddenly between 
one moment and the next, there is an inferno. The man I spoke to said: This was the 
frontline. That is different from the movie.”508 
 
       (Pieter Winsemius, minister of VROM) 
7.1. Introduction  
On October 27, 2005, fire broke out at the detention center at Schiphol-Oost, near Amsterdam’s 
airport. Although the guards at the detention center managed to save 32 detainees, 11 people 
died and 15 were seriously injured as a result of the fire. The Dutch Minister of Justice, Piet 
Hein Donner, resigned on account of the fire. In the House of Representatives he made the 
following statement: 
“After a disaster, one often sees that many things can be improved, although at the time, 
with the knowledge of what could reasonably be foreseen, they could and should be 
considered adequate. The reports however pose more fundamental questions than 
merely looking back and accounting for the past. Those reports seem to imply for 
government such a responsibility and liability for preventing disasters and danger, that 
the question is to what extent such a responsibility is still bearable. If only the prevention 
of danger counts, then democracy and the constitutional state are threatened. These 
questions require a serious debate between government and parliament. This also holds 
true for the question whether government agencies can rely any more on the expertise 
of others.”509 
 
The first part of the case study contains a factual timeline of relevant events. Case characteristics 
will then be presented briefly, followed by an exploration of possible explanations. After that, 
the responses of the governmental organizations involved will be described and conclusions 
drawn about the path between error and evil in this particular case.   
 
 
7.2. Summary of the facts  
 
7.2.1. Timeline of events510  
 
December 7, 2001  
Amsterdam Schiphol Airport had been struggling for years with the importing of drugs hidden 
in cargo or through drug traffickers. Following the introduction of a container scan in October 
2000, the drugs smuggling in cargo declined and the use of drug traffickers showed a steep rise. 
                                               
508 Tweede Kamer, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1213. 
509 Minister of Justice Piet Hein Donner, in the House of Representatives to offer his resignation on account of the 
report on the Schiphol detention center fire. 
http://www.elsevier.nl/web/1092310/Artikel/Verklaring-minister-Donner-in-Tweede-Kamer.htm (date last 
accessed: 17-02-2013) 
510 The timeline is based on several sources. The events on the night of October 26 are described here in more detail 
because of their importance for the understanding of the case. This description is based in large part on the report 
by the Dutch Safety Board. The English version of the report on the Safety Board’s website is used here. Part of 
the timeline after October 26 is also based on the timeline in De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 219-221. In 
addition, information about the fire that is on the Dutch Wikipedia site is referenced frequently. 
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In particular, the use of ‘drugs swallowers’ became a problem. A drugs swallower is a drug 
trafficker who ingests wrapped packets of crack or cocaine in order to deliver the goods safely 
through customs. In 1999, the average number of drugs swallowers arrested was about 50 a 
month, by the end of 2001 that number had risen to 150.511   
 
A letter dated December 7, 2001, written by chief public prosecutor Wooldrik, from the district 
of Haarlem (which included Schiphol Airport) attracted a great deal of publicity. In his letter, 
Wooldrik urged for restrictions in the number of drugs swallowers arrested because the judicial 
system no longer had the capacity to deal with the increased numbers (not enough cells and not 
enough prison personnel). Minister of Justice Korthals received furious responses to this from 
the House of Representatives. The House labeled the release of drugs swallowers as 
inacceptable and was shocked that drugs swallowers could be sent home without sentencing. 
The minister was put under strong political pressure to resolve this situation quickly. The 
problem was that he did not have enough prisons and personnel to deal effectively with the 
situation. 
 
January 23, 2002 
In the debate on this matter in the House of Representatives, Korthals received substantial 
criticism but survived a motion of censure. He promised ‘drastic measures’ to address the 
problems. 
 
March 8, 2002 
The Temporary Law for Penitentiary Emergency Capacity for Drugs Traffickers came into 
effect. This law allowed for the opening of new detention centers to deal with the large influx 
of drugs swallowers. The law allowed deviation from the regular detention regime, for example 
putting two prisoners in one cell.512 
 
November 30, 2002 
The Schiphol-Oost detention center was still under construction when it was struck by a fire: 
25 cells were lost and had to be rebuilt. Following this fire on C Wing, the Netherlands Institute 
for Fire Service and Disaster Management, NIBRA, carried out an investigation on behalf of 
the Municipality of Haarlemmermeer. The NIBRA concluded that the fire may have been 
caused by ignition of the electrical heaters or a television in one of the cells. From one cell, the 
fire could have gone through the cable channel to the other cells. It could possibly have blazed 
for quite a while in the empty tonnage above the cells without the guards noticing it – the empty 
tonnage had not been equipped with fire alarms. The NIBRA also wondered whether the right 
equipment had been used, since an insulation plate had been made of more flammable material 
than prescribed. The NIBRA recommended equipping the empty tonnage with fire alarms, 
improving the fire resistance between the cells and the empty tonnage, constructing a wet 
sprinkler installation in the empty tonnage and a direct fire alarm message from the detention 
center to the fire brigade. The NIBRA concluded:  
 
“In reality the building failed (in our opinion) to comply with requirements in the 
legislation on a number of crucial (structural) points”.513  
 
                                               
511 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 18. 
512 Petiet and Versteeg (2007), p. 125-127. 
513 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 106. 
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Several recommendations were adopted, but not all of them. For instance, the wet sprinkler 
system was not chosen, but instead a dry sprinkler system that would have to be connected to 
the water supply by the fire brigade in the case of an emergency.514 
 
April 22, 2003 
Minister of Justice Donner opened the Schiphol-Oost detention center515, which at the time was 
the first use of ‘container - or unit building’ for detention purposes, and was built in a very short 
time. The municipality of Haarlemmermeer had been reluctant to go along with the new 
complex, but in the end had granted the necessary permits for the detention center.516  
 
December 2003 
J and K Wing were added to the Schiphol-Oost detention center, both of them meant for the 
detention of immigration detainees.517 J and K Wing were built on the base of metal sea transport 
containers.  
 
December 12, 2003 
An inmate started a fire in his cell in the J Wing and had to be taken to the hospital with slight 
injuries. The other inmates had to be evacuated from their cells. This was a recurring problem: 
the management of the detention center was confronted with a large number of false fire alarms, 
most of the time caused by prisoners smoking. Because of this situation, it was decided that a 
standard three minute delay should be built into the emergency notification system, in order for 
the guard to assess the situation and to cancel the notification if the alarm were false. Without 
this inbuilt delay, the fire brigade would have to turn up at the detention center almost daily. 
The policy allowing inmates to smoke in their cell was a national one, but in the course of 2005 
smoking was prohibited in all the wings of the Schiphol-Oost detention center, except for K 
Wing. There had been an intention to ban smoking everywhere in the detention center by the 
end of 2005.518  
 
October 26, 2005519 
Around midnight, all 298 of the cell occupants in the Schiphol-Oost detention center had been 
locked in their cells. In K Wing there were 42 cell occupants. Most of the cells were occupied 
by two people. All 42 cell occupants were immigration detainees, from 18 different countries. 
The occupant from Cell 11, Ahmed Issa Al-Jeballi, was a Libyan, who had sought political 
asylum in the Netherlands in 2003. He claimed that he had political problems with people in 
high places, including a son of Libyan leader Kadhafi. His request for asylum was turned down 
in 2004. On October 24, 2005 he had been transferred to the Schiphol-Oost detention center 
and was to be deported from the Netherlands to Libya on flight KL 573 at 09.55 hours on 
October 27, 2005.520  
All of the wings of the detention center had guards present for 24 hours a day, except J and K 
Wing, which did not have their own guards during the night. In total, there were 16 guards 
present that night: seven from the Custodial Institutions Service (DJI), six from the Royal 
                                               
514 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 26-27. 
515 Petiet and Versteeg (2007), p. 127. 
516 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 14. 
517 Petiet and Versteeg (2007), p. 127. 
518 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 15-16. 
519 This passage about the exact events of this fire is based almost entirely on the report by the Safety Board, most 
of it is an exact copy of parts of the text of the report by the Board, unless otherwise indicated 
520 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 18. 
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Military Constabulary (KMar), two from private security firm Securicor and one employee of 
the medical staff of the detention center.521  
The fire alarm system detected a fire at 23.55 hours in K Wing. Approximately one minute 
later, the occupant of Cell 11 pressed on the intercom attention button. Almost simultaneously, 
smoke could be seen coming through the chinks of the door to Cell 11.522 Once the fire alarm 
had been received, the guards from both the KMar and DJI switchboards started the internal 
alarm process. The two guards manning the DJI switchboard were led to believe by the codes 
they were using that the alarm was coming from D Wing. The guards at the DJI switchboard 
contacted the guard who was at D wing, he reported that there was no question of any fire in D 
Wing. At 23.56 hours, the DJI Duty Officer telephoned the DJI switchboard and said that it was 
a false alarm. The KMar operator, who had interpreted the alarm as indeed coming from K 
Wing, accepted the fire alarm and started a three-minute delay period before the alarm was 
transmitted automatically to Schiphol’s emergency center.  
The KMar switchboard operator alerted a member of staff at the A Wing team station as well 
as the DJI Duty Officer. The guard on duty at A Wing, who had been informed about the fire 
alarm by the KMar switchboard, in turn alerted the guard in D Wing. This guard first telephoned 
the guard in C Wing and subsequently ran with this colleague to K Wing, where they arrived a 
bare two minutes after the fire alarm had gone off. The two KMar employees, who had 
progressed in the direction of K Wing from the KMar switchboard after the fire alarm, arrived 
at the entry door to K Wing shortly afterwards. One of them turned back immediately to the 
KMar switchboard to inform the switchboard operator that a fire had indeed broken out in K 
Wing. The other KMar employee went to B Wing to inform the group commander and to fetch 
a fire extinguisher.523 
 
After the DJI guards from C and D Wing arrived at K Wing, one of them unlocked the entry 
door to K Wing and ran inside, followed by the second guard. The guard who was the first to 
enter the wing, initially ran to Cell 3 at the beginning of the corridor. The attention light above 
the cell door was illuminated, which indicated that the occupant of this cell had called on the 
guards for help. The guard opened the hatch, looked inside, then looked towards the end of the 
corridor before running to Cell 11. The occupant of Cell 11, Al-Jeballi, was making as much 
noise as he could by screaming, banging on the door and by slamming the door to the toilet 
cubicle. The guard tried to open the door to Cell 11, but this was difficult to do because the lock 
was stiff. However, the other guard, who had been second to enter the wing, subsequently 
succeeded in opening the cell door using the first guard’s keys. The two guards opened the door 
to Cell 11 more than two minutes after the fire alarm had first gone off. The occupant of the 
cell fell out through the doorway. As the cell door was opened, a large quantity of thin, black 
smoke emerged from the cell. This smoke spread through the final eight to ten meters of the 
corridor in K Wing. After the two guards had taken Al-Jeballi out, they left the door to his cell 
open. In explanation, one of them submitted that they possibly did this because it was not clear 
to them whether or not a second person was in the cell.  
 
A few seconds after opening the cell door, another quantity of smoke emerged from the cell, 
which advanced in a wave below the ceiling of the corridor in the direction of the entry door to 
K Wing. Approximately thirty seconds after opening the door, the smoke was half way along 
                                               
521 Answers by State Secretary of Security and Justice Teeven to questions by Gesthuizen and Jansen, TK 2010-
2011, Aanhangsel, p. 2. 
522 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 24. 
523 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 25. 
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the corridor. Approximately another 50 seconds later the smoke reached the entry door. The 
hatches of the Smoke and Heat Exhaust Ventilation (RWA) system, which the fire alarm system 
should have opened automatically at the time of the fire alarm, remained closed. Consequently, 
smoke advanced uninterrupted. It took less than one and a half minutes for a dense layer of 
smoke to form below the entire length of the corridor’s ceiling in K Wing. 
 
One of the two guards ran ahead of the smoke in the direction of the hall between J and K Wing 
and waited further along the corridor for the other guard and the occupant of Cell 11. After the 
second guard, who was accompanying the cell occupant, had reached the first guard – who had 
run ahead – he handed over his key ring to his colleague because the first guard’s keys remained 
in the door to Cell 11. The second guard led the occupant of Cell 11 to the hall between J and 
K Wing. Together with a third guard, who had arrived in K Wing in the meantime, the first 
guard began to open the doors to the other cells. They worked starting from the entry door to K 
Wing, which is where they were located at that time, towards the rear of the wing.524 
 
Three minutes after the automatic fire alarm and little less than a minute after saving the 
occupant of Cell 11, two guards started to open the other cells in K Wing. When they opened 
the cell doors, the guards shouted ‘fire’, sending the cell occupants in the direction of J Wing. 
One of the cell occupants later said that he saw Al-Jeballi standing there in J Wing, heavily 
burned “blackened, with raw meat on his upper arms.”525 Approximately a minute after they 
had started their rescue action, the guards saw flames issuing from the doorway to Cell 11. After 
that time, the increasing smoke and heat began to cause them problems. Breathing became 
increasingly difficult, vision became poorer; they could no longer see the exit to the wing. In 
the meantime, the smoke originating from Cell 11 and advancing below the ceiling had reached 
the beginning of the corridor.  
 
Subsequently, the smoke rotated and advanced towards the two guards. When they reached 
Cells 8 and 15, no more than eight meters away from the burning Cell 11, both guards withdrew 
from K Wing out of necessity (at around midnight). Cells 9 and 10 on the left of the wing and 
Cells 12, 13 and 14 on the right of the wing remained unopened. In total the guards saved 31 
inmates from their cells. In the meantime, the DJI Duty Officer ran around the outside of J and 
K Wing in the direction of K Wing’s end wall. The Duty Officer telephoned three minutes after 
the fire alarm to the emergency center Schiphol and announced: ‘Emergency Schiphol-Oost’. 
Thirty seconds later, the Duty Officer again had contact with the emergency control room in 
which he announced that there was a fire at the Schiphol-Oost detention center. As they fled 
from K Wing to the hall between J and K Wing, the smoke completely deprived the two guards 
of any sight. The guards and the cell occupants who were freed found their way to the entry 
door by touch. The personnel present in the hall between J and K Wing urged the freed cell 
occupants to walk in their direction and also tried to enter K Wing with a fire hose. These 
attempts had to be abandoned due to the smoke. One guard, who had freed cell occupants, told 
colleagues in the corridor that there were still people trapped in their cells. 
 
In the meantime, the group commander of the KMar had run to K Wing and seen that the entry 
door between the corridor and K Wing was open. The group commander advanced an estimated 
meter into the wing, but the smoke was so thick and vision so poor that it was impossible to 
help with evacuation. One of the KMar employees called the group commander back. From 
that moment on he considered it too dangerous to enter K Wing and decided to turn away 
                                               
524 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 27.  
525 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 44. 
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everyone who still wanted to go into the wing.526 At some point after the group commander, 
who was the last to leave, had left K Wing, there was an explosion, probably due to the 
combustion of the gases mixing in the corridor. A flash flame spread along the entire length of 
the corridor, starting from the region of Cell 11 and extending to the entry door.  
 
Alert at Schiphol’s emergency center 
Two minutes after the fire alarm had gone off, the DJI switchboard telephoned Schiphol’s 
emergency center to report it was a false alarm. At that time, the alarm from the KMar 
switchboard had not yet come in because the system’s delay time was still in operation. Within 
a minute (23.58) two telephone calls and an automatic fire alert came in, confirming that there 
was indeed a fire in the detention center. At 23.59, the emergency center alerted the fire brigade 
at Sloten Fire Station and indicated that there was a fire that had been confirmed by telephone. 
Almost immediately after Sloten Fire Station had been informed about the fire, the Duty Officer 
confirmed by telephone that there was a fire in the Schiphol-Oost detention center. The fire 
brigade from Sloten left in two vehicles a minute later. One minute after the fire alarm, the 
KMar switchboard contacted the KMar emergency control room (23.56), which, in turn, 
telephoned the Kennemerland police emergency control room with the request to alert the fire 
brigade. It was by this means that the Regional Alarm Center was informed four minutes later. 
By that time, the emergency center Schiphol had already alerted the first vehicles from Sloten.527 
 
Care for cell occupants 
The cell occupants from K Wing were sent to the adjacent J Wing. Some of them tried in panic 
to open the emergency exit at the far end of J Wing to escape from the fire. However, the exit 
was closed. The cell occupants of J Wing were by now also panicking and banging on their cell 
doors. The guards in attendance tried to calm down the former K Wing cell occupants and tried 
to move them to the J Wing exercise cage. Some of the cell occupants resisted and caused some 
damage. At approximately a quarter past midnight, the guards began to free the J Wing cell 
occupants from their cells. The guards tried to guide these detainees also to the exercise cage. 
Two of the guards who were in the midst of the cell occupants had their keys snatched. Those 
present felt the situation to be threatening. Only when the guards and KMar employees in 
attendance received outside reinforcements (the General Police Service of the KMar) did they 
succeed in moving all of the detainees from J and K Wing into the J Wing exercise cage. In 
total, some 73 people were locked in the J Wing exercise cage though some tried to escape from 
it.528  
 
Fire brigade 
At 00.08 hours the first fire brigade vehicle reported at what turned out to be the old entrance 
to the detention center. When the fire brigade arrived, the KMar switchboard opened the first 
gate and the fire engine drove inside. The fire engine then came to a halt by the second entrance 
gate. However, that gate had been closed with a chain lock. An employee from the detention 
center told the fire brigade to go back outside to the correct (main) entrance. In the meantime, 
several KMar vehicles had arrived at the former entrance as well. These vehicles stood behind 
the fire engines and consequently blocked their free passage backwards. Once these were able 
to reverse, they proceeded to the main entrance. This entrance also consisted of two entrance 
gates (fences) with locks. The second gate could be opened only once the first gate had been 
closed behind an incoming vehicle. An ambulance arriving at the same time joined the queue 
and jammed activation of the lock gate. A KMar employee rushed up and assisted the vehicles 
                                               
526 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 28. 
527 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 29. 
528 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 30-31. 
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in entering the complex. At 00.15 hours the first two vehicles from the fire brigade drove onto 
the complex. Once inside, the KMar employee was asked by the fire brigade to open both 
entrance gates for following vehicles, but he indicated that this was not possible.529  
 
The Airport Fire Officer (AFO)530 established there was a developed fire at K Wing. He tried 
but failed to find an employee who could give him information about any victims. The fire 
brigade wanted to enter the complex through the emergency exit at the far end of J Wing. 
However, this door was locked. At approximately 00.18 hours, it was announced that the door 
would be broken open. The fire brigade cut open the latticework and broke through a door 
window entering J Wing through this forced emergency exit at around 00.20 hours. 
Simultaneously, a guard handed over a key with which the now forced emergency exit door 
was opened fully. The Crew Commander in charge then entered J Wing. Once inside, he 
indicated that the wing had to be evacuated due to the smoke and heat. Fire brigade personnel 
consulted with the guards in attendance about victims who might still be located in K Wing. 
They did not obtain any useful information about possible victims and their locations. Using 
one set of keys, that the team had obtained, the fire brigade team walked on to K Wing. 
 
The second fire brigade unit to arrive was a unit from post Rijsenhout, arriving at the old 
entrance at around 00.15 hours. The gate was still closed with a chain. Nobody was there to 
receive the unit, because the entrance was not in use. The post Rijsenhout unit cut through the 
gate’s chain and proceeded to drive to the far end of D Wing. Initially, the vehicle took up 
position within the detention center fencing; however, it took up position next to the ditch 
outside of the gate almost immediately afterwards. The Crew Commander sent six firemen 
inside to reconnoiter the building and to rescue people if necessary. The firemen had breathing 
protection with them but no fire extinguishing equipment. 531 
 
Out of 26 cells, 21 cells in the K Wing had been opened. The 10 people in the five unopened 
cells all died as did an occupant from Cell 5 which had been opened. It appeared from their 
autopsies that all of the victims died as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning. It was later 
estimated by the Safety Board that ten of the eleven victims probably died between 00.10 and 
00.30 hours though this did not include the occupant of Cell 5. That cell’s location was 
relatively distant from the fire and it was deemed probable by the Board that this person 
remained alive for longer than the other victims. Just how much longer could not be ascertained. 
At around 01.15 hours, the fire brigade found the remains of Cell 5’s occupant.532 The fire 
brigade stated that the door to this cell was open at that time. However, on the grounds of traces 
later discovered, the Safety Board considered it probable that the door was closed during a large 
part of the fire. It has not become clear whether the cell door was locked or closed, or why the 
victim was left behind in the cell. 
 
At 02.55 hours, the message ‘fire under control’ was transmitted to the Regional Emergency 
Control Room. Some confusion arose about the dead corpses that were laid on the ground 
outside. No one had kept track of which body had been brought out of which cell. This made 
identification more difficult.533 At around 4.00 hours it was reported that a total of 11 victims 
had been recovered from the fire.534 The inmates of the detention center had to wait outside on 
                                               
529 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 31. 
530 The Airport Fire Officer (AFO) is a management officer for the Schiphol fire brigade.  
531 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 32. 
532 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 33. 
533 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 57. 
534 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 37.  
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the grounds for several hours, some of them wearing only underwear, others in shirts. After 
some time, blankets and cigarettes were passed around by the guards. Members of the police 
riot squad with batons and shields, were lined up in front of the inmates. At 03.00 hours large 
buses arrived. They turned out be special vehicles with small cells in them. The buses 
transferred the inmates to the detention ship Rotterdam or to Camp Zeist with the last buses 
leaving the grounds around 06.00 hours. The occupant of Cell 11, Al-Jeballi was transferred to 
the VU Medical Center. He suffered breathing difficulties and had first and second degree burns 
to his chest, face and both arms and hands. 535 
 
October 27, 2005 
Ministers Donner and Verdonk visited the detention center after the disastrous events the night 
before. Verdonk was quoted saying that she believed the personnel had reacted ‘adequately’ to 
the fire.  
 
November 4, 2005 
Al-Jeballi awoke from an artificial coma. 
 
November 6, 2005 
Al-Jeballi was taken to the Penitentiary Hospital Scheveningen and was officially indicted. 
 
November 8, 2005 
An official commemoration service at Schiphol-Oost took place. 
 
November 21, 2005 
Al-Jeballi was transferred to the detention center in Heerhugowaard and placed in an isolation 
cell.  
 
December 6, 2005 
The municipality of Haarlemmermeer withdrew the occupancy permit for the Schiphol-Oost 
detention center, closing the cell complex. Talks with the Minister of Justice, Donner, had not 
given Haarlemmermeer confidence that fire safety precautions were in order. The mayor of 
Haarlemmermeer, Hertog, remarked: 
“We offered concessions in this meeting that the minister warded off from a very formal 
stance. Because of that we did not get a satisfactory feeling that the minister considered 
the interest of optimal security for the cell complex as paramount as we thought and 
wished for. In fact there was a breach of confidence between the College of Mayor and 
Aldermen and the Ministry of Justice.”536  
 
December 7, 2005 
Minister Donner responded by suspending the decision by the municipality of Haarlemmermeer 
to close the cell complex by means of a Crown Decision. The use of such a measure was 
exceptional in the relationship between central and local government in the Netherlands. 
Donner explained this decision by stating that he had no alternative facility for the detention of 
drug traffickers.  
                                               
535 An awkward anecdote: at the request of the Ministry of Justice Al-Jeballi was listed in the hospital under the name 
Dirk Vonk. After a few days, that name was changed to Dirk de Vries. An official reason was not available, but the 
name ‘Vonk’ (the Dutch word for ‘spark’) could have seemed inappropriate. It is not uncommon that well known 
suspects who are hospitalized are listed under another name. De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p.73. 
536http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/681606/2005/12/01/Gemeente-eist-sluiting-
cellencomplex-Schiphol.dhtml (date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
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“As a minister I am responsible for maintaining the rule of law. The general interest 
goes before the local interest here.”537  
 
December 15, 2005 
The Hendrikx Committee, appointed by the municipality of Haarlemmermeer to investigate the 
way the municipality had performed in this matter, presented its final report in the form of a 
‘quick scan’.538 The committee concluded that the municipality did what could reasonably be 
expected of it as a licensing authority and had conducted an active supervisory role. The delayed 
deployment of the fire brigade was the right one, according to the committee. The committee 
concluded with the remark that nevertheless none of this had led to the prevention of such a 
dramatic fire.539    
 
December 2005 
The foundation ‘A Royal Gesture’ called the fire “a logical consequence” of the policy of 
ministers Donner and Verdonk. The foundation considered the ministers guilty of culpable 
homicide, causing serious bodily injury and subjecting people to cruel and inhuman treatment. 
Through the internet, the foundation gathered around twenty thousand signatures and filed a 
criminal complaint of culpable homicide against Donner and Verdonk.540 
 
December 23, 2005 
The summary trial judge ruled that the State was right to suspend the decision by the 
municipality of Haarlemmermeer to withdraw their permit, saying it was in the general interest 
to give priority to combating drugs while at the same time meeting fire safety demands.541 Later, 
the municipality of Haarlemmermeer and the Ministry of Justice reached agreement on the way 
in which the reopening of the complex could take place, as both parties wanted to avoid an 
endless cascade of legal procedures.542  
 
January 2006 
A report by the forensic police investigation squad concluded that the fire started in Cell 11 and 
was not the result of a technical failure.543  
 
The two guards that were the first at the scene of the fire were suspected of culpable homicide 
by the Public Prosecution. Guard Roxana Kotzebue said later:  
 
“All I was doing was trying to help people, and then you are suddenly considered a 
suspect. Culpable homicide! If I could have saved them all, of course I would have. If 
only I had closed the door. I never thought: ‘how stupid of me’, I did think ‘what else 
should I have done?’ Should I have left him [Al-Jeballi] in his cell? He would have died 
and I could have saved the others. How should it have been done? But that door could 
not be closed anyway, the flames were coming out of it.”544  
 
                                               
537http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2824/Politiek/article/detail/684585/2005/12/07/Cellencomplex-Schiphol-blijft-open-
besluit-geschorst.dhtml (date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
538 Onafhankelijke Commissie gemeentelijke verantwoordelijkheden cellenbrand Schiphol, Hendrikx and Berghuijs 
(2005). 
539 Onafhankelijke Commissie gemeentelijke verantwoordelijkheden cellenbrand Schiphol, Hendrikx and Berghuijs 
(2005), p. 46. 
540 http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schipholbrand (date last accessed: 23-06-2014) 
541 LJN: AU8652, Voorzieningenrechter Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, KG 05/1570 
542 Hertog (not dated), p. 69.  
543 NRC-Handelsblad, Deskundigen steggelen verder over brand, August 11, 2009, p.2. 
544 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 124. 
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July 2006 
Site Manager of the Schiphol-Oost detention center, Arend de Korte, was also suspected of 
culpable homicide.  
 
August 31, 2006 
Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration Verdonk granted residence permits to 39 survivors of 
the fire in the Schiphol-Oost detention center.545 
 
September 21, 2006 
The end report of the Dutch Safety Board was presented. The overall conclusion was as follows: 
 
“The general conclusion is that the governmental organizations involved gave too little 
attention to safety, and to fire safety in particular. On a variety of points, they neglected 
to implement prevailing legislation and regulations in relation to fire safety. The same 
applies for not formally established directives like the Directive for Cells and Cell 
Blocks Fire Safety. This is a disappointing conclusion given that guaranteeing the safety 
of citizens is an unquestioned core duty of the government. Correction mechanisms, by 
means of bodies that have to supervise the application of this legislation and regulations 
(the municipality and government inspectorates in the first and second line of control) 
also functioned inadequately. In consideration of the above mentioned, the Board 
considers it justified to assume that there would have been fewer or no victims if the 
bodies involved had focused their attention on fire safety. More specifically: 
• The organization of DJI’s in-house emergency and first-aid service should have 
been thought through more thoroughly, better prepared and trained, including its 
collaboration and coordination with the fire brigade. 
• The RGD should have built J and K Wing of the detention center as laid down in 
the Buildings Decree. 
• The Municipality of Haarlemmermeer should have more adequately substantiated 
its responsibilities as a licensing authority, supervisory body and agency of 
enforcement.”546 
 
On the same day, the VROM inspectorate, the POS Inspectorate and the Labor Inspectorate 
published a joint report547 concerning the fire safety of cell complexes with units built in a 
similar way to those in the detention center at Schiphol-Oost.548 This investigation had been 
undertaken because, after the fire at Schiphol, fire safety at other penitentiary institutions was 
being queried. The inspectorates studied written material from the RGD and DJI concerning 
fire safety in penitentiary institutions and also investigated five different penitentiary 
institutions about the level of fire safety. Two questions were posed: Is it safe? And will it be 
safe? To the first question the answer was that there was not any evident unsafe situation for 
inmates or personnel, but problems needed to be addressed to guarantee safety in a structural 
way. To the second question the answer was that many actions for improvement had been 
planned and started by the RGD and the DJI, but that implementation needed to happen properly 
and in a consistent manner. The report also mentioned that in 2005, there had been four cell 
fires, and five more in the first three months of 2006, all in different institutions and all of them 
                                               
545 TK 2005-2006, 24587, nr. 187, p. 2. 
546 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 9-10. 
547 VROM Inspectorate, Labor Inspectorate and POS Inspectorate (2006).  
548 That type of cell complex concerned 24 of the 103 penitentiary institutions present in the Netherlands at that time.  
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arson. The Inspectorates also stated that a more integral vision and approach was needed to 
protect safety in the future.549   
 
Minister of Justice Donner, Minister of VROM Dekker and the mayor of Haarlemmermeer, 
Hertog, all resigned on account of the report by the Safety Board. The conclusion by the Safety 
Board that there would have been fewer or no victims if the bodies involved had focused their 
attention on fire safety, was widely quoted. Minister Verdonk did not resign because she was 
not politically responsible for detention (a task of Justice) nor the condition of the detention 
center (VROM). 
 
September 25, 2006 
The Municipality of Haarlemmermeer wrote a letter to its City Council concerning the end 
report by the Safety Board. While acknowledging many of its conclusions, the municipality 
also disagreed with the Board on some aspects. The municipality felt that the Board was very 
strict in its adherence to formal rules, while the municipality wanted to take local circumstances 
into account.550  
 
October 25, 2006 
The House of Representatives held a debate with the new Ministers of Justice and VROM, 
Hirsch Ballin and Winsemius, about the Safety Board’s report. Hirsch Ballin began by stating 
that the government accepted its responsibility for the situation and deplored that it had arisen. 
He also stressed that taking responsibility was different from accepting criminal liability and 
asked for matters to be looked at from both sides (from the cell occupants’ point of view as well 
as that of the prison personnel). Hirsch Ballin spoke about the conclusions of the Safety Board 
that ended with the assumption that there would have been fewer or no victims if the attention 
to fire safety by the organizations involved had been better. He pointed out that this was 
presented by the Board as an assumption, not an established fact and stated that the government 
did not want to distance itself from this assumption.551 In the debate, a question arose about the 
status of a report by the Siepel-committee that in April 2004 had signaled concerns about the 
fire safety of the cell complex. Hirsch Ballin twice stated that the Site Manager was unaware 
of this report. While the debate was suspended, he was informed that in fact the Site Manager 
had received the report. Immediately, Hirsch Ballin made a statement in the House of 
Representatives, calling this ‘unacceptable’ and announcing that it would have consequences 
within the Ministry of Justice for the civil servants involved.552 
 
October 31, 2006 
In a letter to the House of Representatives, Hirsch Ballin stated that the planned reshuffling of 
key positions within his department would now be speeded up. Several top civil servants 
changed positions afterwards or retired.553 
 
November 8, 2006 
The Court of Appeal suspended the custody order for Al-Jeballi who was awaiting trial. In their 
decision the Court took into account the personal circumstances of Al-Jeballi as well as the 
psychological and physical impairments resulting from the fire.554 By that time, the case had 
                                               
549 VROM Inspectorate, Labor Inspectorate and POS Inspectorate (2006), p. 6-7 and 15. 
550 Letter of the College of Mayor and Aldermen of Haarlemmermeer to the City Council, nr. 06.0350780, September 
25, 2006.  
551 TK, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1191. 
552 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 140 and TK, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1242. 
553 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 140-141. 
554 LJN: AZ2209, Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 15-634170/05. 
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taken more than a year, without a clear indication of when the Public Prosecution would bring 
it to court. The IND immediately took him into alien detention pending expulsion. This was 
then appealed at the Criminal Court in Utrecht, which ruled that he should be released from 
alien detention. The reason given was that he should be available for criminal trial in the 
Netherlands and this would be impossible if he were expelled to Libya. The IND filed appeal 
against this decision. Al-Jeballi had to await the outcome of the appeal in prison. 
 
December 8, 2006 
The Council of State555 ordered the release of Al-Jeballi because alien detention was only 
allowed when there was a likelihood of swift expulsion, which was not the case here. Al-Jeballi 
was released from prison following this decision.556 
 
May 7, 2007 
Four inspectorates conducted a large-scale follow up investigation into the fire safety of the 
penitentiary institutions. The final report concluded that improvements had taken place in all 
the aspects that were investigated, but that the long term safeguarding of fire safety needed 
further attention.557 
 
May 21, 2007 
The criminal trial against Al-Jeballi was begun. The Public Prosecution demanded five years 
detention for Al-Jeballi. 
 
June 15, 2007 
The Criminal Court in Haarlem sentenced Al-Jeballi to three years in prison. The Court 
considered: 
 
“that the intention of the suspect in fact was not aimed at the consequences of the fire, 
being the death of eleven cell occupants, but the suspect is held responsible for this. It 
is after all reasonably foreseeable that at a fire in a detention center, in which those who 
are locked up cannot free themselves, deathly victims might fall. The possible 
shortcomings of the building or the relief operations take nothing away from the 
responsibility of the suspect, as the instigator of the fire.”558  
 
July 4, 2007 
The Public Prosecution announced that the director and the guards of the Schiphol-Oost 
detention center would not be prosecuted. The Public Prosecution considered that the fire would 
not have spread as fast had the door of Cell 11 had been closed right away. Quite possibly there 
would not then have been any victims. The guards also started at the wrong end of K Wing 
when opening the cell doors. They should have started nearest to Cell 11 and worked their way 
away from the fire. Instead they worked towards the fire. The Public Prosecution stated that the 
guards had been surprised by the scale of the developing smoke. 559 
 
 
 
 
                                               
555 In Dutch: Raad van State. 
556 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 147-149. 
557 VROM-Inspectie, Arbeidsinspectie, IOOV, Inspectie voor de Sanctietoepassing (2007), p. 59. 
558 LJN: BA7326, Rechtbank Haarlem, 15/634170-05. 
559 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 155-157. 
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September 12, 2007 
An attorney announced that at least ten victims of the fire at the Schiphol-Oost detention center 
would file a complaint at the Court of Appeal against the decision by the Public Prosecution 
not to prosecute the guards and director of the detention center.560  
 
October 30, 2007 
The Court of Appeal announced that a new investigation into the causes of the fire would be 
started at the request of the attorney of Al-Jeballi and demanded the release of Al-Jeballi, 
awaiting the appeal case. 
 
October 25, 2008 
After negotiations between the lawyers of the victims and the State Advocate, the government 
decided that sixteen survivors were entitled to damage compensation of € 10,000 each, due to 
severe psychological injuries that the victims had incurred from the fire. In 2007, 40 survivors 
of the fire had received damage compensation of € 1750, but they had not accepted this amount. 
The relatives of the people who died in the fire also received compensation, but the amount of 
this compensation was not disclosed.561 The compensation of € 10,000 was only paid to 
survivors who could demonstrate that they had incurred severe psychological damage from the 
fire, for example a post-traumatic stress disorder.562 
 
August 10, 2009 
Al-Jeballi’s appeal started at the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam. The Public Prosecution 
demanded a lower sentence than in the case before the Criminal Court. Instead of 5 years, the 
Public Prosecution now demanded a sentence of two years and 24 days. Al-Jeballi had already 
served that time in pre-trial detention, so he was released from detention.563 
 
September 3, 2009 
The Court of Appeal convicting Al-Jeballi to 18 months of unconditional prison sentence, 
concluded that he ‘is guilty of the fire, not of the deaths of 11 persons’. The Court acknowledged 
that there was no proof that he had any direct intention of causing the deaths of the cell 
occupants. Nevertheless, Al-Jeballi was convicted on the grounds of ‘conditional 
intentionality’, meaning that by throwing the cigarette, he accepted the considerable chance that 
that action could result in harm to the people present in the cell complex.  
 
September 18, 2009 
Al-Jeballi was expelled as an immigration detainee from the Netherlands to Tripoli, Libya.  
 
September 29, 2009 
The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Public Prosecution was right not to 
prosecute Ministers Donner and Verdonk for their actions concerning the fire at the detention 
center. 564565 The Court stated that  
                                               
560 http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/841323/2007/09/13/Slachtoffers-Schipholbrand-
willen-vervolging-personeel-en-directie.dhtml (date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
561 http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/2285467/__Hogere_uitkering_na_Schipholbrand__.html (date last accessed: 
30-12-2013) 
562 http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/nieuws/archief/article/detail/1623552/2008/10/25/Vergoeding-voor-celblok-K.dhtml 
(date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
563 Trouw, Verdachte van Brand Schiphol blijft vrij, August 15, 2009, p.4. 
565 For crimes linked to their public duties, the Dutch constitution states that prosecution of ministers is only possible 
if an order to do so is given by the Crown or the House of Representatives. This was the reason that all Dutch 
instances had concluded that the complaint was inadmissible. Krispijn (2010).  
565 For crimes linked to their public duties, the Dutch constitution states that prosecution of ministers is only possible 
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“nothing indicates that the ministers have personally been so careless that they acted in 
a criminal manner and should be prosecuted for that.”566  
 
December 16, 2009 
The Court of Appeal turned down the complaint against the decision not to prosecute the guards 
and the Site Manager. The Court of Appeal concluded that there was a very unfortunate 
concurrence of circumstances which finally led to the dramatic outcome. Several technical 
failures, and actions or lack of actions by the persons involved also played a part. Although the 
people and organizations involved made errors, the Court of Appeal found that in the end the 
suspects could not be held responsible under criminal law – which requires serious misconduct 
– and consequently the complaint would have to be denied.567 
 
November 6, 2010 
The Advocate General of the Supreme Court recommended the process against Al-Jeballi to be 
reworked: The conditional intentionality of the arson was insufficiently proven, research 
material from the Safety Board had unjustly been included and the rejection of a request an 
expert to hear about the low risk of fire by a discarded cigarette was not warranted.  
 
December 14, 2010 
The Supreme Court overturned the decision by the Court of Appeal because the Court of Appeal 
had not justified its denial of the Defense’s request to appoint an expert for further investigation. 
The investigation concerned statistical research into the odds of a cigarette thrown away in the 
circumstances that pertained causing such a fire. The Supreme Court ruled that this research 
could be relevant in determining if the fire were intentional arson In addition, the Supreme 
Court found that the Court of Appeal had unlawfully declared itself incompetent to decide on 
the objection request concerning the investigating magistrate. The case was referred back to the 
Court of Appeal in The Hague.568  
 
May 24, 2011 
A repeat investigation by the four inspectorates concluded that the fire safety of state and semi-
private penitentiary institutions was sufficient, while the fire safety at the private penitentiary 
institutions was judged as still insufficient. It was remarked that fire safety had improved 
substantially since 2007.569 
 
March 1, 2013 
The Court of Appeal in The Hague acquitted Al-Jeballi from the charges laid out against him. 
The Court ruled that it had not been proven that he deliberately started the fire in the sense that 
he consciously accepted the considerable chance that through his actions a fire would be started. 
The court ruled that the possibility that the fire was started because Al-Jeballi tossed his 
cigarette butt (Rizla Blue) in the direction of the waste basket, should be considered to be 
limited. The Court considered that the hand-rolled cigarette was rolled with self-extinguishing 
blotting paper and tossed away 30 to 60 seconds after the last puff was taken. Next to that, there 
were no indications according to the Court that the suspect was tired of living and would accept 
                                               
if an order to do so is given by the Crown or the House of Representatives. This was the reason that all Dutch 
instances had concluded that the complaint was inadmissible. Krispijn (2010).  
566 European Court of Human Rights, September 29, 2009, LJN BK6015, EHRC 2009, 129. 
567 LJN: BK6788, Gerechtshof Amsterdam, K07/0309, K07/0315, K07/0316, K07/0317 en K07/0336. 
568http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad/Nieuws/Pages/Hoge-Raad-vernietigt-uitspraak-hof-over-de-
Schipholbrand.aspx (date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
569 VROM-Inspectie, Arbeidsinspectie, IOOV, Inspectie voor de Sanctietoepassing (2011), p. 6-7. 
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his own death as part of the bargain.570 The same night on the evening television news of the 
NOS, Al-Jeballi’s attorney announced that Al-Jeballi would demand compensation payments 
from the State and a residence permit. 
 
December 24, 2013 
Al-Jeballi demanded compensation payments from the State for a total of € 663.700.571 
 
February 25, 2014 
The Court of Appeal in The Hague awarded compensation payments to Al-Jeballi, but for a 
much lower amount than was asked for: € 47.880. Compensation was awarded for the time Al-
Jeballi had spent in detention on remand. The Court considered the conditions under which Al-
Jeballi was detained to be heavier than normal, but also considered that it had not been shown 
that these conditions (such as being placed in isolation and undergoing frequent visitations) 
were based on insufficient grounds. Violation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(EVRM) had not been proven, according to the Court. The Court of Appeal also considered that 
the Court in its acquittal of Al-Jeballi had ruled that intent or guilt on the part of the suspect had 
not been shown in a legal sense, but that the Court did not speak out about whether the actions 
for which Al-Jeballi was prosecuted actually took place.572 Al-Jeballi’s advocate reacted with 
disappointment to the verdict and stated that Al-Jeballi considered appealing the verdict at the 
European Court of Human Rights.573  
 
 
7.2.2. Case characteristics  
 
damage  
deaths and serious injuries  11 deaths and 15 wounded, serious psychological 
injuries for many persons involved (both cell occupants 
and personnel), for example post-traumatic stress 
disorder suffered by 16 survivors  
damage compensation paid by 
government 
16 survivors received € 10.000 (total € 160.000). 24 
others received € 1.750 as damage compensation  
(total € 42.000). Al-Jeballi received € 47.880 as 
compensation for the time he had spent in detention on 
remand. Total damage compensation paid by the 
government was € 249.880.  
nature of the act   
nature of the connection between 
the governmental organization 
and the deaths and serious 
injuries  
Deaths and serious injuries took place in a government 
building, the Schiphol-Oost detention center. The 
government was responsible for the safety of the inmates. 
what rules were broken? The Working Conditions Act was violated (for example 
the fact that there was no Risk Assessment and 
                                               
570 LJN: BZ2763, Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage, 22-006615-10  
http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Gerechtshoven/Den-
Haag/Nieuws/Pages/GerechtshofDenHaagspreektverdachteSchipholbrandvrij.aspx (date last accessed: 4-1-2014).  
571 http://www.nu.nl/binnenland/3661664/verdachte-schipholbrand-eist-ruim-65-ton.html (date last accessed: 24-12-
2013) 
572 Court of Appeal The Hague, February 25, 2014, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2014:438 
573 http://www.nu.nl/binnenland/3711526/oud-verdachte-schipholbrand-krijgt-halve-ton.html (date last accessed: 25-
02-2014) 
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Evaluation available) and the building construction of K 
Wing did not comply with the Buildings Decree.  
sanctions   
political consequences Minister of Justice Donner, Minister of VROM Dekker 
and the mayor of Haarlemmermeer, Hertog, all resigned 
on account of the report by the Safety Board. 
disciplinary sanctions The Minister of Justice stated that the course of events 
had consequences for individual civil servants, but no 
announcements have been made in which these 
individuals were mentioned by name.574 Site Manager 
Arend de Korte was transferred to another job. It is also 
generally assumed that a director-general and two 
directors were involved in the reshuffling that minister 
Hirsch Ballin promised the House of Representatives, 
but this was not confirmed officially.575   
sanctions concerning criminal 
law 
Al-Jeballi served an 18 month unconditional prison 
sentence, but was acquitted by the Court of Appeal in 
2013. Guards, site manager, DJI, RGD, and ministers 
Donner, Dekker and Verdonk were not prosecuted.  
measures taken for the future 
/lessons learned 
Since the fire at the Schiphol-Oost detention center, a 
total amount of around €400 million has been invested in 
measures to improve fire safety. From 2012, a structural 
budget of € 140 million was made available. From 2007 
to 2010, a total of € 28.9 million had been spent on First 
Aid-training. 576  
number of official 
investigations/reports on the case 
15 (not limitative): 
- Police 
- Public Prosecution  
- Safety Board 
- Committee Hendrikx  
- Forensic police investigation squad  
- joint report by the VROM Inspectorate, the 
POS Inspectorate and the Labor Inspectorate 
- WFR Gent (ordered by the Dutch Safety 
Board) 
- NFI (two different reports)   
- DGMR (ordered by the Public Prosecution)  
- Fred Vos 
- MSNP 
- Olivier Delémont, University of Lausanne 
- Wagenaar / Van Koppen 
- De Haan / Zuidervaart 
number of years from start of the 
case till finish or present  
Eight years and continuing577 
                                               
574 Answers by the Minister of Justice to questions by De Wit and Van Raak, March 29, 2007, TK 2006-2007, 
Aanhangsel, p.2325-2326. Also see: answers to questions by Halsema, February 21, 2007, TK 2006-2007, 
Aanhangsel, p. 1871. 
575 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 140-141. 
576 Answers by State Secretary of Security and Justice Teeven to questions by Gesthuizen and Jansen, TK 2010-
2011, Aanhangsel, p. 3. 
577 Depending on whether the case of Al-Jeballi will be brought before the European Court. 
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7.3. Why: explaining the deaths and serious injuries  
 
7.3.1. Direct and indirect causes  
 
“Fires are commonplace occurrences. In 2004, a total of 43,000 fires in buildings were 
recorded in the Netherlands, 145 of which were in cellblocks. Each year in the 
Netherlands, approximately 70 to 80 people die from fires. In the last century (as far as 
is known), five people died in two fires in cellblocks. By Dutch standards, the loss of 
such a large number of victims, as in the case of this fire at Schiphol-Oost detention 
center, can be regarded as quite exceptional.”578  
 
Direct causes 
It was clear that there was a fire in Cell 11. The two guards had declared that smoke was coming 
only from Cell 11. The Safety Board identified three possible scenarios for how the fire started. 
 
1) The fire was caused accidentally  
This scenario is based on the statement of the occupant of Cell 11, Al-Jeballi.  
 
“In his statement the occupant of Cell 11 made a connection between the start of the fire 
and one or more discarded cigarettes which he threw in the direction of the foot of the 
bed, while he lay on the bed. The cell occupant then fell asleep. He woke with a start at 
around 23.56 because he felt heat around his feet and saw that the bedding at the foot 
of his bed was on fire.”579 580 
 
Safety Board simulations later showed that this was possible. 
 
2) The fire was caused by setting flammable materials on fire   
It was not uncommon for fires to be caused intentionally by detainees.581 Small fires started by 
cell occupants had already occurred during the brief history of the detention center at Schiphol-
Oost. The cell occupants of K Wing were permitted to have lighters in their possession. The 
obvious question was whether such a lighter could have been used in initiating the fire in Cell 
11. The Board therefore also carried out simulations where as much of the available flammable 
material as possible was piled up and demonstrated that this scenario was also possible.582 The 
Public Prosecution at first adhered to the theory that fire was started in two different places in 
the cell: on the bunk bed and in the waste bin. This would point to intentional fire raising, by 
means of a cigarette or lighter. The Public Prosecution based their theory on the report of the 
forensic police investigation squad.583  
 
3) The fire was started by a technical cause 
In this scenario, the fire was caused by malfunction of the electrical equipment in the cell – the 
cabling, wall sockets, lighting, refrigerator or television. On the basis of the evidence the Board 
concluded that the cabling, wall sockets, switches and lighting could be excluded as possible 
causes, as no traces of electrical arcing could be found. The refrigerator was also unlikely, as 
                                               
578 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 5. 
579 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 66. 
580 In a footnote, the Board added that according to data from the Central Bureau for Statistics there were 406 fires 
in detention centers from 2001-2004, of which 37 (9%) were caused by smoking. 
581 According to data from the Central Bureau for Statistics there were 406 fires in cell blocks from 2001-2004, of 
which 165 (41%) were started intentionally. Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 66. 
582 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 66. 
583 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 129. 
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the internal electrical parts were found more or less intact. The television could in theory not 
be excluded, but the Board dismissed this scenario on the basis of the following argument:  
 
“Had the television been the cause of the fire, this would then not have been caused by 
the actions of the occupant of the cell. The occupant would then logically have no 
interest in telling a different story (fire in the bed) to what he had actually seen (the 
burning television).”584 
 
While the report by the Safety Board is still considered by many to be the principal report on 
the fire in the Schiphol-Oost detention center, it is certainly not the only relevant report. Over 
the course of the years, the fire was investigated by at least eight different experts or 
organizations. The following table lists the different reports and gives an overview of the main 
conclusions on the cause of the fire.  
 
Table 7.1. Overview main conclusions on the cause of the fire 
 
Expert/organization Year 
of 
report 
Main conclusion 
Forensic police 
investigation squad 
2005 It is possible that the fire started in two different places.  
WFR Gent (ordered 
by the Dutch Safety 
Board) 
2006 The fire was started by accident, or intentionally, but a 
technical cause can be ruled out. 
NFI 
 
2006 The evidence pointed to a single source of the fire, most 
likely the bed. A technical cause can be ruled out. 
DGMR (ordered by 
the Public 
Prosecution) 
2007 Both an intentional act and an element of bad luck are 
possible. 
Fred Vos 
 
2007 The fire did not start in Cell 11, but outside of it. 
MSNP 
 
2008 The fire started in two different places: Cell 11 and the 
empty tonnage. 
Olivier Delémont, 
University of 
Lausanne 
2009 The fire started in Cell 11 and was caused by human 
action, in other words by Al-Jeballi. 
NFI  2013 Under the most favorable circumstances for a fire to 
develop, the statistical chance that tossing a rolled cigarette 
would lead to fire was 16 per cent. 
 
The statement of Al-Jeballi was quoted in the verdict by the Supreme Court in 2010 as follows: 
 
“On October 26, 2005, I was in Cell K11 of the Schiphol-Oost cell complex in the 
municipality of Haarlemmermeer. It was dark in the room. I was lying on the bed below 
watching television and smoking a cigarette I had rolled myself. I was the only occupant 
of this cell. At my feet were wrinkled sheets that I had kicked away, there was also a 
toilet roll which had been partly rolled out. My pants were at the left corner of the back 
side of the bed. I turned off the television because I wanted to go to sleep. I smoked the 
                                               
584 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 67. 
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cigarette for a quarter. After the last puff I did not extinguish the cigarette. I thought it 
was out. I tossed the cigarette away with my thumb and my index finger in the direction 
of the foot end of the bed. I did not check whether the cigarette was out and I also did 
not check where it ended up. I went to sleep. At a certain moment I felt something warm 
at my feet. I woke up and saw fire and smoke on the bed near my feet. The sheets were 
wrinkled at the foot end of the bed. When I woke up, that was the place where the fire 
was. Later the fire came against the bottom end of the mattress of the upper bed. The 
fire was already as high as the bottom end of the upper bed of the bunk bed. I saw the 
fire myself, it was in my cell.”585 
 
In 2008, at the request of Al-Jeballi’s attorney, Damman, forensic psychologists Wagenaar and 
Van Koppen wrote a report on the reliability of the suspect’s statements. The attorney asked for 
this because Al-Jeballi had been interrogated immediately after he awoke from an induced 
coma. Wagenaar and Van Koppen concluded that the statements were unreliable. His memory 
could have been influenced by the coma and by the way the interrogation had been conducted.586 
Van Koppen said: 
 
“He did not see where the cigarette stub ended up, let alone that he saw that the stub 
caused the fire. On top of that, someone who is permanently in his cell will smoke a lot 
more often. That is such a normal occurrence that you can’t remember it two weeks 
later. If you drive home from work and I ask you two weeks later to tell me in detail how 
the journey went, you won’t be able do it either. The chances are great, then, that he 
made it up by himself.”587 
 
On the other hand, we should consider that Al-Jeballi had not been in the detention center for 
two weeks, but only for two days. The question is to what extent one can speak of routine then. 
From the Public Prosecution’s side, it has been argued that Al-Jeballi has always been 
consistent in his story about how the fire started.  
 
In its final verdict of March 1, 2013, the Court of Appeal in The Hague considered all of the 
research that had been done in the case, with the addition of a new report. This report by the 
NFI had been ordered because of the Supreme Court ruling that the chances of a tossed rolled 
cigarette (Rizla Blue) causing the fire needed to be investigated further. The Court of Appeal 
therefore asked the NFI to conduct around 100 fire tests with both rolled cigarettes and normal 
cigarettes. In consultation with the defense, the Advocate General and the experts, the court had 
formulated the preconditions for the (preliminary) examination. The report was to be based on 
the actual conditions at the time of the fire, based on the known factors such as the type of 
cigarette paper, tobacco, cloth material and toilet paper, and the temperature and ventilation in 
the cell of the accused. In terms of unknown factors, the report had to select most favorable 
conditions for inflammation.  
 
Based on the results, the experts from the NFI estimated the chances that under these 
circumstances a fire would develop to be 16 percent for rolled cigarettes (with a 95% reliability 
rate, running from 8% to 29%) and at 70 percent for normal cigarettes (with a 95% reliability 
rate, running from 40 to 89 percent.) As with all the other investigations, the conclusions of this 
report were criticized by the parties involved and by other experts. The Court considered 
because the report was based on the most favorable conditions for conflagration and because 
                                               
585 LJN: BO2966, Hoge Raad, 09/03607 
586 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 167-168. 
587 Nederlands Dagblad, Twijfel over oorzaak van Schipholbrand, December 19, 2008, p.3. 
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there was still uncertainty about other relevant circumstances the conclusions of the report only 
held limited significance. The Court concluded that if the chances under such favorable 
conditions are already small, the real chances were in all probability extremely limited. A fair 
conclusion would be that while it is theoretically not impossible that the tossed cigarette caused 
the fire, the chances were very small indeed.588 
 
Alternative theories 
There are also alternative theories about the cause of the fire. One of the cell occupants, 
Algerian Ibrahim Benai, claimed that ten minutes before the supposed start of the fire (that must 
have been around 23.45 hours then) he heard guards coming into K Wing and walking to the 
end of the wing (cell 11 of Al-Jeballi was at the end of the wing). According to him, they came 
back a few moments later and he heard them say ‘false alarm’ to each other.589 Benai also told 
this to an employee of the Safety Board. The major argument against this theory is that around 
that time, no staff are seen on the images from the surveillance cameras. The Safety Board did 
not include this claim in their report on the fire.590  
 
In 2007, fire expert Fred Vos conducted his own investigation into the cause of the fire. Vos 
concluded that the fire did not start in Cell 11, but outside of it.591  
 
On November 13, 2008, in a broadcast television program, Nova, researcher Bas van den 
Heuvel from bureau MSNP, presented the findings of new research into the cause of the fire. 
With the use of advanced computer techniques, MSNP analyzed the images from the 
surveillance security cameras from the night of the fire. This analysis used a new method with 
advanced color corrections to make smoke visible where it cannot be seen on regular camera 
images. MSNP claimed that smoke could be detected in the empty tonnage before the fire in 
Cell 11 started. MSNP concluded that the fire in Cell 11 could not have caused the big fire that 
followed, but that another (bigger) fire must have already started in the empty tonnage quite 
some time.592  
 
On November 22, 2008, DJI Duty Officer Melvin Deira, told VPRO radio program Argos that 
he had received a fire alarm about a quarter of an hour before the fire. Guards went up to K 
Wing to take a look and confirmed that it was a false alarm. If the fire had started in the empty 
tonnage already, it was very possible that this went unnoticed by the guards, as it may not have 
been possible to see or smell it from the inside.  
 
When the fire actually started at 23.55 hours, he went out to take a look. Deira: 
 
“Near Cell 11, I saw smoke and fire underneath the roof, from the empty tonnage. That 
is the space between the ceiling of the cell and the roof of the building. I am very sure 
of that, I saw it with my own naked eyes.” 
 
Deira told Argos that he had shared these observations with the police and the Safety Board 
several times. The Safety Board did not include Deira’s observations in its report on the fire. In 
                                               
588 LJN: BZ2763, Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage, 22-006615-10  
http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Gerechtshoven/Den-
Haag/Nieuws/Pages/GerechtshofDenHaagspreektverdachteSchipholbrandvrij.aspx (date last accessed: 4-1-
2014). 
589 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 41. 
590 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 96. 
591 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 166-167. 
592 Bureau MSNP, Van den Heuvel and Roes (2008), p. 19. 
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response to questions put by Argos, the Safety Board replied that the surveillance camera 
images did not show the presence of any guards after 23.00 hours.593 On December 4, 2008 the 
Safety Board issued a press statement, saying that after careful study and consultation with 
qualified external experts, it had not changed its views on the matter as a result of the MSNP 
memo or the broadcast by Argos. The size and intensity of the fire could only be explained in 
as the Board had described in its final report. Their findings were also in line with the statements 
by the occupant of Cell 11 and the two guards who saved him. According to the Board, there 
were no signs or traces of a second place where the fire could have started, such as the empty 
tonnage above the cells. According to the Board, had such a fire occurred, it could not have led 
to the intense fire that spread from Cell 11 and killed eleven people.594  
 
This made sense: The cell consisted of a metal container. Most of the openings in the cell were 
visible on the camera images. The toilet and the shower discharge were openings from which a 
fire could not start. The other openings in the cell were visible on camera images and did not 
point to fire from the outside. All this meant that if the fire had started outside the cell, it would 
have had to start on top of the metal container, gone downwards through one of the container 
openings and, through that opening, caused a fire on the bed below. In any possible scenario, 
the bed is necessary for the fire to catch hold. Fire experts believe it is impossible for a fire to 
develop that way. 
 
On March 30, 2009, Swiss fire expert Delémont, from the University of Lausanne, issued his 
report on the fire, ordered by the Court of Appeal (at the request of attorney Damman). He 
concluded that the fire started in Cell 11 and was caused by human action, in other words by 
Al-Jeballi. Delémont concluded that, as in most disasters, it is not a simple thing to explain how 
an almost banal situation can result in such tragic consequences. It was a concurrence of 
circumstances within a complex process that led to a generalized fire in which 11 cell occupants 
died.595 Delémont found something that had not been found before: a point trace of copper 
evaporation on an electrical wire in a wall socket from Cell 11. He concluded that this proved 
that at that place a short circuit had happened as a consequence of the fire. This ruled out a 
technical failure by the television, the refrigerator or the lighting. If one of those devices had 
started the fire, this would have caused a short circuit in that specific device and not in the wall 
socket too. This made sense, because in the case of a short circuit, the plugs go and there is no 
longer a voltage carried by the electrical wire. In that case, he would not have found the point 
trace that he did. Only human action was left as a possible explanation. When questioned by 
the Court of Appeal, Delémont declared that there was not enough flammable material in the 
empty tonnage to allow a fire to flash over the entire cell block.596 Effectively, technical failure 
was ruled out. The Court of Appeal in 2009 accepted this explanation completely.  
 
Indirect causes 
Clearly, a great deal of research has been done concerning the direct causes of the fire. However, 
not all causes are necessarily direct, there is much to be said about indirect causes. Throwing a 
cigarette might be a direct cause, but the processes of the governmental organizations involved 
can also provide more insight into the indirect causes of the fire. The Dutch Safety Board 
identified the following indirect causes on the part of the DJI: 
 
                                               
593 http://weblogs.vpro.nl/argos/2008/11/22/wachtcommandant-schipholbrand-werpt-nieuw-licht-op-ontstaan-
schipholbrand/ (date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
594http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/investigation-docs/13/986d79f76224reactie-onderzoeksmemo-msnp-
041208.pdf (date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
595 LJN: BO2966, Hoge Raad, 09/03607  
596 Trouw, Nieuwe ‘waarheden’ over Schipholbrand, August 11, 2009, p.6. 
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1) DJI did not adequately assess the risks that a fire in the Schiphol-Oost detention 
center would involve.  
2) The emergency plan was not sufficiently realistic on several crucial points and the 
staff was unaware of the contents and requirements of the emergency plan.  
3) Additional risks were introduced for which no safety compensation was provided. 
For example, relatively long, wide corridors were decided upon for J and K wings 
with many cells within one wing. As a result, the escape route to safety was a greater 
distance and more cells had to be opened than in the adjacent wings. 
4) In addition, the guards on duty in the night of the fire had received inadequate 
instruction, training and exercise drills, although all of them had undertaken a brief 
BHV training. They had never been part of any drill exercise at the Schiphol-Oost 
detention center, partly because, as was reported, there are three teams a day seven 
days a week and therefore a large influx and circulation of personnel. 
5) Finally, there was a lack of effective coordination between the user organization 
and the fire brigade. The impression at the DJI was that the rescue of all the cell 
occupants would not have to be carried out solely by the guards, particularly at night 
– given that the fire brigade “was nearby”. However, in reality, the fire brigade was 
not close by. Through proper coordination and joint exercises, clarification could 
have been given sooner concerning the length of time that the BHV team would 
have to be detailed on its own and the importance of well-defined assistance from 
the BHV team upon arrival of the fire brigade to ensure rapid deployment of the 
firefighting services.  
 
The Safety Board formulated a possible deeper underlying problem: 
 
“It is the opinion of the Board that the internal organization’s limited preparation and 
arrangement is particularly caused by the fact that, in every-day practice, the attention 
of Site Manager and his personnel was focused largely on locking up detainees and 
keeping them locked up within the applicable detention regime (treatment, facilities, 
etc.). Matters such as tuition about, performing exercises for, and the reading of, an 
emergency plan may then soon fall outside of this daily, usually hectic, routine.”597 
 
In the report by the joint inspectorates from 2006, it was concluded that there were shortcomings 
in many areas. The construction materials that were used were often not fire repellant. 
Documentation concerning fire safety was often not in order. Fire safety awareness and specific 
knowledge concerning fire safety were too low, and this was the main cause for the insufficient 
compliance with regulations concerning fire safety. Supervision by the municipality was 
inadequate. Cooperation and coordination between the municipality, RGD and DJI was 
insufficient. There had been great time pressure on applying for, and granting, permits for 
temporary cell units, causing less attention to fire safety than otherwise would have been the 
case. From the point of view of fire safety, the construction of the buildings, in the shape of 
coupled prefabricated units, was intrinsically a vulnerable method of building compared to 
traditional building in stone or concrete. More so given the nature of the housing regime for the 
occupants. The fire integrity and fire compartmentalization, which had been included in the 
performance demands of the Construction Decree, turned out to be difficult to guarantee and 
remain guaranteed. The effects of (small) construction defects could be considerable in the 
shape of a swift spread of the fire. If this type of building had to be chosen, it would require 
                                               
597 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 7. 
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
213 
 
great emphasis on adequate organizational and fire safety measures and strict adherence to those 
requirements.598  
 
There are four different factors to explore further in relation to the case: opportunities, motives, 
masking and factors relevant factors to response (this last factor will be discussed later in this 
chapter). 
 
 
7.3.2. Opportunities  
 
7.3.2.1. Organizational structure and division of responsibilities  
 
Organizational structure 
At the time, in 2005, the following governmental organizations were relevant in the case of the 
fire in the Schiphol-Oost detention center.  
 
Ministry of Justice599 
The Ministry of Justice had two ministers: the Minister of Justice, Piet Hein Donner and the 
Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration, Rita Verdonk.600 The Minister of Justice was (among 
many other things) responsible for legislation and penitentiary institutions. The Minister of 
Alien Affairs and Integration had responsibility for the execution of alien-related legislation, 
including the deportation of aliens. The Ministry of Justice operated according to an official 
chain of command model. This meant that the Secretary-General and the Directors-General 
held linear responsibility for what was done by their management teams and departments. The 
Custodial Institutions Service (DJI) was responsible for the implementation of custodial 
sentences and custodial measures on behalf of the Minister. In part, the DJI must ensure that 
cell capacity is sufficient. In the construction of a penitentiary institution, the DJI operated as 
the client for the construction towards the Government Buildings Agency. Among other things, 
and with that in view, it was customary for the DJI to draw up the Schedule of Requirements 
(PvE).601 The Schiphol-Oost detention center fell under the Temporary Special Facilities 
Directorate (TDBV), part of the DJI. The TDBV employed a total of approximately 140 guards 
in the Schiphol-Oost detention center. Roughly 100 of them were recruited from the so-called 
‘DJI-pool’, which consisted of employees who could be deployed flexibly at a variety of the 
TDBV’s locations. The other 40 guards employed by the directorate were recruited and 
deployed through the external security firm Securicor. The KMar supplied additional personnel.  
 
The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) 
The Ministry of VROM602 was responsible for the building regulations in the Housing Act and 
the Buildings Decree. This responsibility also applied to construction-related regulations in the 
area of the fire safety of buildings. The Government Buildings Agency (RGD) was at the time 
part of the Ministry of VROM. Its task was to manage and develop the State’s largest property 
portfolio.603As far as the construction of the detention center was concerned, the RGD was 
                                               
598 VROM Inspectorate, Labor Inspectorate and POS Inspectorate (2006), p.6-7 and 14. 
599 In 2010 the name of the ministry was changed into the Ministry of Security and Justice.  
600 In 2010, as a consequence of the forming of the cabinet-Rutte, the Ministry of Justice was transformed into the 
Ministry of Security and Justice. The tasks concerning alien affairs were handed over to the Ministry of the Interior, 
the tasks concerning public order and safety were added to the responsibility of the Ministry. 
601 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 46-47. 
602 As a result of the forming of the cabinet-Rutte I in 2010, the tasks of the Ministry of VROM were divided up between 
the Ministry of the Interior (which became responsible for housing, including the RGD) and the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment.  
603 http://www.rgd.nl/english/organisation/ (date last accessed: 30-12-2013)  
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responsible for the compliance of the buildings with construction legislation. The RGD was 
also responsible for building permit applications and for ensuring that construction work does 
not depart from the terms of such permits.604  
 
The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) 
The Minister of BZK was at the time responsible for public order and safety and was also in 
charge of coordination in terms of crisis management (including disasters). The system-related 
responsibility of BZK for fire safety involved including ensuring an adequate level of fire safety 
in regulations and providing a facilitating and promotional role in respect of the implementation 
of fire safety by municipalities.605  
 
The Ministry of Defense and the Royal Military Constabulary (KMar) 
The KMar fell under the responsibility of the Minister of Defense. The KMar carried out 
policing duties at Schiphol Airport and at other airport sites as required by the Ministers of 
Justice, the Interior and Defense. People who were arrested at Schiphol were taken into custody 
in the Schiphol-Oost detention center. Policing duties at the detention center were carried out 
by the KMar.  
 
The municipality of Haarlemmermeer  
Haarlemmermeer has 144.188 inhabitants606 and is among the twenty largest municipalities in 
the Netherlands. Schiphol Airport and the Schiphol-Oost detention center lie within the borders 
of the Municipality of Haarlemmermeer.  
 
“In collaboration with Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, the municipality of 
Haarlemmermeer has a group of people at its disposal who are especially involved with 
fire services provision for the buildings at the airport. Personnel from the Schiphol Fire 
brigade have been added to the municipal Fire brigade in order to prevent and fight fire 
in buildings at Schiphol. The buildings fire prevention team is stationed at post Sloten. 
Half of the team consists of personnel from the Schiphol Fire brigade and the other half 
is made up of personnel from the Haarlemmermeer Municipal Fire brigade. Eight 
members of staff are permanently on site to fight fire in buildings at Schiphol.”607 
 
Various inspectorates   
There were several inspectorates who had specific tasks in relation to this case: the VROM 
inspectorate, the POS Inspectorate, The Labor Inspectorate, the Sanctions Application 
Inspectorate (ISt)608 and, specifically for the Schiphol-Oost detention center, the Supervisory 
Committee (CvT). The Safety Board also criticized the way these inspectorates performed their 
tasks in this case, stating that the lack of coordination between the inspectorates and a limited 
understanding of the responsibilities involved resulted in a situation in which shortcomings 
went unnoticed, particularly as far as the BHV was concerned.609 
 
Division of responsibilities 
The Safety Board strongly criticized the handling of responsibilities in this case. The Board 
                                               
604 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 51. 
605 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 52. 
606 As of November 1, 2013, source CBS. http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haarlemmermeer (date last accessed: 30-12-
2013) 
607 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 22. 
608 The POS Inspectorate and the ISt have merged together on January 1, 2012 to become the Security and Justice 
Inspectorate. http://www.ivenj.nl/organisatie/ (date last accessed: 26-01-2014) 
609 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 9. 
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
215 
 
concluded that the governmental organizations involved were tempted to focus on the 
responsibilities of others, thereby disregarding their own responsibility. The Board added that 
the responsibilities were divided between three governmental organizations, each of which had 
its own role and responsibilities. The Board also concluded that the division of responsibilities 
within DJI (for example between the Site Manager of the detention center and the directorate 
of the DJI) was unclear and ambiguous. In the end, the Board concluded that DJI, RGD and the 
municipality of Haarlemmermeer carried out their responsibilities inadequately.610 
 
The Board could have chosen to focus more on the RGD, since the building, in its opinion, did 
not meet all the requirements. However, the Board considered the DJI to have a special 
responsibility for safety at the detention center, especially since this concerned the safety of a 
vulnerable group. In the opinion of the Board, DJI should have asked for a ‘manual’ for the 
building. In that way, the problems or vulnerabilities in the building could have been managed 
better. That would have required a very early involvement by DJI in the construction process. 
This is something that has led to much debate, Should the user of a building check if the 
construction (the ceiling and the smoke exhaust installation, for example) is sufficient for fire 
safety purposes. Is that demand realistic? Donner’s remarks about how far responsibility should 
reach were in all probability also aimed at this debate. 
 
From what has gone before, it should be clear that the relationship between the municipality of 
Haarlemmermeer and the Ministry of Justice was tense. Mayor Hertog of Haarlemmermeer in 
an interview indicated that the tensions went back a long time: 
 
“At the opening of the building it turned out that DJI had already put people in detention, 
although the occupancy permit had not been granted yet. DJI was working under great 
time pressure, prompted by the desire of the House of Representatives to quickly tackle 
the problems with drugs swallowers. The municipality drew a line at this point and 
stipulated that people could not be detained in the cell complex during night hours. As 
a compromise, awaiting the granting of the occupancy permit, it was decided that the 
inmates would stay in prisoners’ buses at night and would only be detained in the 
complex during the daytime.”611   
 
Although there was much debate about different responsibilities, both the Safety Board and 
Minister of Justice Hirsch Ballin stated that it was not their intention to identify individual 
parties in order to establish their possible guilt.612 Minister Donner’s quote concerning the 
responsibility that government could reasonably bear was also discussed with his successor as 
Minister of Justice, Hirsch Ballin, in the debate in the House of Representatives on October 25, 
2006. Hirsch Ballin stressed that Donner always chose his words carefully. Donner had said 
‘the question is to what extent such a responsibility is still bearable’. The phrase ‘to what extent’ 
was crucial according to Hirsch Ballin. Hirsch Ballin stated that a responsibility for absolute 
safety could not be accepted nor pretended at by government. In the same debate, the new 
minister of VROM, Winsemius, compared the division of responsibilities between the different 
parties to a relay race in track and field. The relay baton of responsibility was lost once in a while 
during the race, especially when the baton had to be passed from one runner to another. Of course 
it is one’s own responsibility to hold on to the baton during the race, but mistakes are often made 
when responsibility is transferred from one party to another.613  
                                               
610 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 5-6. 
611 Hertog (not dated), p. 65. 
612 TK, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1192.  
613 TK, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1209. 
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7.3.2.2. Organizational culture  
 
From the interviews it can be concluded that prison personnel are most often dedicated to 
performing their tasks well. Nevertheless, the relationship between local prisons and the central 
organization in The Hague has often been tense. The ‘us against them’ feeling has a long 
tradition and is fortified by both parties and by several developments, such as more stringent 
central guidelines, budget cuts and reorganizations. In such a setting, there is a certain tendency 
to do things ‘our own way’, and as a consequence, a lack of uniformity in approaches to issues 
such as fire safety, was visible at the time. In the debate with the House of Representatives, 
Hirsch Ballin talked about a large scale organizational improvement project at DJI, called ‘the 
new institution’. This not only comprised changes in structures and work flow processes, but 
also in culture. 
 
“This should lead to a different attitude in both management and personnel. This is a 
demanding process. Indeed it touches the culture in the organization, by taking away a 
kind of restraint that is wrong. We should prevent a culture of fear.”614 
 
In the debate in the House of Representatives, Femke Halsema from Green Left pointed to an 
article in NRC Handelsblad, which linked the problems with the organizational culture to the 
political climate of the previous years. Reorganization was followed by yet another reorganization, 
with new detention centers being built in rapid succession. Hirsch Ballin reacted by saying that 
he did not share the qualifications about the political culture, but that things had improved since 
he had first been a Minister, many years earlier. He now found much more openness and 
awareness when problems and incidents occurred. He added: 
 
“It is good to be open, also when something goes wrong. No cultures of fear should be 
allowed to prevail. We should be able to face maturely what went wrong. Consequently 
it should be expected from management that it sees whether there is a structural problem 
present. At the same time we should not lose sight of the fact that it can also come down 
to human errors which should be reacted to.”615  
 
 
7.3.2.3. The political system and the relations with corporate partners and 
society  
 
There has been much debate about the role politicians have played in this case. A popular theory 
is that the political pressure to find a solution for the problem with drugs swallowers led to an 
irresponsibly quick pace in building detention centers, with serious consequences for fire safety. 
But is this true? What is clear is that the House of Representatives pressed Minister of Justice 
Korthals to solve the problems with drugs traffickers and that made him take unorthodox measures 
such as setting up special detention centers and introducing emergency legislation. Petiet and 
Versteeg argued that there was a lack of self-criticism by the members of the House of 
Representatives who had agreed to budget cuts of hundreds of millions of euros on the prison 
system in the Netherlands.  
 
“These amounts of money are not found by cutting down on the costs of food for inmates. 
You don’t save hundreds of millions with a potato less!” 616 
                                               
614 TK, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1203. 
615 TK, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1204-1205. 
616 Petiet and Versteeg (2007), p. 131. 
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They concluded that fire safety had come under strong pressure as a result of these budget cuts and 
consequently, the ‘draconian measures’ that the minister of Justice had to take to appease 
parliament in its desire to lock up all drug traffickers.  
 
It is still often assumed in public debate that political pressure caused the detention center to be 
built in great haste, causing a situation with many potential hazards for fire safety. It is often 
mistakenly believed that it was the political situation with regard to the drugs swallowers that 
was involved, when in fact K wing was built for immigration detainees. Moreover, it has also 
not been established that a causal relationship existed between the time pressure and the 
building. The Safety Board concluded on this issue as follows:  
 
“J and K wings were completed under substantial pressure of time, of a political nature. 
Nevertheless, no concrete evidence has been found that the time factor in the expansion 
involving the construction of J and K wings had a direct influence on the completed 
building.”617 
 
Nevertheless, it should also be said that the state inspectorates in their report on unit building of 
cell complexes in 2006 stated that the time pressure, nature of the buildings and fuzzy character of 
the regulations did not help in aiding fire safety. They added: 
 
“The temporary character of the institution can lead to a certain amount of restraint with 
financial investments in fire safety.”618 
 
As far as the self-criticism by politicians is concerned, the debate about the fire with ministers 
Hirsch Ballin and Winsemius was actually one of high quality, in which both members of the 
House (for example Wolfsen and Halsema) and the ministers tried to discuss what politicians and 
civil servants should learn from these events. There were several instances in which the subject 
came up whether politicians had asked the impossible. A cynic would say that the frankness of the 
debate was due to the fact that the ministers who were primarily responsible had already stepped 
down, but that would do injustice to the debate. After all, Donner and Dekker stepped down in line 
with ministerial responsibility, explicitly stating that they wanted to facilitate a fundamental debate 
with parliament. Such a debate did indeed follow, with valuable contributions from both ministers 
and members of the house.  
 
A point of interest concerned the relationship at that time between the Dutch Safety Board and 
the Ministry of Justice. The chairman of the Safety Board was Pieter van Vollenhoven, husband 
of Princess Margriet (the sister of Dutch Queen Beatrix).619 Van Vollenhoven had been pleading 
for a long time for an independent authority in the Netherlands that would investigate safety 
incidents. The Safety Board had been launched in February 2005 and given several investigative 
powers by law. This case was its first large investigation. Right after the fire, employees of the 
Board were at the scene, and referring to their investigative authority given to them by law, 
demanded that important evidence be handed over. This was a new experience for every party 
involved then. In the period that followed, several disagreements with the Public Prosecution 
took place. In a book about the fire at the detention center, by De Haan and Zuidervaart, it is 
argued that the Ministry of Justice was afraid that Van Vollenhoven would seize the moment 
to ‘score’ with this investigation. De Haan and Zuidervaart claimed that the Ministry disagreed 
strongly with the concept report Van Vollenhoven sent them and quoted a letter from August 
                                               
617 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 125. 
618 VROM-inspectie, Arbeidsinspectie, IOOV (2006), p. 14.  
619 Of course in 2013, after her son Willem-Alexander became king, Beatrix became a princess again.  
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11, in which Donner supposedly asked Van Vollenhoven to consider omitting the conclusion 
that the fire may have been caused by a tossed cigarette (supposedly because the Public 
Prosecution was still busy trying to prove that the fire started in two different places and that 
Al-Jeballi intentionally caused the fire). 
 
When the report was presented it became clear that Van Vollenhoven had drawn the stern 
conclusion that there would have been fewer or no deaths at all if there had been more concern 
for fire safety. The movie that was shown by Van Vollenhoven at the press conference 
contained music and a voice-over which made the entire story even more dramatic than it 
already was.620 The persons involved at the ministry were appalled, and angry at this 
representation. Van Vollenhoven, on the other hand, felt that the ministry had been trying to 
avoid their responsibility over and over again and fought for what he felt was the most important 
task of his independent Board: finding out the truth.621 Clearly, the perspectives on truth differed 
considerably between both parties.  
 
Committee Siepel 
A special case in the debate in the House of Representatives concerned the Committee Siepel. As 
detailed earlier, the fact that Hirsch Ballin had been wrongly informed about the committee report 
by his civil servants, led him to announce that measures would be taken within the Ministry. But 
how relevant was this Committee Siepel for this case? The Minister of Defense had started the 
Supervisory Committee Scheme for Places of Detention for the Schiphol district of the KMar 
in the fall of the year 2000, chaired by Mr. Siepel. The Safety Board had concluded that both 
the DJI Board and the detention center Site Manager took insufficient action in response to the 
Committee’s disturbing conclusion that “fire safety here gives rise to concern”. It was further 
stated in a report on one of the five visits (in 2003) that: “On the basis of these findings I can 
only conclude that a large number of cell occupants would lose their lives in the event of a fire”. 
In relation to fire safety the Supervisory Committee Siepel stated: “Fire prevention is 
unacceptable: the personnel are not aware of the Evacuation Plan, there are no exercises and 
no facility for the central unlocking of cells”. This report was discussed with the Site Manager 
of the detention center, with a record kept of the discussion.”622 The remark about the loss of 
life in the event of a fire sparked debate when it became public. The House of Representatives, 
especially Member of the House Wolfsen, enquired furiously why this had not been followed 
up on.  
  
Site Manager De Korte however, had declared that these remarks were not aimed at DJI, but at 
the KMar. The cells from the KMar were not the responsibility of DJI, De Korte had nothing 
to say about the personnel (including the two KMar-employees who had made their critical 
remarks towards the Siepel-committee) and the report was not meant for him. Furthermore,  
 
“the record kept of the discussion shows that the supervisory committee that had visited 
the DJI-cells, did not share those negative experiences. The DJI staff and the Securicor 
personnel that worked in the DJI wings of the complex (with the drugs traffickers), 
turned out to be aware of the evacuation plan and gave adequate answers to questions 
concerning fire safety.”623 
 
                                               
620 http://nos.nl/video/40115-reconstructie-schipholbrand.html (date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
621 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 133-136. 
622 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 106. 
623 Petiet and Versteeg (2007), p. 130. 
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It appears that a report about a visit from the committee Siepel, in which two KMar-employees 
made remarks about fire safety, played a crucial role in the debate in parliament, when in fact 
De Korte was right that this did not concern DJI.  
 
The response on this issue by Hirsch Ballin in parliament was influential in his relationship 
with his civil servants. As seen in the other case studies, civil servants regard it as paramount 
that, under difficult circumstances, they receive support and backing from their political 
superiors. Some of the people involved expressed regret that Hirsch Ballin did not support his 
own staff, unlike Winsemius, who in their perception had stood firm for the civil servants from 
his ministry. 
 
Measures taken on account of the fire 
After the fire in the Schiphol-Oost detention center, measures were taken for improving fire safety 
at the cost of more than 400 million euros. The fire safety program was carried out for all state 
buildings. In two years, from 2007 until the end of 2009, all 16,000 cells in the Dutch 
penitentiary institutions were improved for fire safety reasons. Remaining issues were to be 
settled by halfway through 2011. It was also a difficult job, since the whole purpose of a prison 
is that inmates cannot just leave. From a point of view of fire safety, it is important to know 
that prisoners can get away from a fire as soon as possible.624 There are difficult demands in 
such a large program:  
 
“There are 300 different types of cell doors that all have their own norms and 
certificates. Where do you check upon then? If you want to test all 300 on their fire 
integrity, you have to reserve two years of research capacity in labs.”625  
 
This was an enormous program, in which the number of employees trained in in-house emergency 
and first-aid service had to be raised from 1000 to 8500. This resulted in a lot of pressure on 
the organizations running Dutch prisons, led to a lot of people working overtime and temporary 
employees being hired. In an interview about this program, Pieter van Vollenhoven commented 
on the amount of money required: 
 
“Just to comply with the rules. That is of course very awkward. Who has been asleep all 
that time? I actually don’t understand. Of course buildings sometimes have to be adapted 
to the present time and the destination. But I think it is a considerable amount of money.”626  
 
It should be added that Van Vollenhoven had also said repeatedly that safety should never be a 
subject to balance the budget with, so his amazement should be viewed with some skepticism as 
well. In any case, the measures taken have led to the belief that, with regard to fire safety, Dutch 
prisons are now probably amongst the safest in the world. 
 
 
7.3.2.4. Rules, regulations and procedures  
 
In some cases, it can be argued that procedures, rules and regulations present opportunities for all 
sorts of problems. Rules can be highly complex or contradict other rules (‘choosing between two 
evils’), procedures can be overly bureaucratic or impossible to work with or run counter to policy 
intentions. The Safety Board identified 22 laws, regulations and decrees which were applicable 
                                               
624 http://www.rgd.nl/fileadmin/redactie/Smaak/SMAAK-51.pdf p. 63. (date last accessed: 14-1-2014) 
625 http://www.rgd.nl/fileadmin/redactie/Smaak/SMAAK-51.pdf p. 63. (date last accessed: 14-1-2014) 
626 Baardemans and Van Vollenhoven (2007), p. 26.   
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in the case of the fire at the Schiphol-Oost detention center: penitentiary legislation (3), 
legislation in respect of incarceration of aliens (5), Working Conditions legislation (3), 
construction legislation (6), spatial planning legislation (2) and fire services legislation (3).627  
 
Next to these formal rules, there were also informal rules which were applicable. In 1994, the 
Ministry of BZK had developed the Cells and Cell Blocks Fire Safety Scheme. It was intended 
to serve as a guideline for the designers, builders and users of cell blocks. Parties involved with 
evaluating fire safety could use the fire safety scheme to obtain an understanding of the 
coherence between fire safety measures and fire safety provisions. The fire safety scheme was 
not legally enforceable legislation, but the Minister of the Interior had written to the House of 
Representatives that “in practice, the auxiliary material, guidelines and directives provide an 
important framework for action and accountability which also applies to the addressee.”628  
 
The Board concluded that K wing did not comply with the Buildings Decree. Prior to the 
construction, demonstrably insufficient account was taken of the risks regarding fire safety, and 
these were not made known to the DJI on completion of the building, according to the Board.629 
The Board also concluded that the rules for buildings serving as cellblocks were complicated 
and open to interpretation in a variety of ways. An important role in this case was reserved for 
the so-called ‘equivalence article’ in building regulations. This article, with innovation in mind, 
made it possible to deviate from requirements when the building permit application 
demonstrated that the constructural alternative was equivalent as far as fire safety is concerned. 
This equivalence article was used in this case by the RGD to motivate deviations from the 
building permit for the detention center. The Board added that sometimes situations have a 
complexity that makes it difficult for legislature to formulate requirements in an accessible, 
unambiguous way. In such cases, the Board recommended more guidance in the form of 
training.630 
 
The joint inspectorates came to a similar conclusion in their report concerning the fire safety of 
cell complexes with units, stating that the legal framework was aimed at individual sectors 
(construction, labor, fire safety, etc.). This led to a complex framework and fragmentation in 
the granting of licenses and supervision. The lack of uniformity in interpretation and execution 
of regulations was found to be a hindrance to improving fire safety.631  
 
 
7.3.3. Motives  
 
7.3.3.1. Primary motives  
 
Three primary motives have been identified before:  
 
a. rational choice (e.g. a rational choice to commit an act is taken after weighing all the 
options) 
b. ignorance (e.g. errors due to not knowing the relevant rules or due to lack of 
professionalism) or  
c. unwillingness (e.g. governmental organizations who feel that they are confronted by 
rules that are impossible to carry out because of wicked dilemmas) 
                                               
627 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 38. 
628 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 43-44. 
629 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 173. 
630 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 8. 
631 VROM-inspectie, Arbeidsinspectie, IOOV (2006), p. 8. 
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Rational choice as a motive would imply that in this case a rational choice has been made to 
jeopardize the safety of the cell occupants and the personnel after weighing all the options. There 
is no evidence in this case that such a rational choice has been made. It is clear that none of the 
organizations nor the people involved in this case had any intention aimed at the deaths and injuries 
that took place. As in other cases, it appears to be clear that nobody wanted these terrible things to 
happen. Whether all necessary precautions were taken as well as they should have been is another 
matter, but it would be untrue to say that a rational choice has been made here to commit this act.  
 
Ignorance is an important factor, however. One of the guards who opened Cell 11, Roxana 
Kotzebue (25 years old at the time), had been working at the detention center for a year when the 
fire happened. 
 
“I have never had a fire drill”, she said. They had not been held that year. “Otherwise I 
would have heard about it.” She knows of an emergency response plan, but she has never 
read it. “I thought: It is not necessary, everything always went so well in the cell complex. 
It was supposed to be in a yellow folder, but there were many yellow folders in the office.”632 
 
Her colleague Sam had been at the detention center for one month longer and also did not know 
about the emergency response plan or an evacuation plan. He said he never had an instruction on 
how to act in case of a fire. He did not know where the fire extinguishers were. Another of the 
guards, Bas (25), had worked at the detention center since 2003. When he started he received a 
booklet, ‘How to act in case of an emergency’. Later he would say that the information became 
diluted and that people did not re-read the booklet.633 
 
The emergency response plan clearly stated what should have been done: open the door hatch of 
the cell, view the situation and in the case of a fire, extinguish the fire through the hatch. Otherwise, 
release the cell occupant from the cell and close the door again. The fact that the guards did not 
know this and had not practiced this proved to be highly consequential. On the other hand, all 
personnel had received some training. The Public Prosecution, when deciding not to prosecute the 
personnel, also took into account the stress they were under, the age of the personnel, the situation, 
and the lack of practice. Public prosecutor Veneberg said about this: 
 
“You can wonder if one evacuation drill a year is enough, but it is in line with the permit.”634   
 
Her colleague Onderwater added:  
 
“They had all been trained. Perhaps that training was not sufficient, but we could do 
nothing about that fact.”635  
 
The minimal requirements had been met, in the sense that all personnel had received a folder with 
instructions and had signed saying they had received them. Veneberg added that whether they read 
those instructions was a relevant question.636  
 
Unwillingness is also present in this case. There were indeed wicked dilemmas to be faced in this 
case and the pressure on the governing bodies involved can be deemed considerable. Possibly the 
                                               
632 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 49. 
633 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 50. 
634 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 182. 
635 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 182. 
636 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 182. 
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greatest dilemma was that prisons are meant to keep inmates inside, while fire safety requires them 
to get outside as soon as possible. This dilemma between keeping in and letting out is seen clearly 
in the issue of a central system for unlocking all doors in the cell complex. In a case of fire, such a 
system would mean all inmates were released from their cells at the same time. Such a large group 
would be very difficult for the guards to control, making the working conditions for the guards 
unsafe. Such a system would also cause fire safety problems, as the opening of the doors would 
add oxygen to the fire, possibly causing the same effect that the opening of the cell door had in 
this specific fire. For these reasons, the cabinet chose against such a system and were supported in 
this choice by parliament.637 Unwillingness would also imply that the institutions, because of these 
wicked dilemmas, did not want to abide by the rules. The question then is whether they could not 
or did not want to. It seems that it is difficult to prove that they did not want to, although it is clear 
that the governing bodies involved were already in a difficult situation before the fire and were 
dealing with some difficult dilemmas.  
 
 
7.3.3.2. Secondary motives  
 
a. financial concerns (cutting costs, staying within budget, avoiding claims, etc.) 
 
There has been discussion in this case about the possible financial motives. All those involved 
recognized that the detention center had been built in some haste, with strain on the budget. 
Nevertheless, there has not been convincing proof that this was a decisive – nor even an influential 
– factor in the fire. On the contrary, even the Safety Board has concluded that the speed with which 
the building was constructed cannot be proven to have had an impact on the development of the 
fire. Clearly, financial concerns were present (also when it came to hiring personnel), but were not 
an overriding motive in this case. 
 
b. the position of the governmental organization and its public image  
 
Prison organizations are accustomed to receiving criticism of the prison facilities: part of society 
feels that every euro spent on detainees is too much spent already (the classic misconception that 
‘prisons are just like hotels’), while another part of society feels that inmates are unfairly treated 
and do not receive enough facilities, or support to make their way back into society after prison. 
This dilemma has an added dimension when it comes to illegal aliens, since the societal debate on 
asylum seekers was, and still is, often a heated one. It seems too far fetched to suggest that the 
condition of prisons in the Netherlands was a possible motive in this case. They were used to being 
the subject of public scrutiny and their position or public image was not the main factor here.  
 
c. preferring another norm than the law strives for  
 
This motive might apply if there had been a conscious decision not to adhere to fire regulations. 
This however has not been the case: in fact, the necessary permits had been given and the personnel 
had been trained according to the legal norms. Clearly, this compliance with the law did not form 
adequate prevention for the fire, but it is clear that this was not a case in which the civil servants 
involved ‘revolted’ against the applicable rules. 
  
 
 
                                               
637 TK 2006-2007, 24587, nr. 199, p. 7. 
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d. demands by politicians, citizens, special interest groups and media 
 
The pressure that was exercised by politicians on the speedy construction of the detention center 
has been discussed extensively. Media attention exacerbated the heated climate in which prison 
buildings were constructed. Many of the people involved have stated that they, too, had raised 
concerns over the speed and attitude with which the TDBV performed this task. The TDBV 
received considerable discretionary powers in order to raise prison capacity quickly, sometimes in 
an unorthodox manner. The pressure was applied, but it should be pointed out again that this has 
not been shown to have an influence on the occurrence or development of the fire.  
 
 
7.3.4. Masking  
 
Adams and Balfour argued that a characteristic of administrative evil is that it is masked, in the 
sense that there are many factors preventing us from identifying what is really going on and judging 
whether that constitutes administrative evil or not. In the following part, these factors are described 
briefly and subsequently analyzed in relation to this case. 
 
 
7.3.4.1. Distance in time and space  
 
Clearly, perspectives are influenced by time and space. Distance in time is often used as an 
argument: Back then things were in order. With the knowledge of now things might have been 
different. An example of this could be seen in the debate with the House of Representatives on 
October 25, 2006. Minister of VROM Winsemius was asked why a larger wing was constructed 
than was allowed for in the permit (the wing was allowed to encompass 500 square meters, but 
in reality it was 850 square meters). He pointed to the principle of equivalence638 and said that 
it was permissible to build a bigger wing, provided that compensating measures were taken.  
 
“That is the line of thought as it was with us at that time. You might say ‘we’ll change 
that’, but then we are talking about the glasses of today, looking back to yesterday.”639  
 
Winsemius tried to put into perspective what the situation was at the detention center on that 
fatal night. He talked about the personnel working that specific night in the detention center, 
describing them as ‘people in the frontline’:  
 
“Late at night they are watching eleven, twelve television screens and between one 
moment and the next, there is an inferno. The man I spoke to said: this was the frontline. 
That is different from the movie [meaning the movie that the Safety Board made about 
the course of events]. In the movie, piano music was played and there was a stimulating 
voice at the beginning. That is almost offensive for the people from the frontline, because 
things were different. Of course errors were made, but they did act with great speed. I 
think that is extraordinary, though indeed it did not all go well. I have, however, no 
concrete indications that the knowledge that the buildings were incendive failed to arrive 
at the right spot because of the organizational culture. I do suspect that things would 
have gone better if the culture had been sharper at this point.”640 
 
                                               
638 See the explanation in the paragraph on rules, regulations and procedures.  
639 TK, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1213. 
640 TK, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1213. 
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In the debate, Winsemius later compared this situation to a cricket match. In a cricket match, 
there can be long spells of hours at a time where a player has nothing to do. But sometimes, 
after standing in the heat for six hours in a row, he has to catch a ball that comes at him like a 
rocket. If he drops the ball, he lets the entire team down. In order to cope with this, Winsemius 
expanded, you need to take pride in your task and have a good team spirit. Winsemius warned 
against wisdom after the fact here and asked for more understanding for the difficult situation 
the personnel were in at that time. He acknowledged that mistakes were made, but also made a 
plea for learning instead of condemning.   
 
As far as distance in time is concerned, it is striking to say the least that there have been so 
many different investigations into the cause of the fire, each differing from the ones that went 
before. Clearly, perspectives have changed over the course of the years because of all these 
investigations. What is truth and what is fiction is still often difficult to discern and sometimes 
requires expert knowledge about fire safety. But it is not just the cause of the fire that is 
complex, other aspects such as alien detention can come to be viewed in a different light as time 
goes by. The definitive judgment of history on the fire in the Schiphol-Oost detention center is 
possibly yet to come.  
 
 
7.3.4.2. Object-relations psychology/scapegoating (splitting mechanism)  
 
The Safety Board concluded that blame was often laid on other organizations involved. It 
pointed out that the governmental organizations involved were tempted to focus on the 
responsibilities of others, thereby disregarding their own responsibility. Just as an example, one 
can consider the remarks Airport Fire Officer Zuijdervliet of the fire brigade Schiphol made to 
the Rijksrecherche: 
 
“I would also like to state that in my view the guidance and reception by the penitentiary 
institution seriously fell short of the mark. The fire brigade got no reception at all at 
arrival. No information was given concerning the current situation, especially about 
whether or not there were persons left in the spaces that were threatened by the fire. 
And our personnel felt threatened by the behavior of the people present in J wing. 
Something else also grips me: A full detection system was present in the institution. That, 
in combination with 24-hour surveillance, makes me amazed that a fire of this magnitude 
could have taken place before the fire brigade arrived.”641  
 
While it seems clear that some finger pointing, whether justifiable or not, was going on between 
the organizations involved (for example, the arguments between the municipality of 
Haarlemmermeer and the Ministry of Justice), it is more complex when it comes to the 
individuals involved. Certainly, the guards felt scapegoated. There was disbelief and anger at 
the fact that the personnel members were even considered as suspects. The guards and the Site 
Manager perceived this as a great injustice, but other government personnel did too. Fireman 
Peter Vreeken, who was at the fire at the time, was angry at the treatment of the guards of J and 
K wings: 
 
“They gave everything that night, and yet at a certain moment two were suspected of 
culpable homicide. I found that completely unjustified. These people had black marks 
on their faces. It is not the case that they sat outside waiting on a bench while in the 
                                               
641 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 58. 
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meantime the place was burning down to the ground. Whoever thinks that, does not know 
what they are talking about.”642 
 
One could argue that since the guards and the Site Manager were not prosecuted in the end they 
were exonerated. And if this was scapegoating, it was not done by DJI and the RGD, who 
supported their personnel. It would be difficult to claim that they scapegoated their own 
personnel.  
 
In the public debate, it was often stated that Al-Jeballi was the scapegoat for the Ministry of 
Justice and the Public Prosecution. Some of the survivors have stated that they believed the 
wrong person was convicted. The government was not convicted or even prosecuted, it was 
only a survivor who was convicted over the tragic events. A survivor of the fire, Moustapha El 
Boukhari, expressed his feelings about this as follows: 
 
 “The sheep has been punished and the wolf roams around.”643 
 
Public prosecutor Onderwater was indignant about this public image of his decisions: 
 
“I found it disturbing that the image developed that we were looking with all our might 
for a scapegoat. I have no personal feelings about a suspect. But the media often 
reproached us for this, saying that we wanted revenge. The only thing we do and the 
only thing we want is investigation in the interest of finding the truth. Nothing more. 
That is our task.”644  
 
He also stated that the Public Prosecution had all the freedom needed to take its own decisions, 
both to name government personnel as suspects and to drop them as suspects.  
 
 
7.3.4.3. Perspective  
 
As mentioned before, the perspective from which evil is most often recognized is that of the victim. 
This often makes for the ‘myth of pure evil’. This is partly due to the fact that modern culture 
shows tendencies, exacerbated by mass media, to present moral questions in black and white: all 
good or all bad. Elements of the myth of pure evil can be detected in the way the case of the fire 
at the Schiphol-Oost detention center has been covered in the media. The story might be 
described as a simple case: The government quickly built cheap and unsafe prisons because 
they needed to lock up drugs swallowers. When fire broke out, they made a mess of things and 
failed to save the inmates, who were treated badly since the regime for immigration detainees 
had become ever more stringent. In the end, government laid the blame on one of the cell 
inmates and let their own people walk away without punishment.  
 
The completely opposite perspective can also be pictured. From this perspective, government 
is blamed for every possible disaster, even when lightning strikes or simple bad luck has led to 
a disaster. Here, government is always the easiest scapegoat when things go wrong. For the 
case in hand, several arguments could be combined. An inmate carelessly threw a cigarette in 
his cell, which led to a fire in which lives were lost. The guards tried to rescue him and the other 
inmates and, endangering, managed to save 32 inmates although 11 lives were lost. The 
                                               
642 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 181. 
643 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 174. 
644 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 182. 
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construction of the building turned out to be flawed, since mistakes had been made by the 
construction company. Certainly DJI and RGD also made mistakes in this case, and these have 
been treated disproportionately because the event also provided an opportunity to question the 
Dutch government’s immigration policy. The cascade of coincidences, bad luck and errors (not 
only by government, but also by Al-Jeballi and the building company) which had nothing to do 
at all with immigration policy was completely disregarded in the public debate that focused on 
scapegoating government.   
 
Whether one agrees or disagrees with such an interpretation, it can be concluded that moral 
judgment with regard to the role of the government is often a case of black or white, when in 
fact things are often more complex. That should not lead away from firm conclusions, but the 
myth of pure evil does seem present here.   
 
The perspective of the victim often differs greatly from that of the perpetrator. This is called the 
‘magnitude gap’. From the victim’s perspective, most often in hindsight, evil can be clearly 
identified. From the perpetrator’s perspective, however, it is often a problem to identify evil. From 
what went before it must be clear that very different perspectives are adopted here. First of all, 
who were the victims? Certainly, the cell occupants were victims. However, the guards were 
also victims of what happened and had traumatic experiences. And it took many years before 
one of the cell occupants, Al-Jeballi, was acquitted from charges as a perpetrator of the fire. 
The victims argued that the government was the perpetrator, the reason they tried to get the 
government and its employees prosecuted. Both parties felt unfairly treated in many ways, and 
although there seems no reason to doubt the genuine intentions of any of the parties, on the 
other hand they cannot all be right in every aspect at the same time. Clearly, the ‘magnitude 
gap’ is present in this case. 
 
 
7.3.4.4. Language  
 
The use of technical language or euphemisms often masks what is really going on and provides 
for emotional distance towards sensitive issues. Language therefore often masks wrongdoing 
or administrative evil. An example of this is the decision to place Al-Jeballi in an isolation cell 
right after arrival in the prison in Heerhugowaard, Such a measure is not normal for new 
prisoners. In the book by De Haan and Zuidervaart, retired jail director Teule explains this by 
saying that in the cases which society finds most shocking, the Ministry of Justice is especially 
keen that suspects stand trial and that the maximum is done to prevent suicide. This, according 
to Teule, is never put down on paper or even talked about. Apparently the decision to place Al-
Jeballi in isolation was based on the ground that he was considered to be suicidal. A psychiatrist 
who visited Al-Jeballi the next day found ‘no trace of suicidal tendencies’. Nevertheless, the 
isolation sanction was prolonged with the following motivation:  
 
“This decision is partly taken based on the advice of the psychiatrist and the psycho-
medical consultations.”645 
 
When asked how this could be after the psychiatrist said completely the opposite, Teule gave 
the following explanation: 
 
“How do these things go? Hans shall have said: At this moment I don’t see indications 
                                               
645 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 103. 
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but I cannot comment on what will happen in the future. But I know from my own 
experience that if you put someone in isolation long enough, that person will start to flip 
out by himself. So the risk gets bigger by itself.”646 
 
After a while, Al-Jeballi was placed under permanent camera observation, but he was still not 
allowed to see fellow inmates. The isolation sanction was finally lifted in July 2006. It should 
be added here that regulations require that a doctor or psychologist judges whether possible 
suicidal tendencies are present. Such an assessment has to be repeated daily and the assessment 
by the psychiatrist should be verified by the supervisory committee of the institution. The 
attorney of the defendant has the right to ask a ruling by a judge on this matter.  
 
 
7.3.4.5. Dehumanization  
 
It is essential that subjects are put at a distance through language, by making them ‘numbers’, 
‘things’ or calling them inhuman. Quoting Zygmunt Bauman again: 
 
“People, things, events are ‘programmed’; they are ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’, feedback loops, 
variables, percentages, processes, etc., until every contact with concrete situations has 
become abstract. Then all that is left are charts, collections of statistics, print copies.”647 
 
Certainly, all parties involved expressed their shock and horror at the events and extended their 
sympathies to the victims. Nevertheless, some things come to mind in examining whether there 
was dehumanization involved in this case. 
 
It is clear that immigration detainees form one of the weakest groups in society in the 
Netherlands. The fact that they are illegal makes for a life in which they are often exploited by 
others and, in some cases, are more prone to resort to criminal behavior. The stories of the cell 
inmates who survived the fire are no different. Nevertheless, whatever position one takes in this 
discussion, it is clear that government is responsible for the safety of the inmates. In this light, 
the stepping down of two ministers and a mayor accentuates that this special responsibility was 
accepted here by government. What is also clear is what the Safety Board concluded about the 
relief and aftercare of the inmates:  
 
“In view of the insufficient preparation for relief and aftercare, the eventual quality of 
the relief and aftercare of the cell occupants after the fire was - with the exception of a 
number of good local ad hoc measures - inadequate in important areas.”648 
 
In debates in the House of Representatives, criticism was made of the government for not 
reacting appropriately to requests for psychological help. However, after he visited the 
survivors, Minister Donner told a national news program, the ‘Journaal’, that they were satisfied 
with the aftercare they received from government.649 
 
Much discussion took place concerning the handing out of resident permits to the survivors and 
the expulsion of criminal asylum seekers. The treatment of Al-Jeballi has also led to criticism. 
As discussed earlier, he was interrogated immediately after waking from a coma, he was placed 
                                               
646 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 103. 
647 Bauman (1989), p. 146-147. 
648 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 175. 
649 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 96. 
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in isolation for more than half a year, watched over by cameras and visited in his cell every 
single day. After he was released from prison because he had already served the length of his 
sentence, he was deported to Libya. 
 
An analysis on these points is given by Van den Hemel.650 He argues that the fire in the 
Schiphol-Oost detention center was framed by government and Public Prosecution as a legal 
and administrative case, whereas in his view this case cannot be understood without considering 
the position of illegal aliens: 
 
“The fire in the Schiphol-Oost detention center can rather be seen as a moment which 
shows in what way the criminalization of the illegal alien makes it possible to violate 
human rights. For such an interpretation it is necessary to cast a clear look on processes 
of marginalization. Processes of marginalization do not only appear in court, but are 
made possible by the image building, conceptualization and structuring of political 
reality. Answers to the question ‘what is the significance of the fire in the Schiphol-Oost 
detention center’ can only be given if the status of the illegal alien in society is 
explained.”651  
 
Van den Hemel went on to quote Hanna Arendt, who argued that since human rights are 
awarded to citizens of nation states, displaced people are an unprotected group. If one is no 
longer a member of a nation state, one’s human rights are often disregarded by the nation states 
that primarily take care of their own citizens. He also quoted a report by Amnesty International 
in 2008 about the Dutch policy on aliens: 
 
“This report concludes that elements of Dutch policies and practices breach the state’s 
human rights obligations. Policies and measures which, in principal, are in accordance 
with minimum obligations imposed by international human rights standards, still have 
a negative impact on the well-being of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers.”652 
 
Van den Hemel argued that the fire took place in an unsafe and badly controlled detention center 
and in a political climate that allowed for the violation of the human rights of immigration 
detainees. He also claimed that the prosecution of Al-Jeballi (as scapegoat) kept attention away 
from a possible connection between the treatment of illegal aliens in the Netherlands and the 
fire in the detention center.  
 
Whereas the position of illegal aliens deserves concern from government, one question is 
disregarded here by Van den Hemel: Is it true that illegal aliens were treated differently than 
others? More specifically: Did other prisoners get better treatment in prison than the illegal 
aliens? From what has been seen earlier, this conclusion cannot be drawn. Alongside the illegal 
aliens, there were drugs swallowers and people suspected of crimes at Schiphol airport held in 
the same cell complex. There were two differences: In K wing inmates were allowed to smoke 
and J and K wing were the only wings not to have guards present 24 hours a day. Both can 
hardly be seen as worse treatment, perhaps sooner as privileges. It should be added that aliens 
were held in other parts of the detention center as well, making it even less plausible that this 
                                               
650 http://www.flexmens.org/drupal/?q=Wij_zijn_hier_-_Ernst_van_den_Hemel, September 3, 2009. (date last 
accessed: 20-8-2011) 
651 http://www.flexmens.org/drupal/?q=Wij_zijn_hier_-_Ernst_van_den_Hemel, September 3, 2009. (date last 
accessed: 20-8-2011) 
652 http://www.flexmens.org/drupal/?q=Wij_zijn_hier_-_Ernst_van_den_Hemel, September 3, 2009. (date last 
accessed: 20-8-2011) 
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was a conscious policy to be less attentive to fire safety or other human rights for that matter 
when it came to the treatment of illegal aliens.  
 
The question is whether one can see ‘dehumanization’ here. As far as any connection between 
the position of illegal aliens and the prison circumstances is concerned, such a connection 
cannot be found here. On the other points, it can be said that formal requirements were often 
met, but that in practice several things (such as the aftercare for the inmates) were not up to the 
standards that should be met. It would go too far to call this dehumanization. 
 
 
7.3.4.6. Technical rationality  
 
Technical rationality can entail that processes become routine and that people do not give 
enough thought to what is really needed. In this case, that remains debatable. From one 
perspective processes were not as routine for the personnel involved as they should have been. 
The personnel were not trained well enough, they were often unaware of the rules and 
procedures and in general fire safety was given insufficient attention. This is the perspective 
sketched by the Safety Board. In the other perspective, the personnel were trained according to 
the rules but, under extreme pressure, human errors were made that were perhaps very difficult 
to avoid. If one is rarely ever faced with such a situation it is an illusion that problems can be 
overcome by training or highly experienced personnel alone. This was compounded by the fact 
that other technical errors were made in the construction of the building. Clearly, if the fire had 
been extinguished the right way (through the hatch of the cell door) and evacuation had been 
performed in the right manner, the consequences would have been far less severe, but taking 
even more stringent measures would in fact lead to a much higher technical rationality than we 
saw here.  
 
7.4.  Response of the governmental organizations involved  
 
7.4.1. Language  
 
7.4.1.1. Internal language 
 
In this case, few internal documents have been leaked or published through Wob requests. It is 
therefore difficult to conclude what language dominated internally. The book by De Haan and 
Zuidervaart was based on several unpublished sources and at times these have been quoted in 
this case study. For the governing bodies involved, there do not seem to be much difference 
between internal and external language as far as can be established. Analysis of the response 
by the governmental organizations involved should therefore focus on the external language 
that was used. 
 
 
7.4.1.2. External language 
 
The day after the fire, a press conference was held by Minister of Justice Donner and Minister 
of Alien Affairs Verdonk. Verdonk stated that on the basis of the information at that time, she 
considered the handling of the case by the prison personnel ‘adequate’. This prompted wide 
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spread criticism, as it was considered by many to be a premature remark.653 The investigations 
into the causes of the fire had just begun. Furthermore, the responsibility for prison personnel 
lay with Donner and not with Verdonk.654 What is interesting is that the word ‘adequate’ was 
singled out at the time, when in fact Verdonk in the same sentence had added the remark ‘as far 
as I can see at this moment’. This statement was made a day after the fire. Verdonk had just 
spoken with personnel who were literally blackened by the fire after they tried to rescue some 
of the inmates. This nuance has been left out in all commentaries in the press. Verdonk has thus 
become famous for a quote that in reality was more cautious than was presented in the press.  
 
Minister of Social Affairs and Employment De Geus publicly stated on September 20, 2006 
that he regretted remarks that he had made in a radio program. In the program, he called the fire 
a ‘dirty trick’ and stated that the cell occupant had deliberately started the fire. De Geus 
apologized and stated that he was not aware of all the facts and should have kept his mouth 
shut, as both the political debate and the court case still had to take place.655  
 
On August 15, 2006, a case was heard before the District Court in Haarlem concerning a demand 
for compensation payments by the victims of the fire. Site Manager Arend de Korte was questioned 
as a witness there. He said:  
 
“In my recollection, the fire brigade came by every month. I myself was not involved in 
those factual checkups. No serious shortcomings were reported to me.”656 
 
De Korte was later questioned by the Court of Appeal on September 30, 2009 that handled the 
complaint filed by the survivors of the fire against the decision by the Public Prosecution not to 
prosecute the guards and the director of the Schiphol-Oost detention center. De Korte called it ‘the 
world turned upside down’ that Al-Jeballi was one of the persons who filed the complaint, because 
in De Korte’s view the consequences would not have been what they were if Al-Jeballi had not 
started the fire. De Korte called the report by the Safety Board ‘flawed in many ways’. He stated 
that the report by the committee Siepel addressed the KMar and did not apply to the employees of 
the DJI. Concerning the fact that an evacuation drill had not been held, although it should be held 
yearly, De Korte replied that the year 2005 was not yet over at the time of the fire (October 26). 
Of the fact that the fire brigade first drove to the wrong entrance, De Korte stated that the fire 
brigade had been involved in talks about the construction of the new fence and had taken the 
drawings with them to adapt one thing and another. If the fire brigade made mistakes, they should 
not be held against his personnel nor against him. De Korte gave the following summary of how 
he viewed the events of that night: 
 
“With danger to their own lives the guards are able to save 32 inmates. During the rescue 
activities, billiard balls are thrown at them by other inmates and they are driven into the 
hearth of the fire. At that time the KMar is coming in with drawn weapons to save the 
guards. If these employees of the KMar had been there a few seconds later, the guards 
could possibly have lost their lives themselves. Instead of receiving a royal decoration for 
saving so many people, an article 12-procedure is started by the same people whose lives 
                                               
653 A special episode in this case was a poster that was made by squatters, with the lines ‘Rita’s travel agency: arrest, 
deportation, cremation. Adequate until the end’. Court procedures went as far up as the Supreme Court. The 
courts found the posters offensive, but maintained that the freedom of speech should prevail and that the posters 
should therefore be allowed. LJN: BG7750, Hoge Raad, 07/12748. 
654 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 65.  
655 http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/830074/de-geus-neemt-woorden-schipholbrand-terug.html (date last accessed: 30-
12-2013) 
656 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 126. 
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they saved.”657 
 
In a letter of October 18, 2006, the Ministers of Justice and VROM reacted to the report by the 
Dutch Safety Board. They emphasized that they accepted the findings of the Safety Board and 
assumed that the fire started and developed in the way the Safety Board had described. They 
added however that the criminal investigation might lead to conclusions that could deviate from 
the conclusions of the Board on this matter. The cabinet added that they took the conclusions 
by the Safety Board as the starting point for future policy on fire safety.  
 
The municipality of Haarlemmermeer reacted to the Safety Board’s report by acknowledging 
its great value, but the municipality also emphasized that on some major issues there were still 
differences of opinion with the Board concerning the interpretation of facts and responsibilities.  
 
“The Safety Board when judging the events adheres to a strict and full application of all 
legal rules. In the practice of public administration the legal rules must be applied to 
tangible cases, which by definition implies that interpretation of regulations must take 
place.”658  
 
The municipality admitted that in retrospect they should have been more critical concerning the 
required expertise. They deemed supervision at the detention center to be in line with their own 
standards as well as national standards, pointing out that at least six inspection visits to J and K 
wings had taken place from 2003 to 2005 (and a total of at least 40 during that period for the 
entire cell complex). The municipality added that the documentation of both the granting of 
permits and the supervision should and would be improved, underlining the conclusions by the 
Board on that point. The municipality also felt that it had performed quite a lot of inspection 
visits (at least six inspections in J and K Wing between January 2003 and October 2005), but 
that it had indeed neglected to adequately register these inspections.659 The municipality 
concluded that it would accept the recommendations by the Board and felt it important to clarify 
responsibilities between governing bodies as well as allowing room for interpretation of 
regulations. A package of measures was presented to improve the situation.660   
 
 
7.4.1.3. Strategy 
 
In an interview, mayor of Haarlemmermeer, Hertog, told of the moment the concept report by 
the Safety Board was received. Hertog claimed that the Minister of Justice had been furious 
with the Safety Board because he received the concept report at the start of July, during the 
recess of the House of Representatives, with only a four week period to respond to the report. 
Hertog said that Haarlemmermeer wrote its response separately from the Ministry of Justice, 
although they did keep in touch about the steps they were taking. Hertog felt that the Ministry 
of Justice adopted a tough approach, whereas the municipality in his view chose a less 
confrontational approach.661 He also signaled this with respect to transparency:  
 
                                               
657 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 204-205. 
658 Municipality Haarlemmermeer (2006), Reactie op het rapport Brand Cellencomplex 
Schiphol-Oost van de Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, September 25, 2006, nr. 06.0350780, p. 3.  
659 Municipality Haarlemmermeer (2006), Reactie op het rapport Brand Cellencomplex 
Schiphol-Oost van de Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, September 25, 2006, nr. 06.0350780, p. 3-6. 
660 Municipality Haarlemmermeer (2006), Reactie op het rapport Brand Cellencomplex 
Schiphol-Oost van de Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, September 25, 2006, nr. 06.0350780, p. 6-9. 
661 Hertog (not dated), p. 70. 
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“With us in Haarlemmermeer, the TV-crews and written press were sitting in our 
basement going through the archives on the basis of the WOB. In The Hague, journalists 
were constantly turned down. The House of Representatives only received limited 
information if you compare it with our City Council.”662  
 
Hertog also revealed his considerations on how to react to the report by the Board: 
 
“With every conclusion we have asked ourselves if it was necessary to invalidate every 
detail or to focus on the things which were most important and were really incorrect 
according to us. If you fight every single aspect, the outside world can get the impression 
that you are attacking the expertise of Van Vollenhoven. That is a struggle that you 
cannot win in the public eye. We chose not to wreck the entire report from A to Z, but to 
invalidate matters on specific issues.”663  
 
When he received the final report, Hertog was especially stunned by two conclusions: the fact 
that the responsible governing bodies had been unable to jointly safeguard safety and the 
conclusion that less people would have died if the fire brigade had arrived at the spot sooner. 
 
“I was astonished. I soon got the picture that this was going the wrong way. Politically, 
I would not get away with it, because after the departure of several aldermen, I was the 
only politician in charge, not only of the fire brigade but also of the granting of permits 
and of supervision.”664 
 
In the end, this report led to Hertog’s decision to resign as mayor. 
 
On the whole, it is clear that there were some conflicts in this case that were relevant to the 
strategy. The Ministry of Justice came into conflict on several occasions with the Safety Board 
and the municipality of Haarlemmermeer. Perhaps inevitably, there are several sides to these 
stories. Nevertheless, it appears that within the Ministry of Justice, many felt that they had been 
unfairly criticized. The response to the movie which the Safety Board had made can be referred 
to here. All this has led to some defensive reactions (‘incremental defensiveness’), which 
probably strengthened the perception that the Ministry of Justice did not want to admit its 
shortcomings. It should be added that the political situation concerning policy on illegal aliens 
made life even more difficult, since this has long been considered a political ‘headache file’. It 
appears that although often factually correct and legally sound responses were given, the 
adopting of several roles by the parties involved has led to a specific dynamics from which it 
seemed difficult to escape. The debate about responsibilities has been dominant in this case. 
 
Looking back to what was said in the chapter on the bodies of knowledge about factors relevant 
to response, it becomes clear that an error management culture aimed at learning from errors 
was not immediately present. The first responses often concerned the way the responsibilities 
between the different parties were divided. There appeared to be little acceptance of risks and 
errors, but the fact that 11 people died in the fire perhaps gave rise to caution about calling 
certain events bad luck or human errors, even when such a judgment could be supported by the 
facts. Several steps described earlier in the ideal process for reacting to integrity violations are 
found in this case. Independent judgments were made on many occasions (investigations by the 
Public Prosecution, the Safety Board, the Committee Hendrikx and so on), but nevertheless this 
                                               
662 Hertog (not dated), p. 68. 
663 Hertog (not dated), p. 70. 
664 Hertog (not dated), p. 71. 
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did not seem to have generated public consensus about what happened in this case. A political 
judgment on the case has led to the resignation of the ministers and the mayor who were 
involved. There has been extensive debate about what lessons could be learned and a large set 
of measures has been adopted.  
 
Responses by government in this case were partly in line with the typical responses to 
organizational crime. This concerned not so much the severity of the criminal act (though court 
judgments underlined that this was not a criminal act) but more the denial of culpability for the 
criminal act: denial or shirking of responsibilities, emphasizing the necessity of the behavior 
and ‘condemning the condemners’. The typical responses to rule breaking by governments that 
were found in this case included shock at being prosecuted, instancing the many different, 
complex and contradictory interests that government had to address here, the complex and 
contradictory rules, and the argument that, under the given circumstances, their behavior should 
be considered adequate. It is in line with theory of state crime that the state itself can define 
what is criminal. The conclusion by the Safety Board was that responsibility here should be laid 
at the organizational level: The organization should have taken better precautionary measures 
and should have paid more attention to aspects of fire safety. Individuals made mistakes as well, 
but the court judged that these mistakes did not involve such carelessness or intent to justify 
prosecuting them. Immunity to criminal prosecution prevented a criminal trial for the State, 
confirming the theory in state crime literature and raising questions that could have been 
answered in a court case. It has to be admitted that such a case would have been fraught with 
difficulties, since responsibilities were shared by many organizational layers and individuals, 
and political aspects could easily be confused with criminal aspects. Nevertheless, this would 
also have been true for municipalities that have been prosecuted in other cases. In summary, 
the responses by government were in line with state crime theory: denial of any criminal aspects 
of behavior by the state and pointing to other possible responsible parties. All in all, it is fair to 
say that government has reacted mostly in line with theory, here, especially in that the responses 
concerning the division of responsibilities were dominant.  
 
 
7.5. Placing in the space between error and evil   
 
7.5.1. Error  
 
Errors were defined as deviations between the intended and actual outcome of an action, that 
are (1) unintentional and where (2) the error maker should have known better, implying that the 
error was potentially avoidable. Error should also be clearly distinguished from its 
consequences. In many ways, the fire at the Schiphol-Oost detention center shows the 
characteristics that are familiar in the literature on error management. A combination of errors 
and coincidence, which are intertwined in a complicated way, could be seen as the cause of the 
fire. The direct causes can be named: the building was not constructed well enough from a 
viewpoint of fire safety665, the door should not have been opened by the guards, the guards 
should have evacuated away from the fire instead of towards the fire, the fire brigade could 
have been there sooner if only they had arrived at the right entrance, and so on. The indirect 
causes, such as lack of training, little emphasis on fire safety and lack of organizational 
                                               
665 To give another example of this: as mentioned before, the hatches of the Smoke and Heat Exhaust Ventilation 
(RWA) system, which the fire alarm system should have opened automatically at the time of the fire alarm, 
remained closed. It turned out that there had to be three systems (mains, battery and ampoule), two of which 
should have functioned as backup systems. In theory, if the mains power goes out then there is the battery, 
otherwise even the ampoule. It was found that all three did not function and that the ampoule was apparently 
incorrectly inserted. Also see Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 70-71. 
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measures can also be signaled. What makes this case complicated is that virtually every possible 
cause is debated over and over again, as there have been as many as eight investigations into 
the cause of the fire, not including the reports by committees, books and articles on the case. 
Absolute certainty concerning the direct cause of the fire is difficult to achieve and has become 
a struggle between experts and is by now difficult to follow for people with little expertise in 
technical fire analysis.  
 
Nevertheless, there are many errors to be identified in the case. These errors were certainly 
unintentional, occurred in actions that were actually aimed at saving the cell occupants and 
were also avoidable in the sense that the persons involved could and perhaps should have known 
better. Minister of VROM Winsemius concluded: 
 
“With every subject there is a story to tell. Taken together however, it becomes a story 
that you don’t want to tell to your children at the breakfast table, because it is a bad 
story. It is not a story to be proud of.”666  
 
Several times in the debate with the House of Representatives, Winsemius pointed out that 
lessons should be learned from the way that the aviation industry and the chemical industry deal 
with errors.  
 
“The great lesson that one learns in aviation and chemical industry, is that it should be 
safe to deal with a lack of safety. If people do not report near misses, they do not learn 
and accidents are not prevented. That is the core of safety management.”667  
 
He added that this was a difficult task, because it lays a special responsibility with ministers, 
the top of the civil service and in some way also with parliament. According to Winsemius, 
special leadership was needed to deal with these difficulties.  
 
It should be recognized that next to organizational issues, human behavior will always be 
relevant in dealing with risks like this. For sure, that implies that organizations must be aware 
of selecting the right people and training and equipping them properly, but that still does not 
offer 100% security that every possible risk will be dealt with adequately all the time. A balance 
has to be found between investing in these measures for improving safety and leaving room for 
discretion, as well as allowing time and investment in other relevant aspects of the work at 
hand. 
 
 
7.5.2. Integrity violation  
 
Integrity was defined earlier as the quality of acting in accordance with relevant moral values, 
norms and rules. The question here is whether the actions by the governmental organizations 
involved (DJI, RGD and the municipality of Haarlemmermeer) or the people who were working 
for them can be seen as integrity violations. It should be pointed out then that many of the acts 
were in fact in accordance with the norms and rules. The detention center possessed the 
necessary permits, although the Safety Board concluded that the municipality of 
Haarlemmermeer should not have granted the building permit for the cell complex. There is no 
evidence however that illegal actions have been undertaken to persuade the municipality to do 
                                               
666 TK, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1209. 
667 TK, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1213. 
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so. No corruption has been shown to be of influence here.668 No criminal or illegal activities by 
the State have been proven in court either. It cannot be established that the actions by 
governmental organizations and its employees constituted integrity violations.  
 
 
7.5.3. Organizational crime  
 
The first issue here is that of criminalization: Can the governmental behavior in the selected 
case study be defined as criminal, meaning that the behavior constitutes a violation of existing 
criminal law? This question can be answered swiftly in a formal way: None of the organizations 
involved have been convicted for a crime. In fact, none of them (DJI, RGD nor the municipality 
of Haarlemmermeer) have been prosecuted. In the case of DJI and RGD this was to be expected, 
because in the Netherlands the State is immune to prosecution on account of the Volkel arrest. 
White collar crime, implying a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status 
in the course of his occupation, does not apply to the case of the fire in the Schiphol-Oost detention 
center. None of the people involved from the governmental side have been convicted of a crime. 
Corporate crime would refer to corporations or private organizations involved in criminal 
activities. That is not applicable in this case, as there is little or no role for private organizations. 
Only two of the guards present were from a private security firm. Some references have been made 
to the role of the private company involved in the construction of the building but none of the 
private companies involved have been prosecuted for their part in this case. All in all, the claim 
that a private organization played a large part here, let alone a criminal part, is not credible.  
 
 
7.5.4. Rule breaking by governments  
 
Rule-breaking governmental organizations have been defined as governmental organizations 
that violate rules or standards while executing their responsibilities. To be sure, in its report the 
Safety Board reached the conclusion that rules were often complex and open to interpretation 
in a variety of ways. An important role in this case was reserved for the ‘equivalence article’ in 
building regulations. It is not surprising the different parties gave different answers to the 
question whether it was permissible to go further than the building permit allowed (and 
according to the Board, it should not have been granted by the municipality of 
Haarlemmermeer). One might be tempted to say that if rules were broken, it was because of 
this ambiguity. Nevertheless, the Board also formulated tough conclusions on the role the 
organization played in this case: 
 
“The organization of the Schiphol-Oost detention center was insufficiently prepared and 
set up for an outbreak of fire, as a result of which the staff members on duty were faced 
with a virtually impossible task. The Site Manager did not draw up any risk inventory in 
advance, and did not sufficiently think through how the staff should act in the event of 
fire. The main directorate of the Custodial Institutions Service (DJI) did not provide any 
framework and/or create any conditions for this. In addition, supervision was limited.”669 
 
In other cases of this dissertation, conclusions such as these have been seen before. In such 
cases (notably the fire brigade divers), these conclusions led to prosecution for violating the 
                                               
668 There has been a case of an employee of the RGD who in May 2007 was convicted for corruption involving the 
building of the cell complex. This project manager secured orders for befriended building companies. A causal 
relation between any problems in building the cell complex and the fire could not be established. De Haan and 
Zuidervaart (2010), p. 141-142. 
669 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 170. 
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Labor Conditions Act. However, no organization has been prosecuted by the public prosecutor 
for its role in the Schiphol detention center fire. In a way, this makes sense because of the Volkel 
arrest, which granted immunity for criminal prosecution to the State. On the other hand, if 
municipalities are prosecuted and sometimes even convicted for not training their personnel, 
for having limited supervision and inadequate training, it seems plausible that the actions of the 
State could also be the subject of scrutiny from the Dutch courts. It should be mentioned that 
the Safety Board did not conclude that violations of the Labor Conditions Act took place in this 
case, since this has not been proven. The minimal requirements in this area had been met. All 
in all, there is not enough evidence to characterize this case as rule breaking by government.  
 
 
7.5.5. State crime  
 
State crime was defined before as illegal or socially injurious acts of omission or commission 
by individuals in an institution of political governance for the attainment of state or state 
agencies’ operational goals. The question whether the acts by the governmental organizations 
involved were illegal has been discussed before. The failure to save the lives of the 11 cell 
occupants could be labeled ‘socially injurious’. This then must be seen as an act of omission 
rather than commission, as clearly neither this fire nor its consequences were commissioned, 
but rather involved a failure both in preventing as well as in combating the fire. This failure is 
by no means a simple matter as has become clear, a cascade of events and errors combined to 
account for the tragic ending. The people involved (the guards, the Site Manager, the firemen, 
etc.) were certainly working in an institution of political governance. The main question here is 
whether they were acting for the attainment of state or state agencies’ operational goals. To be 
sure, there is no sign of intentionality towards the consequences of the fire by anybody. All 
those involved had traumatic experiences on the night of the fire, no one would have wanted 
this to happen. This also goes for Al-Jeballi, as the Court of Appeal ruled that there was no 
proof nor other signs that his intentions were aimed at the death of the cell occupants. These 
acts then were not in any way aimed at attaining a state goal. The state goal was to lock up these 
immigration detainees awaiting their return to their native country, not to put their lives in 
danger.  
   
 
7.5.6. Administrative evil  
 
First of all, is there evil in this case? Evil is defined by Adams and Balfour as “actions of human 
beings that unjustly or needlessly inflict pain and suffering and death on other human beings”.  
 
- people engage in acts of evil.  
 
Actions can also imply a lack of actions or undertaking the wrong actions. One could argue that 
the lack of adequate prevention as well as the lack of an adequate immediate response by the 
organization and the people in it were significant causes of the deaths of the inmates. In fact, 
that was the conclusion of the Safety Board.670 It should be remembered here that this conclusion 
by the Board has been debated fiercely and that since then the Board has never produced a 
conclusion worded in this way. Whether all this can be called ‘unjust’ is still being debated, but 
that it is ‘needless’ should be clear to everyone. The pain and suffering and death are clear as 
                                               
670 Dutch Safety Board (2006), p. 10. 
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many people suffered injuries, both physical and psychological (as evidenced by the many 
PTSS-disorders) and eleven people died.  
 
- perpetrators are not aware that they are doing anything wrong.  
 
“The common characteristic is that people can engage in acts of evil without being aware 
that they are in fact doing anything at all wrong. Indeed, ordinary people may simply be 
acting appropriately in their organizational role – in essence, just doing what those around 
them would agree they should be doing – and at the same time be participating in what a 
critical and reasonable observer, usually well after the fact, would call evil.” 671 
  
This certainly seems true, as none of the people involved deliberately undertook evil acts or 
even dangerous actions. In fact, the guards did their very best to save as many lives as possible, 
at risk to their own health.  
 
- it is masked (less easily recognized as evil) 
Certainly, there has been some masking going on. The fact that there have been eight 
investigations into the cause of the fire shows at least that new facts seem to appear all the time. 
Depending on the viewpoint one takes, a tendency to un-name evil may or may not be signaled. 
Organizational structure certainly played a large part here, as there is clearly a diffusion of 
responsibilities. As pointed out before, shifting of responsibilities and scapegoating has taken 
place. A culture of technical rationality is more difficult to see, although arguments could be 
made here. 
 
- there can be moral inversion: something evil is presented as something that is 
actually good 
 
There is no evidence of moral inversion. No one has argued that there was anything good about 
events that fatal night. As Winsemius put it: This is not a story you want to tell to your 
grandchildren. Summing up, there are several elements of administrative evil present here, but 
some elements are missing as well. While masking certainly seems to have taken place in many 
ways, the elements of technical rationality and moral inversion do not seem strong here. 
 
7.6. Conclusions  
 
There is no easy answer to why and how governmental behavior in this case led to the deaths of 
the inmates. In many ways, this is a classic example of error: a dramatic concurrence of events, 
which led to the fatal outcome. For sure, errors have been made, both by organizations and 
individuals. It would be disproportionate and besides the fact to point to one single responsible 
actor: many of the parties involved could have acted in a manner that would at least have helped 
in limiting the negative outcome of the fire. The question what caused this fatal accident and 
how this happened has been researched extensively. The conclusion has to be that error and bad 
luck have prevailed here. To quote the verdict of the Court of Appeal on the decision not to 
prosecute governmental actors in this case: 
 
“The Court considers that in the fire in the night of October 26 to October 27, 2005, a 
highly unfortunate coincidence of various circumstances has led to the dramatic 
                                               
671 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 4. 
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outcome in the end. Several technical failures, actions and failures to act by persons 
involved played a role here, in addition to other factors.”672 
 
Public prosecutors Veneberg and Onderwater said this was, in a way, a standard story of how 
a disaster happens. A sequence of little events and incidents, 
 
“in which it is very difficult to blame it on one person. If the smoke exhaust installation 
had worked, if they had not used fast crumbling plates, if Al-Jeballi had not been allowed 
to smoke in his cell, if the guards had closed the door again…”673 
 
Public prosecutors Veneberg and Onderwater said this about the case against Al-Jeballi: 
 
Veneberg:  
 
“But I do think that he did not want eleven people to die there. I don’t believe anything 
of that. But what the truth is, remains difficult. What he is saying, an accident, no 
intentionality, that may be, it could have happened like that. Let me put it this way: Even 
if he had started the fire on purpose, he did not want those eleven deaths.” 
 
Onderwater:  
 
“But he is responsible for it. If he had not thrown a cigarette, this would not have 
happened.”674 
 
The second central research question is how and why governmental organizations reacted as 
they did. In this case, it is remarkable how much the response by government to the case has 
been dominated by quarrels over the division of responsibilities. This received much criticism 
and has led to debate. It appears that the relationships between the Safety Board, the Ministry 
of Justice and the municipality of Haarlemmermeer developed in such a way that this debate 
about responsibilities received a perhaps disproportionate amount of attention. Although errors 
and bad luck played a major role, it is seldom denied that the Ministry of Justice (and more 
specifically the DJI-organization) as an organization held responsibility for the safety of the 
inmates who had been placed under its care. The question how far this responsibility should 
reach was the main question that Donner posed when resigning on account of the case.  
 
As far as the court cases are concerned, Veneberg remarked that looking back, the entire 
criminal trial could and should have gone a lot faster than it did.675 What is striking is that the 
case went on for a very long time, with an enormous amount of investigation going on and a 
significant number of legal procedures involved. The fact that a definitive judgment on the 
cause of the fire is so hard to reach says something about the dynamics of this case. The struggle 
between the parties involved has been fought in the legal arena on many battlefields, often 
focusing on minute detail. This could be labeled the ‘incessant investigation cycle’, meaning a 
constant stream of investigations that constantly adds new fuel to the continuing struggle 
between the parties involved. 
 
On top of all these investigations, an enormous program was adopted to deal with fire safety in 
                                               
672 LJN: BK6788, Gerechtshof Amsterdam, K07/0309, K07/0315, K07/0316, K07/0317 en K07/0336. 
673 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 183. 
674 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 153. 
675 De Haan and Zuidervaart (2010), p. 184. 
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the future. If the fire safety measures by themselves amount to € 400 million, one can imagine 
that the cost of all those reports, legal procedures, answers to questions from parliament and 
debates would make for incredible financial damage. The positive side that might be identified 
is that fire safety in prisons in the Netherlands has improved considerably. Although it was a 
traumatic experience for many, safety awareness and culture in Dutch prisons has been changed 
forever.  
 
Minister of VROM Winsemius said that after a crisis, one has to consider whether the existing 
frameworks suffice or whether a new framework is needed. Winsemius stated that after the 
disaster caused by the explosion in the fireworks factory in Enschede, the Netherlands possibly 
had the safest fireworks storage in the world. Nevertheless, one can have major doubts about 
whether the lessons about handling dangerous materials and dangerous places were really 
learned. 
 
“You have to consider the root causes: Are there things that form the roots of the 
problem and how did that come about?”676  
 
  
                                               
676 TK, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1214. 
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8. The AP-23 land mine accidents and Spijkers  
 
 
“It seems by now that everything that could go wrong has gone wrong in this case. I am 
more and more coming to the conclusion that we should put an end to this case as soon 
as possible, if necessary by taking the blame upon ourselves.”677 
 
State Secretary of Defense Jan Gmelich Meijling in 1994 
 
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
On September 14, 1984 in the Dutch town of Oldenbroek, an AP-23 land mine678 exploded, 
killing Army test leader Rob Ovaa. A year earlier an AP-23 land mine exploded in an Army 
classroom, causing seven deaths and nine serious injuries. Were these accidents caused by 
mistakes by the people who died while handling the mines? Or were these errors that should be 
attributed to the Army organization? Or was there something else going on? In any case, this 
explosion was not just a terrible ending to life, but also the beginning of a case that has lasted 
for more than 30 years.   
 
In this case study, the accidents with the AP-23 land mines in 1983 and 1984 will be examined, 
as well as the case of Fred Spijkers, which is connected, but not restricted to these two incidents. 
Spijkers has become one of best known whistleblowers in the Netherlands. He has met with 
considerable skepticism over the years, for a long time seen as yet another ‘conspiracy’ theorist 
seeking attention for an improbable cause. After many years, this image began to shift. Consider 
the following account of the first meeting between Spijkers and Robert van Voren of the Geneva 
Initiative on Psychiatry (GIP):  
 
“It must have been at the beginning of 1988 that a stocky and somewhat nervous man 
appeared on our doorstep. Our offices were then still located on the Raadhuissstraat in 
Amsterdam, behind the Royal Palace on Dam Square, where you first had to go through 
our shop with dissident literature and Soviet paraphernalia before you could reach the 
office part of the premises. The man wanted to see me, and after I had seated him at a 
table, he started a long story of which, I have to admit, I couldn’t understand a word. 
We were more often visited by people who were convinced they were directed 
radiographically by either the CIA or KGB or both, or that they were victims of some 
sort of conspiracy, and, at first, I thought I was dealing with a similar case. His rapid 
speech and the pile of documents he brought with him made me suspicious. On the other 
hand, his story seemed to be pretty consistent.”679 
 
The focus of this case study lies on the role of governmental organizations in the Netherlands, 
in this case in particular (although not exclusively) on the role of the Ministry of Defense. While 
there has been a lot of attention for this case and for Spijkers’ part, the question why Defense 
                                               
677 Nijeboer (2006), p. 157-159. 
678 AP stands for AntiPersonnel.  
679 Van Voren (2009), p. 239. 
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has acted the way it did has been under exposed. The interesting question is how this case could 
develop into more than three decades of battle between the parties involved.  
 
The first part of the case study contains a factual timeline of relevant events. Case characteristics 
will then be presented briefly, followed by a short discussion of the question of psychiatrization. 
Possible explanations will be explored. The responses of the governmental organizations 
involved will then be described and conclusions drawn about the space between error and evil 
in this particular case.   
 
 
8.2. Summary of the facts  
 
8.2.1. Timeline of events680  
 
In a case like this, spanning more than 30 years, it is impossible to give a complete summary of 
the facts. A selection of facts has been made in full awareness that this selection cannot be 
wholly representative.  
 
1983 
July 18 
In a classroom at the army barracks at the city of Oldebroek, an AP-23 land mine exploded. 
The instructor, De Bakker, was teaching a class about the AP-23, when the land mine exploded 
in his hands. As a consequence, seven soldiers lost their lives and nine soldiers were injured.  
 
The Dutch military police investigated the accident and concluded that the accident happened 
because a ‘live’ land mine was mistakenly switched with a ‘practice’ land mine. It appeared 
that the ‘live’ mines looked quite similar to the ‘practice’ mines. On top of that, they were kept 
in the same storage.681 The Ministry of Defense stated that De Bakker was partly to blame for 
the accident, because he confused a ‘live’ mine for a ‘practice’ mine. As a consequence, the 
Ministry of Defense at that time did not explicitly accept liability for the accident.  
 
1984 
February 16  
In a letter in response to a request by the Foundation of Legal Aid for National Servicemen, the 
Ministry of Defense explicitly accepted liability for the accident of July 18, 1983. Survivors of 
the accident and relatives of the victims were not actively informed that they were entitled to 
compensation payments and possibly to a disability pension.682  
 
March 15 
According to the investigation report, two officers were responsible for the transport of the land 
mines. They were brought before the High Military Court in Arnhem. In the end, they were not 
prosecuted for death by guilt.683 
 
 
                                               
680 This timeline is based on many sources. The following have been used the most: 
National Ombudsman (1999 and 2006). Nijeboer (2006). http://www.katholieknieuwsblad.nl/dossier_spijkers.htm (date 
last accessed: 30-10-2011) 
http://www.depers.nl/binnenland/179192/Word-geen-klokkenluider.html (date last accessed: 30-10-2011)  
681 Nijeboer (2006), p. 87.  
682 National Ombudsman (1999), p. 284-285. 
683 Nijeboer (2006), p. 87. 
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July 1 
Fred Spijkers started work as a social worker for the Ministry of Defense. Among other things, 
Spijkers was assigned the task of giving guidance and aid to the relatives of the army employees 
who died in the accident in 1983.  
 
September 14 
A second accident happened with the AP-23, during a routine test in the Artillery Shooting 
Camp at Oldenbroek. An AP-23 was tested and put away at a safe distance, but did not explode. 
Following the safety instructions, the test leader Rob Ovaa waited five minutes before 
approaching the land mine again. When he knelt down by the land mine, it exploded. Ovaa died 
as a result of the explosion. Spijkers was told by his superiors to inform Marjolein Ovaa, the 
widow of test leader Ovaa, of her husband’s death. Spijkers claimed he was ordered to tell her 
that the accident had been caused by her husband’s own conduct. He delivered this message to 
the widow, but at the same time he non-verbally indicated (by shaking his head) that he himself 
did not support this message. Spijkers had found out earlier that there had been numerous 
problems with the AP-23 and he suspected that these problems could be the real cause of the 
explosion. What Spijkers did not know when he went to visit the widow that evening, was that 
three army officers (among them Ovaa’s direct superior) had already visited the widow in the 
late afternoon to inform her of the passing away of her husband. These army officers had told 
the widow that the test leader was in no way to blame for the accident and that she should not 
worry about receiving compensation and income.684 Later, Spijkers started giving guidance and 
aid to the widow Ovaa.  
 
1985  
October 10 
The Dutch pension fund for civil servants, the ABP, had to determine whether the widow of 
Ovaa and her children were entitled to the full pension and salary of Ovaa. For this purpose, the 
Ministry of Defense on October 10, 1985, forwarded the investigation report that the military 
police had made to the ABP. In the investigation, statements were made by two officers, Vlug 
and Margherita, in which they stated that it was not Ovaa, but the problems with the AP-23 
landmine were to blame for the accident. It appeared that Ovaa did experience some problems 
in his work: He was talented but relatively young and inexperienced for a test leader. His 
relationship with his personnel was not particularly good and he ignored some well-meant 
advice. Nevertheless, the experts agreed that Ovaa’s own actions on the day of the fatal accident 
were not the cause of the accident. However, the ABP received a version in which many parts 
(in total 21 text parts) had been omitted by a civil servant from Defense.  
 
“The pages in between, number 3 through 13, contain a technical description of the 
construction and operation of the AP-23 landmine, which appear to me to be irrelevant 
for the judgment you have to make.”685  
 
As a consequence, the ABP found that Ovaa’s death was caused by his own carelessness and 
the widow Ovaa was given a pension for widows and orphans of only 198 guilders a month 
(gross) and 39 guilders a month (gross) for each of the children.  
 
1986  
July 1 
Spijkers’ temporary contract as a social worker was changed into a permanent contract.  
                                               
684 TK 1997-1998, Handelingen, p. 3515-3516.  
685 Nijeboer (2006), p. 70. 
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The Army Secret Service (LAMID) started a secret investigation into Spijkers’ case at the 
request of Director-General Wim Bunnik of the Ministry of Defense.686 In a highly confidential 
statement, it was noted that the source (Spijkers) had failed to comply with a strict order to keep 
complete silence about the Ovaa-case. This order had been issued by the Secretary-General, the 
highest civil servant in the department. Spijkers was told of the order by a superior, brigade-
general Heezen. The statement noted:  
 
“Correct source for his talkativeness, in such a way that he will stay available as 
possible informer if necessary.”687  
 
In his book, Nijeboer stated that all this was linked with Spijkers role as an informant for the 
BVD, the Dutch Secret Service. According to Nijeboer, Spijkers’ superiors at the Ministry of 
Defense strongly disapproved of these contacts, although Spijkers possessed written documents 
showing these contacts were even included in his job description.688  
 
1987  
February 24  
Spijkers was told that he would be transferred to the Ministry of Defense and could no longer 
work as a social worker on location. He objected, but was told he could not influence the 
decision. He was awarded a higher salary. In July, Spijkers was told to stop providing assistance 
to the victims of the AP-23 land mine incidents. The relationship between Spijkers and his 
employers became strained and Spijkers turned to the organization’s medical councilor, 
Lankhorst, who was part of the RBB (an organization that comes under the Ministry of the 
Interior). Spijkers had regular contact with her concerning a great deal of confidential 
information.  
 
“That contact was good, so I thought. I had complete confidence in her. I had no idea 
that she, in the meanwhile, as if I had been visiting her during consulting hours, wrote 
statements in my own medical file, stating that I suffered from ‘complete delusions’, that 
I was ‘paranoid’, told ‘ghost stories’ and that I talked with ‘gloating face’ about a case 
of sexual intimidation. On top of that she falsely reported that I had received treatment 
from a psychiatrist in a military hospital. I had only visited that hospital for professional 
reasons, not for myself.”689 
 
August 5 
Spijkers was relieved from his position by the Ministry of Defense. According to the Ministry 
of Defense, this decision was based on complaints about the way he functioned in his job, more 
specifically in connection to the handling of a case of alleged wiretapping and a case of alleged 
sexual intimidation made by employees of the Ministry of Defense. The newspaper Katholiek 
Nieuwsblad much later reported that on that same day Spijkers was subjected to what he himself 
referred to as a ‘Russian interrogation’ by two high-ranking personnel managers from the 
Ministry of Defense, allegedly also working for the LAMID. According to Spijkers, they were 
intimidating. His doctor, Leo Beth, visited him at home and remarked that Spijkers ‘was a total 
loss’.690  
                                               
686 Bunnik played an important role in the Spijkers’ case. He was one of Spijkers’ superiors at the time of the AP-23 
landmine accident and he was involved in the case for a long time because he was director-general for personnel.  
687 Nijeboer (2006), p. 98. 
688 Nijeboer (2006), p. 92-98. 
689http://www.katholieknieuwsblad.nl/archief/Spijkers/1997/08/29/Systematische_karaktermoord_door_Defensie 
(date last accessed: 30-10-2011) 
690http://www.katholieknieuwsblad.nl/archief/Spijkers/1997/08/29/Systematische_karaktermoord_door_Defensie 
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1989  
June 23 
Reportedly, someone fired shots at Spijkers near a McDonald’s restaurant at Huis ter Heide, 
though he was not wounded. Spijkers reported the assault to the police. It turned out that five 
national servicemen from the air force base Soesterberg were involved. Apparently they were 
given disciplinary sanctions for their actions that were referred to as ‘a bad joke’.691 In response 
to questions about this shooting incident from Krista Van Velzen in the House of 
Representatives, the Ministry of Defense wrote in December 2005 that there was no knowledge 
of such an incident with the Public Prosecution Office or the Dutch military police, nor the 
court-martial.692 
 
1991 
January 31 
The Central Appeals Tribunal, the highest appeal court for labor cases, confirmed the verdict 
by the former administrative court for civil servants in The Hague, in which the decision of 
August 5, 1987, to relieve Spijkers from his position, was nullified. The Tribunal stated that it 
was confident of a rapid return to work for Spijkers.693  
 
1992  
June 12  
An appeal committee consisting of medical experts ruled that Spijkers was not unfit for work 
for medical reasons. In that sense, Spijkers’ appeal was granted. However, it was also stated 
that Spijkers was suffering from illness and deficiency and as a consequence was ‘temporarily’ 
unfit for work.694 
 
Spijkers filed complaints with the Central Medical Disciplinary Committee against four 
medical officers from the RBB concerning the way they handled the medical and psychological 
reports in his case. Spijkers claimed that they tried to psychiatrize him: According to him this 
was an attempt to get rid of him by declaring him mentally ill. The medical officers of the RBB 
reported that Spijkers suffered from a personality disorder, was paranoid and schizophrenic. In 
the end, all complaints by Spijkers were rejected, except for one disciplinary warning for the 
way the patient log was documented.695  
 
November 12 
Human rights organization Global Initiative on Psychiatry adopted the case of Spijkers. 
 
1993  
June 18 
Spijkers, who had not worked since August 5, 1987, was fired from his job as a social worker 
by the Ministry of Defense as of October 1, 1993. He lost his welfare payments because he 
refused to sign a declaration stating that he was unfit for work and had to live without income 
for years.696  
                                               
(date last accessed: 30-10-2011) and Nijeboer (2006), p. 104-105. 
691 Nijeboer (2006), p. 222-227. 
692 Tweede Kamer, Handelingen 1995/1996, p. 1039-1040. 
693 Quoted in the decision by the Tribunal of 1997: 16-10-1997 LJN: AK6377, Centrale Raad van Beroep, 96/5015 
AW en 96/5016 AW. 
694 16-10-1997 LJN: AK6377, Centrale Raad van Beroep, 96/5015 AW en 96/5016 AW as well as Nijeboer, p. 142. 
695 16-10-1997 LJN: AK6377, Centrale Raad van Beroep, 96/5015 AW en 96/5016 AW, pleitnota Centrale Raad van 
Beroep landsadvocaat Mr. G.R.J. de Groot, 4 september 1997, National Archive, unpublished as well as Nijeboer, 
p. 321. 
696 Nijeboer (2006), p. 154. 
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A letter of complaint by Spijkers to Secretary-General Van Aartsen of the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs concerning the RBB-medical officers was met with the response that no further 
investigation would be made and that in any case there was no damage involved for Spijkers.697 
 
1994 – 1996  
In this period, the State Secretary of Defense, first Frinking and then his successor Gmelich 
Meijling negotiated with Spijkers’ lawyers about compensation payments. Senator Vis and 
senator Glastra van Loon pleaded Spijkers’ case with Gmelich Meijling. The senators appeared 
to negotiate a deal with Gmelich Meijling for a compensation package for Spijkers, but the deal 
never materialized. Later, both parties gave different accounts of what was discussed and 
decided upon in their conversations.698 
 
1996 
April 24 
Spijkers had filed appeals against the decision to fire him and against the decision to refuse to 
reinstate his salary up until the date of his dismissal. Both appeals were turned down by the 
District Court of The Hague.699 
 
1997 
March 27 
In a letter to the widow Ovaa, Minister of Defense Voorhoeve for the first time accepted liability 
on the part of the Ministry of Defense for the accident in 1984.700  
 
August 22 
Minister of Defense Voorhoeve informed the House of Representatives about the letter to the 
widow Ovaa. He also wrote the House that he had no knowledge of any order given to Spijkers 
to inform the widow Ovaa that her husband was to blame for the accident. According to 
Voorhoeve, questions put to the people involved did not provide any evidence for Spijkers’ 
claim. Voorhoeve stated that the three army officers had made their statement to the widow 
because such a statement was necessary for paying for the costs of the funeral (this is paid only 
when it concerns an accident during the service of the deceased). Later investigations carried 
out showed, according to Voorhoeve, that Ovaa was partly to blame. Voorhoeve wrote that this 
view changed suddenly: 
 
“Very recently, based on two till then unknown documents, it has become apparent to 
me that a different view on the question of liability is by all means possible.”701  
 
Members of the House of Representatives asked Voorhoeve if the ministry had forged 
psychiatric reports in such a way to construe a personality disorder for social worker Spijkers. 
Voorhoeve gave the following answer:  
 
“No, the accusation of forgery of psychiatric reports by the Ministry of Defense is not in 
any way grounded on facts. Moreover, I emphatically distance myself from the 
accusation that Defense wanted to declare Spijkers mentally ill, to which several media 
                                               
697 Nijeboer (2006), p. 195-196. 
698 Nijeboer (2006), p. 157-159. 
699 Awb 93/868 AW and 93/1060 AW. 
700 TK 1997-1997, Handelingen, p. 3513. 
701 TK 1997-1997, Handelingen, p. 3516. 
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alluded. Defense has already informed Mr. Spijkers and/or his attorney that as far as 
Defense is concerned, it is established that he is not mentally ill.”702  
 
October 16  
The Central Appeals Tribunal ruled that the Ministry of Defense fired Spijkers on sufficient 
grounds and overturned Spijkers appeal in the matter.703  
 
1998 
May 
At the request of the regular Committee of Defense of the House of Representatives, the 
National Ombudsman704 started an investigation into the two accidents with the AP-23 land 
mine.  
 
October 30 
A report by Henk Rijkers, a journalist from the ‘Katholiek Nieuwsblad’, who researched the 
case at that time, claimed that the presiding judge of the Central Appeals Tribunal in Spijkers’ 
case, Vermeulen, might not have been as impartial and independent as he should have been. 
Vermeulen had been a manager within the division of the Ministry of Interior Affairs that had 
dealt with Spijkers’ job dismissal.705 Members of the House of Representatives asked questions 
about the matter. Any possible bias on account of judge Vermeulen was denied. When Spijkers 
asked the Central Appeals Tribunal what had happened to a complaint he filed about 
Vermeulen, he was informed that the State Advocate was preparing an answer. The State 
Advocate had pleaded on behalf of the Ministry of Defense in the case concerning the dismissal 
of Spijkers that went before the Central Appeals Tribunal. In the end, an answer was never 
received.706 
 
December 17   
In a letter to the House of Representatives, State Secretary of Defense Gmelich Meijling 
reaffirmed the position of the Ministry of Defense. Gmelich Meijling stated that the only cause 
for the accident in 1983 with the AP-23 was that a ‘live’ landmine was mistaken for a ‘practice’ 
landmine. He recognized that back in 1970 there were already reports on problems with the AP-
23, but ‘blocking’ the lot of AP-23 landmines would not have prevented the accident in 1983 
he stated. Consequently, the relatives of the victims of the 1983 accident were not falsely 
informed on the true nature of the accident, according to Gmelich Meijling.707 
 
1999  
April 19 
In his report about the two accidents with the AP-23, the National Ombudsman stated that 
information had been withheld from the widow of test leader Ovaa by the Ministry of Defense, 
classifying the actions of the Ministry as ‘improper’. He went on to state the following:  
 
                                               
702 TK 1997-1997, Handelingen, p. 3515-3516. 
703 16-10-1997 LJN: AK6377, Centrale Raad van Beroep, 96/5015 AW en 96/5016 AW  
704 “The National Ombudsman is an independent, impartial intermediary between you and the public administration. 
He is here to defend your interests and to keep a critical eye on government operations.” 
http://www.nationaleombudsman.nl/english (date last accessed: 2-2-2014) 
705 Katholiek Nieuwsblad, October 30, 1998, Duistere Zaken bij Defensie.  
706 Nijeboer (2006), p. 168-171. 
707 Letter State Secretary of Defense to the House of Representatives of December 17, 1997, TK 1997/1998, 25600 
X, nr. 39. 
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“The Minister of Defense has only recently on March 27, 1997, twelve and a half years 
after it happened, accepted liability for the accident in which the test leader died. The 
National Ombudsman finds that the Minister of Defense could not with good reason take 
the position that the accident was in part attributable to the test leader. It is likely, as 
the Minister himself has acknowledged, that the accident of September 14, 1984 would 
not have happened if adequate measures had been taken following the recommendation 
in the testing report of November 11, 1970 that land mines that ‘refuse’ should be 
destroyed from a safe distance. After all, there is no reason to believe that the test leader 
would have approached the ‘refusing’ land mine in that case. Moreover, it is likely that 
the failings of the AP-23 land mine, that proved fatal for the test leader, would have 
resurfaced (again) before September 14, 1984, if the Ministry of Defense had started an 
investigation into the technical state of affairs of the AP-23 land mine following the 
accident in 1983. Because of all this it should be stated that the Ministry of Defense in 
1992 and later in 1995 and 1996 could not and should not have rejected liability for the 
accident. It is therefore also not right that the Minister of Defense has nevertheless 
maintained up until 1997 towards the widow that his Ministry was not responsible or 
liable for this accident.”708  
 
At the press conference where the report was presented, the National Ombudsman, Marten 
Oosting said that the Ministry of Defense had gravely neglected the safety of its personnel.709 
On account of the National Ombudsman’s report, the State Secretary of Defense informed the 
House of Representatives on May 7, 1999 that he had approached the survivors and the next of 
kin of the casualties of both accidents and that talks would start about aid and guidance for 
them. The settlement of damages would also be examined. The report of the National 
Ombudsman would determine the way in which the Ministry of Defense dealt with this matter 
in future. Furthermore, the State Secretary pointed out that the report underlined the need for 
significant improvements at the Ministry of Defense, especially concerning decisiveness and 
communications.  
 
The report did not deal with the role of Fred Spijkers. When confronted with questions about 
this, Oosting stated that he was sorry, but that he could not investigate Spijkers’ role, because 
in Spijkers’ case a court had already given a ruling (meaning the ruling by the Central Appeals 
Tribunal which confirmed the dismissal of Spijkers in 1997). Under such circumstances, 
according to Oosting, the Law on the National Ombudsman did not permit an investigation.710 
This was criticized in the book on the Spijkers’ case by Nijeboer, who pointed out that that 
there had also been cases in court for the 1983 accident. The ruling of the Central Appeals 
Tribunal dealt with the dismissal of Spijkers, other aspects could have been taken into account, 
he stated.711 
 
The report by the National Ombudsman stated that the widow had indeed received two different 
messages concerning the death of her husband, but also said it found no proof that Spijkers had 
been ordered to tell the widow Ovaa that the death of her husband was due to his own 
                                               
708 National Ombudsman (1999), p. 287 – 288. 
709 Press statement National Ombudsman, 19 April 1999. 
710 In fact, this is not stated in the Law on the National Ombudsman. What is probably meant is article 9:22 of the 
Algemene wet bestuursrecht, which states that the National Ombudsman does not have the competence to start 
an investigation if (among other things) the request to do so concerns an activity which has led to a verdict by an 
administrative judge. In my view, it is questionable to assume that the verdict of the Central Appeals Tribunal 
concerning the dismissal of Spijkers (a case of labor law) made an investigation by the NO into his role in the 
affair impossible. Moreover, some years later the National Ombudsman found cause to investigate Spijker’s case 
after all.  
711 Nijeboer (2006), p. 191. 
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carelessness. Spijkers’ superiors, the head of Social Work, Van der Geer-Swager and Director-
General Bunnik, denied the accusation, while Marjolein Ovaa confirmed Spijkers’ view in her 
statement. According to Nijeboer, a statement by a press services employee at the Ministry of 
Defense admitted to NRC-Handelsblad later in 1997 that Spijkers had been given this order.712  
 
In 1999 Spijkers received documents dating from 1986, showing that the mark ‘POL/CRIM 
KNV ASD’ was put above his file. ‘POL/CRIM’ was according to Spijkers an abbreviation for 
‘political criminal’. Being labeled a ‘political criminal’ in Spijkers’ experience meant that one 
is declared an enemy of the state, with severe implications for all contacts with government 
organizations. According to Spijkers, KNV stood for Kabinet Nationale Veiligheid (Cabinet 
National Safety) and ASD stood for Amsterdam, his residence at the time. The attorney for the 
Dutch State however claimed that KNV stands for ‘Komt Niet Voor’ (Does Not Exist), claiming 
this was a routine statement that, on the contrary, implied that Spijkers was not registered as a 
political criminal.713  
 
2000  
March  
The Dutch consultancy and accountancy firm KPMG was asked to try to finally settle the 
differences between Spijkers and the Ministry of Defense, as well as the differences between 
the widow Ovaa and the Ministry. The State Secretary of Defense, Van Hoof, declared 
beforehand that the results of the KMPG report would be binding for his Ministry. The results 
would not be binding for the widow Ovaa and Spijkers.  
 
September 26  
Van Hoof had a private meeting in a restaurant with Spijkers. During the conversation, Spijkers 
claimed to have documents that would incriminate the Ministry of Defense that he could make 
public. Spijkers claimed that Van Hoof then made a death threat, which Van Hoof later 
vehemently denied.    
 
2002 
July 10 
KMPG delivered its advice on the matter. Part of the advice was a declaration of agreement, 
outlining the terms under which the conflict was to be ended for all parties involved. The widow 
Ovaa and Spijkers had both stated their approval of the advice.  
 
July 22   
A new State Secretary of Defense came into office, Van der Knaap.  
 
August 29 
Van der Knaap informed the House of Representatives that he did not feel bound to the advice 
of KPMG, because KPMG had stated in its advice that the Ministry of Defense had misled the 
                                               
712 Nijeboer (2006), p. 192. In any case, it is at least remarkable that although the NO found that Spijkers (and thereby 
Defense) had told Ovaa that the accident was her husband’s own fault, the NO also ruled that there was no proof 
of an order given to Spijkers to bring this message. This leaves two alternatives: 1) Spijkers did not get any order 
and decided himself to bring this message or 2) the order was given. In the first case, surely Spijkers would have 
been reprimanded severely for jumping to conclusions too early. That apparently did not happen and from all the 
evidence afterwards it can be deduced that the second possibility seems more plausible than the first one.  
713 Nijeboer (2006), p. 101. However, it is clear that the mark POL/CRIM exists and is also used with other persons 
who are considered political criminal. Later, in 2009, Spijkers received written documents from the National 
Archive which made the arguments made by Defense more implausible, as Pol/Crim yet again appeared as a 
mark (this time without KNV). 
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widow Ovaa and Spijkers. In the declaration of agreement the following statement was 
included:  
 
“that from the reports by the National Ombudsman and / or KPMG it has become crystal 
clear that several representatives of the Dutch State, in the period dating from the 
accident in 1984 up until the present time, have acted gravely negligently and 
inaccurately towards the relatives of Mr. A714 and towards Mr. Spijkers, by misleading 
them and treating them unfairly.”715  
 
Van der Knaap felt that this statement was not backed up by evidence and therefore refused to 
sign the declaration of agreement. He stated that he had talked to the representatives of KPMG 
and that they had informed him on August 27 that they would not present further evidence than 
was already in their advice to back up the description ‘misleading’. 
 
“In all fairness, it cannot be expected of me – also on account of the accountability 
towards parliament and the Court of Audit – to follow an advice in which it is central 
that there would be mention of misleading behavior by employees of my Ministry, 
without any grounds whatsoever being presented for this claim.”716 
 
This was important, Van der Knaap wrote, because KPMG had stated the description 
‘misleading’ was also important for establishing the amount of financial compensation that was 
to be awarded in this case.  
 
November 8 
In a letter to the House of Representatives, Van der Knaap stated that his predecessor had begun 
the process of coming to an agreement with Rob Ovaa’s next of kin and that, at the express 
demand of the House of Representatives, the role of Spijkers was also made part of this process. 
According to Van der Knaap this happened despite the fact that the National Ombudsman had 
not investigated Spijkers’ part in the case because of the ruling by the highest appeal court 
concerning the dismissal of Spijkers. The state advocate was ordered by Van der Knaap to begin 
talks with both the widow Ovaa and Spijkers to try, once again, to reach agreement. The advice 
by KPMG was still the starting point for those talks.  
 
After prolonged talks, Van der Knaap decided to eliminate the passage in the advice that used 
the description ‘misleading’ as well as the passage in which it was stated that Spijkers would 
be recommended to receive a high royal decoration. The amount of financial compensation for 
Spijkers that was proposed by KPMG remained at € 1.600.000. The talks had led to agreement 
between the widow Ovaa and her children on the one hand and the Ministry of Defense on the 
other but Spijkers did not agree to these terms. Van der Knaap went on to state that he felt that 
the Ministry of Defense had done everything within the boundaries of fairness to reach a 
solution in this matter.717  
 
November 28  
The House of Representatives (at the initiative of Krista Van Velzen of the Socialist Party) 
summoned Van der Knaap for an interpellation debate. In the debate, Van der Knaap received 
                                               
714 This refers to Rob Ovaa, the test leader who died in the accident in 1984.  
715 National Ombudsman (2006), appendix Vaststellingsovereenkomst, overweging VI. 
716 Letter State Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the House of Representatives, 29 August 2002, def0200166. 
717 Letter State Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the House of Representatives, 8 November 2002, 
def0200202. 
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strong criticism of his handling of the matter. The liberal VVD spokesman in the House of 
Representatives, Van den Doel, came under fire in the debate when he supported Van der 
Knaap’s rejection of the term ‘misleading’. Other members asked him how this was possible 
when the former State Secretary of Defense, Van Hoof, a member of the VVD, had agreed 
beforehand to commit himself to the results of the KPMG report. “Perhaps he did not expect 
that the report would lead to the description ‘misleading” was the response of Van den Doel. 
After a short recess, the debate was reopened and Van der Knaap promised the House of 
Representatives that he would accept and sign the declaration of agreement with the exact same 
wording as the original KPMG advice had used.  
 
“I want to give Mr. Spijkers what he is entitled to, but I hope that we can conclude 
together that the case is closed and that from now one we can look to the future. Together 
we now bear responsibility for the term ‘misleading’. For this, the debate was necessary. 
”718  
 
November 29  
The declaration of agreement was signed by Van der Knaap and Spijkers. 
 
2003 
November 27  
A year after the agreement, Spijkers received a royal decoration from State Secretary of Defense 
Van der Knaap, as had been agreed upon in the declaration of agreement.  
 
2005 
August 29, 2005 
The House of Representatives received a letter from the Ministry of Defense about the way it 
had arranged for the administrative rectification that was agreed upon in the declaration of 
agreement. Based upon advice by consultancy firm Deloitte, all the documents regarding 
Spijkers, Ovaa and his relatives and the accident with the AP-23 land mines were placed in the 
National Archive.  
 
September 23  
The ‘Katholiek Nieuwsblad’ reported that, almost three years after it was signed, the execution 
of the declaration of agreement was failing.719 Most notable were reports that Spijkers received 
an income tax assessment of around € 900.000 (following the payment to Spijkers by the 
Ministry of Defense of the compensation of € 1.600.000 which was agreed upon in the 
declaration of agreement).  
 
October 20 
The National Ombudsman (by then Brenninkmeijer, who had succeeded Oosting) started an 
investigation into the way in which the declaration of agreement was being carried out. At first, 
the involvement of the National Ombudsman constituted a form of mediation. After it turned 
out that the differences between the parties could not be resolved through mediation at that 
time, the National Ombudsman decided to report in writing on this matter.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
718 TK 2002, Handelingen TK 28-11-2002, 27-1915-1926. 
719 http://www.katholieknieuwsblad.nl/dossiers/spijkers (date last accessed: 30-10-2011), several articles in 2005. 
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
252 
 
2006  
October 31 
The report by the National Ombudsman was published.720 The period covered in the report 
ranged from November 29, 2002 to October 20, 2005. The National Ombudsman’s report 
concluded that the Ministry of Defense had adhered to virtually all of the provisions of the 
declaration of agreement.  
 
The Ministry of Defense placed the files of the Spijkers-case in the National Archive, 
stipulating that the files were not to be opened for twenty years. Defense mentioned two 
possibilities for after those twenty years had elapsed: 1) keeping the collection closed until 
Spijkers and/or his relatives have died or 2) a limitation on public access for 70 years.721 The 
arrangements were quite unusual: a special room was reserved in the National Archive, 
accessible only by the State Secretary of Defense and/or the Minister of Interior Affairs (or 
mandated personnel from their respective organizations).722  
 
2008  
March 7 
Researchers from the University of Amsterdam, led by legal ethics researcher Joep van Vliet 
published a report on the Spijkers case and severely criticized the actions of the politicians and 
civil servants who were involved, as well as those of the National Ombudsman. 
 
“Ministers, State Secretaries and their subordinates have made Spijkers’ life and the 
exercising of his rights impossible over the course of 23 years, because he revealed 
injustices. They were not the keepers of justice and of the constitutional state, on the 
contrary, they used their powers which were at their disposal to trample on the rights of 
a citizen.”723  
 
May 17 
Pieter van Vollenhoven, chairman of the Dutch Safety Board and member of the Dutch royal 
family724, announced that he was willing to be a mediator in the Spijkers-affair if he were asked 
to do so by the Ministry of Defense. Krista Van Velzen asked Van Vollenhoven to intervene 
and try to bring the matter to a satisfying conclusion. The union FNV (chairman Agnes 
Jongerius) was also actively involved on Spijkers’ behalf. However, the Ministry of Defense 
did not respond to the offer made by Van Vollenhoven, at least not publicly. Van Velzen and 
Jongerius held talks with State Secretary of Defense De Vries to try to reach a solution.725 
 
July 11 
Van Vollenhoven announced that he had decided not to make himself available for the task of 
mediating in the case, in order not to become a subject of discussion in this affair himself. It 
was claimed in the media that Prime Minister Balkenende, who as Prime Minister was 
accountable for all actions of the royal family, had exercised pressure on Van Vollenhoven not 
to become involved in the matter.726  
                                               
720 National Ombudsman (2006). 
721 Tweede Kamer, Aanhangsel van de Handelingen, 2004-2005, p. 3998. 
722 Convenant in verband met de bewaring van de collectie betreffende de heer J.J. Spijkers, 24 November, 2006. 
723 Vliet, J. van, c.s. (2008), p. 18. 
724 He is married to princess Margriet, a sister of Queen (by now Princess) Beatrix. 
725 Between 2008 and 2010, Van Velzen and Jongerius frequently held talks and corresponded with the State 
Secretary of Defense about the case. 
726 For example http://nos.nl/artikel/74113-kabinet-wil-geen-bemiddelaar-zaak-spijkers.html (date last accessed: 30-
12-2013) 
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September 4  
State Secretary of Defense Jack de Vries wrote the House of Representatives a letter under the 
title ‘Spijkers file: a solution to practical problems’. The letter began by saying that the 
declaration of agreement in 2002 had ended the differences of opinion between Spijkers and 
the Ministry of Defense. De Vries also referred to the apology letter that the State Secretary of 
Defense had written to Spijkers on the day of the declaration of agreement, in which apologies 
were given for what had been done to Spijkers. De Vries underlined that the Ministry of Defense 
was well aware of the important and special role Spijkers had played in connection to the land 
mine accident of 1984. For this reason, he said, he wanted to adopt a generous attitude to solving 
the problems that Spijkers was facing. Several issues about the implementation of the 
declaration of agreement of 2002 were addressed. Concerning Spijkers tide-over allowance, De 
Vries offered to pay this going back to September 1, 1998, provided that Spijkers signed a 
declaration concerning possible extra earnings. His pension benefits would be raised 
accordingly. De Vries also agreed to pay for the costs of Spijkers lawyer since 2002 and for the 
costs of Spijkers’ personal doctor. It was also stated that Spijkers had the right to access his 
personal files in the National Archive in accordance with the rules laid down in the Law on 
Protection of Personal Data. On the subject of Spijkers being considered a political criminal, 
De Vries wrote: 
 
“From our conversations it has become clear that Mr. Spijkers would appreciate a 
statement made by Defense to be put in the archive that he is not considered a political 
criminal or a psychiatric patient. My predecessor has written Mr. Spijkers earlier that 
the Ministry of Defense does not consider Mr. Spijkers a political criminal or a 
psychiatric patient and I would explicitly like to confirm that here.”727 
 
Finally, De Vries stated that Spijkers was free to use the €1.600.000 he was awarded in the 
declaration of agreement in 2002, as the income tax for this was paid by the Ministry of Defense 
to the tax collector’s office years ago. He also stated that the Ministry of Defense had no plan 
whatsoever to reclaim this payment and would not do so in the future. The right to freedom of 
speech for Spijkers was according to De Vries not hampered by the declaration of agreement.728  
 
2009 
January 21, 2009 
In a letter, Spijkers requested full access under the Dutch Data Protection Act (Wbp) to all of 
his personal files from the Ministry of Defense, including his personal files from the Ministry 
of Interior and Kingdom Relations In May and in September, Spijkers received from the 
Ministry of Defense several of his files that had been stored in the National Archive. In total 
there were 39 archive boxes handed over to him. 
 
October 8 
Spijkers applied for a revision of the court ruling of October 16, 1997 by the Central Appeals 
Tribunal in which his dismissal by the Ministry of Defense was upheld.  
 
2010 
December 23 
The Central Appeals Tribunal ruled in favor of Spijkers’ request for a revision of its ruling of 
October 16, 1997. Spijkers had stated at the court hearing that he had several reasons for filing 
his request for a revision. He wanted to establish that the case concerning the accident in 1984 
                                               
727 Tweede Kamer, 2007–2008, 28 686, nr. 10, p.3. 
728 Tweede Kamer, 2007–2008, 28 686, nr. 10. 
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with Ovaa played a decisive role in the decision to fire him from his job at Defense. He also 
wanted to correct the remark made by the attorney of the State at the court hearing of September 
4, 1997, that Spijkers used the Ovaa case for his own gain, which he found extremely offensive. 
Furthermore, Spijkers wanted to establish that the cause of the disturbed relation between 
employer and employed lay mainly with the Minister of Defense. His final wish was to get rid 
of the psychiatrization which he had experienced, from which he suffered daily. He wanted it 
to be clear what his role had been and that he was not crazy. Spijkers emphasized that he was 
not trying to secure further financial compensation with his request for revision. For Defense’s 
part, it was argued that the request for revision should be found inadmissible as a result of the 
declaration of agreement of 2002. The Central Appeals Tribunal rejected this argument, 
concluding that provisions of the declaration of agreement did not concern the Spijkers’ 
dismissal. The Central Appeals Tribunal concluded that Defense had already admitted that the 
interference of Spijkers in the way the Ministry of Defense acted after the accident with Ovaa, 
was decisive in the disturbed relationship that eventually led to Spijkers being fired. 
 
“The Tribunal establishes that appealer’s interference with the handling of the accident 
with Mr. Ovaa played an essential part in the job dismissal in the sense that this formed 
the source of the labor conflict that developed afterwards.”729 
 
The Tribunal stated that this was shown through various statements, such as the declaration of 
agreement, the letter Van der Knaap wrote to Spijkers on the day of the declaration and the 
speech Van der Knaap gave when Spijkers was awarded his Royal decoration. The Tribunal 
also concluded that the minister had played a predominant role in the emergence and 
continuation of the disturbed relationship between both parties.  
 
“Meanwhile the minister has acknowledged that various representatives of the State 
have acted in a seriously negligent and inaccurate way towards the appellant; the 
appellant was misled and snubbed, also prior to the dismissal from his job.”730 
 
The Tribunal did not grant a revision as far as the question of psychiatrization was concerned. 
The Tribunal stated that in its ruling of 1997 it had not established that the appealer was - to 
use his own words - ‘crazy’, nor could such a statement by the Minister be found in the 
documents put before the Tribunal. The Tribunal also found that in 1997, the Tribunal had taken 
the G.I.P. report into consideration and that there were no new facts or circumstances which 
could lead to a revision of the ruling on this point. As Spijkers had stated he was not in it for 
the money, the financial settlement was not altered by the Tribunal.  
 
2011 
April 12, 2011 
The administrative sector of the Court in Arnhem ruled that the Ministry of Defense justifiably 
denied Spijkers’ WBP request from January 21, 2009. The Court pointed out that Spijkers had 
received many of his personal files from the Ministry of Defense in two shipments in 2009. 
Some parts had been redacted and some documents had not been sent to Spijkers (such as drafts, 
personal correspondence, correspondence with the state advocate and internal advice given by 
civil servants). The Court ruled that this partial refusal was in accordance with the law. 
 
 
 
                                               
729 LJN: BO7715, Centrale Raad van Beroep, 09/5689 AW en 09/5999 AW, paragraph 7.3. 
730 LJN: BO7715, Centrale Raad van Beroep, 09/5689 AW en 09/5999 AW, paragraph 8.3. 
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July 11 
Minister of Defense Hans Hillen wrote a letter to the House of Representatives in which he 
responded to a television broadcast by Een Vandaag. The letter opened as follows: 
 
“The fatal accident in 1984 and the events afterwards have had very drastic 
consequences for the Ovaa family and Mr. Spijkers. In 1997 Defense accepted liability 
for the accident. In the first years after the accident Defense failed to act, and has since 
not acted, in a decent manner. After this was established by the National Ombudsman 
in 1999, the members of government for Defense have endeavored to reach a solution. I 
am aware of all the suffering that has been brought upon Mr. Spijkers and deeply regret 
that Mr. Spijkers has the feeling that he cannot come to closure for this difficult period 
yet.”731 
 
Hillen went on to list all the measures that Defense had undertaken since 1999 and concluded 
that in the light of those actions, he saw no grounds for a new mediation attempt.  
 
October 26 
A debate was held in the House of Representatives about the Spijkers case.732 PvdA, SP, Green 
Left and D’66 had requested the appointment of a mediator (Van Vollenhoven). Before the 
debate, a majority in the House appeared to be in favor of this proposal. Hero Brinkman of the 
Party for Freedom (PVV) had stated beforehand that he would support the proposal. In the 
debate, Brinkman was replaced by his colleague Marcial Hernandez, himself a former Army 
major. In the debate, Hernandez withdrew the support of the PVV for the proposal and voted 
against the motion. Since CDA and VVD also voted against the motion, it was denied by a 
majority of the House of Representatives. Hernandez stated that Defense had gone down on its 
knees for Spijkers in the past but that this was apparently not enough for him. Because of this, 
he felt that people had lost sympathy for Spijkers. He pointed to the € 1.6 million that Spijkers 
received in 2002 and the doctors’ and lawyers’ bills that were paid by Defense. 
 
“It is really enough. Mister Spijkers has received a splendid settlement, of which Henk 
and Ingrid733 can only dream.”734 
 
2012 
February 22 
Spijkers filed a new request for revision with the Central Appeals Tribunal with regard to the 
psychiatrization issue.   
 
November 28 
The Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State upheld the ruling of the 
Court in Arnhem concerning Spijkers’ WBP request.735 
 
 
 
 
                                               
731 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2010–2011, 28 686, nr. 11, p. 1. 
732 I attended the debate in the House of Representatives for this dissertation. 
733 ‘Henk and Ingrid’ is a reference which was made famous by the leader of the PVV, Wilders, who often refers to 
‘Henk and Ingrid’ (common first names) as typical voters for his party.  
734 http://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/nieuws/nieuws/pvv-de-gebeten-hond-in-zaak-
spijkers.2560759.lynkx (date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
735 Uitspraak Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak Raad van State, 28 november 2012, 201105915/1/A3. 
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2014 
August 21 
The Central Appeals Tribunal turned down Spijkers’ request for revision with regard to the 
psychiatrization issue. The Tribunal repeated that it had not been established in its earlier 
rulings that Spijkers had been considered to be ‘crazy’ nor could such a statement be found in 
the documents supplied by the Ministry of Defense. The Tribunal ruled that no new evidence 
had been produced and, as a consequence, it ruled against the request for revision.736 
 
 
8.2.2. Case characteristics  
 
Damage  
deaths and serious injuries  AP-23 land mine accident 1983: 7 deaths, 9 serious 
injuries. 
AP-23 land mine accident 1984: one death. 
damage compensation paid  The family of the victims of the 1983 accident received 
25.000 guilders as compensation payment. The widow 
Ovaa eventually received € 1.600.000 from the Ministry 
of Defense and her children both received € 500.000. 
The Ministry of Defense eventually paid Spijkers 
€1.600.000 as a result of a declaration of agreement. 
Later, Defense also paid the income tax on this payment 
(€308.126). In addition, defense also paid € 81.000 for 
Spijkers’ lawyers’ expenses, €130.000 for Spijkers’ 
medical expenses and € 280.000 for his retainer.737  
nature of the act   
what rules are broken Violations of criminal law could be identified in this 
case, but none have led to prosecution, so definitive 
proof is not given. Despite this, it is possible to see with 
hindsight that there had been compelling grounds in 
several incidents in the past to at least have raised a 
criminal investigation into forms of forgery and fraud. 
By now, such an investigation or prosecution seems 
impossible because of the passing of the terms of 
limitation in these cases. 
what kind of act The role of the governmental organization in this case is 
predominantly as an employer, both of the army 
personnel involved in the AP-23 accidents and for 
Spijkers. Naturally, other roles such as law enforcement 
and the judiciary are involved as well, but the role as 
employer is most relevant here.  
sanctions   
political consequences No political consequences have been drawn on account 
of the AP-23 land mine accident in 1983. 
No political consequences have been drawn on account 
of the AP-23 land mine accident in 1984. 
No political consequences have been drawn on account 
                                               
736 Centrale Raad van Beroep, August 21, 2014, 12-1227, AWECLI:NL:CRVB:2014:2815. 
737 Tweede Kamer, 2010–2011, 28 686, nr. 11. 
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of the Fred Spijkers affair. 
disciplinary sanctions A disciplinary warning was given to one medical officer 
of the RBB for the way the patient log was documented. 
Apart from that, no disciplinary sanctions have been 
applied.  
sanctions concerning criminal 
law 
No one has been prosecuted in this case, neither for the 
accidents in 1983 and 1984 nor for the Fred Spijkers-
affair. Spijkers has made several declarations to the 
police, none of these have led to prosecution. 
Measures taken / lessons 
learned  
Several measures were announced on account of the 
1983 accident. In addition to blocking the use of the 
AP-23, the following measures were announced:  
- the system of munition classification was 
revised 
- the demand for instruction materials for 
lessons on munitions would be reviewed 
- the making of munitions for instruction 
would be examined 
- an investigation was started into safety 
aspects at the Munition Renovation 
Company, also examining how to prevent 
confusion between ‘live’ mines and 
instruction mines. External control visits to 
the munition depots were announced.  
- the possibility of an extra check between the 
delivery and the first use of the munition 
would be looked into. 
- the instruction booklets and other instruction 
material were reviewed to deal better with 
safety aspects. 
- special attention to be given by the 
inspectorate for the Armed Forces to the 
safety aspects of instruction and exercising 
with munition.738 
However, the AP-23 was not modified, replaced or 
destroyed.739 
 
The 1984 accident led to several measures, the most 
important of which was the decision to block the use of 
the AP-23 immediately. Also, the decision was taken to 
modify the detonator of the land mine. Nevertheless, 
until 1990 the AP-23 land mine was maintained in the 
arsenal of Defense. The National Ombudsman 
concluded that Defense failed to come up with adequate 
instructions and safety measures concerning the 
shortcomings of the AP-23 until 1990.740 
                                               
738 Nationale Ombudsman (1999), p. 120-121. 
739 Nationale Ombudsman (1999), p. 260. 
740 Nationale Ombudsman (1999), p. 261. 
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In his speech on the occasion of Spijkers’ royal 
decoration, State Secretary of Defense Van der Knaap 
stated that it was because of Spijkers and the support 
Spijkers had gathered with a number of political parties, 
that a temporary committee for investigation of 
accidents had been installed at the Ministry of Defense, 
awaiting the inauguration of the permanent Dutch 
Safety Board. 
number of official 
investigations/reports on the case 
12 (not limitative) 
- Investigation by Royal Netherlands 
Marechaussee into the accident with the AP-23 
in 1983 (P 842/1983) 
- Investigation by the Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal Service (EOD) into the accident with 
the AP-23 in 1983 
- An investigation concerning security aspects at 
the Munition Renovation Company in 1983 
- Case investigation before the High Military 
Court concerning the referral of suspects of the 
1983 accident.741 
- Investigation by Royal Netherlands 
Marechaussee into the accident with the AP-23 
in 1984, concerning the sudden detonation of the 
AP-23 (P 4/85) 
- Investigation by Royal Netherlands 
Marechaussee into the accident with the AP-23 
in 1984, concerning the death of the test leader 
(P 674/1984)742 
- GIP-report  
- National Ombudsman 1999 
- KPMG-report  
- National Ombudsman 2006 
- Book on the Spijkers case by Nijeboer 
- University of Amsterdam (J. van der Vliet c.s.) 
Also several investigations by police and Public 
Prosecution were held on various occasions.  
Number of years from start of 
the case till finish or present  
31 years and counting743  
 
 
8.2.3. The question of psychiatrization  
 
A specific subject in this case is the question whether Spijkers was psychiatrized by Defense 
and RBB or not. Spijkers was asked to undergo examination by different independent 
psychiatric experts. Spijkers himself asked for an examination in February 1988 by Van der 
Post. The following examinations all took place at the request of the RBB: in July 1988 by 
                                               
741 Nationale Ombudsman (1999), p. 59. 
742 Nationale Ombudsman (1999), p. 67. 
743 The accident with the AP-23 in 1983 is chosen as a starting point for this. 
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Rooijmans, in June 1989 by Van Tilburg, in November 1991 by Keilson and in April 1992 by 
Kuilman. Spijkers was also examined in the Central Military Hospital by psychiatrists Unck 
and De Loos. These reports showed that Spijkers was stressed because of his work situation, 
but that he was not mentally ill.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Geneva Initiative on Psychiatry (GIP) analyzed the psychiatric reports 
that had been made about Spijkers and the way in which these reports were dealt with. In a 
letter that Robert Van Voren of GIP wrote personally to Minister of Defense Voorhoeve on July 
31, 1997, Van Voren stated that the psychiatric reports had been twisted in such a way that a 
mentally healthy person had been changed into a psychiatric patient. The way the Ministry of 
Defense and the RBB acted in this case was according to Van Voren: 
 
“a clear case of political misuse of psychiatry, however this time it is not in the Soviet 
Union, but in the Netherlands. Miraculously, Fred Spijkers has endured despite the 
Kafkaesque situation in which he was caught, purely and solely because he had followed 
his conscience.”744  
 
The following conclusions were drawn in the GIP-report: 
- The reports the psychiatric experts had brought out were unanimous: Spijkers did 
not suffer from an illness or deficiency. He was unfit for work because of non-
medical reasons. 
- The reports of the psychiatric experts were rewritten in the documents by the RBB-
medical officers. As a result, Spijkers was registered as ‘mentally ill’, a situation 
which had both material and non-material consequences for Spijkers. 
- The examinations of the RBB were secretive in nature. Together with the 
conclusions about the reports that were rewritten by the RBB, it can be stated that 
the RBB made a mess of the reports and that they were inaccurate. The impression 
that these actions were deliberate could not be overlooked. It might have been 
attributable to error (such as typing errors for example or heavy workload for the 
RBB), were it not for the systematic character of these errors, the total neglect of 
the reports from the psychiatric experts and the systematical failure to reply to 
questions concerning the medical necessity of the actions of the RBB. 
- Since questions about the purpose of the medical examinations were systematically 
left unanswered, ethical principles such as autonomy of the individual and non-
damaging actions were violated in relation to Spijkers. 
- Independent experts had pointed several times to a possible conflict of interest that 
lay at the base of the attempt at psychiatrization in the dispute over Spijkers 
dismissal. A conflict of interest within the RBB seemed clear. 
- The organizational structure of the RBB was not optimized according to the 
Medical Inspector of South-Holland, more specifically concerning the functioning 
of doctors, the mixing of medical roles, risks arising from a practice of ‘leaving to 
others’ and the regular practice of examinations.745  
 
Spijkers has pointed to his patient card on which the RBB had kept its record. In handwritten 
statements by RBB physicians, the suggestion seemed to be made that something was wrong 
with Spijkers’ mental health. Concerning the analysis by Van der Post, it was concluded that 
Spijkers had a paranoid interpretation of events. The patient card also mentioned that 
psychiatrist Van Tilburg had concluded that Spijkers was overstressed and showing signs of 
                                               
744 Nijeboer (2006), p. 145. 
745 Geneva Institute on Psychiatry, ‘De zaak Fred. J.J. Spijkers’, 20 april 1993, National Archive, unpublished. 
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depression and fear that were based on a personality disorder.  
 
Spijkers often contested the truthfulness of written documents by governmental agencies. In his 
view, there were many documents concerning his case in which important parts were omitted, 
words were changed or events were described that never happened. An example of the last 
category is that a handwritten RBB report in which a daily log was kept, noted the following as 
happening on August 7, 1987: 
 
“Spijkers sufficed by stating that his girlfriend and his family doctor were arranging his 
committal in a psychiatric hospital.”746  
 
Both Doctor Beth and Spijkers were adamant that there had never been any activities 
whatsoever to arrange committal to a psychiatric hospital for Spijkers.747 Psychiatrist Van 
Tilburg, who examined Spijkers, was presented with a copy of his report by a television crew. 
He recognized the report as being his own report and started reading. 
 
“When I read what was included in the conclusions of the report, I was astonished. The 
word ‘not’ was rubbed out. That meant that I would have concluded that Spijkers was 
suffering from a serious psychiatric disorder, a personality disorder. But the point was 
that I had explicitly declared that he was NOT suffering from something like that! I had 
also emphatically written that he was not psychotic and was not suffering from 
delusions. The first thing I exclaimed then, was as I recall: ‘This is fraud!’”748 
 
Defense had a very different view of what happened, as evidenced by answers given to the 
House of Representatives in 2011 concerning the question of possible psychiatrization of 
Spijkers. Defense pointed out that the complaint by Spijkers to the Medical Board of Discipline 
held that the company doctor of the RBB had misinformed the appeal committee by providing 
an information overview that contained false information about the findings of Van Tilburg and 
Van der Post. The Medical Board of Discipline had ruled that the company doctor should have 
been more precise in distinguishing the findings of the psychiatrists and his own findings in the 
information overview. However, this was not sufficient grounds for a sanction against the 
company doctor, as the appeal committee knew that personal remarks by the doctor were 
involved and it had to decide based on all of the available information, including the reports by 
the psychiatrists. The Minister added that the information overview did not have consequences 
for Spijkers’ legal status. The appeal committee at the RBB had ruled that Spijkers was in fact 
unfit for work, but also considered that this was a temporary situation. The firing of Spijkers on 
October 1, 1993, was not because he was unfit for work, but was based on the conclusion that 
the relation between employer and employee had become so strenuous that a satisfactory 
cooperation between Defense and Spijkers was no longer possible.749  
 
Furthermore, the Minister pointed to the revision case before the Central Appeals Tribunal in 
2010, in which the Tribunal did not find sufficient grounds to rule that psychiatrization had 
taken place. On top of that, Defense had on several occasions (Van der Knaap in 2003 and De 
Vries in 2008) publicly declared that Defense ‘does not consider mister Spijkers to be a political 
                                               
746 http://www.psy.nl/fileadmin/files/Psyarchief/Files_2011/verslag_1987.pdf (date last accessed: 20-1-2012) 
747http://www.psy.nl/meer-nieuws/dossier/Artikel/de-zaak-spijkers-arts-bespioneert-haar-
patient/?no_cache=1&cHash=531f43d1c9dc6cf1133373def1f3f2fd (date last accessed: 20-1-2012) 
748 Psy, February 23, 2011: http://www.psy.nl/meer-nieuws/dossier/Artikel/psychiater-van-tilburg-schokkend-dat-
mijn-psychiatrisch-rapport-herschreven-is/ (date last accessed: 20-1-2012) 
749 Letter by the Minister of Defense to the House of Representatives in answer of questions by Eijsink (PvdA) and 
Van Dijk (SP), April 7, 2011, BS/2011009281. 
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criminal or a psychiatric patient’.750 Spijkers was not satisfied with this statement, as he saw in 
it a denial of what had happened. The words he was looking for were that Defense ‘no longer’ 
considered him a political criminal or a psychiatric patient, thereby admitting that they had tried 
to psychiatrize him for many years. It should be pointed out that in its ruling of August 21, 
2014, the Tribunal stated that only Van Tilburg and the journalist who handed Van Tilburg the 
altered copy of his own report had seen the report with the alterations. The Tribunal concluded 
that in all the legal procedures on this issue, including the ones before the Tribunal, correct 
copies of the report had been used.751 
 
Spijkers claims that he is still not receiving any pension funds as a result of the actions by 
Defense to psychiatrize him. Whatever the different angles on this issue may be, it is noteworthy 
that Defense and the RBB had Spijkers examined by six different psychiatrists over the course 
of a few years, from 1988 until 1992. It is difficult to avoid the impression that the results of 
the examination of the psychiatrists (Spijkers is overstressed, but does not have a personality 
disorder) were not what RBB and Defense wished for and therefore different psychiatrists were 
consulted. It would be interesting if Defense spoke out on this issue and explained why so many 
examinations were deemed necessary. It is relevant to note that Defense, from 1988 to 1996, 
had arranged for benefits for Spijkers based on the law concerning labor disability, the AAW 
(Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet), indicating that Spijkers was unfit for work. The 
organization for social insurances later demanded that Defense return payments made in 
benefits to Spijkers since they had given wrong information about the nature of Spijkers’ 
condition. When informed of this Gmelich Meijling made the statement quoted at the head of 
this chapter. Defense has stated many times that it does not consider Spijkers to be a psychiatric 
patient. The question can still be asked whether Defense did try for a period of time to assemble 
the grounds to establish that he was, and what consequences this did, or did not have, for 
Spijkers. Considering the final ruling of the Tribunal on this matter, more clarity than is now 
available should probably not be expected anymore.  
 
 
8.3. Why: explaining the deaths and serious injuries  
 
There are four different factors to explore further in each case: opportunities, motives, masking 
and factors relevant factors to response (this last factor will be discussed later in this chapter). 
 
 
8.3.1. Opportunities  
 
8.3.1.1. Organizational structure and division of responsibilities  
 
Organizational structure 
In 2011, a total of € 8.1. billion was spent on Defense, with approximately 58.000 people employed 
by Defense.752 The budget has been cut significantly over the years and many jobs have been lost. 
The Ministry of Defense has many characteristics of a classic large bureaucratic organization. 
Nevertheless, Defense is by nature different from the other ministries in the Netherlands. Former 
Minister of Defense Relus ter Beek described this as follows: 
 
                                               
750 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2010–2011, 28 686, nr. 11, p.2.  
751 Centrale Raad van Beroep, August 21, 2014, 12-1227, AWECLI:NL:CRVB:2014:2815, p. 3. 
752http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/overheid-politiek/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2012/2012-3690-wm.htm 
(date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
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“There are large differences between Defense and the other departments, the job of 
Minister of Defense is different from all others. At Defense almost all important advisors 
are also lobbyists for specific interests. They do not only originate from the armed forces, 
they are still part of it. If they give advice to the Minister, they do so concerning themselves, 
concerning their own organization, concerning the tasks and the size of their own part of 
the armed forces. That makes decision making processes sensitive and complicated. It 
always creates tensions. At other ministries special interest groups and target groups are 
usually outsiders, at Defense they are insiders.”753  
 
Within Defense there are a number of differences: the Army, Navy and Air Force have their own 
interests and often have a complex relationship with the Ministry that is often seen as bureaucratic. 
There has traditionally been a discussion between the different ‘colors’ within the organization. 
 
Division of responsibilities 
Clearly, the most prominent governmental organization involved here is the Ministry of Defense. 
The AP-23 accidents involve the Defense organization, Spijkers was an employee of Defense and 
essentially, this case involves conflicts between the widow Ovaa, Spijkers and the Defense-
organization. Nevertheless, there are many other organizations involved who all played a role, 
some more prominent than others. Ministries, parliament, police, Public Prosecution, courts, 
municipalities, inspections, pension funds, the social security office (UWV), the National 
Ombudsman, the secret service (both AIVD and MIVD), the state advocate, universities, media 
and many others have at some stage all played a role in this case.  
 
During the 31 years that this case has been ongoing, there have been eleven different Ministers of 
Defense and eight different Secretaries of Defense. The changes in the top of the civil service are 
of course a multiple of these numbers. The title of the book by Nijeboer, ‘One man against the 
state’, could be paraphrased as one man against a multi-faceted government, as virtually no 
important player, whether politician or civil servant, has remained in his or her position during the 
entire Spijkers’ case. On the other hand, it should be noted that the image of ‘one man’ who is 
entirely alone in his fight against the state has shifted in the course of this affair. In the beginning, 
it surely was a lonely struggle that Spijkers and the widow Ovaa, with the notable support of 
Spijkers personal doctor Beth, were fighting. However, over the years Spijkers has been able to 
generate more and more support for his case, mobilizing political parties, media, the trade union 
FNV and special interest groups to name but some.  
 
 
8.3.1.2. Organizational culture  
 
In 2008, former Commander of the Armed Forces General Couzy said about the culture within 
the Defense organization:   
 
“At the armed forces the prevailing culture is one of maintaining silence. Defense is still 
of the opinion that errors cannot be made. If you bring things out in the open, you will 
be dealt with immediately. As soon as a soldier reports that something has gone wrong, 
his boss will start to give a beating to everything that comes his way. That is hardly an 
encouragement for openness. This ‘cover-up culture’ is strengthened even more by 
politicians, who often react disproportionally to these kinds of things.”754 
                                               
753 Ter Beek (1996), p. 216-217.  
754 Van Vliet c.s. (2008), p. 18. The quote is from an interview with Couzy by Th. Broer, Vrij Nederland 2007 
number 14. 
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Former Minister of Defense Ter Beek described a culture where hierarchy plays an important role 
and where meetings often have a formal character. ‘Saying what’s on your mind’ was considered 
‘not done’ according to Ter Beek. He also stated that it should be noted that there are large 
differences in culture between the different parts of Defense.755 
 
As for hierarchy: 
  
“In the hierarchical organization of the armed forces the subordinates carry out the orders 
of the superiors. Right or wrong, it will be done. Even if the commander is wrong, he will 
be considered right.”756 
  
This in itself is not surprising: In situations of military conflict some kind of hierarchy is a 
necessity. The course of action to be taken cannot be debated each time. Not all hierarchy is bad. 
Then again: not all situations are war situations. Different angles should be present in making 
judgments and thinking about alternative courses of action. It appears that in some instances in the 
Spijkers’ case, the ‘war’ mode prevailed over the ‘peace’ mode.  
 
There is another way of looking at the organizational culture. From this perspective, it is stressed 
that the armed forces perform their duties under very difficult circumstances, are extremely loyal 
and are highly professional. The influence of the media and significant military action (such as the 
involvement of Dutch armed forces in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica) have also put pressure on 
Defense to become more open and in Defense’s view, there already is more openness, especially 
since the turn of the century. On occasion, loyalty can be taken too far in order to protect the image 
of the organization or the interests of the minister. Hierarchy is influenced by the importance of 
the specialist in the field, simply because in an operational situation the opinion of such a specialist 
can be crucial. In this view, the budget cuts in Defense exemplify a lack of appreciation for the 
important and difficult job that Defense carries out every day for the greater good of the Dutch 
state. Nevertheless, not only in Spijkers’ case but also in other cases there has been criticism of the 
culture of the Ministry of Defense (notably the Dutch role in Srebrenica and the Hercules plane 
crash at the military airport in Eindhoven). In 2014, TV-program Een Vandaag published a 
confidential internal military report about the death of a Dutch soldier, Boy van Geffen, who died 
after a training exercise. The report concluded the following about the organizational culture: 
 
“More attention to the human factor is necessary when assessing risks. This aspect only 
receives limited attention. That is partly caused by the organizational culture, which is 
characterized by a ‘can do’-mentality. The positive thing is that loyalty, professionalism 
and creativity lead to getting the job done; at the same time this culture can leave room for 
unthinkingly taking unnecessary risks.”757 
 
  
8.3.1.3. The political system and the relations with corporate partners and 
society  
 
This has been a politically sensitive case. There have been many debates with the House of 
Representatives on these matters, too many to be covered here individually. It is fair to say that the 
case of Spijkers is one of the biggest (if not the biggest) ‘headache files’ in the history of the 
                                               
755 Ter Beek (1996), p. 220. 
756 Ter Beek (1996), p. 244. 
757 http://dossiereenvandaag.eenvandaag.nl/dossier-
eenvandaag/50549/tientallen_fouten_defensie_bij_dood_boy_van_geffen_ (date last accessed: May 8, 2014)  
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Defense department. Where in the beginning Spijkers’ case did not receive much attention, from 
the late 1990’s onwards there has been considerable pressure for Defense to ‘solve’ the case.  
 
As time has passed, more politicians had been involved in the case, often influential figures within 
their own parties. The largest number of ministers and state secretaries to become involved have 
been from the CDA (the Christian democrats) and the VVD (the liberal party). It can be argued 
that solving the case became more difficult as time went by because the passage of time suggested 
that prominent political party members had been wrong in the way they handled the case. This 
could have begun with the response to the 1984 AP-23 accident: Minister of Defense Job de Ruiter 
had promised effective measures after the AP-23 accident in 1983 and could have been reproached 
for misinforming the House of Representatives.758 Every new minister or state secretary at Defense 
has been faced with this case, providing both opportunities as well as threats to the civil servants 
at Defense as well as to Spijkers.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
In his book, Nijeboer claimed that the House of Representatives was misinformed about the 
case on 49 different occasions by the Ministry of Defense. It should be noted that in this list, 
there are four examples of letters which were not addressed to the House or members of the 
House or which concerned media interviews. The other 45 on the list regard various subjects, 
such as the cause of the AP-23 accidents, the order to Spijkers, the ‘psychiatrization’ and the 
carrying out of the declaration of agreement.759 Most of these issues were, at the time or even 
now, subjects on which both parties disagree fiercely. However, on some subjects there can by 
now be no more disagreement and it can be concluded that the House was misinformed (For 
example, what was said of the causes of the AP-23 accidents, or the link between Ovaa and the 
dismissal of Spijkers, as shown by the report by the National Ombudsman and the revision of 
the Central Appeals Tribunal).  
 
It should also be noted that Spijkers has fuelled debate in parliament in many ways, actively 
trying to gain support for his own case. He has sought and received the support of several 
politicians over the years. Members of the House have asked many questions, organized 
mediation attempts with the Minister or State Secretary and requested debates in parliament in 
support of Spijkers. Defense has on several occasions been forced by the House of 
Representatives to reverse its actions in this case. Clearly, over the years the Spijkers’ case has 
also become a struggle in the political arena, with both parties (Defense and Spijkers) trying to 
persuade political parties to choose their side.  
 
What is striking is that the political uproar about the AP-23 accidents seems to have been rather 
limited when compared to other cases. As already mentioned, the National Ombudsman had 
concluded that it was plausible that the two accidents with the AP-23 land mine (leading to 8 
deaths in total) would not have happened if Defense had taken measures in 1970. In other cases 
such a conclusion led to the resignation of the ministers involved (for example, in the Schiphol 
detention center fire), but in this case the House of Representatives did not discuss political 
consequences for the ministers involved. There may be several reasons for this. The report by 
the National Ombudsman was brought out in 1999, while the actions involved ranged from 
1970 to 1984. This meant that no one from the former cabinet was still in post when the report 
came out. This made it easier for the politicians receiving the report to distance themselves from 
what had gone wrong. Again, the largest Dutch political parties (CDA, VVD and PvdA) all had 
ministers or state secretaries at the department of Defense at some point during this case and it 
appears that at times this hampered reaching a solution. Each party had its own problems with 
                                               
758 Nijeboer (2006), p. 96. 
759 Nijeboer (2006), p. 279-298. 
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admitting errors or wrongdoing in the case. Nevertheless, it is remarkable in retrospect that the 
case did not come close to gathering as much publicity or causing as much political turmoil as 
other incidents involving deaths, such as the fires in Volendam, Enschede or the Schiphol 
detention center fire.   
 
Economic importance 
The AP-23 was manufactured by Eurometaal, a former state company, which became a private 
holding in 1973, with the Dutch State still holding 70% of the shares. In 2000 the State sold its 
shares. The AP-23 was exported only once, to the American Navy, in 1983.760 In 1985, the 
Ministry of Defense still had 46.600 AP-23 land mines in stock. In 1990 this number had 
decreased to more than 30.000 AP-23 land mines, which were all superfluous by then. In 1990 
the Ministry of Defense gave an order to Franerex (a daughter company of Eurometaal) to 
attempt to convert the AP-23 to a secured type of land mine, for around € 750.000. In 1991, the 
stock of AP-23 land mines was placed on a list of superfluous military materials which were to 
be offered for sale abroad. The AP-23 was on the list for € 36 per land mine, making the total 
value of the stock around € 1.080.000. State Secretary Van Voorst tot Voorst was called to the 
House of Representatives on October 14, 1992 and felt compelled to say that the AP-23 could 
not be sold considering the poor technical state the mines were in, adding that they would be 
destroyed. Hurriedly, an erratum was added to the list of materials to be sold. The fact that the 
AP-23 was on the list to be sold was judged as ‘improper’ by the National Ombudsman.761 
Clearly, the AP-23 held economic importance to Defense. The fact that Eurometaal was a state 
company was relevant, as the company suffered under the budget cuts that Defense had to take 
over the years. For a long time, the State therefore had economic interests in this matter. There 
have been reports that politicians were connected to the weapons industry in such a way that it 
influenced their stance in the cases of the AP-23 and Spijkers. Nijeboer also wrote about this. 
Official investigations into these claims did not take place as far as can be traced here.  
 
 
8.3.1.4. Rules, regulations and procedures 
 
In some cases it can be argued that rules, regulations and procedures present opportunities for all 
sorts of problems. Rules can be highly complex or in contradiction with other rules (‘choosing 
between two evils’), procedures can be overly bureaucratic or impossible to work with or run 
counter to policy intentions. There were complex procedures for dealing with the AP-23 landmine. 
This should come as no surprise. One would expect that safety procedures for such dangerous 
instruments are stringent, in order to maximize safety for the personnel that work with these 
weapons. It cannot be maintained that rules and regulations were the problem in the case of the 
AP-23 accidents. No reference has been made to complexity of rules and regulations when trying 
to find explanations for the accidents but argument was made by Defense that the procedures were 
not properly followed. In the case of Ovaa, it was originally claimed that he violated the procedure 
by his own behavior. In the case of the 1983 accident, it was argued that the instructor made a 
personal error by mistaking a live mine for a practice mine. The report by the National Ombudsman 
in 1999 showed that the accidents were not due to difficult or bureaucratic procedures, but rather 
to the fact that research findings were denied and not dealt with. In conclusion: For the AP-23 
accidents rules, regulations and procedures did not form major opportunities. As for the Spijkers’ 
case, it should be clear that the conflict between Spijkers and Defense created a legal battle on an 
enormous scale but the problems in this case were not caused by rules, regulations and procedures.  
                                               
760 Only 21 land mines were sold, the Americans were informed of the defects to the AP-23 for the first time in 1998. 
National Ombudsman (1999), p. 262-263. 
761 Nijeboer (2006), p. 107-123 and National Ombudsman (1999), p. 262-263. 
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8.3.2. Motives  
 
8.3.2.1. Primary motives  
 
Three primary motives have been identified before:  
 
a. rational choice (e.g. a rational choice to commit an act is taken after weighing all the 
options) 
b. ignorance (e.g. errors due to not knowing the relevant rules or due to lack of 
professionalism) or  
c. unwillingness (e.g. governmental organizations who feel that they are confronted by 
rules that are impossible to carry out because of wicked dilemmas) 
 
The AP-23 accidents in 1983 and 1984 
In a letter State Secretary of Defense Gmelich Meijling sent to the House of Representatives, 
Defense offered an explanation for the fact that the research in 1970 by the Munitions Research 
Service, which showed there were serious problems with the AP-23, failed to lead to adequate 
measures being taken. He said that the investigation in 1985 by the Royal Dutch Marechaussee 
concerning the Ovaa case attributed this failure to several circumstances. Someone who had 
played an important role in following the research results in 1970 left the service at a crucial 
moment (in 1971) without any transfer of knowledge because a successor had not been 
appointed. Overburdened munitions technicians, poor record keeping and badly structured 
quality control were also cited as reasons.762 A letter written in 1998 by Spijkers to the chairman 
of the Defense Committee of the House of Representatives stated that instructor Den Bakker 
had never given an instruction lesson with the AP-23 land mine and that Den Bakker had not 
received any training for this task.763   
 
This line of reasoning could imply that ignorance (error) was the predominant motive. 
Organizational problems and miscommunication could therefore be cited as the main problems 
here. Undeniably errors have been made, but the question is whether this is the whole story. 
From a second perspective, deeper motives could be attributed to the behavior within the 
Defense organization. This perspective would point to the fact that there were alarming reports 
about the AP-23. All people involved were well aware that they were dealing with highly 
dangerous materials. The strict procedures in place for landmines were in place precisely to 
protect people from injury and it is scarcely credible that the one person who transferred to 
another job was the only one responsible for following up on the test results If the test result 
had shown that these landmines were highly dangerous (and that was the result), it is likely that 
whoever was responsible would notify others and request action. The other excusing 
circumstances may well have pertained, but even then, there was a responsibility for those who 
knew the test results to act on them.  
 
The widow Ovaa offered the following analysis:  
 
“I blame the Ministry of Defense in this for the death of my husband, because of (among 
other things) incompetence, a rigid bureaucratic organization, overburdening and 
understaffing coupled with a lack of sharpness, ability, supervision and control. 
                                               
762 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996–1997, Aanhangsel Handelingen p. 3513. 
763 Nijeboer (2006), p. 177. 
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Especially the failure to act as should have been done by employees of the Ministry of 
Defense has caused, in my opinion, the death of my husband.”764 
 
The National Ombudsman was clear in his judgment of the possible reasons mentioned by 
Defense for the accidents: 
 
“The National Ombudsman finds these reasons to be of an internal nature and finds that 
they can in no way justify that the testing report of November 11, 1970, did not lead to 
immediate measures.”765  
  
The National Ombudsman in his report also drew firm conclusions about the way Defense acted 
in this case: 
 
“On the whole, the National Ombudsman finds that Defense could not reasonably take 
the position over a number of years that the accident was partly the consequence of the 
actions of the test leader for which he could be blamed. The National Ombudsman 
therefore finds it to be incorrect that Defense until 1997 took the aforementioned 
position towards the widow of the test leader and that, based on that position, it rejected 
the liability claim by the widow. He finds it especially poignant to the widow that 
Defense has persevered in this viewpoint for no less than twelve and a half years. On 
top of that the National Ombudsman finds it incorrect that the Minister has informed the 
widow of the test leader that the information that came up in 1997 was new and gave 
reason to a different view towards the issue of liability.”766  
 
Clearly, it is difficult to ascertain what motives were present within the Defense organization 
and to be sure what motivations were relevant to the Defense employees involved. 
Nevertheless, the question is relevant even if a sequence of errors that, according to Defense, 
determined events between 1970 and 1984 did not have any motive. In this line of reasoning 
rational choice is the fitting characterization, because the option to keep the land mine in use 
was preferred over the option to stop using the land mine altogether. Financial motives, coupled 
with the wish to protect the image of Defense and avert possible political damage could then be 
said to have played an important role.  
 
In this light, reference can be made to the description Nijeboer gave in his book concerning the 
failure to act on the deficiencies that were found with the AP-23. This is a long and complex 
story, in which financial interests, conscious decisions and errors were complexly intertwined. 
In the book, Nijeboer included a copy of a test report of a number of AP-23 land mines, on 
which Cor Engelsman, coordinator of the technical section of the Material Supplies Section 
(MVA-4) had blotted out the words ‘disapproved’ and substituted them for the words 
‘approved’. Engelsman had a large role in the development of the AP-23, which was by many 
seen as ‘his’ land mine. The problems with the AP-23 apparently disturbed him very much. 
Engelsman admitted in a hearing held by the Royal Marechaussee to single handedly changing 
the wording, adding that he did this because the factory, given the correct way of producing the 
land mine, had not made a manufacturing fault. Engelsman had changed the description to 
‘approval’ since the fault lay with the organization of Defense, and in order to arrange for 
correct payment to the factory (Hembrug) that had manufactured the AP-23. On the backside 
of the report, Engelsman had written the code ‘R59’, which meant ‘repel and destroy’ according 
                                               
764 Nijeboer (2006), p. 75, quoting a letter written by the widow Ovaa. 
765 National Ombudsman (1999), p. 313.  
766 National Ombudsman (1999), p. 318. 
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to Engelsman. Possibly, the ‘R59’ went unnoticed and attention was only given to the 
description ‘approved’. Why a crucial judgment concerning the destruction of this lot of land 
mines was only mentioned in a code at the back of a form, was not asked by the interrogators. 
Nijeboer argued that Engelsman had personal financial interests in the AP-23, as did the Dutch 
State which held a financial stake in the company that developed the land mine.767  
 
Unwillingness, in the sense that Defense was faced with complicated or contradictory rules or 
with dilemmas that were impossible to solve, does not seem to properly characterize events in 
this long lasting case. Perhaps, on occasion, there were in fact dilemmas based on the rules 
(think of the problems with the rules on the protection of personal data for instance, which 
accounted for certain complexities when deciding what to do with the files in this case). But on 
the whole, when describing the motives of Defense, unwillingness does not fit the bill.  
 
It should be clear that nobody wanted these accidents to happen. Many errors have been 
identified that were relevant in this case but it would be unjustified to dismiss this case as a 
simple example of error or mistakes. Although unwillingness is not found to be a relevant cause, 
there are valid arguments to identify at least some rational choices that in hindsight have 
jeopardized the safety of those working with the AP-23 land mines. This also refers to the 
financial aspects involved, which will be discussed next.  
 
 
8.3.2.2. Secondary motives  
 
a. financial concerns (cutting costs, staying within budget, avoiding claims, etc.) 
 
As mentioned before, the State had considerable financial interests in the AP-23 land mines. 
Putting the entire stock of AP-23 land mines out of use for good would have brought with it a large 
price tag. This seems a compelling reason for ignoring the information about the technical failures 
and consequent dangers that were attached to the use of the AP-23. The concern for financial 
matters can also be evidenced by the attempts to sell the AP-23 to foreign buyers. Nevertheless, it 
is not known with certainty what the main motive was. Defense in its response to the National 
Ombudsman denied that financial motives played a role here.768 As discussed before, ignorance 
and errors also played an important role. Nevertheless, there can be no excuse for not acting on the 
information that had been available since 1970 about the dangers attached to the mines. The 
National Ombudsman was very clear about this in his conclusion concerning these accidents, in 
which he added that the lack of openness on the part of Defense added considerably to the problems 
that followed these accidents. Whether financial motives were to the fore in this is not proven 
beyond any doubt, although there are compelling arguments to be made that they were.  
 
The wish to avoid claims and financial concerns were certainly present in the conflict with the 
widow Ovaa and Spijkers that followed the accident. There has been a continual struggle on this 
point. The declaration of agreement of 2002 has put an end to the dispute with the widow Ovaa, 
but not with Spijkers. Clearly, this dispute did not only concern the financial aspects. In all the 
internal memos that have been investigated, financial concerns are often quoted as relevant 
considerations for the strategy that should be followed. There are several sides to this: It is not 
surprising that civil servants advise their minister about possible liability claims from citizens, and 
the financial risks attached to this. It is also clear that Defense has viewed Spijkers as someone 
who is by now ‘in it for the money’. This is part of the struggle between the two sides: describing 
                                               
767 Nijeboer (2006), p. 49-51.  
768 Nationale Ombudsman (1999), p. 31. 
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the other as motivated mainly by money and position is something both parties have used as a 
tactic. Finally, it is clear that financial motives played a part in the strategy of Defense towards 
Spijkers, a strategy which has rendered little success and instead has led to very high costs and a 
prolonged battle.  
 
b. the position of the governmental organization and its public image  
 
For the accidents with the AP-23 in 1983 and 1984, the fact that since 1970 the deficiencies of the 
land mines had been known has led to many different speculations on the possible motives for 
taking no action. From the report by the National Ombudsman concerning these accidents, it is 
still difficult to state with certainty which motives were in fact present. Nevertheless, it should be 
reminded that all this took place in the Cold War era, in which the position of the Dutch Defense 
system would be influenced by the announcement that a large number of land mines were not 
usable. Besides the financial interests, this was certainly a situation in which the position of 
Defense and its public image was at stake. All in all, however, it is difficult to maintain with 
certainty that the accidents with the AP-23 took place as a result of concerns for the position of 
Defense and its public image.  
 
c. preferring another norm than the law strives for  
 
This case does not concern wicked dilemmas over contradictory rules for governmental 
organizations. The norms and rules are fairly clear in this case. Since there is little or no ambiguity 
concerning this point, this type of motive is not applicable in this case, neither for the accidents 
with the AP-23 nor for the conflict with the widow Ovaa and Spijkers that followed the accidents. 
 
d. demands by politicians, citizens, special interest groups and media 
 
For the accidents with the AP-23 in 1983 and 1984, it cannot be said that the demands by 
politicians, citizens, special interest groups or media have been influential in causing the accident. 
Instead, errors and internal considerations seem to have played a large part. It should be added that 
these sorts of demands did play a role in the conflict that arose after the accidents. This case has 
turned into a full scale battle between Defense and Spijkers (and the widow Ovaa in the period 
before 2002), in which politicians, interest groups, media and others all chose sides. Certainly, on 
both sides there have been those who have done their utmost to bring the matter to an ending 
acceptable to both sides. The fact that this has been unsuccessful up till now only adds to the 
tragedy this case has become over the years.  
 
 
8.3.3. Masking  
 
Adams and Balfour argued that a characteristic of administrative evil is that it is masked, in the 
sense that there are many factors preventing us from identifying what is really going on and judging 
whether that constitutes administrative evil or not. In the following part, these factors are described 
briefly and subsequently analyzed for the case. 
 
 
8.3.3.1. Distance in time and space  
 
In the case of the AP-23 and Spijkers, distance in space played a role. The mask that is worn here 
could be the assumption that in the Netherlands the democratic constitutional state functions in 
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accordance with the expectations and demands of society. That is not a strange assumption at all, 
in fact it is of crucial importance that we have faith in our democratic institutions and the correct 
functioning of our legal system. There is no reason to conclude that this faith should not be present 
in the situation in the Netherlands. However, we should always be alert to possible exceptions. In 
some instances in this case, there is reason enough to speak of this exception. We do not expect 
things such as in this case to happen in our own country. Hence the first impulse for response can 
be disbelief and dismissing it as some awkward conspiracy theory. That is in fact what happened 
to the widow Ovaa and Spijkers over a long period of time, and it is also a phenomenon that is not 
uncommon for whistleblowers. It is not always easy to determine who is right (the whistleblower 
or the governmental organization involved) and it is certainly not always a question of black or 
white. The quote ‘not in the Soviet Union, but in the Netherlands’ might sum up this discussion.  
 
Distance in time is also a masking factor that applies here. Over the years, the case has been viewed 
very differently. Where in the first years, the AP-23 incidents were seen as errors made by the 
personnel who handled the mines, over the years this has changed. After the report by the National 
Ombudsman in 1999, it seems that there is unanimity that the mines themselves were defective 
and that this had been known since 1970. In the case of Fred Spijkers, the mask has been on for a 
very long time as well and still it is possible that not all the information is known. Certainly, time 
has been an important factor in this case, with a struggle developing to see who can hold out the 
longest.  
 
 
8.3.3.2. Object-relations psychology/scapegoating (splitting mechanism)  
 
In this case the government body involved has indeed initially pointed to other parties to blame: 
The accident with the AP-23 in 1983 was according to Defense caused by an error made by the 
instructor (confusing a live mine for a practice mine). For the 1984 accident the original 
response was that test leader Ovaa had failed to take the necessary safety precautions. In the 
Spijkers case, Defense, at least for a certain period of time, painted an image of Spijkers as 
someone who suffers from delusions and is mainly focused on personal gain. The image that 
was painted was that Spijkers tried to connect the fact that he was fired with the Ovaa case, 
with Defense contending that those two things held no connection whatsoever. To be sure, 
Spijkers has also painted images of Defense in the publicity and has tried to frame things his 
way. Nevertheless, it is clear that for a long period of time, the governmental organizations 
involved (particularly the Ministry of Defense) have engaged in scapegoating in order to 
mitigate their own responsibility and liability.  
 
 
8.3.3.3. Perspective  
 
It should be noted, as Spijkers himself pointed out many times, that Spijkers was not the only 
victim in this case: First of all, this case was about the victims of the accidents with the AP-23 and 
their families. In this case the myth of pure evil and the ‘magnitude gap’ seem to come true. The 
perspectives in the publicity seem to change from either all right to all wrong. First, Spijkers 
and Ovaa were ‘all wrong’, later Defense was ‘all wrong’. From the victim’s perspective, pure 
evil is present here. After three decades of struggle between Defense and Spijkers, it should 
come as no surprise that Spijkers views the behavior by Defense in his case to be evil. Every 
action, whether small or big, is seen as holding a bigger significance and often a sign of a 
premeditated and malign strategy by the other party to damage him. This impression is 
strengthened every time that something strange, odd or possibly illegal happens. In this case, it 
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is undeniable that over the course of the years, many things have happened that qualify as 
misleading, suggestive or at times illegal. After what Spijkers has experienced over the years, 
it is understandable that he is suspicious of whatever form of communication from Defense 
comes his way.  
 
The perspective of the victim often differs greatly from that of the perpetrator. This is called the 
‘magnitude gap’. From the victim’s perspective, most often in hindsight, evil can be clearly 
identified. From the perpetrator’s perspective, however, it is often a problem to identify evil. In 
this case, many of the people involved seem to produce rationales and justifications for the 
handling of the AP-23 and the Spijkers-case. In this line of reasoning, the case of the AP-23 
and Spijkers shows a number of errors that have led to an unfortunate sequence of events. In 
this viewpoint, Defense also had an image of the widow Ovaa and of Spijkers which seemed to 
fill this ‘magnitude gap’. Defense saw the widow Ovaa as possibly out to damage Defense and 
Spijkers as making use of the situation, ‘in it for the money’ and out to inflict maximum damage 
on Defense. What is remarkable is that over these three decades, a very large number of persons 
worked on this case at Defense. In that time, a shared perception of this case must have 
developed within the organization that helped the people involved choose their strategy and 
actions. This shared perception cannot be seen separately from the dynamics of the decades of 
conflict between the parties and the very serious reproaches that both parties made towards each 
other.  
 
 
8.3.3.4. Language  
 
The use of technical language or euphemisms often masks what is really going on and provides 
for emotional distance towards sensitive issues. In this case, there are many examples of 
language being used in a way that disguises what is really going on. The letter to the ABP comes 
to mind in which the technical description was deleted because it ‘appeared irrelevant’ for the 
judgment that had to be made. Similarly, the quote ‘Correct source for talkativeness’ comes to 
mind here. As discussed by the National Ombudsman, and stated in debate with the House of 
Representatives, Defense has misled the widow Ovaa and Spijkers for many years. The conflict 
between Spijkers and Defense also often focuses on words that turn out to be crucial. The issue 
of psychiatrization, for instance, hinged upon a crucial difference in wording: Defense said it 
‘does not consider Spijkers mentally ill’ whereas Spijkers wanted that sentence to be ‘no longer 
considers Spijkers mentally ill’, since that would imply an admission that Defense wanted to 
psychiatrize Spijkers. There are numerous examples in this case where close reading is not a 
luxury, but necessary in order to comprehend what is really being said. By using language 
strategically, a smoke screen is often erected that masks or attempts to mask what is actually 
going on. The use of language, then, is often an instrument in the legal battle between parties. 
Considering all the documents available to this dissertation, it can be said that on numerous 
occasions governmental organizations have communicated in a way that could – and should – 
be called erroneous and, on occasion, misleading. This is not always the case, but it has 
happened too often over the years to dismiss this as an occasional error. 
 
8.3.3.5. Dehumanization  
 
Doing evil unto others is easier when the other is seen as ‘not normal’, not like the majority. It 
is essential that subjects are put at a distance through language, by making them ‘numbers’, 
‘things’ or calling them inhuman. The issue of psychiatrization centers on the question whether 
Defense tried to have Spijkers declared mentally ill. If this would be firmly established, this 
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should be labeled a form of dehumanization. If in fact efforts were made to have Spijkers 
declared mentally ill in order to ‘solve’ the case, this should be seen as an effort to deprive 
Spijkers of his humanity. For those on the Spijkers’ side, this point was clear already. In June 
2011, Jasper van Dijk, member of the House of Representatives for the Socialist Party said this 
about Spijkers: 
 
“He is dehumanized. Defense has declared him insane for years and for that minister 
Hillen must now apologize.”769 
 
The question can be whether Defense has tried for a period of time to assemble grounds to 
establish mental ill health and what consequences this did or did not have for Spijkers. 
However, it should be acknowledged that several legal procedures have taken place and that 
none of them concluded that there has been compelling proof for the psychiatrization of 
Spijkers.   
 
 
8.3.3.6. Technical rationality  
 
It is claimed by Adams and Balfour that most deeds of administrative evil do not emanate from 
individual wicked and seductive leaders on the outside, or from exceptional psychopaths for that 
matter, but are in fact engrained and intertwined in the daily operations of public administration (a 
social construction), waiting to start a route down the proverbial slippery slope. Technical 
rationality implies that processes become routine and that people seem to stop thinking about 
them. This case has gone on for three decades. During that time, there have been a very large 
number of politicians and civil servants who all had some part in it. Some of them have been 
highlighted in this case study, but a much larger number of people must have taken smaller 
actions and will probably never make the headlines. The administrative rectification process, 
for example, was an enormous operation, considering the immense volume of files involved 
and the special arrangements made with the national archive. The debates with the House of 
Representatives and the legal procedures must also have provided plenty of work for hundreds, 
if not thousands of employees at ministries, Public Prosecution, consultancy firms, the state 
advocate and many others. It would be fascinating to know how this case was handled by the 
bureaucracy of all these organizations acting together. Van der Knaap referred to this as the 
sometimes stubborn bureaucracy at Defense, adding that some at Defense were unhappy with 
Spijkers.  
 
It seems likely that the bureaucratic process in this case has provided a frame of thought for 
civil servants and politicians to examine it. In the early years, the frame must have suggested 
that everything had been researched and that the errors were made by the test leader himself. 
After the declaration of agreement, the frame seems to be that Spijkers is aiming for personal 
advantage and is out to damage the organization. Whether or not this frame was justified, a 
technical rationale by the bureaucracy involved could very well be present here. In particular, 
it seems that legal considerations in this case have often outweighed considerations of openness 
and the genuine wish to reach a solution. To be sure, Spijkers has done his bit in the conflict to 
arouse negative emotions from government employees. It is understandable that this did not 
make it any easier for government to reach a solution that was within legal boundaries and at 
the same time did justice to both parties. But that does not take away from the fact that for many 
years, a large governmental organization acted in a technocratic way that at some points fell 
                                               
769http://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/nieuws/kamermeerderheid-wil-zaak-spijkers-
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way short of what should be expected in terms of values and behavior.  
 
 
8.4. Response of the governmental organizations involved  
 
8.4.1. External language  
 
In the external communication after the accidents with the AP-23, the Ministry of Defense has 
maintained that the accidents with the land mines were in part caused by mistakes by the 
personnel themselves. For the 1983 accident, Defense held the position that a ‘live’ land mine 
was mistaken for a ‘practice’ land mine. For the 1984 accident, Defense held the position that 
the accident was in part due to mistakes made by test leader Ovaa. Defense has written that this 
position was taken in 1985 after the investigation reports about the accidents came out. This 
line of argument was maintained until 1997 when for the first time liability was accepted.  
 
The change in approach was justified by Voorhoeve by stating that two, till then unknown, 
documents changed the view that was held previously. The two documents may have been 
unknown to Voorhoeve personally at the time, but the record showed that within the Defense 
organization this information had been available for a long time. The fact that that information 
had not been made available in the right way to all persons working with the AP-23, led to 
severe criticism by the National Ombudsman in the report of 1999, who pointed out that the 
information in those two documents had been available at least since the investigation report 
by the Royal Dutch Marechaussee came out on April 12, 1985. According to the National 
Ombudsman, this information could not be considered ‘new’ by Defense.770  
 
After the National Ombudsman’s report in 1999 about the two accidents with the AP-23 land 
mine, Defense acknowledged that mistakes were made and promised to come to arrangements 
with the victims and their families about compensation payments. Nevertheless, until the 
declaration of agreement in 2002, Defense maintained that there was no connection between 
the case of Fred Spijkers and that of the victims of the accidents with the AP-23 in 1983 and 
1984. This changed when the declaration of agreement was signed in 2002. The change in 
approach was underlined by the words State Secretary Van der Knaap used when Spijkers 
received his royal decoration: 
 
“For years, in many different ways and in many places, you have pointed out injustice 
to the stubborn bureaucracy that my Ministry can be as well, and have put this to fire 
and sword. Since 1984 you have dedicated yourself to the interests of the relatives of 
two deadly land mine accidents. This struggle has cost you your job and your income. 
You were not bothered. You have put the interests and rehabilitation of others first. In 
doing so, you have become an important link in the process of transparency at Defense. 
‘Gadflies’ often work as a lever to force things like these through. At Defense not 
everybody was happy with that, but outside of Defense you did receive this 
appreciation.”771  
 
Since the declaration of agreement in 2002, Defense has consistently maintained that it has 
fulfilled the obligations that were attached to it. The report by the National Ombudsman in 2006 
confirmed the opinion of Defense that they were correct. As for the connection between the 
decision to fire Spijkers on the one hand and the case of Ovaa on the other, Defense consistently 
                                               
770 National Ombudsman (1999), p. 317-318.  
771 Speech by State Secretary Van der Knaap on November 27, 2003.  
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pointed to the ruling of the Central Appeals Tribunal of 1997. The same line of reasoning was 
followed for the issues that Spijkers brought up, namely being labeled a ‘political criminal’ and 
what Spijkers called the psychiatrization. It was also stressed that Defense did not consider 
Spijkers to be a political criminal or a psychiatric patient. Defense consistently pointed to the 
declaration of agreement whenever Spijkers sought publicity (article 5 of the declaration 
prohibited seeking further publicity). The declaration of agreement was also quoted in legal 
procedures, as it held a clause in article 2 in which parties agreed to relinquish their rights to 
start legal procedures against each other.772 This was a central argument for Defense defending 
itself against legal claims by Spijkers, such as the revision requests at the Central Appeals 
Tribunal.  
 
The Ministry reacted as follows to questions from the House of Representatives about the 
revision verdict by the Central Appeals Tribunal: 
 
“The verdict follows that what has been determined in the declaration of agreement and 
the actions taken afterwards. After the verdict by the Central Appeals Tribunal, no 
further actions have been undertaken because the decision itself to fire Spijkers and the 
compensation arrangement that was made at time were not altered by the Tribunal.”773  
 
When looking over all these years of communication, a pattern seems to appear. Originally, 
Defense takes the position that its actions were taken for good reasons and were in accordance 
with what was reasonable, considering the circumstances. After pressure from investigative 
reports, media, judges or the House of Representatives, Defense is at several crucial points 
forced to admit some mistakes, but does so somewhat reluctantly. It then takes a new position 
that is as close to the former as possible and defends that for a long time, until the next moment 
of pressure arises and it is forced to withdraw a bit further again. To be sure, some earnest 
efforts by (ministers or state secretaries of) Defense have been made over the years to make 
progress in the case and to try to reach a solution, but generally speaking the mechanism seems 
to work as described here. As mentioned in the Probo Koala case, this could be referred to as 
‘incremental defensiveness’.  
 
 
8.4.2. Internal language  
 
In this case, many internal documents have become available in some way, giving an insight in 
the way the governmental organizations involved spoke about it. There is an enormous volume 
of internal memorandums and documents available. Clearly, the case has formed a major 
headache for decades within the Defense organization. An internal confidential memo by the 
legal affairs division of the Ministry of Defense holds the following telling phrase: 
 
“I am afraid that something will now have to happen to end this case.”774 
 
Considering that this memo was written in 1993, two decades ago, this desired outcome has 
still not been reached, at least not when considering the steady stream of publicity and the court 
case that still goes on.  
 
                                               
772 Nijeboer (2006), p.335-338. 
773 Answers by the Minister of Defense to questions put by Members of the House of Representatives Eijsink (PvdA) 
and Van Dijk (SP), March 8, 2011, BS/2011005941.  
774 File from the National archive, unpublished. Internal memo Ministry of Defense, DJZ to HBST, April 20th, 1993, nr. 
DJZ93/025. 
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Civil servants from Defense made an internal summary of the case after the verdict by the 
Central Appeals Tribunal on the decision to fire Spijkers. The summary stated that Defense was 
proven right on all points in the Spijkers’ case:  
 
- Spijkers was fired on sufficient grounds 
- Spijkers was unfit for work because of illness or disability 
- The chosen ground for dismissal was correct 
- The arrangements made for Spijkers because of his dismissal were, considering 
the circumstances, adequate 
- The escalation of the conflict is for the largest part due to Spijkers himself 
- There is no case of psychiatrizing here. The report by GIP can be put at a distance. 
- Glastra van Loon cannot claim that a deal was made with the State Secretary of 
Defense for compensation for immaterial damage for 600.000 – 800.000 guilders. 
That deal was not made and if it was made, it was made in the process of coming 
to an agreed settlement. Because the settlement was not made, parties cannot 
claim this during the process in court. 
- There is no connection between the case of Ovaa and the case of Spijkers.775 
 
These points have clearly been used over the years by Defense in its communication strategy 
for the case.  
 
 
8.4.3. Strategy  
 
A clear example of the strategy chosen by Defense in this case concerns a highly confidential 
memorandum by Director-General Personnel Bunnik to State Secretary Gmelich Meijling in 
1997. In the memorandum, Bunnik stated that the aim of the meeting with the state advocate at 
the time had as its central goal keeping the cases of Spijkers and Ovaa separate and coming to 
a settlement in both cases. Bunnik then mentioned some strategic concerns:  
 
“If Defense does not move any further in the Spijkers’ case, it is not impossible that Mrs. 
Ovaa will take the case to court, not because it is directly in her own interest, but in 
order to be able to call up Spijkers as a witness in order to cause maximal damage to 
Defense. However, in moving further in the Spijkers’ case, great publicity risks arise. 
The amount of money that is offered to Spijkers is, in light of the relevant norms for these 
kinds of arrangements, already very high. If we go further, the question can come up 
publicly why Defense is willing to go so far to buy Spijkers out. Nevertheless, we agreed 
to look again at the deal that was offered to Spijkers in order to determine whether there 
is any room left in it.”776  
 
Strategic concerns then were: averting ‘maximal damage’ to Defense, publicity risks and paying 
too much compensation. In the memorandum, Bunnik went on to point to risks of setting a 
precedent if norms for these kinds of financial settlements were not adhered to. The fear of 
publicity risks (which automatically entail political problems) and of financial claims is 
manifest in many internal documents and led to not only a defensive attitude, but sometimes 
also to a lack of openness and transparency. The following example illustrates this. 
                                               
775 Internal memo Ministry of Defense attached to the ruling of the Central Council of Appeal, unpublished from the 
National Archive. 
776 Unpublished document from the National Archive: Internal memorandum by Director-General Bunnik to DJZ 
(Director Legal Affairs), meant for a meeting with the state secretary, April 11, 1997.  
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In a letter from the head of the personnel division of the Ministry of Defense to the director of 
the RBB, dated December 14, 1992, Defense enclosed advance copies of its questionnaires 
concerning Spijkers’ medical condition and asked if these questions were suitable. Defense also 
forwarded an action plan for the handling of the Spijkers’ case to the RBB. The letter ended 
with the following sentence: 
 
“Since Mr. Spijkers periodically requests access to his personal files from the RBB, I 
urge leaving this correspondence out of the file.”777 
 
Central to this approach seemed to be the fear of liability towards Spijkers. In an internal 
memorandum of April 27, 1993 to the legal affairs division of Defense, the head of the 
personnel division gave advice on whether to react to the report by GIP on the issue of 
psychiatrization of Spijkers. Interestingly, he advised emphasizing the response that the 
employer did not have access to the medical files of the employee and that the competences 
were strictly separated between the RBB and Defense. He gave the following consideration: 
 
“If the accusation of ‘conspiracy’ were to stand, this would virtually automatically lead 
to a greater liability towards Spijkers.”778 
 
He advised denying beforehand the assumption of Spijkers’ attorney that Defense and the RBB 
conspired together in this matter. This is remarkable considering the letter mentioned earlier, 
that urged that the letter should not be included in the file. At the very least, the question could 
be posed whether the intention was to keep information about a possible ‘plotting together’ of 
the RBB and Defense hidden from Spijkers. At the end of the memo, a handwritten message 
was added: ‘Direct contact Defense – RBB is still necessary’. This poses serious questions about 
the transparency that the governmental actors involved showed here and the sincerity of their 
motives. It is certainly not uncommon for civil servants to advise about financial and publicity 
risks, but deliberately excluding passages from official files out of financial concerns seems to 
be taking things a few steps further than that. 
 
The position Defense has taken in the conflict 
It is clear that this case involved a full scale battle between Spijkers (and until 2002 Ovaa) on 
the one side and Defense on the other. As Van der Knaap mentioned in his speech to Spijkers, 
not everybody at Defense was happy with him. There are several points that the Ministry of 
Defense has emphasized over the years (mostly in legal proceedings or in communication with 
the House of Representatives) when it came to describing Spijkers and his behavior in the case, 
both in external and internal communication: 
 
1) Spijkers starts legal procedures all the time. 
2) In his procedure against the decision to fire him, Spijkers made the connection 
with the Ovaa case for the first time in the final appeal case at the Central 
Appeals Tribunal, possibly because it served him well in his labor law case. 
3) Spijkers was not as powerless as he likes to present himself, he has mobilized 
many parties around him. 
4) Spijkers had done little to de-escalate the conflict between him and Defense, 
whereas Defense has endeavored to come to a solution in the case. 
                                               
777 Unpublished document from the National Archive: letter dated December 14, 1992, from J. Vermeij, Head Division 
Personnel Central Organization to the Director of the RBB.  
778 Unpublished document from the National Archive: Internal memorandum from HBPZCO, J. Vermeij, to DJZ,  
afd.Bestuursrecht t.a.v. mevr. Van den Bout, dated April 27, 1993.  
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5) Spijkers did not abide by the pledge of secrecy which was agreed upon in the 
declaration of agreement of 2002. 
6)  Spijkers’ aim was to receive a much larger financial compensation in the case. 
 
Each of these points will be discussed briefly. 
 
1) There is often comment that Spijkers started so many legal procedures against the 
government. This seems backed up by evidence: Spijkers has started at least 19 
legal procedures against governmental organizations over the years.779 If WOB 
requests count as well, this number rises to 27 or 28 procedures. Without passing 
judgment on whether all of these procedures were started for good reason or not, it 
can be concluded that this case has seen a full blown legal battle evolve that by any 
standard can be called enormous. 
2) In the procedure against the decision to fire him, it is in fact true that Spijkers first 
made the connection with the Ovaa case at a late stage. Metselaar, Spijkers’ lawyer 
at the time, later stated that he originally felt that he had enough arguments for 
winning the case without making the connection with Ovaa. In hindsight, he 
regretted this approach and brought it up in the final appeal. On the one hand it does 
seem curious that such a vital part of Spijkers arguments was originally left out of 
the case. On the other hand, one could point to the fact that in its revision in 2010, 
the Central Appeals Tribunal concluded that the Ovaa case had in fact played a 
determining role in the decision to fire Spijkers.  
3) Spijkers has mobilized support for himself over the years. Political parties, the 
FNV-Union, GIP, media, public organizations, universities, municipalities and 
others have at some time all pleaded Spijkers’ case. The case of ‘One man against 
the State’ certainly involves one man who is at the heart of it, but undeniably he has 
endeavored to mobilize support for his viewpoints and to erect some sort of counter 
movement against Defense for the purposes of his case.  
4) In a conflict like this spanning more than three decades, trust between the parties 
involved has completely disappeared. It is undeniable that this has become a 
struggle which has dominated Spijkers’ life. While Spijkers felt offended by many 
statements from Defense and other governmental organizations, the same could 
probably be said for Defense. Spijkers has on numerous occasions voiced his 
frustration and anger about the behavior by Defense as he perceived it. Two quotes 
can illustrate this point: 
 
1) “After being cheated for 27 years, in the land mine cases of 1983 and 1984, 
as a civil servant and employee of Defense and as a person by the State, for 
me my cup has been filled. The consequent and systematic behavior by the 
State has in my opinion more to do with white collar criminality than with 
decent government administration.”780 
 
2) “I have also included documents from other files that show that misleading 
                                               
779The estimate was given by Spijkers in an interview on October 26, 2012 for this dissertation: two complaint 
procedures with the National Ombudsman, one for the original dismissal from his job in 1987, one against the 
decision by Defense to fill the vacancy left after the original dismissal of Spijkers, one for the decision to fire him 
in 1993, one revision of the decision to fire him, eight procedures at the medical disciplinary committee, two with 
the Inspection of Public Health, the revision case at the Central Appeals Tribunal in 2010, the WBP case (which 
in fact has been divided into two cases) and the revision case at the Central Appeals Tribunal for the 
psychiatrization. Spijkers estimated that he had started 8 or 9 WOB-procedures.  
780 Letter by Spijkers to the Council of State of May 22, 2011 filing appeal against the decision concerning his WBP 
request, unpublished. 
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at Defense from both politicians and civil servants is not an incident, but that 
these actions have by now become part of the regular structure at Defense. 
This is all very damaging to those who cherish our Democratic 
Constitutional State. Cicero has been dead for a long time in the dungeons 
of the State in the case of Defense. There are causes and evidence in 
abundance to show that the State is messing around on behalf of Defense 
and is sinning and has sinned with criminal acts in my file. Call to the 
Committee. Since you are all civil servants and bound to abide by the law I 
expect from each of you individually and in Committee that you, bound by 
the Law, hand over this file to the Public Prosecution and confirm this in 
writing to me. If you don’t, I will hold you as accomplices, together with the 
Minister of Defense, to criminal acts, such as, amongst others, forgery, fraud 
and embezzlement. Which should be duly noted.”781 
 
5) The article in the declaration of agreement concerning the pledge of secrecy 
clearly stated that publicity was to be shunned by both parties. It is clear that 
Spijkers did not abide by that rule. Both parties have different opinions on the 
question whether this was, and is, justifiable for Spijkers considering the 
circumstances of the case.  
6) In the revision case at the Central Appeals Tribunal, Spijkers clearly stated that 
he was not out for further financial compensation. The Tribunal consequently 
decided that alteration of the financial agreement between Defense and Spijkers 
was not called for. Defense and the state advocate have argued that a satisfactory 
financial agreement has been made and that that should reasonably suffice. 
Magazine ‘Binnenlands Bestuur’ published an article on January 7, 2011, in 
which Spijkers was quoted as being out for a multi-million dollar compensation:  
 
“I hope that Defense has left some room in its budget plans. Because I 
have been screwed for more than 26 years by the State and surely a 
container filled with money should be kept in return for that.”782 
 
Spijkers denied having used these exact words. That does not exclude the 
possibility that at a later time he will perhaps try to receive compensation for 
damage, both material and immaterial.  
 
To conclude on these six points: It seems that by and large, there are facts which back up these 
claims by Defense about Spijkers. The question is what to make of this. Both parties clearly 
have different opinions on the question whether all this was, and is, justifiable for Spijkers, 
considering the circumstances of the case. Was Spijkers left with no options by Defense who 
mistreated him consistently in some way or another, or is he someone who adds fire to the fuel 
wherever he can, even though he is faced with a government which tries its hardest to treat him 
in a reasonable manner? Or is all this not as straightforward as this dichotomous question might 
suggest?  
 
Looking back to the chapter on the bodies of knowledge and the factors identified there that are 
relevant to governmental response, it becomes clear that there were serious problems with the 
                                               
781 Written plea bargain by Spijkers for his hearing in the WBP-case at the Ministry of Defense, April 20, 2012, p.5., 
unpublished. 
782http://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/nieuws/fred-spijkers-denkt-aan-claim-a-la-
oltmans.610758.lynkx (date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
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error management culture in this case. The accidents with the AP-23 took place, in the main, 
because errors were not acted upon or learned from. If communication about these errors, 
sharing knowledge about errors and detecting and handling errors had been part of the way 
things were done at Defense at that time, none of this would have occurred. Instead, admitting 
to errors took twelve and a half years (in 1997 when Defense for the first time accepted liability 
for the accidents). The denial of errors, and the way Defense reacted to the accidents with the 
AP-23 and the following conflict with the widow Ovaa and Spijkers, have clearly played a 
decisive role in this entire case. In fact, this all took such a long time that this way of responding 
has been proven to cause almost unsolvable problems between the parties involved. A basic 
form of trust between the parties has been completely absent in this case.  
 
This case has by no means followed the ideal process for reacting to integrity violations. It took 
a very long time before the National Ombudsman investigated the AP-23 accidents, not to 
mention the investigation into the role Spijkers played in the case and the way he was treated 
by government. Openness about the further course of events has been hard to find here. 
Independent judgments have been made on many occasions (investigations by the National 
Ombudsman and the court cases), but the political judgment on the facts was also long in 
coming and has become part of the struggle between both sides. Disciplinary and criminal 
judgment have been rare in this case, even though there have been many instances in this case 
that in hindsight required further investigation.  
 
Responses by government in this case were in line with the typical reactions to organizational 
crime. This concerned the denial of victimhood (the connection of Spijkers’ case to the Ovaa 
case was consequently denied for years by Defense). It appears there has been little debate about 
whether the accidents with the AP-23 constituted a criminal act by Defense, so there was no 
need for denial of a possible criminal character (apart from the fact that the State was at that 
time and to this day still is immune to prosecution). The denial of responsibility in this case 
concerned the refusal for many years to accept liability for the accidents with the AP-23. 
‘Condemning the condemners’ should refer to the struggle with Spijkers and the widow Ovaa, 
who for many years had to fight for recognition for their own cause.  
 
Some typical responses to rule breaking by governments were found in this case, but not all of 
them. Defense has not been prosecuted. Referral to different, complex interests that Defense 
had to address here has not been made often, nor has Defense pointed to complex or 
contradictory rules very often to justify its behavior. On the other hand, integrity breaches have 
consistently been denied. Mistakes have certainly been admitted, eventually, and assurances 
given that lessons have been learned. This refers back to what was referred to as incremental 
defensiveness.  
 
It is completely in line with state crime theory that, as in this case, determining responsibility 
for state crimes is difficult. The state is composed of many different organizations and individuals 
with segmented tasks and responsibilities. As demonstrated earlier, over the years an enormous 
number of people in many government organizations (and at times in private companies as well) 
at many different levels have been involved in this case. It is therefore an insurmountable task to 
pinpoint exact responsibilities completely. The State itself can define what is considered criminal. 
The law enforcement system is still oriented to individuals and not to organizations. In this case, 
the organization as a whole is responsible for what happened, not just any given individual. The 
difficulty is not that this should offer a cheap excuse for individual politicians or civil servants to 
‘duck’ their own responsibilities, but that the organization cannot be called into court to be judged 
on possible criminal acts. One can only speculate, then, what the outcome of a criminal trial against 
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the State in this case would have been. The response by Defense has been in line with what was to 
be expected based on state crime literature: denial of any criminal behavior. 
 
All in all, the way Defense responded in this case can be said to be more in line with the response 
to organizational crime and state crime, and not so much with error management and integrity 
violations. That is remarkable, in the sense that Defense itself has consistently described this 
case as an example of error.  
 
8.5.  Placing between error and evil  
 
8.5.1. Error management  
 
Errors were defined as deviations between the intended and actual outcome of an action, that 
are (1) unintentional, and where (2) the error maker should have known better, implying that 
the error was potentially avoidable. As the discussion about the AP-23 accidents showed, errors 
have certainly been made in this case. These at times seem classic errors such as we have seen 
in other cases: miscommunications, inexperience, organizational problems and so on. As far as 
the events with the AP-23 are concerned, it can be established that error is certainly an important 
part of the explanation. No one has argued, nor should argue, that anyone acted with the 
intention of people being killed by the defective land mines. On the other hand, there is more 
to be said about this than merely stating that errors have been made. Misleading, breaking rules 
and breaches of integrity can be detected in this case too.  
Roel Bekker783, who should be considered a connoisseur of the Dutch civil service, wrote the 
following in connection to this case: 
 
“The number of difficult cases did in fact grow, and whether it was a matter of 
underestimating things, or sloppiness, or lack of expertise among their staff or simply 
bad luck, Defense often received bad publicity. Fighting back publicly however was not 
something that Annink [then secretary-general of the Ministry of Defense] did very well, 
in contrast to those with specific interests in a case. The Spijkers case is well known. 
Anyone who studies this case, will be surprised how in the end the case evolved in favor 
of Spijkers, with Spijkers even being declared in order when, despite a definitive 
agreement to discharge the case, he yet again sought publicity. The case, which started 
in 1984, still drags on. Unmistakably, in this case professional errors have been made 
that have caused the evident wish of the top civil servants and the politicians involved 
to put an end to the problem, to fail before the judge.”784 
 
What makes this an interesting quote is that it reveals how this case is perceived by many people 
in government. There is certainly something to be said for this view. The declaration of 
agreement between Spijkers and Defense should have brought an end to the case. The National 
Ombudsman in 2006 concluded that Defense had adhered to the provisions of the agreement. 
Spijkers did not abide by the clause not to seek the publicity and started many legal proceedings 
both before and after the signing of the declaration of agreement. In normal circumstances, one 
could conclude that Defense held to its part of the deal while Spijkers did not.  
 
                                               
783 Bekker is a former top civil servant, who had been chairman of the council of secretaries-general and now works 
as professor at the University of Leiden.  
784 Bekker (2012), p. 66-67. 
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However, in this long lasting conflict it has been shown that what goes for normal cases, does 
not always hold in this case. Errors certainly have been made after the signing of the declaration 
of agreement, but the legalistic concerns and the complicated discussions between both parties 
have accounted for a climate in which nothing is trusted. Whether or not that mistrust is at all 
times justified could be debated, but it can be understood that a situation has arisen in which 
there seems little hope of a shared understanding between parties. If we go back to the source 
of the conflict and we consider the revision verdict by the Central Appeals Tribunal, it should 
be concluded that Defense’s responsibility for the conflict with Spijkers, at least until the 
signing of the declaration of agreement, has been established. If Spijkers has mobilized ‘troops’ 
around him and is out to ‘win’ the struggle with Defense and reach his personal goals, the 
question how and why it got this far is justified. The fact that a solution has still not been reached 
is by any standard a failure of the parties involved, for which the governmental organizations 
involved carry a heavy responsibility.  
 
All in all, certainly errors have been made in this case and part of the explanation can indeed 
be found in organizational flaws, but to describe the whole case as a form of error would not 
tell the entire story. 
 
 
8.5.2. Integrity and corruption  
 
Corruption in the sense of bribing was defined as the misuse of public power for private gain: 
asking, offering, accepting bribes. Integrity was defined earlier as the quality of acting in 
accordance with relevant moral values, norms and rules. In this case, it is sometimes ambiguous 
whether certain behavior is illegal. Nevertheless, there are many examples of behavior which 
do not seem to match what we would normally expect from governmental organizations. 
Corruption in the sense of accepting bribes does not seem to be present. Breaches of integrity 
can at times be signaled. Two examples are selected here to show how strange things happen 
which raise serious concerns about the integrity of the governmental organizations or civil 
servants involved.  
 
1) Public Prosecution informs Defense about conversation with Spijkers over possible 
prosecution of Defense 
 
On May 21, 1997, the public prosecutor in Arnhem, Monsma, wrote Spijkers a letter about a 
conversation between Spijkers and Monsma. The conversation took place because Spijkers 
considered reporting criminal acts allegedly committed by Defense between 1984 and 1997 to the 
police and the Public Prosecution. In the letter, Monsma noted that he had told Spijkers that there 
seemed to be no prospect of successful prosecution and that Spijkers had informed him that he 
would take time to consider his options. When Spijkers received some of the files from the 
National Archive, he found a letter dated May 23, 1997. In this letter, the letter to Spijkers was 
forwarded ‘for your information’ from the chief public prosecutor to Minister of Defense 
Voorhoeve. This seems quite remarkable: ‘A’ considers filing a request for prosecution against 
‘B’, ‘A’ talks to the Public Prosecution and the Public Prosecution informs ‘B’ about the content 
of that conversation. That is not the behavior one would expect in the constitutional state from an 
independent public prosecutor when dealing with a case in which government could possibly fall 
under suspicion.785  
 
                                               
785 Unpublished from the National Archive, letters from May 21, 1997 and May 23, 1997, both with document number 
Ah 3222-627/97. 
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2) The handling of Spijkers’ medical file 
 
Another interesting example is the issue of the handling of Spijkers medical file. In a 
memorandum of May 12, 1993, the director of the RBB, De Bosschere, responded to the request 
of the secretary-general of Interior Affairs (via Defense) for information about the Spijkers’ 
case: 
 
“Concerning your request to be informed about the Spijkers’ case, I can say to you that 
Mr. Van Gelder and I are willing to inform you verbally at short notice about this case. 
It is not possible to hand over medical information in writing since that would require 
permission by Mr. Spijkers. If that is what you would appreciate, I am willing to ask Mr. 
Spijkers for this permission.”786  
 
That in itself seems in disagreement with the purpose of the applicable rules. If giving 
information in writing about medical files is forbidden without the unambiguous consent of the 
person involved (which seems only reasonable considering the right to privacy and so on), why 
would giving information verbally be allowed? And if that was allowed, why was Spijkers not 
informed about this? If this was not illegal, it was at least not what, in a moral sense, could be 
expected of the employees from Achmea Arbo, Deloitte and Defense.  
 
Over the years, it was made clear by the RBB and subsequently by Achmea Arbo (the successor 
to the RBB), that explicit consent by Spijkers was necessary for handing over the medical files, 
in the first instance to Defense and later, after the declaration of agreement, to Deloitte in order 
for the medical file to be placed in the National Archive. Spijkers later found out that his 
medical file had been transferred from Achmea Arbo to Deloitte without his explicit and 
unambiguous consent. When he demanded an explanation, Achmea Arbo wrote to him that 
Deloitte, working for Defense in order to carry out the administrative rectification promised in 
the declaration of agreement, had produced a memo for the purpose of handing over the file. In 
the memo, it was stated that the declaration of agreement could be seen as the explicit and 
unambiguous consent by Spijkers, since he had signed that declaration. This had been discussed 
by legal advisors of Achmea Arbo and Deloitte and they had agreed that this was satisfactory.787 
Spijkers was not informed about this at the time. In a letter by Achmea Arbo to Deloitte, dated 
March 4, 2005, Achmea Arbo added that, according to their information, a copy of Spijkers’ 
medical file was in the possession of the state advocate, being a combination of employers’ 
information and the medical file itself. Achmea Arbo added that the state advocate was 
unwilling to disclose any information about this, including whether or not they possessed the 
medical file itself.788 All this raises serious questions concerning compliance with relevant rules, 
norms and standards. 
 
To conclude: Corruption cannot be found here, but, taking into account what has already been 
said about government rule breaking, serious breaches of integrity have taken place in some 
instances.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
786 Internal memorandum by the director of the RBB to the secretary-general of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, May 
12, 1993, DS 93/1006, unpublished from the National Archive.  
787 Letter by Achmea Arbo to Spijkers, October 26, 2011, unpublished.  
788 Letter by Achmea Arbo to Deloitte, mr. Hofstra, dated March 4, 2005, unpublished.  
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8.5.3. Organizational crime  
 
Although there can be serious questions about integrity and rule breaking, it is difficult to prove 
beyond doubt that criminal law has been violated here. Spijkers’ current attorney, professor 
Knoops, has said that he understands the call to prosecute the persons involved in the Spijkers’ 
case, but he added that he does not consider that to be very likely. Knoops said about this: 
 
“You cannot speak of specific suspects. That would require further investigation. In 
many aspects in the Spijkers’ case a sort of twilight zone exists, with a grey area between 
what is allowed and what is not.”789  
 
In addition, it should be mentioned that many of the acts which could fall under suspicion will 
by now have exceeded the terms of limitation in the applicable criminal laws.  
 
As far as the accidents with the AP-23 are concerned, it seems clear that no one intended this 
to happen. Prosecution of anyone for the accident was virtually impossible, as many persons 
had been involved in the process with the AP-23 over a period of nearly 13 years (from 1970-
1983 and 1984) and a decisive action or moment in this sequence was very difficult, if not 
impossible, to pinpoint exactly. Prosecuting the State as an organization was at that time, and 
still is, impossible under Dutch jurisprudence (Volkel arrest), so prosecuting Defense for death 
by guilt was impossible, even if proof had been available. Organizational crime is then difficult 
to prove. White collar crime, implying a crime committed by a person of respectability and high 
social status in the course of his occupation, could have taken place here, but is not proven. As 
mentioned before, no one has been prosecuted and the chances of this happening could not be 
considered high at the moment. Corporate crime does not seem to fit the bill here, as mostly 
governmental organizations are involved. The role of Achmea Arbo and Deloitte could be debated, 
but the heart of the case focuses on the role played by a governmental organization, Defense.  
 
 
8.5.4. Rule breaking by governments  
 
Rule-breaking governmental organizations were defined earlier as governmental organizations 
that violate rules or standards while executing their responsibilities. It would go too far to 
pinpoint every possible single instance and discuss whether this constituted breaking relevant 
rules and norms, but a few points will be mentioned here to demonstrate that sometimes strange, 
and possibly illegal, things happened here. Many things appear to have taken place in a sort of 
twilight zone, to use Knoops’ expression. Further investigation would be necessary, but some 
eye-catching instances of possible rule breaking are discussed here, with the clear reservation 
that definitive proof in the form of a verdict by a judge has not been delivered. These examples 
should be looked at with this important reservation in mind.   
 
Reference can be made (not limitative) to:  
1) The incomplete and misleading facts in the statement concerning the investigation 
into the 1984 accident, referred to as ‘proces-verbaal P4/85’. In this document, the 
information from a telegram of July 1983 stating that ‘no actions whatsoever should 
be allowed with the AP-23 land mine’ was not included, although the information 
had been known within Defense and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. Public 
                                               
789www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/nieuws/kans-op-strafzaak-spijkers-lijkt-klein.627550.lynkx 
(date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
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prosecutor Veurink who decided not to prosecute at that time, was later faced with 
documents which made him remark that he still considered prosecution for death 
by guilt impossible, but that if he had possessed this information at that time, 
prosecution for forgery would seem possible.790  
2) The leaving out by Defense of the passage about the ‘technical aspects’ of the AP-
23 land mine in sending the declaration P4/85 to the pension fund ABP seems to 
possibly hold elements of forgery and fraud and could have warranted further 
investigation. 
3) The deletion by RBB employees of the word ‘not’ in the sentence ‘is not suffering 
from a personality disorder’ in the psychiatric report by Van Tilburg seems to 
qualify as forgery and fraud and should have been investigated at the time. 
4) Spijkers found that a personal letter, written to him at his home address by the 
parents of one of the victims of the 1983 accident was present in the National 
Archive files concerning his case. Since neither Spijkers nor the writers of the letter 
sent the letter to Defense, and since they also did not give permission to Defense to 
access this personal letter, this should be viewed as a violation of the confidentiality 
of mail. If proven, such an act constitutes a violation of article 13 of the Dutch 
constitution, unless a judge had given permission for it. Whether such permission 
was given is unknown, but questions can be asked about what justification could be 
possible at all for this.  
 
Although convictions have not taken place, there seem to be grounds to conclude that 
government over the many years of this case has broken relevant rules on several occasions.  
 
 
8.5.5. State crime  
 
State crime was defined earlier as illegal or socially injurious acts of omission or commission 
by individuals in an institution of political governance for the attainment of a state or state 
agencies’ operational goals. As mentioned before, it is clear that nobody wanted these accidents 
to happen. It should also be recognized that no one from government has been convicted for a 
criminal act in relation to the accidents with the AP-23 or the treatment of Spijkers afterwards. 
The word ‘crime’ in the description ‘state crime’ is inherently difficult then, but it should be 
recognized that this is a legalistic way of looking at this phenomenon. The Dutch state still 
holds immunity from prosecution, so at this time the Dutch State as an organization ever being 
convicted in a criminal court is ruled out Nevertheless, there have been many examples in this 
case where proof of illegal acts was indeed present. That it took so many years for some of 
these facts to become known, and that responsibilities were spread over so many individuals 
and organizational levels can explain why no one has been convicted for any wrongdoings in 
this case.  
 
If the elements that are given in the definition of state crime are applied here, this case measures 
up in many ways. As explained earlier, many errors have been made in this case which probably 
were nothing more than errors. However, this case has seen so many texts that were ‘forgotten’, 
passages that have been deleted, declarations that were changed overnight, information that was 
withheld and misleading forms of communication, that coincidence is not a credible explanation 
for government’s actions. Many claims by the widow Ovaa and by Spijkers have been proven 
right and have by now been admitted to by government itself, although such admission clearly 
                                               
790 Nijeboer (2006), p. 77-79. 
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has not been granted to every claim by Spijkers. The report by the National Ombudsman in 
1999, the declaration of agreement in 2002 and the revision of the ruling by the Central Court 
of Appeal in 2010 all showed that, in this case, Defense had not treated its citizens (the victims 
of the accidents with the AP-23, their relatives and Spijkers) as they should have. These acts of 
omission or commission were clearly socially injurious and there are sound arguments that in 
several instances these acts were probably illegal too (most notably cases of forgery and fraud). 
These acts were committed by individuals in an institution of political governance: A very great 
number of civil servants and politicians have been involved in this case over the years. It can 
also be concluded that some of these wrongdoings have been committed for the attainment of 
a state or state agency’s operational goals. Fear of financial claims and of political damage have 
led to actions that were aimed at misleading the widow Ovaa and Spijkers: Liabilities were for 
many years denied and important information was withheld. Although the label ‘crime’ has not 
been proven in court, this case holds many relevant elements of state crime.  
 
 
8.5.6. Administrative evil  
 
First of all, is there evil that can be demonstrated in this case? Evil is defined by Adams and 
Balfour as “actions of human beings that unjustly or needlessly inflict pain and suffering and 
death on other human beings.” Administrative evil consists of several key elements:  
  
- people engage in acts of evil 
 
For the AP-23 case, the National Ombudsman concluded that the deaths would not have taken 
place if adequate measures had been taken after it had become known that the land mines were 
dangerous. The fact that this information was not acted upon was unjust and needlessly, caused 
deaths and serious injuries. Apart from the victims of the accidents with the AP-23 and their 
relatives, Spijkers has suffered for many years as a consequence of the actions of government 
in his case. His personal life has been damaged in many ways as a result of it all. 
 
- perpetrators are not aware that they are doing anything wrong  
 
This seems to be the case. Various rationales have been produced by Defense and certainly 
many of the people involved never felt that they were doing anything wrong. On the contrary, 
the frame had been for many years that the accidents were caused by the personnel themselves 
and that the widow Ovaa and Spijkers believed in ‘conspiracy theories’. It should be recognized 
that the good intentions of the thousands of civil servants that were probably involved should 
not be doubted. Certain actions in the course of all those years should have led to serious 
suspicions against a limited number of individuals. Nevertheless, it would go too far to believe 
in a reversed conspiracy theory, in the sense that everyone who was involved in the large 
machinery of government that made all this possible was part of some secret ‘grand design’ out 
to damage the victims of the AP-23 and Spijkers. That would be just as misplaced as dismissing 
the widow Ovaa and Spijkers as conspiracy theorists themselves.  
 
Rather, this case has been framed in a certain way in which all individuals involved became 
part of the struggle between the two sides. As an example: Civil servants wrote standard letters 
to Ovaa and Spijkers denying them allowances or compensation. This all aided the cause of 
government, which in the long run has turned out to have aspects which should, in some way, 
be called ‘evil’ (according to the definition used here), however harsh that sounds. The large 
majority of the ‘perpetrators’ were not aware that they were doing anything wrong.  
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- it is masked (less easily recognized as evil) 
 
All the masking factors are present in this case. The question whether dehumanization was a 
relevant masking factor forms a possible exception. Although questions can be asked why so 
many psychiatric reports were deemed necessary, the courts involved have not found definitive 
evidence that Defense psychiatrized Spijkers. Apart from that, this case provides textbook 
examples of the masking factors.  
 
- there can be moral inversion: Something evil is presented as something that is 
actually good 
 
Adams and Balfour point out that because administrative evil is masked, no one has to accept 
an overt invitation to commit an evil act: Such invitations are hardly ever issued. It is much 
more likely that some ‘good cause’ is presented for the civil servant involved to work on, and 
this actually contributes to the evil acts becoming possible.791 It is clear that the use of language 
in this case has been very important for the dynamics of the struggle between the two sides. 
‘Framing’ the position of the other side as an immoral one has taken place regularly. In this 
sense, government employees could involve themselves in a case in which, according to the 
government frame, they were helping the cause against a party (Spijkers) who was in it for his 
own gain and to damage Defense. The myth of pure evil goes here for both sides, as Spijkers 
saw many actions by government as deliberate evil actions. Moral inversion is not easy to 
identify, as Adams and Balfour had suspected. It is clear that government has denied and 
downplayed its own role in this case for many years, at least until 2002 and indeed afterwards, 
in some instances. There is no direct evidence of the possible evil in this case (the failure to act 
upon the information about the defective land mines and the accident that followed it) being 
presented as something that is actually good, but some instances of moral inversion were 
probably present that facilitated the masking of administrative evil.  
 
To conclude: Out of the five cases researched here, the case of the AP-23 land mines and 
Spijkers comes closest to the description of ‘administrative evil’. This evil has not been seen 
out in the open at all times within the case, but specific illegal or injurious actions, combined 
with genuine errors, have amounted in total to something that should be called a form of 
administrative evil. The mask in this case has been on for a very long time (consider the report 
of the National Ombudsman more than 15 years after the accidents) and still there are many 
questions left unanswered. To be sure, there should be no misconception that administrative 
evil is a description that is totally applicable to any person or to Defense as an organization, but 
in this specific and (hopefully) exceptional case, a form of administrative evil has been present 
that should serve as a constant reminder that governmental organizations are vulnerable to this 
unwanted phenomenon.  
 
 
8.6. Conclusions  
 
The previous paragraphs have reached several conclusions on the two main research questions:  
- why and how governmental behavior has led to deaths or serious injuries 
- and how governmental organizations have responded to the cases and why they 
responded the way they did. 
 
                                               
791 Adams and Balfour (2009). p. 9. 
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Why has governmental behavior led to deaths and serious injuries here? 
As mentioned at the outset, this is the history of two accidents and of a struggle between 
government and its citizens (the widow Ovaa and Spijkers, as well as the victims and relatives 
of the victims of the accidents with the AP-23 land mines in 1983 and 1984). Concerning those 
accidents it should be noted that the National Ombudsman concluded that the accidents would 
not have taken place if the Ministry of Defense had taken adequate measures after alarming 
reports about the safety of the land mines. Sometimes these events seem to have faded into the 
background in the debate about the case, that for the last decade has focused on the conflict 
between Spijkers and Defense. Nevertheless, the accidents with the AP-23 concern one of the 
most serious cases of deaths connected to government over the last decades, with eight deaths 
in total and nine serious injuries as a consequence. For sure no one intended these accidents to 
happen, but serious failures from the governmental organization involved had dramatic 
consequences. These failures have been admitted. Nevertheless, this case cannot be dismissed 
as just a simple case of error. Some rational choices appear to have been made in a way that 
does not conform with what should be expected of government. The background to the failures 
or rational choices are perceived differently by the parties that were involved in this case. 
 
How has government responded to this case and why did it react this way? 
This case is about deaths connected to government, but it is also about the way government 
acted following these tragic events. Government response here is really a case in itself. By any 
standards, probably also those of Defense, this is a case which has gone completely wrong. If 
one considers the strategic concerns of Defense mentioned before, it is clear that it has not 
realized its objectives at all.  
 
1) The financial damage is very substantial indeed. Taken altogether, the State has 
paid around € 5.400.000 as damage compensation to the relatives of the victims of 
the accidents with the AP-23 land mines and to Spijkers. In addition to that, the 
legal costs and the costs of the declaration of agreement and the administrative 
rectification are also high: in 2011, RTL News reported that the costs of the state 
advocate between 1993 and 2011 totaled € 427.917. The bill that KPMG sent to the 
State for its services came to a total of € 956.899 and the fee Deloitte charged totaled 
€ 546.187. RTL News added that the total fee for these advisors was higher than 
the amount that was paid to Spijkers at the time of the declaration of agreement (€ 
1.9 million versus € 1.6 million).792 If we add in the manpower that has worked on 
this case and calculate an equivalent amount in salary costs, the numbers will in all 
probability be several factors higher. 
2) The image of the Defense organization has suffered immensely from this case: 
Public indignation about the case has been widespread. 
3) Political problems have also taken place frequently: Virtually all ministers and 
State Secretaries who have served Defense have had to defend themselves in the 
House of Representatives in this case. The term ‘headache file’ is not an 
exaggeration. Nevertheless, political consequences were never drawn in this case. 
 
Clearly, even when one assumes that Defense has been right over the years in choosing the 
position that it did, this case still turned out to be highly unsuccessful for it. The Central Appeals 
Tribunal has ruled that the source of the conflict should be attributed in large part to Defense. 
That the conflict has not been resolved is certainly the result of the interaction between both 
parties, and Spijkers has done his bit too. This case has dominated his life and it seems that the 
                                               
792 http://www.rtl.nl/components/actueel/rtlnieuws/2011/10_oktober/31/verrijkingsonderdelen/landsadvocaat-de-10-
zaken-in-het-kort.xml (date last accessed: 30-12-2013) 
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conflict is by now very difficult to bring to an end. Nevertheless, it should be remembered 
where the conflict originated and it should be admitted that things have happened in this case 
which (hopefully) make it an exceptional case in which governmental behavior does not meet 
normal standards.  
 
On the part of Defense, there has not been much openness in this case. The National 
Ombudsman has considered that much of the grief of the victims of the AP-23 could have been 
avoided if Defense had exercised more openness and had not acquired such a stubborn attitude 
towards the widow Ovaa. The Ombudsman also considered that the accidents gave rise to the 
question whether procedures and culture were adequate to deal with possible calamities.793  
 
When studying this case, the sheer scale of the case is overwhelming. The resources dedicated 
to the three decades of this conflict are by all standards enormous. Both parties in the conflict 
(that is the one remaining conflict between Spijkers and Defense, as the other conflicts with the 
victims of the AP-23 land mines and their relatives have ended) would point to the other side 
to explain the length and intensity of the conflict. Whatever position one chooses, it can be 
concluded that the conflict has taken on its own dynamics. Defense has spent a great deal on 
organizing for this conflict and Spijkers, and earlier the widow Ovaa, have mobilized many 
people and organizations to aid them in their struggle. The interaction with parliament, media 
and judges makes for a conflict which seems to have a virtually unstoppable dynamics. 
Nevertheless, everyone involved should hope that this case will teach all persons involved in 
government some invaluable lessons. To quote Frans Timmermans, at that time member of the 
House of Representatives and currently Vice-President of the European Commission:  
 
“Suppose it happens to you. A man rings your doorbell to tell you that your husband, 
the father of your children, has died in an accident that he himself has caused. From 
that moment on, a process starts that even Kafka could not have thought of. A process 
of years of misleading – no other word fits the bill. That has started a process that should 
touch us, as representatives of the government, deeply, and for which we all, so not only 
the people at the Ministry of Defense, should feel deeply ashamed.”794  
 
  
                                               
793 National Ombudsman (1999), p. 321. 
794 TK 2002, Handelingen TK 28-11-2002, 27-1924.  
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9. Comparison and analysis of the combined findings of the 
case studies  
 
 
9.1. Introduction  
 
In the previous chapters, five cases in which government was connected to deaths and serious 
injuries have been discussed extensively. These cases will be briefly summarized here to refresh 
the memory.  
 
The Catshuis fire concerned a fire in the residence of the Dutch Prime Minister, the Catshuis, 
in which a painter died. The painting company had used a prohibited substance, thinner, to 
remove a wax layer from a floor. Later, it turned out that a critical report, which revealed that 
the wall hangings in the room had added to the speed with which the fire spread, had not been 
made public by government. Prime Minister Balkenende faced severe criticism in parliament 
and in response qualified the actions by his civil servants in the case as ‘inaccurate, incorrect 
and incomplete’. In the end, a settlement was reached between the widow of the painter and the 
State.   
 
Within a period of seven years, from 2001 to 2008, three separate incidents took place in which 
three fire brigade divers drowned. The municipality of Utrecht was convicted of death by guilt 
for its role in the case. The municipalities of Urk and Terneuzen accepted fines from the Public 
Prosecution for breaking applicable rules and regulations concerning labor conditions. The 
reports concerning these three cases showed causes that were highly comparable (insufficient 
training, lack of preparation, organizational culture, etc.).  
 
The Probo Koala case revolved around an oil tanker which needed to get rid of its waste 
material. The waste was first presented for processing at the harbor of Amsterdam, but the 
Dutch authorities allowed the ship to take back its waste materials and continue its journey. The 
contaminated waste from the Probo Koala was eventually dumped at various sites in the 
neighborhood of Abidjan, the capital of Ivory Coast, allegedly causing the death of numerous 
people (reports varied from 10 to 17), the hospitalization of many more, and thousands 
(estimates ranging from 20,000 up to 100,000) to seek medical treatment. Over time, 
perspectives on the case have altered greatly. There is no absolute certainty that deaths resulted, 
but it seems improbable. Serious injuries were shown to be likely. The cooperation between 
governmental organizations in the case was inadequate, although intensive consultation had 
taken place between them.  
 
The Schiphol detention center fire was a case in which fire broke out in a cell complex for 
immigration detainees. Eleven inmates died and fifteen were seriously injured as a result of the 
fire. A report by the Dutch Safety Board concluded that there would have been fewer deaths or 
none at all if fire safety had received proper attention from the governing bodies involved. The 
ministers of Justice and VROM, as well as the mayor of Haarlemmermeer, stepped down 
following the Safety Board’s conclusions. The cause of the fire has been the subject of years of 
debate. The Libyan inmate who threw a cigarette into a waste bin in his cell was eventually 
acquitted of charges. 
 
The case of the AP-23 land mines and Spijkers started with two accidents within the Dutch 
Army. In 1983, an AP-23 land mine exploded in a classroom at the army barracks at the city of 
Oldebroek. The instructor was teaching a class about the AP-23, when the land mine exploded 
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in his hands. As a consequence, seven soldiers lost their lives and nine soldiers were injured. 
On September 14, 1984 in the Dutch town of Oldenbroek, an AP-23 land mine exploded, killing 
Army test leader Rob Ovaa. For many years, the Ministry of Defense contended that the 
explosions were caused by the victim’s own errors. Fred Spijkers was an army social worker, 
who allegedly refused to inform the widow of test leader Ovaa that her husband was to blame 
for the accident. Spijkers came into conflict with Defense. In 1999, a report by the National 
Ombudsman concluded that the Ministry of Defense had acted inappropriately by not accepting 
liability and by misinforming the relatives. In 2002, a settlement was reached between Spijkers 
and Defense determining that Spijkers would receive damage compensation and a royal 
decoration. In 2010, the Court of Appeal revised an earlier ruling, stating that Spijkers’ 
dismissal from his job was wrong and that Defense was largely to blame for the conflict.  
 
The coming chapter will move from the within-case analysis to the cross-case analysis. In this 
chapter, all the case study elements will be discussed by comparing cases and combining the 
findings to reach more general conclusions about cases in which governmental organizations 
were connected to deaths and serious injuries. 
 
 
9.2. Case characteristics  
 
In this paragraph, the case characteristics that were described in the case studies will be 
combined and analyzed.  
 
 
9.2.1. Deaths and serious injuries  
 
Deaths and serious injuries formed the starting point for this dissertation. Wars and genocides 
in the past have accounted for large numbers of deaths caused by government.795 Although exact 
figures about fatal accidents (or accidents involving serious injuries) connected to government 
are difficult to find, it is clear that ‘large accidents’ draw a lot of attention, even when in a 
statistical sense, such accidents only account for a small part of the total number of fatalities. 
Helsloot explained this by distinguishing between subjective and objective physical safety: 
Feelings and emotions in these ‘high profile’ cases are often seen as equally or even more 
important than objectively verifiable facts.796 Although, obviously, every fatal accident will be 
considered one too many, the number of deaths in accidents connected to government must, by 
reasonable comparison, be considered to be small indeed.797 In the cases under consideration, 
there is no discussion whether these deaths and injuries actually occurred, with the exception 
of the case of the Probo Koala. In the five case studies, the number of deaths and serious injuries 
were distributed as follows:  
  
                                               
795 Rummel (1994). 
796 Helsloot (2007), p. 11-14. 
797 http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lijst_van_Nederlandse_rampen (Date last accessed: 21-10-2013). 
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Table 9.1. Number of deaths and serious injuries in the cases 
 
Case Number of deaths Number of serious injuries 
Catshuis fire 1 - 
Drowned fire brigade divers 3 - 
Probo Koala  Not confirmed 30.000 (estimated, not 
confirmed exactly) 
Schiphol detention center fire 11 15 
AP-23 land mines and 
Spijkers 
8 9 
 
 
9.2.2. Damage compensation paid  
 
Claims for damage compensation can be expected in cases in which governmental organizations 
are connected to deaths and serious injuries. A report by the National Ombudsman in 2009 
concerning the way the Dutch government dealt with claims for damage compensation 
concluded that exact figures about the number of claims against government were not 
available.798 At the same time, an upward trend in the number of claims could not be discerned, 
based on the information available. The National Ombudsman concluded that a ‘claim culture’ 
(often with reference to the situation in the United States) was not present in the Netherlands. 
The National Ombudsman was particularly interested in the way damage compensation claims 
were dealt with. The Dutch government over the last years has advocated an approach of 
‘dejuridification’, in which a less legalistic approach to these kinds of cases is called for. In this 
viewpoint, mediation and more attention to ‘the story behind the case’ are necessary. The 
National Ombudsman quoted the Schiphol detention center fire as an example: DJI received 
225 claims for damage compensation on account of the fire in the detention center. DJI adopted 
a lenient approach towards these claims: Almost all of the claims were granted and, as much as 
possible, victims and their relatives were actively approached in order to inform them about 
possible compensation.799  
 
Table 9.2. Amount of damage compensation paid by Dutch government  
 
Case Total amount of damage compensation paid 
by Dutch government 
Probo Koala € 1.000.000 
Schiphol detention center fire € 249.880 
Catshuis fire € 200.000 (estimation) 
Deaths of fire brigade divers by drowning € 0 
Spijkers and AP-23 € 5.400.000 
 
In all but one case that was investigated here, governmental organizations have paid some form 
of compensation. The only exception concerns the cases of the drowned fire brigade divers. In 
those cases, no claims for compensation were submitted by anyone involved, nor was there any 
public demand for such compensation. The explanation for this appears to be that since being 
a fireman can be a dangerous profession, a solid framework for compensating relatives of 
victims of accidents is already in place. As one of the interviewed persons explained, the 
                                               
798 National Ombudsman (2009), p.1.  
799 National Ombudsman (2009), p. 9-10. 
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insurance for firemen covers these kinds of accidents and is generally regarded to be 
satisfactory.  
 
In addition to the payment of damage compensation, the case studies have shown that costs for 
legal advisors, for investigations and for other consultants were high. In 2011, RTL News 
carried a report about the costs the State incurred for legal advisors. 800 The costs for the legal 
advice in the case of the Catshuis fire were reportedly € 209.340, the costs for the case of 
Spijkers were reported to be € 427.918, and this only reflected the costs of the state advocate. 
In the case of the Probo Koala, the legal procedures were very complicated and took years. The 
municipality of Amsterdam has spent hundreds of thousands of Euros on legal costs in this case, 
and possibly more than a million. These cases (with the notable exception of the firemen who 
drowned) have resulted in lengthy debates in the democratic arena, on a national level as well 
as on a local level (most notably the case with the Probo Koala, which was the only case also 
to have a significant international aspect). The costs for the apparatus of the civil service to 
answer all questions by parliament and city council, facilitate investigative committees and 
prepare for debates can only be guessed at, but will probably be a multiple of the legal costs 
mentioned. Of course there are principal concerns to be dealt with in these cases that could, and 
perhaps should, override financial concerns, but in general the financial costs involved make 
the description ‘headache file’ easy to understand. 
 
All in all, it can be concluded that in these kinds of cases of death and serious injuries, Dutch 
governmental organizations paid large amounts of money for damage compensation for victims 
and their relatives, with the notable exception of the cases of the drowned fire brigade divers. 
What is striking is that this often happened only after years of struggle, whether in the legal 
process, the political arena or in the media. The costs for these struggles were much higher than 
those of the compensation payments themselves.  
  
 
9.2.3. Nature of the connection between the governmental organization and the 
deaths and serious injuries  
 
In all cases, governmental organizations carried responsibility for the safety of their own 
personnel (the firemen who drowned, the military personnel who worked with the AP-23 and 
the personnel of the Schiphol detention center) or the people from private companies that were 
hired for specific tasks (the painters in the Catshuis, but also the personnel from the private 
security company who worked in the Schiphol-Oost detention center). Securing safe working 
conditions was often at stake in these cases. A major responsibility in this context was also the 
safety of inmates. The exception is the Probo Koala, in which the governmental organizations 
involved where primarily involved in granting permission to private companies to perform 
activities in line with environmental rules. All this is in line with the research into rule breaking 
governments, which showed that rules concerning labor conditions and environmental aspects 
were the ones most often broken.801  
 
The connection between government and deaths and serious injuries should be compared with 
that between private actors and deaths and serious injuries. Although private companies played 
at least some part in almost every case (perhaps with the exception of the fire brigade divers), 
in two cases they played a more significant part: Trafigura in the case of the Probo Koala and 
                                               
800 http://www.rtl.nl/components/actueel/rtlnieuws/2011/10_oktober/31/verrijkingsonderdelen/landsadvocaat-de-10-
zaken-in-het-kort.xml (Date last accessed: 01-03-2014). 
801 Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen et al. (2005) and Mein and Van de Bunt (2010). 
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the painting company in the case of the Catshuis fire. Both companies were convicted in 
criminal proceedings for their part in the cases. As far as Trafigura was concerned, it finally 
ended in a settlement with the Public Prosecution as part of which Trafigura paid the maximum 
fine. In the case of the Catshuis fire it should be added that the information about the 
flammability of the wall hangings had not been included in the criminal trial against the painting 
company nor in the civil law suits, to the disadvantage of the painting company.  
 
 
9.2.4. What rules are broken  
 
In the cases of this research project, rule breaking by governmental organizations was found 
frequently. The kind of rules that were broken were found to be most often in line with the 
earlier research on rule breaking by governments in the Netherlands: environmental rules 
(Probo Koala), rules on labor conditions (firemen who drowned, Catshuis fire) and fire safety 
rules (Catshuis fire, Schiphol detention center fire).802 This might not be surprising: In all cases, 
things went wrong in some way and people died. Laws and regulations are often in place 
precisely to guard the safety and security of human lives. It was not only criminal laws that 
were breached in some cases, but also administrative law and possibly European laws and 
regulations.  
 
 
9.2.5. Political consequences 
 
It has often been argued that ministers consistently cling to their positions and are not willing 
to step down on account of failures or conflicts. However research shows that over the years 
the number of Dutch ministers and state secretaries that have stepped down involuntarily has 
actually increased. Whereas during the 50’s, the 60’s and the 70’s an average of four ministers 
and state secretaries per decade stepped down, in the last decade this number has risen to nine. 
Political turbulence in the Netherlands has risen since the turn of the century, with none of the 
cabinets completing its entire term.803 The question is whether there were political 
consequences for the politicians involved in specific cases under discussion. Political debate 
often focused on what went wrong. However, contrary to popular belief, this did not mean that 
in all these cases that debate was coupled directly with a call for political consequences for the 
politicians. In fact, there is only one case in which there were political consequences for the 
politicians involved: the Schiphol detention center fire, where two ministers and a mayor 
stepped down. It should be added that, in this case, the fact that the national elections were only 
a few months later seems to have played an important part in the resignation decisions.804 In the 
other cases, the call for political consequences for the politicians involved has been limited, 
although in the case of the Probo Koala (Alderman Vos) and the Catshuis fire (Prime Minister 
Balkenende) the political debates on these cases can be said to form some kind of blemish on 
the records of the politicians involved.  
 
It can be concluded from these cases that political consequences do not happen automatically 
and in these cases have happened less frequently than might have been expected. The timing of 
critical reports coming out and the political situation (such as a cabinet near the end of its term 
or a politician already under fire) seem to influence the occurrence of these political 
                                               
802 Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen et al. (2005) and Mein and Van de Bunt (2010). 
803 Bovens, Brandsma, Thesingh and Wever (2010). 
804 Donner came back in the next cabinet, albeit at a different Ministry. It should also be noted that the government 
of Ivory Coast stepped down after the incident with the Probo Koala, but they were reinstated only ten days later. 
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consequences. Another relevant factor is that responsibilities were divided between several 
ministers, making it difficult to hold just one minister accountable. The minister who has to 
respond to parliament is often the representative of a line of ministers before him, complicating 
the question of ministerial responsibility805 (as in the case of the AP-23 land mines and Spijkers). 
All in all: Fatal accidents do not automatically lead to ministers or aldermen resigning. 
 
 
9.2.6. Disciplinary sanctions  
 
In the summing up of case characteristics there were few examples of disciplinary sanctions. In 
the cases of the firemen who drowned, the Catshuis fire and the Probo Koala no such sanctions 
are publicly known. In the Spijkers case, one disciplinary warning was given to a medical 
officer, and in the case of the Schiphol detention center fire, a public statement was made that 
some measures towards personnel were taken although no individuals were named. The 
explanation for this could be that disciplinary sanctions against civil servants are by nature not 
revealed to the public, as they concern internal matters which also touch upon the privacy of 
the civil servants involved. If anyone has been fired, given a warning or transferred to a lower 
position because of their actions in one of these cases, this would in most cases not be 
publicized. In the case of the Schiphol detention center fire, it was seen as exceptional that the 
minister referred to taking such measures. In the interviews held for this dissertation, questions 
were asked about this subject, but few examples of disciplinary sanctions were found. However, 
relationships between top civil servants and politicians sometimes came under heavy strain as 
a result of the public debate about these fatal accidents. The Catshuis fire and the Schiphol 
detention center offered examples of this, seriously testing the loyalties of civil servants and the 
relationship with the minister. A dynamics can develop in which the politician involved can 
feel compelled to direct part of the blame to his civil servants. Politicians are expected to stick 
up for their own personnel in these stressful situations. If that does not happen, or civil servants 
feel scapegoated, relations between civil servants and politicians deteriorate.  
 
 
9.2.7. Sanctions concerning criminal law  
 
Research on rule-breaking governments has shown that governments do not face criminal 
sanctions often.806 This is partly due to the fact that Dutch governmental organizations hold 
immunity against criminal prosecution: The State cannot be prosecuted at all and municipalities 
can only be prosecuted when executing tasks that do not concern an exclusively governmental 
task. New legislation concerning these immunities has taken years of debate and is now subject 
of debate in the Senate.807 In cases under consideration here, it is highly unusual for 
governmental organizations to be prosecuted by the Public Prosecution and even more unusual 
for them to be convicted. The exception concerned the firemen who died by drowning: Utrecht 
was convicted for death by guilt (at the time a unique sentence for a governmental organization) 
and Urk and Terneuzen both accepted fines from the Public Prosecution for breaching the Labor 
Conditions Act. To conclude: This research shows that prosecution of governmental 
organizations did not take place often in these cases and when it did, convictions by the courts 
were even rarer. The explanation should be sought mainly in the immunity that governments 
hold from criminal prosecution. The policy the Public Prosecution has adopted on the 
                                               
805 http://www.nieuws.leidenuniv.nl/nieuwsarchief/waarom-minder-ministers-aftreden-.html (date last accessed: 02-
04-2014) 
806 Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen et al. (2005) and Mein and Van de Bunt (2010). 
807 http://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/30538_initiatiefvoorstel_recourt (date last accessed: 25-02-2014) 
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prosecution of governmental organizations (namely a restrictive one) also offers part of the 
explanation.808 Together, it explains why it is harder to prosecute municipalities than companies 
and why the State is not prosecuted at all.   
 
 
9.2.8. Measures taken for the future/lessons learned  
 
When listing case characteristics, considerable space is taken up in listing all of the measures 
that have been taken by governmental organizations in response to what has happened. In 
responding to the investigative reports that are produced, there is often a package of measures 
undertaken to prevent these accidents from happening again. The Council for Public 
Administration calls this the ‘risk-rule reflex’.809 It is clear that resources are more readily 
available after incidents with tragic endings. In the case of the Schiphol detention center fire, 
hundreds of millions have been spent on fire safety measures for prisons, probably making 
Dutch prisons nowadays amongst the safest in the world. On the other hand, it can be asked 
whether such a large investment is proportionate to the goal it serves, as absolute security can 
never be guaranteed. In the case of the firemen who died by drowning, it was striking to see 
that the greatest change came about after the third fatal accident in seven years had happened. 
Cases like the Probo Koala and the Schiphol detention center fire led to large programs and 
projects being carried out in order to accomplish the desired improvements. The cynic might 
point out that in almost every case important improvements have been made in the relevant 
field. ‘Never waste a good crisis’ is a saying that has proven its truth over the years.  
 
 
9.2.9. Number of investigations into the case  
 
When a fatal accident takes place, several investigations are begun. The criminal investigation 
by police and Public Prosecution is most often not the only one. Over the years, a structure has 
evolved in which several organizations, often simultaneously, investigate the accident. These 
organizations have tasks which are usually designated by law, but in many cases special 
committees are erected specifically for that accident. The Safety Board, the inspections, the 
Public Prosecution, special committees: Governmental organizations which are in some way 
connected to death and serious injuries face a multitude of organizations, all with their own 
demands and time schedules. Besides this, governmental organizations sometimes hold internal 
investigations to find possible causes and explanations and to learn from the accident.  
Much has been said about the growth of auditing and inspections. During the 90’s, and around 
the turn of the century, inspections seemed to become ever more numerous.810 However, over 
the last years there has been a tendency in the Netherlands to merge inspectorates and, 
increasingly, to limit their budgets. Cooperation between inspections has received growing 
attention.811 Even in light of all this, it is striking how many investigations have been made in 
these cases. In these five cases a total of at least 60 different investigations have been 
undertaken: seven for the Catshuis fire, nine for the fire brigade divers (this case in fact involved 
three separate incidents), seventeen for the Probo Koala, fifteen for the Schiphol detention 
center and twelve for the AP-23 land mines and Spijkers. From these five case studies, it appears 
                                               
808Aanwijzing voor de opsporing en vervolging van overheden.  
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0021499/geldigheidsdatum_25-02-2014 (date last accessed: 25-02-2014) 
809 The Council for Public Administration [Raad voor het openbaar bestuur – Rob] is an advisory body of the 
government and parliament. http://www.rob-rfv.nl/rob/english_rob (Date last accessed: 17-02-2013). 
810 See for instance Power (1999). 
811 Mertens (2011).  
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that those that involve multiple incidents grouped together and in which more deaths are 
therefore involved generate more investigations than the single cases. The fire brigade divers 
who drowned involved single accidents, with relatively little media coverage and no struggle 
between the parties involved.  
 
The investigations often last more than a year, sometimes longer. Technical expertise is hired 
for the research and test results have to be awaited. The criminal investigation also limits the 
possibilities of some other types of investigation. After these initial and often time-consuming 
investigations have been finished, demands for further research continue. Conclusions made in 
reports are questioned by one or more of the parties involved and a special dynamic seems to 
start in which every investigation comes under heavy scrutiny. That leads to yet another expert 
being hired to investigate the case. There seems to be an insatiable demand for more research 
that might preferably lead to other conclusions. This can be called the ‘incessant investigation 
cycle’, meaning a constant stream of investigations that constantly add new fuel to the 
continuing struggle between the parties involved. It is often asked how governmental 
organizations can possibly show that they did not cause an accident, did not try to cover up a 
scandal and did not have evil intentions, when language is continually used in a strategic way. 
On the other hand, governmental organizations themselves sometimes also play a large part in 
raising these questions because of the strategic stance they take in the public debate about their 
specific case.   
 
On the whole, it has become clear that in almost every case, many investigations have been 
undertaken from a variety of angles. The number of investigations seems dependent on the 
number of deaths involved and the intensity of the struggle between the parties involved in the 
case. These investigations take up long periods of time, sometimes more than eighteen months. 
There seems to be an insatiable demand for more investigations, which fuels the battle between 
the parties involved.  
 
 
9.2.10. Number of years from start of the case till finish or present  
 
Table 9.3. Number of years from start of the case till finish or present 
 
By any standards these cases are lengthy. The exception here is given by the cases of the 
accidents involving the firemen, which ‘ended’ in one to two years. The other cases have lasted 
five, six or seven years or have not ended yet. The case of Spijkers and the AP-23 has spanned 
more than 30 years. 
 
Years
0
10
20
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Firemen Catshuis Probo Schiphol AP-
23/Spijkers
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9.2.11. Conclusions about case characteristics  
 
damage  
deaths and serious injuries  There was no discussion about whether these deaths and 
injuries actually occurred, with the exception of the Probo 
Koala case. 
damage compensation paid Dutch governmental organizations often paid large amounts 
of money for damage compensation for victims and their 
relatives (Probo Koala: € 1.000.000, Schiphol detention 
center fire: € 249.880, Catshuis fire: € 200.000 (estimation), 
firemen who drowned: € 0, AP-23 and Spijkers: € 
5.400.000). Compensation was paid only after years of 
struggle, whether in a legal process, the political arena or in 
the media. The costs of these battles were usually much 
higher than those of the compensation payments.  
nature of the act   
nature of the connection 
between the governmental 
organization and the deaths 
and serious injuries 
Government was involved in these cases in different 
capacities: most often as an employer, but the connection 
was also found in licensing, inspection and detention. The 
role of private actors in the connection with the deaths and 
serious injuries was also often relevant. 
what rules are broken Environmental rules, rules on labor conditions and fire 
safety rules. 
sanctions   
political consequences These cases did not automatically lead to political 
consequences. The Schiphol detention center fire was the 
only case in which there were political consequences for the 
politicians involved. 
disciplinary sanctions Few examples of disciplinary sanctions have been found, but 
relationships between top civil servants and politicians 
sometimes came under heavy strain as a result of the public 
debate about these fatal accidents.  
sanctions concerning criminal 
law 
It was exceptional for governmental organizations to be 
prosecuted by the Public Prosecution and even more 
exceptional for them to be convicted. Private actors have 
been convicted more often in these cases.  
measures taken for the 
future/lessons learned 
These fatal accidents led to a large number of measures to 
prevent repetition of the tragic outcome. These measures 
often encompassed large financial investments and stricter 
rules, regulations and procedures. Most often, significant 
improvements were made in several areas, but questions 
about effectiveness and efficiency were asked (e.g. the risk-
rule reflex).  
number of official 
investigations/reports on the 
case 
In almost every case, several investigations have been 
undertaken from many different angles. The more people 
die, and the greater the conflict between the parties involved, 
the more investigations are undertaken. These investigations 
often took up long periods of time, sometimes more than a 
year and a half.  
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number of years from start of 
the case till finish or present 
Five to seven years on average, with exceptions below and 
above. 
 
 
9.3. Why: explaining the deaths and serious injuries  
 
For each case, different factors were examined: opportunities, motives and masking. Each factor 
is divided into several aspects, which are presented in a short analysis. 
 
 
9.3.1. Opportunities  
 
9.3.1.1. Organizational structure and division of responsibilities  
 
In all of these cases, a multitude of organizations played a role. Most often, there was not a single 
organization or person who was responsible for maintaining an overall view or at least it was 
debatable who this was. There is not one kind of organizational structure, there are many. This 
makes frequent coordination and consultation between agencies a necessity. Governance 
nowadays is a multiplayer game. In this sense, it is interesting to see that in investigative reports, 
most emphasis is on the organizational level and not on the individual level. For instance, the 
Safety Board has adopted as one of its guiding principles that individual civil servants will not 
be singled out in reports, but that the focus will be on organizations. The exception to this will 
be the politicians involved, since they are appointed to carry this public responsibility. The 
focus on the organizational level is motivated by the thought that organizations must be able to 
organize an overview, formulate policies for safety and uphold checks and balances to 
safeguard such a system. This prompts the question of how much room is left to include the 
possibility of bad luck or coincidence.  
 
In some cases valiant efforts have been made to coordinate and gain overview. The actions of 
DMB in the case of the Probo Koala come to mind. Complications arose there because of all 
the different responsibilities and legal competences handed to the different authorities, coupled 
with a process that should be described as ‘passing around the hot potato’ by the authorities 
involved. In the case of the firemen, many organizational problems concerning fire brigade 
diving came to light because of the fatal accidents. Checks and balances did not work properly 
and procedures were not followed as they should have been.  
 
To conclude: Complicated organizational structures and a multi-interpretable division of 
responsibilities form relevant opportunities for things to go wrong in these kinds of cases. Because 
of this, the demand for cooperation and coordination between different governmental 
organizations has become greater. Investigations have been found to focus on the organizational 
level as opposed to the individual level.   
 
 
9.3.1.2. Organizational culture  
 
Establishing precisely what culture exists within a certain organization is fraught with difficulties. 
Nevertheless, organizational culture is often mentioned as an important opportunity for things to 
go wrong, in virtually every body of knowledge drawn on here, from error management to rule 
breaking governments to administrative evil. Although remarks about organizational culture 
inevitably involve a subjective element, it does seem that some common threads can be identified 
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from the interviews, the reports and the literature about these cases and the organizations involved. 
In these cases, hierarchical relationships play an important role as civil servants aim to ‘serve’ their 
superiors by trying to avoid financial or political damage. To be sure, it is also the task of civil 
servants to advise their (political) superiors about these aspects, but sometimes there seems to be 
disproportionate attention paid to these aspects, as well as to perceived legal problems. 
Defensiveness is found in several cases, not always serving the intended purpose. Openness, where 
it is found, comes under pressure. In organizations such as Defense, DJI and the fire brigades, 
hierarchy and group culture seem to be strong factors. These were examples of organizational 
cultures that can be characterized as somewhat ‘closed’ organizations, where keeping problems 
‘inside’ is more part and parcel of the culture than openness, which may be found to be threatening. 
Error management within government has not been part and parcel of organizational culture, as a 
result of which a culture of fear of mistakes or fear of reprehension for taking responsibility is 
sometimes present. On the other hand it should be noticed that black and white images should not 
dominate the picture of the culture in these governmental organizations. A professional ambience 
was observed during the interviews for this dissertation and they took place with dedicated 
professionals who aimed to learn from the past and who possessed relevant expertise in their fields. 
It seems all too easy sometimes to question the professionalism of the civil servants involved given 
the difficult circumstances they have to deal with. 
 
 
9.3.1.3. The political system and the relationships with corporate 
partners and society  
 
These cases had their own specific political dynamics and were debated at length in the democratic 
arena. Often, political parties became part of the struggle between those involved, choosing which 
side they would support. Political leadership and the ability to manage crisis situations were both 
necessary for politicians to withstand the pressure from parliament, city council and the public. As 
seen before, political consequences were not drawn all that often, but political debate was often 
time consuming and frustrating for the people involved. This might have been due to the political 
opportunism that sometimes appeared in these cases. On the other hand, these kinds of situations 
could also be seen as ‘windows of opportunity’ to garner political support for structural changes. 
Economic relationships with private partners, such as corporations, sometimes posed a risk in these 
kinds of cases. Questions about the impact and visibility of these economic relations could stain 
the image of an open government that acted in accordance with demands of integrity, but, in the 
cases under discussion, no large irregularities were found. Allegations may have been made, but 
proof has not been presented of any unethical relationships with private partners.  
 
 
9.3.1.4. Rules, regulations and procedures  
 
Rules, regulations and procedures can form relevant opportunities. Research has shown that where 
rules are complicated, contradictory or contested, governmental organizations can be tempted to 
break them.812 In two cases (the Catshuis fire and Spijkers and the AP-23), the rules were mostly 
fairly clear and unambiguous. That things went wrong in these cases could not, or only in very 
small part, be attributed to complex or contradictory rules. However, in the other three cases the 
framework of rules, regulations and procedures did create a relevant opportunity. Nevertheless, 
there are some caveats. At times, it could seem as if blaming the rules and regulations was the best 
way out for governmental organizations: ‘we wanted to act differently, but the rules did not allow 
                                               
812 Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen et al. (2005), p. 163-169. 
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it’. And although rules were at times complex or even contradictory, it should be added that in 
these cases the governing bodies involved usually had professional legal staff at their disposal. 
These experienced professionals were quite capable of grasping the finesses of the legislation 
involved. The fact that some of these cases led to real improvements in the relevant legislation was 
by itself an unexpected bonus, but it should be stressed that the ‘contradictory and complex’ rules 
have come about through the regular democratic legislative process. It may be a point worth 
making that legislation will always need to leave professionals some room for discretion. In 
considering individual courses of action, different assessments should be made based on the 
relevant rules and regulations. Considering that many of the applicable rules were in place 
precisely to promote the safety of the people involved, it is also relevant to ask how much room 
should be left to professionals when it comes to labor conditions, fire safety and environmental 
rules. If the movement towards more trust in professionals is strengthened (which is one of the 
aims of the current Dutch cabinet813), this also means accepting some risks. To repeat the words of 
former Minister of Justice Hirsch Ballin:  
 
“Society should strive to prevent calamities and to limit risks as much as is reasonably 
feasible. That is what our policy is aimed at. But government should also realize that 
such a calamity can nevertheless occur. When it comes to fire safety, this will require 
more attention to compliance with regulations, to structural and mental precautions. 
That, too, applies to the lessons we have learned from what happened. We should also 
learn from the lack of action in dealing with earlier signals. These lessons should be 
followed up in the conscious processes of organizations such as those for which I have 
taken responsibility. To comply with regulations, training, education and exercise, as 
well as a proper mental attitude, are required. In this way, this kind of disaster can be 
prevented as much as possible. My predecessor has probably thought about other areas 
in which it is important that the concern for safety is limited by the freedoms belonging 
to a democratic state under the rule of law. Citizens have a legitimate claim to safety, 
but not to a zero risk society.”814 
 
 
9.3.2. Motives  
 
The motives of the governmental organizations involved should be related to the behavior 
demonstrated in the selected cases where they were connected to deaths and serious injuries. It is 
not only individuals who have motives, then, but organizations also. A distinction is made between 
primary motives, which are related to a more individually-oriented criminology, and secondary 
motives, oriented more towards organizations and organizational crime. Primary motives are 
rational choice, unwillingness and ignorance.815 Secondary motives are financial concerns, the 
position of the governmental organization, preferring another norm than the law strives for and 
demands by politicians, citizens, special interest groups and media.816 The following conclusions 
can be drawn about these motives:  
 
Primary motives 
1) Ignorance seemed the most relevant primary motive in these cases and was connected to the 
many errors that occurred.  
                                               
813 http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2012/10/29/regeerakkoord.html p. 2. 
(Date last accessed: 27-02-2014) 
814 TK, October 25, 2006, p. 17-1193. 
815 Huisman and Niemeijer (1998), p. 43. 
816 Huisman (2001), p. 132. 
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2) Rational choice was found less often than would perhaps have been expected.  
3) Unwillingness was not found often as a motive, although most of these cases saw tough 
dilemmas to be faced.   
 
Secondary motives 
4) Financial motives often played at least some part, but perhaps contrary to popular belief they 
were seldom found to be the most important motive for government actions in these cases before 
the deaths and serious injuries occurred.  
5) The position of the governmental organization and its public image was not found to be a very 
relevant motive.  
6) Governmental organizations rarely preferred other norms than the law strives for. Some tough 
dilemmas had to be faced from time to time in almost every case, but this did not usually lead to 
the applicable legal norms being ignored.  
7) Demands by politicians, citizens, special interest groups or media did not appear as a relevant 
motive in all cases either. Only in the cases of the Schiphol detention center fire and the Probo 
Koala did these demands play a part, but even there these were not the main motives for the actions 
of the governmental organizations involved. Although there have been many suggestions that these 
demands were influential in these cases, there has been little evidence to back up such suggestions.  
 
The conclusion is that ignorance is the most relevant primary motive, especially since it is closely 
connected to error. None of the secondary motives is relevant for every individual case. More 
often, it was a combination of motives that appeared relevant. Each case has its individual 
dynamics and motives and it is therefore difficult to detect motives that apply to all of these cases. 
On the other hand, some of these motives are shown to be relevant in individual cases. Apart from 
the fact that five case studies cannot be extrapolated easily to a larger population, it seems clear 
that generalization about the applicability of these motives would not be justified.  
 
 
9.3.3. Masking  
 
In ‘Unmasking administrative evil’, Adams and Balfour described the factors that led to the 
masking of administrative evil. The masking factors offer explanations for why administrative 
evil is so difficult to recognize in one’s own time, organization, culture and country.817 It should 
be realized that these masking factors were identified in connection with what Adams and 
Balfour call administrative evil. Nevertheless, it appears that these masking factors can also 
apply to the other situations that are described here: errors, integrity breaches, rule breaking by 
governments, organizational crime and state crime can also be masked. When operationalized, 
the masking factors distilled from ‘Unmasking administrative evil’ turn out to be worthwhile 
examining in these kinds of cases. For the most part, the masking factors turn out to be relevant. 
 
1) Distance in time is found to be relevant in all of the cases. According to Adams and Balfour, 
it is more difficult to identify evil in our own time and our own city or country, since we do not 
have enough distance from our own time and culture to have sufficient critical reflexivity.818 These 
are all cases that have lasted for years, most often five to seven years, with the shortest case taking 
about a year and the longest almost three decades. During those years, in virtually every case, the 
view of what actually happened that led to the fatal accidents has changed. Sometimes, the people 
involved were only willing to tell their part of the story after they retired, or even in their will 
after they died. History’s definitive judgment on some of these cases is possibly yet to come. 
                                               
817 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 15-38. 
818 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 15-16. 
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This observation should be coupled to the large number of investigations that were undertaken in 
most cases. The sheer number suggested a demand for different perspectives on the accidents that, 
in turn, required further investigations. If no breakthrough is achieved, this can lead to an 
‘incessant investigation cycle’, which may continue without end in sight. This goes, for 
instance, for the Schiphol detention center fire, where by now eight (!) investigations have been 
held to establish the technical cause of the fire, examining, for instance, whether Rizla Blue 
cigarette paper still burns after it is thrown into a paper basket. Large scale investigations even 
by respected institutes were not trusted, and more investigation followed. For many years, the 
place where the fire happened was kept just as it was after the fire just so that further 
investigations could take place.  
 
2) Distance in space is more difficult to pin down than distance in time and seems to offer fewer 
possibilities for unmasking what is going on. In the selected cases, the Probo Koala case is the 
only one with a real international aspect. Interest in the other cases was on a national level for 
the most part, as was the media interest. It is therefore difficult to verify whether this is a 
relevant masking factor. It is possible to follow the line of thought that unmasking is more 
difficult in your own country, province or city, but these cases have not offered enough evidence 
to prove that this is actually relevant. 
 
3) Scapegoating and the splitting mechanism819 are found in some form in every case. Clearly, 
what seems like scapegoating to one party, will seem to another to be attributing responsibility 
to the right person or organization. This is often the subject of heated debate and can be 
connected to the phenomenon that society nowadays seems to demand clear answers on who is 
to blame for a certain accident. In such a debate, it seems that pointing to one major culprit 
appeals more to some than pointing to shared responsibilities. Simple answers seem to score 
more points than complex answers. On the other hand, those shared responsibilities can also be 
used as ‘a way out’ for the governing bodies involved, eventually leading to the conclusion that 
everyone was to blame, so nobody can really be blamed after all.  
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that scapegoating is something that is frequently found in Dutch 
governmental organizations that find themselves under public scrutiny for their role in cases of 
serious injury and death. Individuals were targeted for scapegoating less often than 
organizations. This especially held true when it came to the personnel of the governmental 
organizations, who were usually protected by their organizations. It is remarkable to see how 
often national and local governments clashed heavily with each other and with supervisory 
organizations. Relationships between the governing bodies involved have sometimes suffered 
as a consequence. Scapegoating is often done in an indirect fashion by governmental 
organizations that do so while defending their own position. This phenomenon, which is seen 
in most of the cases, is called ‘cautious scapegoating’. 
 
4) The perspective from which evil is most often recognized, is that of the victim. This could lead 
to the ‘myth of pure evil’, in which moral questions are presented in black and white, implying 
that persons or organizations are all good or all bad. The perspective of the victim often differs 
greatly from that of the perpetrator and this is called the ‘magnitude gap’.820 Elements of the 
myth of pure evil can be detected in most of these cases. Consider for example the way the case 
of the Schiphol detention center fire has been covered in the media. The story is often described 
as a straightforward one: The government quickly built cheap and unsafe prisons because they 
needed to lock up drugs swallowers. When fire broke out, they made a mess of things and failed 
                                               
819 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 14-15. 
820 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 16-17. 
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to save the detainees, who were treated badly as the regime for immigration detainees had 
become ever more stringent. In the end, government laid the blame on one of the cell occupants 
and let their own people walk away without punishment. This entire description will be highly 
offensive as well as incorrect in the eyes of the civil servants involved. They have a radically 
different view on what happened. Whichever view is accepted, it can be concluded that moral 
judgment with regard to the role of the government here is often black or white, when in fact 
things are usually more complex. That should not deter making firm conclusions, but the myth 
of pure evil does seem present here. There seems no reason to doubt the true intentions of any 
of the parties, but on the other hand they cannot all be right. The ‘magnitude gap’ is therefore 
also present.  
 
It is noteworthy that, in these cases, criticism of the victims themselves is most often absent. This 
seems to be part of code of honor not to besmirch the memory of the deceased and to show respect 
to the families who have had to suffer the dramatic loss of their loved ones. Instead, the 
organization as a whole and its political leaders and top level management are targeted. The 
argument here is that organizations have a responsibility to think ahead and build in checks and 
balances for maintaining and promoting safety and security. Clearly, the complicated world of 
the civil servants, politicians and lawyers involved is a far cry from the experiences of the 
relatives of the deceased. That should not mean that we invariably question the sincerity of one 
of the parties. From their own perspective, the truth might be clear cut. It seems nevertheless, 
that the distorting features of perspective are at work in most of these cases. 
 
5) According to Adams and Balfour, the use of technical language or euphemisms often masks 
what is really going on and provides for emotional distance towards sensitive issues. Language 
can be used to convince people that activities are not evil, but, rather, are necessary solutions.821 
The use of language in most cases seems to be influenced by fear of admitting either political 
guilt or criminal guilt. Language is often important for its legal meaning. The fear of claims for 
financial compensation has caused many governmental organizations to be sensitive about the 
exact language used to describe what actually happened. This is also often true of the words 
that were used in the political arena. As discussed before, the language that was used publicly 
by government seemed to differ substantially from the words that were used internally. 
‘Openness’ was often replaced by ‘consideration of political and financial risks’. Considering 
all the documents that were available for this research, it can be concluded that on several 
occasions governmental organizations have communicated in a way that could, and should, be 
described as erroneous and sometimes misleading. On the other hand, it should also be kept in 
mind that other parties involved have often used exactly the same instruments of language to 
their own advantage. Language is rarely a tool used to imply that the accident was in any way 
a good thing. Instead, language is more commonly an instrument in the struggle between the 
parties involved. The case of the AP-23 and Spijkers serves to illustrate this. The Ministry of 
Defense and Spijkers disagreed on the use of language on many occasions. Two examples can 
be quoted here: State Secretary of Defense Van der Knaap accepted the description ‘misleading’ 
when it came to actions of Defense, but refused to sign off on ‘deliberately misleading’. In the 
case of the psychiatrization of Spijkers, Defense stated publicly that it ‘did not regard Spijkers 
to be mentally ill’, but Spijkers wanted to add the word ‘anymore’ to that. Defense refused, as 
this would imply that it admitted to psychiatrization in the past. There are numerous examples 
where, in order to understand what is being said, close reading is not a luxury. By using 
language strategically, a smoke screen was often erected that masked or attempted to mask what 
was actually going on. 
                                               
821 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 18. 
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6) Dehumanization is an important theme for Adams and Balfour. Doing evil unto others is 
easier when the other is seen as ‘not normal’, not like the majority. Here people are sometimes 
defined as less than human. It is essential that subjects are put at a distance through language, 
by making them ‘numbers’, ‘things’ or calling them inhuman.822 Dehumanization is not found 
to be a very relevant masking factor in four of the five selected cases. Although dehumanization 
has scarcely been found in these cases, it should be added that this is probably one of the most 
difficult masks to uncover. In Adams and Balfour’s theory, dehumanizing is a process that is 
often difficult to distinguish in one’s own culture, time and place and that is by nature opaque 
for many observers. With this warning in mind, it should nevertheless be stated clearly that not 
enough compelling evidence was found to show that this particular masking factor is present in 
the behavior of the Dutch governmental organizations that were connected to cases of serious 
injury and death.  
 
7) Technical rationality is a central theme for Adams and Balfour when explaining 
administrative evil. Technical rationality refers to a way of thinking and living (a culture) that 
emphasizes a scientific-analytic mind set and a belief in technological progress. Adams and 
Balfour connect bureaucracy and organization with an unintentional tendency toward 
compliance with authority and with the elevation of technical progress and processes over 
human values and dignity. Norms of legality, efficiency and effectiveness can be of value to 
professionalism, but they do not necessarily promote or protect the wellbeing of humans. In 
essence, it is claimed by Adams and Balfour that most deeds of administrative evil do not emanate 
from individual wicked and seductive leaders on the outside or from exceptional psychopaths for 
that matter, but are in fact engrained and intertwined in the daily operations of public 
administration (a social construction), waiting to start a route down the proverbial slippery slope. 
It is often not a question of a clear-cut decision that has to be taken on ethical issues, but instead a 
succession of smaller, more ambiguous choices are made that, taken together, add up to evil 
consequences. Technical rationality is the masking factor that is most connected to the dark side 
of organization. To be sure, organization has brought many advantages, but according to Adams 
and Balfour, the slow and masked processes that are described here can have devastating 
effects.823Technical rationality is an important masking factor in the selected cases, with the 
exception of the accident involving the firemen. From the case studies and the interviews that 
were carried out, it certainly appears that these organizations were staffed by professionally 
competent civil servants and politicians, whose good intentions have not been disproven. 
Nevertheless, a multitude of different people were involved in all these cases, usually 
performing their own little part in the overall process. That made consideration of the bigger 
picture in these cases difficult, and there could be no guarantee of a sharp eye, of personal 
attention nor of empathy. What is clear is that, in most cases, what was missing was 
coordination, and the taking of, and acting on, an overview, at least at some point during the 
process.  
 
The slow and unintentional process that is identified here, is extremely difficult to uncover and 
is often situated against the background of the conflict that sometimes developed between the 
parties involved. Such conflicts tended to strain the relationships between the parties. Therefore, 
reaching a solution that, on the one hand, did justice to legal norms and to what actually 
happened, and on the other hand showed concern for human values and empathy, was often 
very difficult. This led to long, hard battles with more focus on legal, financial and political 
concerns than on reaching a swift solution that was satisfactory for all parties involved. 
Technical rationality is the most complicated, and yet probably the most influential, of the 
                                               
822 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 18. 
823 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 27-36. 
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masking factors involved here. 
 
To conclude: By and large, the masking factors that were identified here are relevant. Distance 
in space, dehumanization and language were less relevant than others, although language was 
found to have an impact that was different from its theoretical relevance. In practice, distance 
in time, perspective, scapegoating, the splitting mechanism and technical rationality all served 
as factors that masked, at least for some time, what was actually going on in these cases. A 
further complication here is that the conflicts that arose in these cases often have a distorting 
effect on their own. Information is seen through different lenses, complicating and blurring our 
view and any possibility of separating fact from fiction. 
 
It should be added here that masking can apply to each of the central research questions: It can 
say something about why these fatal accidents happened (technical rationality and 
dehumanization are relevant here), it can be relevant for the response to what happened 
(distance in time and scapegoating come into play) and it can even be relevant to both questions. 
The way that masking works can vary with each case. It has been included in this paragraph, 
although perhaps it is even more relevant to the response to fatal accidents or evil.  
 
 
9.3.4. Conclusions about opportunities, motives and masking  
 
The following table summarizes the conclusions about opportunities, motives and masking: 
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Table 9.4. Summary of conclusions about opportunities, motives and masking 
 
 
  
Opportunities
• Structure: complicated organizational structures, multiple actors involved
• Culture: professionalism and loyalty, but also hierarchy, legalism, focus on financial / 
political risks
•Political system: political parties part of struggle, no proof for unethical relations with 
companies
• Rules, regulations and procedures: relevant, but also used as excuse for failure, rules 
must leave room for discretion and involve some acceptance of risks.
Motives
•Primary motives
•Ignorance:  connected to errors but professionalism and loyalty often high
•Rational choice: less often than expected. Rational choice as opposed to error and 
ignorance. Such calculating behavior not found often.  
•Unwillingness: not found often though tough dilemmas faced in most cases.
• Secondary motives
•Financial motives: played some part, but seldom the most important motive for 
government actions in these cases before the deaths and serious injuries occurred. 
•The position of the governmental organization and its public image: not found to be 
particularly relevant.
•Governmental organizations did not prefer other norms than the law strives for very 
often. Some tough dilemmashad to be faced at various occasions in almost every case, 
but this usually did not lead to the choice to ignore the applicable legal norms. 
•Demands by politicians, citizens, special interest groups or media: not a relevant 
motive in all cases. Played a part in Schiphol Detention Center Fire and Probo Koala 
case. Not main motives for those involved. Claims that these demands were influential 
not substantiated. 
Masking
•Most relevant:
•Distance in time: duration five to seven years on average, incessant investigation cycle
•Perspective: myth of pure evil (governmental organizations are wholly good or evil) 
and magnitude gap (victims and perpetrators create their own 'frame' of the case) 
often found
•Scapegoating: often between governmental organizations, less towards individuals
•Technical rationality: coordination and overall picture missing, conflicts contributed to 
shared perception of the case and at times to misinforming or misleading 
•Less relevant:
•Distance in space: more difficult to prove
•Dehumanization: important in theory, difficult to identify in practice
•Language: not in the sense that evil is presented as good, but relevant as an instrument 
in the battle between the sides
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9.4. Response of the governmental organizations involved  
 
In this paragraph the findings for each case will be collated to analyze how governmental 
organizations in the Netherlands have responded to cases in which they were in some way 
connected to serious injury and deaths. In each case, both external and internal language were 
studied. Response strategies for these types of incidents were analyzed and the findings were 
compared with factors that were identified earlier as being relevant. 
 
 
9.4.1. External language  
 
Governmental organizations that were connected to serious injury and death reacted to events 
publicly on several occasions. Key communications included: 
- The first reaction by the political leader involved in the accident  
- Answers to questions put by the press, by parliament or by a city council 
- The announcement of the start of investigations 
- Answers to questions put while investigations were pending 
- Response to reports by investigators (in the criminal court case, but also Safety 
Board, inspections, special committees and so on) 
- Verdicts by courts 
- Settlements with victims and/or their relatives 
 
Governmental organizations are often limited, or perceive themselves to be limited, in what 
they can state publicly when criminal proceedings are still pending. These proceedings usually 
take time. In the meantime, pressure mounts on the governmental organization involved to react 
publicly to claims and allegations by the other parties involved, or to the media. The same goes 
for reports by the Safety Board, inspections or special committees.  
 
The cases studied show that governmental organizations at first often state they are waiting for 
the full report of the investigation that is being conducted. At the same time, they speak 
positively in support of their own personnel and their roles. This plays an important part in 
maintaining good relationships between civil servants and management (from the perspective 
of both).  
 
A general pattern emerged. In these sorts of cases, governmental organizations emphasize that 
they restrict themselves to the facts, cooperate fully with independent research and have 
confidence in the outcome. During the process, it was often emphasized that the governing body 
had been completely open and transparent. The governmental organizations involved frequently 
pointed to limitations that they had to face, whether caused by a unique situation, the complex 
and contradictory rules or by the other actors involved (governmental as well as private). The 
phrase ‘with the knowledge we had then and the knowledge we have now’ was frequently used. 
Here there is a recurring argument with Dutch governmental organizations when reacting to 
reports on fatal accidents. With the knowledge available before the incidents, things were 
generally thought to be in order. With the knowledge gained after the incidents, that is with 
hindsight, other choices might have been made. Highly critical reports are then often considered 
‘wisdom after the fact’.  
 
When it comes to admitting mistakes, it seems that this is often done very reluctantly and only 
step by step. Only after reports come out, or evidence has come out in the open, is there 
admission of mistakes, usually accompanied by the reassurance that apart from that particular 
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mistake or error, things have been done in accordance with rules, regulations and procedures. 
This is what has been referred to as incremental defensiveness, a mechanism824 in which, in 
response to cases of serious injury and death, governmental organizations adapt defensive 
positions where they reluctantly give in to criticism and calls for improvement, step by step in 
a long, costly and slow process. 
 
 
9.4.2. Internal language  
 
If key words in external language are ‘openness’, ‘transparent’ and ‘with the knowledge we had 
then and the knowledge we have now’, internal language seems to focus more on ‘controlling 
risks’, ‘confidentiality’, ‘financial claims’, ‘political damage’ and ‘legal restrictions’. As 
already noted, giving advice about financial, legal and political matters is part of the job of civil 
servants, who must advise their political leader professionally about these issues. 
Confidentiality is in some instances inevitable: the interests of criminal proceedings, for 
instance, require that certain information is not disclosed before a judge has come to a verdict. 
The question is whether the balance of conflicting values in specific instances is correct. As 
already noted, scrutiny in these cases of death and serious injuries shows a bias towards 
examining the behavior of governmental organizations and their employees. Focus, then, is on 
what went wrong. If the balance is not maintained correctly, reproaches follow.  
 
Internal documents that were found in these cases (through Wob requests, leaks to the media or 
WBP requests), often give insight into the internal considerations that were deemed relevant. 
To be sure, in the vast majority of cases these documents are nothing more than the professional 
advice given by the civil servants trying to collate all the facts, advice on answering the 
questions of press and parliament, and correspondence about legal, financial and political 
issues. The media, or the parties involved, regularly ‘spin’ information from these documents 
to support their own case. On the other hand, in several cases there has been a disproportionate 
focus on safeguarding legal, financial or political interests. In cases like the Catshuis fire and 
Spijkers and the AP-23, there has been public scolding for setting the wrong priorities and 
sometimes even breaking rules and regulations as a consequence.  
 
 
9.4.3. Strategy and factors relevant to response 
 
In analyzing the responses by governmental organizations to these cases of deaths and serious 
injuries, attention has been given to what had to be taken into consideration, to possible alternative 
approaches, to dilemmas and to interventions by other governmental organizations. This was done 
in order to find out if any strategy could be discerned in the available research material. In addition 
to this, the factors considered relevant to any response (outlined in the chapter on bodies of 
knowledge) were examined. In each case study, these factors were discussed to assess their 
relevance for that case.  
 
As mentioned, governmental organizations often responded in these cases by saying that they 
had to await the results of the pending investigations. This has merit and can be summed up by 
the approach ‘first the facts, then the judgment’. Total openness at that stage can conflict with 
the interests of a proper criminal investigation. However uncomfortable this may be, this also 
means that some questions by the media, parliament or the relatives of the victims will be left 
                                               
824 Leeuw (2008), p. 19 and Astbury and Leeuw (2010), p. 368. 
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unanswered for a longer period of time. This should have implications for the speed with which 
the investigations are carried out. Thorough investigation is needed in these cases to come up 
with conclusions that will stand, but there is a limit to what is acceptable. In the case of the 
Catshuis fire for instance, the Public Prosecution took more than a year and a half to come to a 
decision whether to prosecute or not, for a single fire. In such a case as this, that is simply much 
too long.  
 
In addition to the many investigations that were undertaken in these cases, governmental 
organizations also faced many Wob requests. Although some were granted, many were turned 
down. Certainly, a great deal of information was given by the governmental organizations, and 
at times openness was indeed manifest. There is a clear pattern: In most cases the governmental 
organizations involved claim that they have been open, even up to the point that they feel no 
matter how open they are, it will never be considered enough by the outside world (‘how can 
we prove that something has not happened?’). Nevertheless, though openness is often manifest, 
there are also many examples of information being withheld, or only disclosed at a late stage in 
the proceedings after considerable pressure has been exercised. Each Wob request, of course, 
has to be judged on its merits, but the claim by the governmental organization that they are 
being open is not completely consistent with the many Wob requests that were turned down.  
 
Openness and transparency is indeed a difficult subject. Research by Grimmelikhuijsen shows 
that it is too simple to think that more transparency will automatically increase the trust people 
have in government. 825 Transparency is a ‘hygiene factor’: A clean toilet does not lead to more 
satisfaction, but a dirty toilet leads to a lot of dissatisfaction. The same goes for transparency 
and the supposed trust that comes with it. The experiments Grimmelikhuijsen conducted 
showed that when complete information was given to citizens, their trust in government actually 
decreased, because citizens could also see the effects of quarreling and political compromise 
on the policy that was being adopted by the local government involved. It was also found that 
the way in which openness was exercised mattered. If governments were critical of themselves 
in their message, trust decreased. But trust also decreased if the message was too positive. A 
balance is needed. In the end, citizens still expect transparency and are displeased if they don’t 
get it.  
 
The case of the Probo Koala illustrates this point. Here, the national governmental organizations 
involved adopted a defensive approach, in which they defended their actions and only conceded 
when this was unavoidable. The municipality of Amsterdam adopted a legalistic approach, 
claiming that the law did not leave them any other option than to pump back the slops. 
Amsterdam was also more open about what happened and actively supplied information about 
the case. On a political level, such a consistent strategy was not followed, but instead the 
position taken ‘moved along’ with the debate in the political arena. A wavering and sometimes 
uncertain response (in this case by Alderman Vos) apparently leads to many more political 
problems than the strategy of incremental defensiveness that was adopted by national 
government (in this case State Secretary Van Geel). This is surprising in a way, since exercising 
more openness would be expected to generate more support than defensiveness. However, Vos 
is still often negatively associated with the Probo Koala case, while Van Geel has not been 
targeted. Perhaps this is because Amsterdam could be, and has been, prosecuted and the State 
still cannot be prosecuted. But the other possibility also deserves consideration. Not following 
a consistent line of communication, even if being inconsistent is actually more open, makes the 
politician involved more vulnerable. This is worrying: It could discourage a policy of openness. 
                                               
825 Grimmelikhuijsen (2012).  
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
310 
 
Grimmelikhuijsen’s research is supported by the findings here. His conclusion that 
transparency should still be expected from government can equally be supported. 
 
In this dissertation, factors relevant to response were taken from the bodies of knowledge 
consulted. In error management literature, emphasis was on error management culture: 
communicating about errors, sharing knowledge of errors, helping in error situations and 
quickly detecting and handling errors.826 In these cases of deaths and serious injuries, such an 
error management culture aimed at learning from errors did not seem present immediately after 
the accidents. On the other hand, most cases did lead to several measures being taken to improve 
existing practices. In the case of the fire brigade divers who drowned, for instance, a much 
stronger emphasis on learning from errors came about after the third fatal accident took place. 
The case of the AP-23 land mines showed the most serious problems with error management 
culture, as the reform of organizational practices that was needed had failed to be implemented 
from 1970 up and until the fatal accidents of 1983 and 1984. Responses by governmental 
organizations often involved measures being taken and new rules and regulations being 
announced (the ‘risk rule reflex’), but sharing error knowledge and helping in error situations 
can still be improved. This research shows that error management in governmental 
organizations (which also includes reacting to errors in the right manner) is at a much lower 
level than in sectors that have grown accustomed to this way of thinking and operating, such as 
the aviation industry and the medical industry.  
 
The ideal process for reacting to integrity violations calls for preventive measures, clear 
assessment of suspicions or allegations, openness about the course of events in the integrity 
investigation, as well as prompt, thorough and independent investigation of the facts. After that, 
possible political, criminal or disciplinary judgments should be made and lessons should be 
learned.827 This ideal process was not found in its entirety in any of these cases, but independent 
and thorough investigations have been carried out. That this has often not been enough and that 
this has led to what should be called the ‘incessant investigation cycle’ has been discussed. The 
cases have also shown that sanctions, whether political, criminal or disciplinary, have not been 
handed out often. It is not likely that the investigations in these cases could be described as 
‘prompt’. And even though a ‘thorough’ investigation is also important, some of these 
investigations have simply taken far too long. The length of the investigations and the period 
of public unrest that often accompanied the wait for results, added fuel for a continuing struggle 
between the parties involved in the case.  
 
The typical responses to organizational crime that were taken from the relevant literature were 
called neutralizations. The possible neutralizations by governmental organizations in these 
cases involved both denying the severity of the criminal act (denial of the occurrence of damage, 
denial of victimhood, reference to ‘higher loyalties’ and denial of the criminal character of the 
act) and denying the culpability of the criminal act (denial or shirking of responsibilities, 
emphasizing the ‘normality’ and the necessity of the behavior and ‘condemning the 
condemners’).828 This research showed that in these cases of deaths and serious injuries, 
governmental organizations did not deny the severity of the acts very often (with the notable 
exception of denying the criminal character of the act, since this was at all times denied, often 
with reference to the immunity for criminal prosecution). Denying the culpability of the act, 
however, has been part and parcel of governmental responses to these cases. Responsibilities 
were frequently denied or laid elsewhere. It appears that when fatal accidents occur, 
                                               
826 Van Dyck, Frese, Baer and Sonnentag (2005), p. 1229. 
827 Van den Heuvel and Huberts (2001), p. 1151-1156. 
828 Berg, Aldala and Beenakkers (2002), p. 67-78. 
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governments can seldom resist the temptation to point to the responsibilities of others. The 
entire process of consulting all the governmental organizations involved in the Probo Koala 
case comes to mind. Here a form of ‘ping pong government’ emerges: Each governmental 
organization bounces the ball back to another government organization, as most parties try to 
avoid ending up with public blame for the accident.  
 
There were some typical responses to rule breaking by governments identified in the relevant 
literature. These included shock reaction to prosecution and referring to the complexity of the 
situation the government found itself in (by pointing to complex laws, policies and funding 
arrangements with national government). Or, government might maintain that an action was 
unavoidable given the difficult circumstances, and would often admit mistakes while stating 
simultaneously that lessons had already been learned.829 This research showed that almost all of 
these responses were displayed in these cases. The psychological phenomenon that Adams and 
Balfour described, the splitting mechanism, seems to apply here: Negative judgments are 
attributed to persons, organizations or circumstances that fall outside of the sphere of influence 
of the organization concerned. Accepting blame where no blame applies can also decrease trust. 
A delicate balance is to be maintained. 
 
State crime literature expects the state to react to its crimes by denying its own criminality and 
by pointing to others.830 Determining responsibility for state crime is difficult. The state itself 
can define what is considered criminal, law enforcement systems are aimed more at individuals 
than at organizations (least of all the state itself) and criminal liability can be confused with 
political liability. The fact that the state is segmented into many different organizations and 
individuals is also important. Finally, independent control over law enforcement towards the 
state is problematic. In the cases examined, many of these factors were found to be relevant. It 
should be mentioned that in all cases, independent control over law enforcement was in place, 
in the sense that many independent investigations and court cases followed on from the 
accidents. But at the same time, immunity to prosecution prevented the State from facing 
criminal charges in any of these cases, even though decisions not to prosecute civil servants 
belonging to the State organization were laid before the Dutch courts on occasion. Finger 
pointing and denying the criminality of the behavior frequently appear in these cases. The fact 
that the State cannot be prosecuted while the municipalities can, creates the anomalous situation 
that the same criminal acts are treated differently depending on whether they are committed by 
the State or the municipality. That this leads to frustration for the municipality involved (as 
demonstrated with Amsterdam in the case of the Probo Koala) can be well understood. Perhaps 
this will change with the proposal for law reform in relation to criminal immunity for 
governments.831  
 
 
9.4.4. Conclusions about government responses  
 
The following table summarizes the conclusions about government response in the cases under 
consideration. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
829 Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen et al. (2005), p.165-166 and Mein and Van de Bunt (2010), p. 21.  
830 Della Porta and Vanucci, in; Ross (2000), p. 149-150, Bojarski (1997), p. 174 and Van der Wilt (2005), p. 6-8. 
831 http://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/30538_initiatiefvoorstel_recourt (date last accessed: 16-04-2014) 
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Table 9.5. Summary of responses by governmental organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
External language 
- investigations are pending 
- cooperation with the 
investigations  
- openness and transparency 
- limitations, unique situations, 
complex / contradictory rules and 
the role of other actors involved 
- ‘with the knowledge we had then, 
things were generally in order, 
with the knowledge we have now 
perhaps other choices would have 
been made’ 
Internal language 
Focuses on: 
 
- controlling risks 
- confidentiality 
- financial claims 
- political damage 
- legal restrictions 
.  
 
Strategy 
- ‘first the facts, then the judgment’: this requires thorough and independent investigation that 
should not take longer than strictly necessary 
- Openness and responding to Wob requests: ‘How can we prove that something has not 
happened?’ 
- Incremental defensiveness: adapting defensive positions, giving in step by step and only when 
almost unavoidable 
- Not following a steady line of communication, even if much more open, makes politicians more 
vulnerable to political problems than incremental defensiveness 
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
313 
 
9.5. Concluding: Where would these cases be found in the terrain between error and 
evil?  
 
9.5.1. Error management 
 
Error is concerned with the way government actually performs. Errors were defined as deviations 
between the intended and actual outcome of an action, that are (1) unintentional and where (2) 
the error maker should have known better, implying that the error was potentially avoidable. 
Errors should be clearly distinguished from consequences.832 In all of these cases, important 
errors that had serious consequences have been made. This is true, first of all, on an individual 
level. Certain people made mistakes that changed the course of events. The guards who left the 
door open in the Schiphol detention center, the painter who used thinner in the Catshuis without 
knowing or checking that the pilot light in the gas heater was turned off, the combination of 
errors with equipment and rescue operations that the fire brigade divers made.  
 
Deeper causes for these errors find their roots at organizational level: miscommunication, lack 
of coordination, lack of training, failing supervision, understaffing, etc. Whereas in other areas, 
such as aviation and the medical sector, error management has received serious attention over 
the years, many governmental organizations have no structure for learning from fatal accidents 
such as these. True, measures were often put in place following the accidents, but error 
management was not made part and parcel of the culture and structure of these organizations. 
This can lead to mistakes happening again, such as in the case of the firemen who drowned, 
where the real improvements came about only after a third accident that had largely the same 
causes.  
 
In all of the cases, a sequence of errors occurred that influenced the turn of events. It is usually 
the combination of these errors and the lack of checks and balances or precautionary measures 
that account for the accidents. On the other hand, it can just as easily be argued that bad luck or 
coincidence can never be ruled out completely. To use an apt expression: ‘shit happens’. People 
inevitably make mistakes. If a serious accident happens, we tend to scrutinize every single 
action and every decision made in a case and, at this point, reproaches about ‘wisdom after the 
fact’ can sometimes be justified.  
 
 
9.5.2. Rule breaking by governments  
 
Rule breaking governmental organizations were earlier defined as governmental organizations 
that violate rules or standards while executing their responsibilities. This can concern not only 
criminal law, but all rules and regulations, such as administrative law, constitutional law or civil 
law.833 Rule breaking by the governmental organizations was found to some degree in all cases. 
The research results were in line with the earlier research on rule breaking by governments in 
the Netherlands: governmental organizations violated environmental rules (Probo Koala), rules 
on labor conditions (the firemen who drowned, Catshuis fire) and fire safety rules (Catshuis 
fire, Schiphol detention center fire). That rules and regulations were found to be broken should 
not surprise: In all these cases, things went wrong in some way and people died, yet laws and 
regulations are in place precisely to guard the safety and security of human lives. It was not 
only criminal law that was breached. Administrative law and possibly European laws and 
                                               
832 Homsma et al. (2008), Van Dyck (2000), Helmreich (1998 and 2000) 
833 Huberts, Van Montfort, Doig and Clark (2005), Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen et al (2005), Mein and Van de Bunt 
(2010). 
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regulations were also breached in some instances. The case of Spijkers and the AP-23 revealed 
several breaches of laws and regulations that should have led to further criminal investigation. 
Since there were no criminal investigations, judgment should be reserved when trying to reach 
firm conclusions about rule breaking in this case. Nevertheless, that particular case involved so 
many odd or inexplicable actions that mere coincidence should be considered improbable. 
Certainly, sometimes things went wrong through miscommunication or because of simple 
mistakes, but several documents reveal rule breaking and instances of forgery. In any event, it 
is clear that rules were broken by Defense in the case of the AP-23 land mine, evidenced by the 
National Ombudsman’s report in 1999. Another example of rule breaking by government. 
 
 
9.5.3. Integrity and corruption  
 
Integrity was defined earlier as the quality of acting in accordance with relevant moral values, 
norms and rules.834 Corruption, in the sense of bribing, was defined as the misuse of public power 
for private gain; asking, offering, accepting bribes.835 There were no clear cut examples of corrupt 
activities by Dutch governmental organizations or their civil servants in these cases. As far as 
can be established, no bribes were offered,836 However, it can be concluded that rules were 
broken on many occasions and, in that sense, integrity violations can be identified. At other 
times, governmental organizations misinformed victims, the public and others. In a few 
instances, especially in the case of the AP-23 and Spijkers, people were misled in different 
ways. To conclude: Integrity violations were certainly found at times, (Spijkers and the AP-23 
and the Catshuis fire), but overall, it would be inaccurate to say that these cases demonstrated 
the sort of corruption and integrity violations that would determine position on the pathway 
between error and evil. 
 
 
9.5.4. Organizational crime  
 
In seeking to qualify governmental behavior as organizational crime we need to ascertain 
whether the governmental behavior in the selected case studies can be defined as criminal.837 
Did it constitute a violation of existing criminal law? In most cases, the answer is no, at least if 
one abides by the rulings of the Dutch courts. Prosecution of Dutch governmental organizations 
in these cases has either not happened or been unsuccessful. The only conviction of Dutch 
governmental organizations in these cases involved the municipalities in the case of the fire 
brigade divers who drowned (one case led to a conviction, the other two to a fine). It should be 
reminded here that the jurisprudence concerning immunity for governmental organizations 
plays a part. Organizational crime is often suspected, but rarely proven. White collar crime is 
irrelevant, as the cases neither involved individuals nor fitted the other criteria. Corporate crime 
can be found with Trafigura in the case of the Probo Koala, although it should be remembered 
that, after convictions before the court and the Court of Appeal, Trafigura settled the case with 
the Public Prosecution. A definitive conviction was not made, but Trafigura accepted the 
highest possible fines for its role in the affair. In the case of the Catshuis fire, the painting 
company was convicted for violating regulations on labor conditions (although it should be 
remembered that information about the possible role of the wall hangings had not been made 
                                               
834 Lasthuizen, Huberts and Heres (2011), p. 387. 
835 Huberts (2007), p. 210. 
836 It should be reminded here that there was a corruption scandal with a minister in Ivory Coast concerning the relief 
funds.  
837 Coleman (1987), Huisman (2001), Sutherland (1949). 
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available to the Public Prosecution at that time, thereby putting the painting company at a 
disadvantage).   
 
 
9.5.5. State crime  
 
State crime was defined earlier as illegal or socially injurious acts of omission or commission 
by individuals in an institution of political governance for the attainment of a state or state 
agencies’ operational goals.838 If this definition is accepted, several observations should be made 
about the research results. There have certainly been illegal acts of omission or commission by 
individuals in institutions of political governance. For example, in the case of the fire brigade 
divers, the breaking of regulations on labor conditions would meet this criterion. It should be 
recognized however, that these activities were rarely considered criminal in the sense that they led 
to prosecution and conviction in a criminal court. That these acts were socially injurious is 
undeniable, since human beings died or suffered serious injuries as a result. In the selected cases, 
many elements of state crime are present. It should be added that it is often difficult to distinguish 
individual acts from acts by organizations. Individuals often act within their organizational roles 
and are constrained by the procedures, regulations, hierarchy and lines of communication within 
their respective organizations. The definitional difficulty lies in the last part of the definition: ‘for 
the attainment of a state or state agencies operational goals’. As mentioned earlier, in none of 
these cases can it be said that there was any intention on the part of the governmental 
organizations involved for these accidents to happen: No one wanted people to die or to suffer 
serious injuries. It can be argued that governmental organizations have been negligent in some 
of these cases and have sometimes failed to perform their duties adequately, but that still does 
not prove intent. In a legal sense, there is something called ‘conditional intentionality’ in the 
Netherlands, meaning that the person involved accepts the considerable chance that their 
actions could result in harm to other people. But even with this conditional intentionality, it is 
difficult to see how the actions – or omissions - that led to all these tragic consequences were 
undertaken in pursuit of state or state agencies’ operational goals. To conclude: Although 
elements of state crime are present in these cases, on the whole they cannot be described as 
state crime.  
 
 
9.5.6. Administrative evil  
 
Every case in this study has been examined to see if elements of administrative evil were 
present. Evil is defined by Adams and Balfour as “actions of human beings that unjustly or 
needlessly inflict pain and suffering and death on other human beings”.839 Clearly, this is a very 
broad definition that can encompass many kinds of behavior. Nevertheless, it is the first hurdle 
for indicating administrative evil. As pointed out, administrative evil consists of several key 
elements: people engage in acts of evil, perpetrators are not aware that they are doing anything 
wrong, it is masked and there can be moral inversion where something evil is presented as 
something that is actually good. 840  
 
‘Inflicting evil on human beings’ assumes that a causal connection exists between the actions 
of human beings (or organizations for that matter) and the pain and suffering and deaths that 
follow. In all cases, deaths, pain and suffering occurred (although there are reservations about 
                                               
838 Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003), Green and Ward (2004), Ross (1995), Ross (2000). 
839 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 3.  
840 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 4. 
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whether there were deaths in the Probo Koala case), but a causal connection between the actions 
of the governmental organizations involved and the deaths or serious injuries cannot be proven 
in all cases. As well as in the Probo Koala case, causality is also problematic in the case of the 
Catshuis fire. That does not mean to say that the masking factors have not been present (some 
of them do apply to this case), but these are less about evil than about the way governmental 
organizations have withheld at least some crucial information in order to avoid political or 
financial damage. Clearly, something else should be expected from government, but that does 
not mean that what we get can be called administrative evil. In the other cases, the actions 
causing human suffering can in some way or another be identified. The second element 
(perpetrators are not aware that they are doing anything wrong) also holds for all of the cases.  
There is rarely any discussion about whether civil servants or politicians harbored ‘good’ 
intentions. In a few instances this can be debated, specifically in the case of the AP-23 and 
Spijkers, but there, too, it can be contended that the majority of persons involved were simply 
performing their regular duties without giving thought to whether the entire chain of events 
would lead to an outcome that could be considered just. For many, judging their actions in 
hindsight will appear to be ‘wisdom after the fact’, since they could not unmask what was going 
on at the time.  
 
The third issue is whether the evil was masked. As discussed before, most of the masking factors 
applied in these cases. Taking an overview of the five cases here, it is striking how difficult it 
often is to unmask what really happened. Unmasking administrative evil is not easy. 
Conclusions about administrative evil should be drawn with some reservation, and the 
possibility should not be overlooked that the author, too, is ‘wearing the mask’. He may not be 
the critical and reasonable observer that Adams and Balfour described. Nevertheless, an earnest 
and extensive effort has been made to objectively collect and weigh the facts in these cases. 
The fourth element, moral inversion, is not found in these cases except perhaps in a few minor 
incidents. Moral inversion means that something wrong is presented as something good. Such 
a moral inversion is not found in these cases, as there are no positive aspects attributed to the 
accidents by any party. Perhaps governmental organizations in the Netherlands are sensitive 
enough to public opinion not to try to present something wrong as something right. Whether 
governmental organizations privately recognize or admit wrongdoing is a different matter.  
 
There is one case in which the description of administrative evil probably does apply: the case 
of the AP-23 and Fred Spijkers. In the AP-23 case, the mask was on from 1983841 until 1999, 
when it was finally recognized that the land mines were dangerous. In the affair with Spijkers 
that followed, some things are as yet unknown, and it is possible that the mask is still on. It 
should be concluded that over the three decades this case has lasted, many civil servants and 
politicians, linked with various governmental organizations, have participated unknowingly 
(and in a few instances probably knowingly) in a long process that could eventually be 
described as administrative evil. The term does not apply to all of these cases, nor even to the 
majority. But some elements are found, especially the first three elements of the definition. 
Only moral inversion is completely absent.  
 
 
9.5.7. Conclusions about the ground between error and evil  
 
1) In most cases, error seems to best describe what actually happened. In virtually all of the 
cases, a sequence of errors occurred that influenced the turn of events. It is usually the 
                                               
841 It could be argued as well that 1970 is the start of the case, as the negative test report about the AP-23 was carried 
out then and necessary measures on account of that report were not taken by Defense.  
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combination of these errors and the lack of checks and balances or precautionary measures that 
account for the fatal accidents. With one exception, there is little evidence of administrative 
evil.  
2) Corruption was not found in these cases. Integrity violations were found at times (Spijkers 
and the AP-23 and the Catshuis fire), but corruption and integrity violations are not the most 
fitting descriptions for these cases as an attempt is made to locate them in the space between 
error and evil. 
3) Organizational crime is often suspected, but rarely proven. White collar crime seems 
irrelevant, as none of the cases matched with this description. Corporate crime is detected, 
however, in the cases of the Probo Koala and the Catshuis fire.  
4) In all of the cases examined in this dissertation, rule breaking by government was found to 
some degree. 
5) Although elements of state crime are present in these cases, on the whole what happened 
cannot be described as state crime. There are two reasons for this: ‘crime’ has rarely been 
proven in court and the definitive element of an action being ‘for the attainment of a state or 
state agencies’ operational goals’ was not found at all in these cases.  
6) The term administrative evil does not describe correctly what happened in these cases, but 
sometimes it offers valuable insights. The case of Spijkers and the AP-23 is the only one where, 
at least for a large period, what happened can be described as administrative evil and this helps 
locate the incident in the terrain between error and evil.  
 
These conclusions are visualized in the figure below, which spans the territory between error 
and evil. 
 
Figure 9.1. The territory between error and evil842 
 
 
                                               
842 This figure does not attempt to portray an exact calculation of the ‘amount’ of error or administrative evil established 
in these cases, but to illustrate the relative extent of each wrongdoing established by the research. 
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10. Conclusions  
 
 
10.1. Placing this research  
 
In the final chapter, the findings of this dissertation will be viewed from a range of perspectives, 
moving from risk and error management to popular discourse and towards a perspective of 
administrative evil. The two central research questions will then be returned to briefly. Following 
this, the dynamics within governmental organizations will be examined. The chapter will end with 
some final remarks and by identifying opportunities for moving forward in the cases where 
governmental organizations are connected to deaths and serious injuries.  
 
From risk management to error management 
When he resigned on account of the Schiphol detention center fire, Minister of Justice Donner 
asked ‘What responsibility can government bear for preventing danger?’ These words began this 
dissertation. They are representative of a school of thought in which the role of government in 
society is closely connected to the risk society. Beck introduced the concept of the risk society in 
which instrumental rationality is what leads action. 843 According to this way of thinking, disasters 
or accidents are not caused by nature or by an act of God, but by rational decisions taken by human 
beings. If risks materialize and become accidents, the search for an organization or person to blame 
starts. Following this line of thought, one could conclude that government has become the most 
likely scapegoat for whatever goes wrong in society. Bad luck, failures, impossibilities and 
coincidence are no longer accepted as reasons. ‘Bad luck must go’.844 Ministers and State 
Secretaries are often asked to assure the House of Representatives that ‘this will never happen 
again’. Van Eeten has argued that fatalism (summarized simply by ‘that is how it is’) seems to 
be forbidden in politics, even though ordinary citizens understand full well that a risk-free 
society is impossible and that mistakes will always be made.845 Frissen added that government 
fails to understand that, by definition, the human condition is tragic. 846 But in an effort to prevent 
tragedy, government intervenes in society, driven by a misguided aspiration to solve all of our 
problems.  
 
In the report about the risk rule reflex published by the Dutch Council for Public Administration 
(the Rob), the main question was how government should cope with risks and incidents.847 
Government often operates in different capacities: lawmaker, policymaker, implementer or law 
enforcer. Government is expected to maintain strict policies, while at the same time an 
accommodating attitude is often asked for, with more leniency over adhering to rules and 
regulations. However, according to the Rob this ‘over asking’ should, not be used as a mask for 
underperforming. Government is just one of the actors that determines what happens in the risk 
society and not always the most important one. While government is often still characterized by 
hierarchical, vertical relationships, society itself is developing into a network society in which 
horizontal relationships matter most. According to In ‘t Veld, the problematic aspect here is that 
governments have trouble adapting to what is required by a network approach.848 In any given 
problem more than ten different actors might play a role. They need each other to be effective in 
                                               
843 Beck (1992), Giddens (1990). 
844 Mertens, Pieterman, Schuyt, Vries de, et al. (2003).  
845 Van Eeten (2010). 
846 Frissen (2013). 
847 Rob (2012), p. 28. 
848http://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/achtergrond/achtergrond/bekwame-burger-redt-
democratie.125875.lynkx (date last accessed: 05-04-2014) 
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this network setting. This means steering discussion away from who is responsible for what, or 
redirecting focus away from budget limits and regulations and how to stick to them. Empathy 
should be the central value in such a network. In this view, government is struggling to come to 
grips with this new reality.  
 
Incidents can be highly influential in altering the trust that citizens have in their government. The 
Rob stated that in responding to incidents government should influence its own reputation and 
image by competent action (‘doing the job right’), adhering to values that are shared with citizens 
and by consistent image building. When investigating incidents, steps should be taken in the 
correct order: first establish the facts, then establish accountability and finally the lessons to be 
learned. In line with De Bruijn849, the Rob stated that the crucial question is why something 
happened (including attention to context) and should be preferred over one-dimensional causal 
explanations (‘if fire safety had received sufficient attention, than there would have been fewer 
casualties or none’).850 In investigations, the possibility of bad luck should be kept in mind: One 
dimensional causal explanations can lead to the ritual conviction of governmental organizations. 
It is argued by the Rob in its report that when it comes to dealing with risks, by its very nature 
there will always be risk acceptance. The question of which risks should still be considered 
acceptable is a political question that involves calculating costs and estimating probability. 
Helsloot, who participated in the Rob report, has consistently pleaded for more rationality in 
dealing with these risks. 851 But the desire to achieve absolute safety leads to disproportionate 
investment. Analyzing costs and benefits in the domain of physical safety then makes sense. 
 
This entire line of thinking seems to have gained popularity within government circles. Consider 
the opening lines of the letter that the Dutch government sent to the House of Representatives in 
reaction to the report by the Rob: 
 
“People cannot protect themselves against every danger in society. Government has a task 
in this. Over the last decades this task has steadily become broader, thereby giving 
government a continually increasing responsibility for guaranteeing safety and dealing 
with the consequences of incidents. This creates a dilemma for the role government plays. 
In a society that is characterized more and more by horizontal relationships, government 
can be expected to play a smaller role, but that is complicated by the assumption that it 
should go further and further in covering physical and other risks, even when this involves 
low risks with limited impact on society.”852 
 
Hirsch Ballin’s words, quoted before, are mirrored in this: Citizens can expect government to care 
for their safety, but promises of a zero risk society should not be made nor expected. The risk of 
stepping into the trap of the risk rule reflex is highlighted in this approach. In ‘t Veld, too, has 
warned that in such a situation, professionals are not given enough trust and room to be effective. 
We are moving from ‘high trust’ towards ‘low trust’. The tendency by parliament to demand stern 
measures and guarantees that ‘this will never happen again’ reinforce the vertical approach and 
compound the problems.853 The research on error management should be taken into account here 
                                               
849 De Bruijn (2007) 
850 To be precise: De Bruijn argued that both questions have advantages and disadvantages, he pleaded for a 
combination. 
851 Helsloot (2007). 
852 Letter by the Minister of Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations to the House of Representatives, May 27, 2013, 
nr. 2013-0000309300.  
853http://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/achtergrond/achtergrond/bekwame-burger-redt-
democratie.125875.lynkx (date last accessed: 05-04-2014) 
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when discussing risk management.854 The body of knowledge on this was quoted extensively and 
holds valuable lessons for both preventing errors and for learning from them. In each case, many 
errors can be identified. These errors do not stand alone, but are often complexly intertwined with 
other circumstances and compounded by other mistakes.   
 
Popular discourse  
The public debate about these cases (in parliament, in the media, on the internet) contrasted with 
the approach taken in risk management and error management literature. In the public debate, 
words like ‘scandal’, ‘cover-up’ and ‘conspiracy’ were often coupled with ‘government’. Actions 
by government were believed to have deeper motives and intentions. In this line of thought, 
government was not willing to admit its shortcomings and tried to divert the blame for what went 
wrong. Such a view draws a clear conclusion: Government did a poor job, perhaps unintentionally 
but often intentionally, tried to blame the victim or others (private or governmental organizations) 
and refused to admit its mistakes and to compensate the victims. In this popular discourse, there 
seems to be a need for one single responsible actor who can be blamed (government being a 
popular target) and one single cause for the fatal accident. This research has looked at these cases 
at some distance and, admittedly, with the wisdom gained with the passage of time. In every case 
there were many investigations carried out, reports and books published, debates held, and one 
case even inspired a theatre play.855 This dissertation combined information from all of these 
sources and interviews with key players in each case. As a result, the findings often differ from the 
views expressed in public discourse, although some of what was said in popular discourse was 
confirmed in the case studies.  
 
Let us look at just one case to illustrate this. The popular discourse about the Probo Koala could 
present this as a case in which the Dutch government allowed a ship with toxic waste to leave the 
harbor of Amsterdam, making it possible for the ship to continue its journey and dump the waste 
in Ivory Coast, causing deaths and serious injuries. The case study has shown that by now it should 
be considered improbable that the waste of the Probo Koala led to any deaths. The municipality of 
Amsterdam was prosecuted, but the Court ruled that in this case the municipality held immunity 
from prosecution. The reconstruction of the case showed that, in fact, the municipality had done 
its utmost to consult all the parties involved and had tried to reach a solution. Rules and regulations 
were complex and cooperation between governmental agencies was not up to standard, as many 
shirked their responsibilities in response to the questions put to them by the municipality. There 
are some striking features in this case. In the end deaths have not been proven, government was in 
fact just one of the many players in this case (and arguably not the dominant one) and the private 
company involved was convicted twice for their actions, which should be labeled as a serious 
environmental crime, before agreeing to settle and accepting the biggest fine possible. This forms 
a stark contrast with the public discourse, but what has become known in the case has not affected 
or changed the discourse. This is most probably because virtually all the information provided in 
this case has been heavily contested by the parties involved. Legal issues, publicity campaigns, 
framing: It has all added to the blurring of the real facts in the case. Some of those facts will 
probably never be fully known, while other facts have been evinced as arguments on every possible 
side of the story. For the uninformed reader it is an almost impossible task to separate fact from 
fiction. Even for the informed reader it remains a daunting task. 
 
 
                                               
854 Helmreich (1998 and 2000), Reason (2000), Van Dyck (2000), Van Dyck, Frese, Baer and Sonnentag (2005), 
Homsma (2007), Dimitrova (2014). 
855 About the case of the Probo Koala, http://www.mightysociety.nl/1koloms.asp?path=o2y0pduk (date last accessed: 
12-05-2014). 
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A different perspective: towards administrative evil 
There is another way of looking at these accidents and the role that government plays. This 
perspective can be connected to other areas of knowledge. Research on rule breaking by 
government, which is still relatively limited, showed that governmental organizations sometimes 
violate rules or standards while carrying out their responsibilities. This concerned criminal law, 
but also administrative law, constitutional law and civil law.856 Research on corruption and 
integrity violations is more developed and has focused on bribing and on acting in accordance with 
moral values, norms and rules.857 Criminological research has looked at organizational crime, 
showing how motives and opportunities can combine to offer possible explanations for criminal 
acts.858 State crime research has a longer tradition and has focused on crimes committed by states 
for the attainment of their own goals.859 A new perspective in this analysis of criminal behavior by 
public authorities is ‘Unmasking administrative evil’. The book by Adams and Balfour has led to 
much debate in public administration science860, but has rarely been followed up by research in 
which the theories from the book have been operationalized for research purposes.861 
 
The subject of evil has been studied by many disciplines such as philosophy, sociology and 
psychology862, but is also slowly gaining ground with social scientists that have an interest in 
organizational behavior. Jurkiewicz brought together various social scientists to study evil within 
organizations. 863 Although evil is a highly contested concept, often stirring up fierce emotions, it 
is believed that it is possible to take evil as an analytical framework and that this is necessary for 
the understanding of the dynamics within organizations. To quote Hannah Arendt:  
 
“The sad truth of the matter is that most evil is done by people who never made up their 
minds to be or to do either evil or good.”864  
 
Unless we pay attention to the idea of evil, it is very difficult to establish how organizations that 
start with decent people harboring good intentions can develop into organizations that harm people 
for their own benefit. This line of thought is more susceptible to ethical judgments than factual 
description and analysis of organizational behavior, but it also allows valuable insights into 
organizational dynamics.  
 
One thing should be made clear: The concept of administrative evil has certainly not been 
developed to add to government bashing. Adams and Balfour point that out when studying 
genocide and administrative evil. Here, states are inevitably recognized as the major 
perpetrators. That does not mean that we should not appreciate all the good work that is being 
done daily in public administration by dedicated and benevolent people. However, it is essential 
                                               
856 Brants and De Lange (1996), Huberts, Verberk, Berndsen et al. (2005), Huberts, Van Montfort, Doig and Clark 
(2005), Mein and Van den Bunt (2010), Roef (2001). 
857 Huberts (2005), Caiden (2001), Cooper (2001), De Graaf (2007), De Graaf, Von Maravic (2010), Heidenheimer 
and Johnston (2002), Van den Heuvel (2007), Huberts and Nelen (2005), Bull and Newell (2003). 
858 Sutherland (1940 and 1949), Kramer (1982), Coleman (1987), Simpson (1993), Maguire, Morgan and Reiner 
(1997), Huisman and Niemeijer (1998), Huisman (2001), Lundmann (2002), Berg, Aldala and Beenakkers (2002). 
859 Tilly (1985), Chambliss (1989), Kramer and Michalowski (1990), Weiss (1995), Bojarski (1997), Arnold and 
Silverman (1998), Ross (2000 and 2003), Jørgensen (2000), Kauzlarich, Matthews and Miller (2001), Kramer, 
Michalowski and Kauzlarich (2002), Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003), Green and Ward (2004), Rothe 
and Mullins (2011), Laslett (2012).  
860 Adams and Balfour (2009), Adams and Balfour (2000), Browder, Perrow, Adams and Balfour (2000), Dubnick 
(2000), Koven (2012). 
861 Adams, Balfour and Reed (2006), Ghere (2006). 
862 Arendt (1963), Bauman (1989 and 1993), Neiman (2002), Bernstein (2005), Van der Wilt (2005), Baron Cohen 
(2011).  
863 Jurkiewicz (2012). 
864 Bernstein (2005), p. 9. 
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to adopt a critical stance when looking at government, not to take part in government bashing 
but rather to prevent disasters taking place.865 This point of view is confirmed in this dissertation. 
After reading this book, no one should be able to conclude that the Dutch government, or the 
governmental organizations involved, could be described accurately as ‘evil’, or by the more 
complicated term ‘administrative evil’. However, there is sufficient reason to look critically at 
the organizational dynamics in these cases, in an effort to learn from them.  
 
 
10.2. Returning to the central research questions  
 
In the previous chapter, the findings of the case studies were collated and general conclusions were 
drawn. In this paragraph, a brief return to the central research questions will be made. The first 
research question was:  
 
1) Why and how does governmental behavior in the Netherlands lead to the 
occurrence of deaths or serious injuries to human beings?  
 
In this dissertation, the combination of opportunities, motives and masking in each case was 
explored. The findings under each heading were considered as a whole in an effort to find just how 
governmental organizations became connected to the deaths and serious injuries described.  
 
Opportunities  
A trend towards ‘deverticalizing’ relationships with government has been pointed out, a trend from 
top-down government (where government is the dominant actor ) to a form of governance (where 
government is but one of the actors in a broader societal network, operating in both a bottom-up 
and horizontal fashion). From these cases, it appears that hierarchical organizational structures 
(such as those found within the fire brigades, Defense and ministries) increase vulnerability to 
these kinds of fatal accidents. Cooperation between governments has become more important, but 
government also needs to cooperate with other actors (companies, citizens, media, interest groups, 
etc.). If responsibilities were found to be divided between many actors, the risk of finger pointing 
and scapegoating others increased. Governmental organizations often blamed other governmental 
organizations, causing a deterioration in the relationships within government. Relationships 
between politicians and civil servants also came under pressure quite often. The dissertation has 
also shown the risk of accepting responsibility where it should not be taken (Alderman Vos in the 
case of the Probo Koala, for instance). In the organizational culture of the entities studied, hierarchy 
was a relevant factor, as well as loyalty and dedication to the job. This is congruent with the 
observation that governmental organizations in the Netherlands still struggle with the shift from 
hierarchy to network, from vertical to horizontal relationships. These cases have shown that, in 
line with this hierarchical, bureaucratic culture, a disproportionate amount of attention was paid to 
legal, financial and political risks. Fear of claims for compensation was influential in the internal 
discourse. As pointed out before, advice about legal, financial and political risks is by nature part 
of the work of civil servants. However, this research produces examples of cases in which these 
concerns seemed to dominate over other relevant concerns, such as openness, empathy and the 
interest of the victims. The political system and relationships with companies were not found to be 
an opportunity for things to go wrong.  
 
Motives 
A distinction was made in this dissertation between primary motives (which have an individual 
                                               
865 Adams and Balfour (2000), p. 481. 
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origin) and secondary motives (organizationally oriented). The primary motive that turned out to 
be the most relevant was ignorance, which in a broad sense included errors of various kinds. 
Ignorance, in the sense that professionalism or knowledge was insufficient, was actually found less 
than might be expected. The civil servants involved in these cases were most often dedicated 
professionals who needed discretion to be able to fulfill their tasks. Unwillingness was seldom 
found as a motive, although governmental organization certainly faced some wicked dilemmas in 
these cases. Financial motives often played a role, but were seldom the only or dominant factor. 
The position of the governmental organization and its image, preferring other norms than the law 
and demands by politicians, citizens and interest groups were not found to be relevant motives in 
the majority of these cases. Each case appears to have its own dynamics and the motives vary. A 
pattern is difficult to discern, other than that errors can always be found and that often means that 
someone has made a mistake or is at least responsible for some form of shortcoming.  
 
Masking  
This research shows that the masking factors that were introduced by Adams and Balfour in fact 
apply to most of these cases. Distance in time, perspective, scapegoating and technical rationality 
often masked what was going on. Over time, the way the case was viewed changed substantially. 
Often, the perspective was also part of the masking. There seems to be a myth of pure evil that is 
kept in place and there is a ‘magnitude gap’ between the perspective of victims and perpetrators. 
What this research has shown is how unmasking is fraught with difficulties and by nature uncertain 
and contested. The mask can stay on for a very long time, and this can also be an excuse for one 
of the parties involved to keep up the accusation of a cover-up, or conspiracy, indefinitely.   
 
These case studies seem to occupy consistent territory between error and evil. The findings 
revealed plenty of error, no corruption, some integrity violations, not a lot of organizational crime 
(often because government is difficult to prosecute), some form of rule breaking by government 
in all cases, and no state crime (because of the definition of crime, and because actions were not 
taken in pursuit of operational goals). There may be have been some hints of administrative evil 
in some instances, but the only case where, for a certain period of time, it was really a fitting 
description was that of the AP-23 land mines and Spijkers. However, it was often masked and 
these cases have shown that there is reason enough for government to be cautious and to be aware 
of the dangers of administrative evil.  
 
Explaining why and how governmental organizations are connected to deaths and serious injuries 
For every case, a large number of investigations were carried out. There are certainly patterns and 
mechanisms to be discerned in the combination of all these reports, as well as in the other research 
material that has been presented in this dissertation.866 Offering explanations and drawing 
conclusions in these government–connected cases of serious injuries and death requires sensitivity. 
Judgment should not be made lightly, should be done by independent organizations and should be 
based on the facts, not on emotions.  
 
It is interesting to examine the conclusions drawn in the investigative reports in these cases. The 
exact wording of the conclusions by the Safety Council in the case of the Schiphol detention 
center fire gives food for thought. For example, in the case of the fireman drowned in Utrecht, 
the municipality was convicted of death by guilt for not adhering to the rules and regulations 
on labor conditions for the divers involved. If that line of argument had been followed by the 
Safety Council in the case of the Schiphol detention center fire (of course the accident in Utrecht 
took place before the Schiphol detention center fire, so this is a fictional notion), one could 
                                               
866 Leeuw (2008), p. 19 and Astbury and Leeuw (2010), p. 368. 
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come up with the same conclusion: ‘There would not have been any victims if the governmental 
organization involved had focused its attention on safe labor conditions’. This might have 
brought about a quite different dynamic in the political arena. De Bruijn has explained this 
phenomenon by comparing the conclusions drawn by the Safety Board in the case of the 
Schiphol detention center fire and those of the Hulshof Committee in the case of the Probo 
Koala. 867 De Bruijn distinguished a focus on causality (the Safety Board: ‘If they had focused 
on fire safety, there would have been fewer or no deaths’) and a focus on context (Hulshof 
Committee: ‘Under these special circumstances, the way of operating was not adequate’). Both 
approaches have disadvantages: Causality approaches do not explain why certain rules were 
broken and why cooperation or coordination was inadequate, while context approaches can 
offer legitimation for existing harmful situations and reduce judgment to a marginal check. De 
Bruijn concluded that a comparative approach should be preferred over single case analysis and 
that elements of causality and context approaches should be combined in reports by 
investigative committees. 
 
Later research on methods of accident investigation has signaled a trend. First, attention was 
focused on errors (both human and technical) and causality. Later, there was more interest in 
the context in which these errors had occurred and in the role the organization played. Finally, 
the focus seems to be shifting to the system as a whole, with more attention being devoted to 
interactions and dynamic relationships. Most investigations still focus on causality but the 
Safety Board has moved on to an approach that is more in line with context-driven analysis. A 
more system-driven approach is being developed and tested as the latest method for 
inspectorates and investigative authorities.868  
 
Summing up the explanations 
In each case a combination of errors was seen, often in a cascade of coincidences, failures, bad 
luck and sometimes wrong choices. These errors can be identified at different levels: the individual 
level (for example, the cell door was not closed), and the organizational level (staffing was 
inadequate, not enough training, and culture not aimed at learning from errors). In some instances, 
the societal level can be involved as well (for example the importance that is attached to 
environmental concerns as opposed to economic concerns or the choices made concerning 
immigration or detention).869 Merely looking at errors is not enough. Government should be aware 
of the small, simple steps that taken together can form administrative evil. Moral decisions rarely 
present themselves as moral decisions. These are not ‘black and white’ decisions, but small steps, 
at first sight doing little harm. Nevertheless, a slow process can start down the slippery slope. This 
process is difficult to discern, or to unmask for that matter. Civil servants and politicians must 
therefore be keenly aware of what exactly their role requires: A strongly felt identity that is fed by 
relevant moral values and norms and that is well adjusted to expectations within society, is vital 
here.  
 
All of this requires a strong awareness of the dangerous dynamics that can come with large and 
complex organization. Within governmental organizations, a shared ‘frame’ can develop in a case 
in which a victim or whistleblower is involved. The case of Spijkers can serve as an example: 
Without a doubt, many Defense employees thought they were doing the right thing in their 
individual contribution to this case over the years. Nevertheless, if the case had been handled 
differently from the start, with serious attention to the victims and the employees involved and 
                                               
867 De Bruijn (2007). 
868 Mertens, Van Schaardenburgh-Verhoeve and Sillem, ed. (2012), p. 29-30. 
869 This corresponds with the micro-to-macro distinction that was discussed before in paragraph 3.4., Coleman 
(1987), De Graaf (2007), p. 547-553 and Huberts (1998), p. 35. 
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empathy for their story, it probably would not have developed into decades of struggle between 
government and one of its citizens. If the first step in such a process turns out to be the wrong one, 
the process afterwards becomes difficult to reverse.870 That leads to embitterment and struggle and 
in the end to large damage compensation claims and serious damage to the image of the 
governmental organization involved. It is this organizational dynamics that is sensitive to the 
development of administrative evil and this is precisely the danger governmental organizations 
should be more aware of. 
 
In these cases of fatal accidents, overview and coordination was often lacking, thereby begging 
the question who was really in charge. The danger of administrative evil that stays masked for a 
long time can loom in the background. This research shows that such masking in fact takes place, 
mostly without the persons involved knowing about it. A tragic turn of events is often more the 
result of a slow creeping process which people do not recognize than that it is the outcome of a 
‘conspiracy’ or ‘cover-up’ that is often assumed to be present in these cases.  
 
Government has not internalized error management to the extent that the aviation industry or the 
medical industry has. Although many measures are often adopted (risk rule reflex), learning from 
errors can still be improved. This will involve more focus on system-oriented learning in 
investigative reports, instead of individual or organizational analysis. From this research, it does 
not appear that bad intentions on the part of governmental actors were often present, but large 
organizations and bureaucracy can cause defensiveness, a ‘closed’ culture and ultimately a tension 
between taking either too much or too little risk.  
 
That brings us to the second central research question: 
 
2) How do governmental organizations in the Netherlands respond to these cases 
and why do they respond that way?  
 
Examining the response of governmental organizations to these cases leads to several conclusions. 
Governmental organizations’ first line of communication was often that they had to await the 
results of the independent investigation. Following that, full cooperation with these investigations 
was promised. In most cases, support for their own personnel was voiced in one way or another, 
but this did not always happen. Such words of support are appreciated within their own 
governmental organization, and there is strong reaction if such support is not articulated. This can 
be connected to the culture of strong loyalty within these organizations. Governmental 
organizations stressed that they were completely open and transparent about what happened. 
Reference was made to the complex and ambiguous rules that governmental organizations had to 
deal with. Responsibilities by other parties were pointed out.  
 
A noticeable element in the external language used by governmental organizations in these cases 
was reference to the uniqueness of the situation and the lack of relevant information and knowledge 
at the time of the accident: ‘with the knowledge we had then, things were generally in order, 
with the knowledge we have now perhaps other choices would have been made’. There were 
noticeable differences between external and internal language. That should not come as a 
surprise, since it is the job of civil servants to advise their ministers, aldermen or mayors about 
all kinds of aspects. Internally, in addition to providing relevant information, advising often 
seemed to focus on limiting risks – on controlling risks, confidentiality, financial claims, 
political damage and legal restrictions. 
                                               
870 This can be seen as an example of the cascading mechanism that was identified by Leeuw and Vaessen, Leeuw 
and Vaessen (2009), p. 18. 
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As a strategy, governmental organizations often seemed to try to buy time in cases like this: 
‘First the facts, then the judgment’ is a popular strategy here. This requires thorough and 
independent investigations. It should be noted that in all these cases, independent investigations 
were invariably carried out and that governments often had to go to great lengths to cooperate with 
the investigative authorities and to provide the information that was asked for. The number of 
investigations was significant. The parties involved often used investigations as part of the 
struggle, each investigation giving fuel to the arguments of one of the parties involved. In some 
cases, it appears that the parties could not agree on any single fact. This led to a seemingly endless 
cascade of investigations, the ‘incessant investigation cycle’.871 In fact, dissatisfaction was often so 
great that not one single cause could be agreed as forming the definitive answer to why the fatal 
accident took place.  
 
Governmental organizations took a large number of measures to prevent repetition of these 
accidents. This can be referred to as the risk rule reflex, but it should also be recognized that these 
measures indeed led to significant improvements. Fire brigade diving became safer after the third 
diving accident in several years took place in Terneuzen, but absolute guarantees that such 
accidents can never happen again cannot and should not be given. Hopefully, the chances of such 
accidents happening will have decreased and governmental organizations will be better prepared.   
 
In most of these cases governmental organizations reacted in a defensive way, out of fear, with a 
lack of openness and a lack of empathy. Legal concerns were often dominant. Governmental 
organizations often struggled with being open and with handling Wob requests. Where Wob 
requests were refused, documents were often leaked to the press, strengthening the appearance 
of a cover-up. Governmental organizations struggle to respond to that accusation. The Catshuis 
fire serves as an example: ‘How can we prove that something has not happened?’ There is no 
simple template for responding to accusations of ‘cover-up’ and ‘conspiracy’. Another strategy 
adopted in some cases was ‘incremental defensiveness’: conceding responsibility step by step 
only when it becomes almost unavoidable. Not following a consistent line of communication, 
although it displays greater openness, seems to make politicians more vulnerable to political 
problems than incremental defensiveness. This is crystallized in the case of the Probo Koala 
comparing the outcomes for Alderman Vos, who wavered in her response even though she was 
being more open in so doing, and State Secretary Van Geel, who adopted incremental 
defensiveness as a strategy. The conclusion should be that for politicians, consistency (even when 
this implies a defensive, ‘closed’ attitude and denying responsibility each time) is appreciated more 
than changing your mind.  
 
Two subjects will be discussed briefly since they play an important role in the way government 
reacts in these cases: the way governmental organizations deal with claims for financial 
compensation and the impact these cases have on the relationships between politicians and civil 
servants.  
 
Dealing with damage claims 
How should governmental organizations deal with claims for financial compensation in these 
cases? Administrative law expert Scheltema pleaded for more personal contact between 
governmental organizations and citizens in order to reach swift solutions. Settling cases out of 
court is also advantageous for the governmental workload. At the same time this calls for 
responsible citizenship in society: Government belongs to all citizens.872 The State advocate, 
Houtzagers, chose a different approach. He felt that government should communicate more 
                                               
871 The Rob referred to this as ‘the disaster after the disaster’, Rob (2012), p. 10. 
872 National Ombudsman (2009), p. 32. 
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clearly why claims are turned down. In his view, bringing in the right legal expertise is crucial. 
Careful communication is seen here as the key to avoiding lengthy procedures. Payment of 
compensation based on leniency should, in Houtzager’s view, only happen in very special cases, 
since it involves the use of taxpayers’ money.873 This dissertation shows that in the cases studied, 
Houtzagers’ approach (‘we would like to explain again why your claim was turned down’) was 
adopted much more often than Scheltema’s (‘we would like to talk to you personally about 
what happened and about your claim’).  
 
What do these cases tell us about the relationships between politicians and their civil servants? 
Disciplinary sanctions against civil servants are a sensitive issue within governmental 
organizations. As a matter of constitutional law, politicians are responsible for the actions of 
their civil servants who cannot, and will not, defend themselves in public. That is the job of the 
minister and is what determines the nature of the relationship between civil servants and the 
politicians whom they are to serve loyally. This Weberian view has been challenged and 
criticized over the years. Adams and Balfour (and Arendt before them) argued for a more active 
stance to be taken by civil servants in their relationship to politicians than would be expected 
in the Weberian ideal. The subject of loyalty has been a research topic for a long time.874 De 
Graaf has researched the loyalties of top public administrators.875 He found several different 
concepts of loyalty, displayed by administrators who focus on serving society and its citizens, 
administrators who believe they should be as neutral as possible, administrators whose loyalties 
lie with their private lives and individual consciences and administrators whose loyalties lie 
with their own principles, with the law and with official rules. It was found that combinations 
of these loyalties exist, but being loyal to the minister and serving society still came out on top.  
 
Nieuwenkamp found that relations between members of government and top civil servants had 
deteriorated over the years, putting mutual trust and mutual loyalty at stake.876 Nieuwenkamp 
uncovered a ‘sorry culture’ in which ministers apologized, stayed on and officials left office. 
Such a blame culture made top civil servants cautious and defensive, avoiding risks as much as 
possible. Nieuwenkamp noted that in practice many top civil servants protect themselves 
against the risk of being scapegoated by a disloyal minister after incidents or parliamentary 
inquiries. These top officials sometimes keep diaries, send deliberate written warnings to 
ministers and take ‘witnesses’ to meetings with their own minister. An explanation for this trend 
was found in the ‘primacy of politics culture’ with top-down leadership styles. 
 
This research established that immediately after these fatal incidents, there was a strong feeling 
among civil servants that they should receive backing from their political superiors. A lack of 
initial support can have a negative impact on the subsequent relationship between the politician 
and his civil servants. This support should also be forthcoming in the democratic arena. In some 
of these cases, ministers, state secretaries and aldermen have come under fire for their role. If the 
threat of political damage develops, it can be tempting for politicians to blame the civil servants 
involved. This is a delicate matter. Sometimes the minister genuinely was not informed well 
enough about the case. In such cases, the minister often says that they would have wanted to know 
all about the incident when it happened. In other cases it seems that the ministers jumped to 
conclusions too early in blaming their civil servants. The research found that, in the cases 
examined, relationships between politicians and civil servants often came under stress and at times 
were seriously damaged.  
                                               
873 National Ombudsman (2009), p. 34. 
874 See for instance Denhardt and Denhardt (2000), Bovens (1998)  
875 De Graaf (2011), p. 13-15. 
876 Nieuwenkamp (2001), p. 396-397. 
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The central research questions have been answered in line with the research design. However, 
reflecting on this subject matter led to yet another perspective that can be taken on these cases and 
will be explored briefly in the next paragraph. From this perspective, the organizational dynamics 
that have been examined bear many of the characteristics of tragedy.  
 
 
10.3. The dynamics of governmental tragedies  
 
In the cases that have been studied and in the interviews that have been done, it is striking that 
there seems to be some sort of inevitability in the dynamics of cases like these. These dynamics 
seem to create, maintain and then expand themselves. It all begins like a movie or a play with a 
tragic ending from which we cannot seem to escape. The plot possesses many complexities and 
the main characters face impossible dilemmas. The script seems to have been written beforehand 
and the characters have already been cast. Reality seems to adapt to this scenario. To quote Dutch 
sociologist Schinkel: 
 
“Of course it is no longer so that film resembles reality, it is the other way around: reality 
resembles film.”877 
 
The question, then, is what this scenario looks like and what factors influence the dynamics. And 
even if we understand who plays which part, the question is also about where we might find the 
director of the play. Is this ‘rule by nobody,’ as Arendt called it, that played a major part in 
‘Unmasking administrative evil’? Or is something else going on? An important element in all of 
this is that reality is often distorted before the eyes of the actors and the audience, as it is masked 
in many ways. The masking factors which have named by Adams and Balfour offer valuable 
insights here.  
 
Attention to dramaturgical aspects in governmental behavior can be found in the work of Hajer. 
Together with Uitermark, he analyzed the performance of the Dutch authorities following the 
murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by an Islamist extremist.878 In the article, Hajer and 
Uitermark stated that the way in which a murder may shape politics depends on the struggle over 
the meaning of the murder. They look at authority in times of crisis in a discourse-analytical way 
and see two dimensions: the discursive (what is said) and the dramaturgical (how it is said and in 
what setting). For the discursive dimension, political leaders must come up with the right words in 
the right ‘frame’ to influence people successfully. Metaphors, story lines and rhetoric are often 
more influential than rational arguments. The dramaturgical dimension refers to how the setting 
influences the act. It is not just what is said that is relevant, but also who says it, how, and in what 
particular context. Discourses are not just a way of looking at the world, but are embedded in social 
practices that reproduce the way we look as a form of truth. Examining what is said and written 
can teach us how views on the state of the world are constructed.879 
 
The significance of context was mentioned before, in the work of De Bruijn, who emphasized the 
importance of including not only causality, but also context in the work of investigative 
committees.880 Another interesting phenomenon is what communication scientists call ‘context 
collapse’: the interlocking of endless contexts, making it so diffuse and inconclusive that in fact 
there is less context. Wijnberg wrote about this:  
                                               
877 http://www.groene.nl/2008/7/wij-joran (date last accessed: 19-2-2014) 
878 Hajer and Uitermark (2008) 
879 De Graaf (2003), p. 43-50. 
880 De Bruijn (2007).  
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“It is a cathartic realization that the bulk of our ideas and judgments about the world is 
focused on emotion, prone to simplification and designed through an increasingly 
sophisticated communication technologies derivative: a picture, squeezed into a format, 
interpreted by a transmitter, commented by an audience, cooked back to ultimately the 
most lasting impression. Of the remaining 99.9 percent, we know virtually nothing.”881 
 
It is concluded that this simplified and condensed picture of reality, in which the context has 
become almost irrelevant (thus ‘context collapse’) has an enormous impact on what we see as 
truth and reality. There can be a tendency to see the fatal accidents in these cases as examples 
of what happens in daily government practice, even when in fact (as the numbers have shown) 
these cases can, and should, be described as clear exceptions. Important exceptions to be studied 
and learned from, but yet still exceptions. Earlier, this research focused on the importance of 
‘framing’ in communications, highlighting certain aspects of a situation using language 
designed to influence public opinion (consider, for instance, the frame ‘Europe poisons Africa’ 
in the case of the Probo Koala). De Bruijn gave the following definition of framing:  
 
“a substantive political message, which is used in the political debate and which leads 
to a specific interpretation of reality.”882 
 
Hajer looked at the sequence of ‘performances’ to understand how meaning was produced and 
distributed. The success of political leaders is dependent here on the extent to which they succeed 
in influencing the public understanding of a situation and, in so doing, change the political 
significance of a particular event. All this does not mean to imply that politicians or civil servants 
are merely actors who simply ‘play’ a role. Hajer and Uitermark refer to Bourdieu for a better 
understanding of this: 
 
“In practice, politicians need to act not on the basis of rational calculation but out of a ‘feel 
for the game’ that they have accumulated over time and in environments both inside and 
outside politics.”883 
 
Hajer and Uitermark concluded that the dramaturgical dynamics do not match with a model of 
politicians as rational actors who calculate which step should be taken next. Rather, things evolve 
in a natural way as each politician is limited by their ‘performative habitus’. Hajer and Uitermark 
end by restating what good governance is all about: awareness of the many different discourses 
that people might use to attach meaning to what politicians do. Hajer is interested in examining 
this ‘performative habitus’ to understand how administrators respond tactically in emotional 
discussions. This is summarized in the following boxes: 
 
BOX 1 Discourse (refers to markers, structures and patterns in a discussion) 884 
 
• Discourse: an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations through which meaning is 
allocated to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduces in an 
identifiable set of practices 
• Metaphor: understanding and experiencing a particular thing/event in terms of another 
                                               
881https://decorrespondent.nl/947/ergens-is-er-iets-aan-de-hand-en-er-wordt-wat-van-gevonden/24271610-
88bc23da (date last accessed: 09-04-2014) 
882 De Bruijn (2011), p. 16. 
883 Hajer and Uitermark (2008), p. 3.  
884 Hajer and Uitermark (2008), p. 3. 
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• Story line: a condensed sort of narrative that links an event to one or more discourses and 
thus provides the basis of ‘discourse coalitions’ 
  
The discourse here concerns the ideas and concepts that determine how we ‘talk’ about 
governmental tragedies. Three discourses can be identified. The first is the popular discourse, 
which was discussed at the start of this chapter. The second can be called the risk and error 
discourse, which provides a specific lens through which these fatal accidents can be viewed. In 
this discourse, it is emphasized that risks and errors are part of life. Risk management and error 
management are aimed at coping with these risks and errors. We should learn from errors, but 
also accept them: ‘shit happens’. Aiming to eliminate all risks is something which comes at a 
cost for society. In this view, governmental organizations should be cautious of stepping into 
the trap of the risk rule reflex. More realistic demands and expectations of the role of 
government in society (a smaller government that acts more as one of the partners in the risk 
landscape instead of presenting itself as the ‘solver of all problems’) is needed in this 
perspective. The legitimate claim for safety (for which government should take its 
responsibility) should not be confused with the illusion of a zero risk society. The down side is 
that this discourse could seem to offer an easy way out for governmental organizations who 
have failed in some way: ‘shit happens’, expectations of government are unrealistic and so 
government should be exonerated from blame no matter what. Such relativism is not advocated 
by anyone, but could be a consequence if this discourse is taken too far.   
 
The third discourse is the one that looks at the potential of government for rule breaking, crime 
and administrative evil. This can be called the evil discourse. In this discourse, it is emphasized 
that government as a large bureaucratic organization holds strong potential for breaking rules, 
committing crimes for its own goals and a potential for administrative evil. That is not to say 
that this is always coupled with intent. On the contrary, it is argued that most problems arise 
because of routine actions and decisions, which never presented themselves as moral decisions. 
The disadvantages of bureaucracy and hierarchy are often quoted in this discourse. Mechanisms 
like scapegoating and shirking responsibilities are seen as relevant responses in fatal 
accidents.885 In this view, governmental organizations would do well to be aware of the 
organizational dynamics that can build towards something that nobody wanted beforehand. 
Acquiring a better overview, maintaining moral standards and courage are advocated as 
important features in a government that can prevent the growth of its potential for evil. The 
down side of this evil discourse is the mirror image of the down side for the error and risk 
discourse: It is an easy way out for all parties involved to blame government for everything that 
went wrong. In this discourse, it is very difficult not to find government guilty. This comes 
close to what Donner warned of: a responsibility for every possible disaster which is impossible 
for government to bear. If this discourse is the dominant one at all times, trust in government 
will probably be eroded further.  
 
The collision of these discourses brings us to the core of this dissertation: between error and 
evil. In the cases studied, it has become clear that these discourses continually clash with each 
other. In most cases, two sides appear. One will lay more emphasis on the risk and error 
discourse, the other will emphasize elements from the evil discourse. In the end, both discourses 
have one thing in common: Government doing a good job is seen as the best possible remedy. 
In the risk and error discourse, reference can be made to the title of the report by the Rob: ‘The 
embodiment of the competent government’. For the evil discourse, the words of Guy Adams 
can be quoted:  
                                               
885 Leeuw (2008), p. 19 and Astbury and Leeuw (2010), p. 368. 
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“Imagining a model public service professional who might be less receptive to 
administrative evil is instructive. Such a person should be expert, knowledgeable, 
competent, effective—all these attributes almost go without saying. The public service 
professional also needs to be an educator who can help foster learning organizations 
and learning communities—in effect, schools where citizens learn, deepen, and 
eventually habituate the practices of democratic citizenship. This professional also 
needs to become adept at systems thinking, and to learn the public value of courage. 
Courage in the face of fear is a crucially important virtue that should not be 
underestimated. Franklin Roosevelt, in the midst of the Great Depression, wisely said 
that we have nothing to fear but fear itself. Fear is almost always involved when we go 
really wrong; it plays well to our worst instincts. So the professional who can foster 
public courage is to be prized.”886  
 
Metaphors were often used in these cases: ‘Europe poisons Africa’ in the case of the Probo 
Koala is a classic example. The symbolism is very strong here, even when in retrospect, if one 
considers the facts of the case, this can be considered far too sweeping a statement. Storylines 
are often highly influential and difficult to reverse. In the case of the Schiphol detention center 
fire, the case was linked to the immigration policies in the Netherlands and the level of care for 
illegal aliens. The fire was thus presented as part of, and exemplary of, a bigger problem. Here 
too, a sharp analysis of the case should lead to a more balanced judgment, in which the cascade 
of errors and coincidences is studied more closely in order to improve organizational learning.  
 
BOX 2 Dramaturgy (analysis of policy making as a sequence of staged performances)887 
 
• Performance: The way in which the contextualized interaction itself produces social 
realities like understandings of the problem at hand, knowledge, new power relationships 
• Setting: The physical and organizational situation in which the interaction takes place, 
including the artifacts that are brought to, or found, in the situation 
• Scripting: The efforts of protagonists to create a particular political effect by determining 
the characters in the performance (‘Dramatis Personae’) and to provide cues for appropriate 
behavior 
• Counter-scripting: Efforts of antagonists to undo the effect of the protagonists’ scripts  
• Staging: The deliberate organization of an interaction, drawing on existing symbols and the 
invention of new ones, as well as to the distinction between active players and (presumably 
passive) audiences (‘mis en scene’) 
 
The dramaturgical setting in these cases holds many resemblances to Greek tragedy. The setting 
is often classical: Debates in the House of Representatives, criminal courts and city councils can 
easily be compared to the Greek arenas and theatres. The performance by the governmental 
organizations in these cases has been scrutinized by many. For example, the performance of Prime 
Minister Balkenende in the case of the Catshuis fire was often coupled with the debate about his 
performative habitus: His political opponents often questioned his leadership skills. The fatal 
accident with the painter formed an opportunity to frame this as an example of his poor leadership 
skills. In this view, Balkenende was not ‘on top of things’. It was clear that Balkenende was forced 
to defend himself, urging people with relevant knowledge about the case to present themselves 
and provide him with information. The lamentation heard in this view ‘how can we prove that 
something has not happened’ confirmed that Balkenende was not in charge in the way that he 
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887 Hajer and Uitermark (2008), p. 3. 
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should have been. The case ended with the scolding of his civil servants, whose actions were 
labeled by Balkenende as ‘inaccurate, incorrect and incomplete’.   
 
Scripting and counter-scripting have been part and parcel of these cases. In these governmental 
tragedies, the antagonists and protagonists were often identified at an early stage. It is sometimes 
possible to reverse the way the ‘Dramatis Personae’ are seen. Consider, for example, the case of 
the AP-23 and Spijkers: The role of the perpetrator and the victim has shifted back and forth over 
time. First, the test leader was blamed, while on the same day he was exonerated from blame. 
Spijkers was seen for many years as a conspiracy theorist in a labor conflict with Defense. When, 
after many years, Defense was blamed for the accident, his image changed and Spijkers was seen 
as ‘One man against the State’, out to find out the truth. Over the years, many efforts have been 
made by both parties to script and counter-script in the struggle about who should be considered 
antagonist and protagonist. Language is a vital instrument in the struggle between the opposing 
sides. Staging (deliberate organization of interactions with the use of symbols and distinguishing 
actors from the crowd) has been arranged on many occasions: Consider for example the ceremony 
in which Spijkers was awarded a royal decoration or the visit by the EU-committee member Dimas 
(accompanied by camera crews from the media) to the Probo Koala when it was in Estonia.  
 
The dramaturgical dimensions present in the five cases that were studied make clear that there are 
similarities between these cases and the world of theatres and movies. Our cases can be likened to 
several different art forms: drama, thrillers, whodunits and tragedies. Although elements from the 
first three are present in these cases, tragedy seems the most appealing and fitting art form of all. 
Tragedy can be defined as follows:  
 
“Tragedy is a form of drama based on human suffering that invokes in its audience an 
accompanying catharsis or pleasure in the viewing.”888 
 
In all the cases discussed there is a tragic ending. It is typical of Greek tragedy that many plays end 
with almost all of the main characters dead and lying in a pool of blood. Masking was certainly 
important here, as actors in Greek tragedies always wore masks. If we continue with this metaphor, 
we should develop a new form of drama, which builds on the classical form of tragedy, but does 
so with a new ‘look and feel’ of its own. This could be called the ideal typical ‘governmental 
tragedy’: a description of the fundamental basic scenario that applies when government is 
connected to deaths and serious injuries. This is a play in itself that is detached from the five cases 
researched, has elements in common with those cases but shelters a broader applicability.  
‘Governmental tragedies’ often take place in real life, in a setting in which it has become difficult 
for the audience to separate facts from fiction. The organizational dynamics that have been 
discussed before are fascinating to study here and can offer valuable insights into the way 
governmental organizations can deal with cases in which they are connected to deaths and serious 
injuries in the future.  
 
 
10.4. Final remarks and opportunities to move forward  
 
This dissertation demonstrates that different discourses are relevant when it comes to dealing with 
cases in which governmental organizations are connected to serious injuries and deaths. 
Governmental organizations nowadays must adapt to developments in society and adjust the way 
they operate: from vertical to horizontal relationships, from hierarchy to network. Government is 
not the only player in the network society, but it is still a special player. Citizens exert high 
                                               
888 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragedy (date last accessed: 05-03-2014) 
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demands on government. That should not lead to complaints from government. It should step 
forward to meet the challenge. These cases have shown that when risks materialize, this is often 
caused by a complex set of factors, in which errors, coincidence, rule breaking, criminal breaches 
and sometimes administrative evil can be identified and intricately interact with one another. 
Government too often reacted in a restricted way. Fear appears to have played an important role.  
 
To be sure, many things actually went right in these cases: Staff were often dedicated, loyal and 
professional, independent investigations were carried out, information was supplied and measures 
for improvement were taken. Nevertheless, when things went wrong, fear was often a bad 
counselor. Fear of financial, political and legal risks was present in those instances when, in 
retrospect, the wrong decisions were taken. The clear vision of what happens, and the overview 
that is needed within governmental organizations were often lacking. The masking factors that 
were discussed in the dissertation can help explain why this happens. The dynamics that followed 
often played on those fears and strengthened them, plunging all parties involved into a downwards 
spiral from which it seemed impossible to escape. Although government should sometimes come 
to grips with fatalism, this downward spiral in cases such as these should not be accepted as a 
given fact.  
 
Although some fascinating insights can be gained from the approach taken in this dissertation, the 
limitations of this research should be kept in mind. The research did not include cases in the private 
sector, but was limited to the public sector. This dissertation focused on a limited number of cases 
(five), which should lead to some restraint when drawing broader conclusions. The research 
concerned cases in the Netherlands and did not include cases which primarily involved 
governments from other countries. The research was based on open sources and interviews, 
confidential files or criminal records were not used. There are many opportunities ahead in the 
future for a broader research agenda. Research in different settings and contexts can add to deeper 
insights and knowledge into what happens in the area between error and evil, especially when it 
involves the role of government in fatal accidents.  
 
To quote the Dutch poet Deelder: “I harbor no illusions, but I remain an optimist.”889 With this 
motto in mind, some opportunities for doing better in the future can be pointed out. This is done 
in the knowledge that recommendations at the end of a dissertation often feel obligatory and a bit 
empty. De Bruijn has rightfully indicated that recommendations in investigative reports often 
adopted an ‘a contrario’ scheme890: Communication between governmental organizations in this 
case was not good, hence the recommendation is to communicate better. That does not help much. 
Therefore, only modest ambitions are harbored in pointing out seven opportunities for moving 
forward:  
 
1) Establish contact (preferably on a high level) with the victims and their relatives as 
soon as possible after the accident and first show empathy, rather than concern for 
procedures and claims. If the case shows signs of becoming a long-lasting struggle, 
consider starting a ‘breakthrough’ team, which actively pursues the options to 
establish a breakthrough in communication and negotiation. The costs of the struggle 
almost always outweigh the costs of compensating the victims. Adopt Scheltema’s 
approach to dealing with damage claims: ‘We would like to talk to you personally 
about what happened and about your claim’.  
2) Consider the possibilities for compensating victims and their relatives before accidents 
happen: in sectors where fatal accidents happen more often, a good arrangement (for 
                                               
889 Deelder (2005), p. 608. 
890 De Bruijn (2007), p. 24.  
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example with insurance) can prevent long lasting procedures. This has proven its 
worth in the case of the fire brigade divers.  
3) Take the lead in promoting cooperation between investigative authorities: It is in 
everyone’s interest that the investigations provide solid conclusions and that there is 
no need for parties to start up the incessant investigation cycle.  
4) Organize the internal debate: Often the civil servants that were responsible for what 
happened in the case of the fatal accident are the same ones who advise the minister 
or alderman about how to deal with the case. Their knowledge and expertise is often 
necessary, but including someone from the organization who is used as counter expert 
can help to prevent tunnel views on a case.  
5) Encourage people to speak up within governmental organizations, to be open about 
their errors and show courage as political leaders or as top public administrators in 
order to reach solutions in these cases. 
6) Error management has been applied successfully in the medical and aviation industry. 
Government is not far down this line yet, but can benefit from explicit attention to 
learning from error management. Promoting an error management culture is vital. 
Attention to systematic analysis in investigative reports is wise: not just focusing on 
the individual or the organization, but on the system as a whole.  
7) Go back to square one: If a case has gone on for years, go back to the roots and 
examine what really happened at the start. If you start with the wrong assumptions, 
the rest of the case cannot go right.  
 
In the end, easy and ready-made solutions are not available. Although it might not sound exciting, 
doing a good job is probably still the best remedy against trouble. And doing a good job is what 
citizens could and should expect from their government. In my opinion, working for government 
is attractive precisely because government needs to find solutions to difficult dilemmas and 
expectations. If anything, I hope this research will encourage governmental organizations and the 
people who work for them to continue to be professional in their jobs, to examine critically what 
happens in cases like these ones, and to have the courage to speak up if their questions do not lead 
to satisfying answers or results.   
 
The space between error and evil is filled with difficulties, especially since there is no guiding light 
to help. The masking that goes on there holds many challenges and dilemmas for government. For 
government, this can feel like commuting between ‘damned if you do and damned if you don’t’. 
It requires that governmental organizations manage to cope meaningfully with many forms of 
duality. It requires choosing between the tough or the soft approach. Between empathy and 
enforcing the rules. Between openness and confidentiality. Between being cautious in spending 
taxpayers’ money and being generous. Between accepting responsibility and laying responsibility 
with those who should be held responsible. Between error and evil.  
 
 
  
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
336 
 
 
 
 
 
  
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
337 
 
Appendix A: List of people interviewed  
 
Probo Koala 
 
x Jeroen Trommelen, journalist, De Volkskrant 
x Jip Van Klaveren, former head of the Environmental Licence Division of DMB 
Amsterdam 
x Marietta Harjono, Greenpeace 
x Jessica Hoitink, Director of Legal Affairs and Riccardo Osterwald, senior legal 
advisor, both at the municipality of Amsterdam 
x Karel Knip, journalist NRC 
Catshuis fire 
 
x Peter Jägers, former Director-General RGD and former President-Director of DJI  
x Jacques van Eck, former advisor to the Prime Minister  
x Pieter Hans De Goede, owner of painting company De Goede and Peter van 
Beuningen, advisor  
x Geert Bos, former advisor legal and administrative affairs at the National Office 
of the Public Prosecution Service and former advisor at Directorate Legal and 
Operational Affairs at the Ministry of Justice 
Schiphol detention center fire 
 
x Thérèse van der Velden, former secretary to the Safety Board investigation 
x Cor Petiet, assistent professor in criminal and penal law VU University 
Amsterdam and chairman of Supervisory Committee (CvT) Schiphol-Oost 
detention center  
x Peter Jägers, former Director-General RGD and former President Director of DJI   
x Dineke Mulock Houwer, former Director-General Prevention, Youth and 
Sanctions, Ministry of Justice  
x Peter van de Sande, former President Director of DJI   
Drowned fire brigade divers 
 
x Mark Bokdam, former national coordinator of fire brigade diving  
x Simon van der Doorn, former inspector POS Inspectorate  
x Lex Tillart, Chairman, National Working Group on Accident Management and 
Head of the Division of Incident Management District Rijn en Venen, safety 
region Utrecht  
x Annie Brouwer-Korf, former mayor of Utrecht and former member of the Safety 
Board 
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The AP-23 and Spijkers 
 
x Rik van Steenbergen, policy advisor, FNV Union  
x Jack de Vries, former State Secretary of Defense  
x Fred Spijkers, former social worker, Ministry of Defense 
 
Cross case interviews 
 
x Koos Visser,  former member of the Dutch Safety Board 
 
In order to learn more about one research subject, a further interview was conducted after 
which guarantees of anonymity were given.  
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
Inleiding 
 
Toen de toenmalige minister van Justitie, Donner, aftrad naar aanleiding van het rapport over 
het onderzoek naar de Schipholbrand door de Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, sprak hij in de 
Tweede Kamer de volgende woorden: 
 
“Na een ramp ziet men vaak dat tal van zaken beter kunnen, die men voordien met de 
kennis van wat toen redelijkerwijze te voorzien was, voldoende kon en mocht achten. 
Maar met de voorliggende rapporten liggen veel fundamentelere vragen op tafel dan de 
vraag naar de verantwoording van het verleden. Die rapporten lijken bij de overheid 
een zodanige verantwoordelijkheid en aansprakelijkheid voor het voorkomen van 
rampen en gevaren te vooronderstellen, dat de vraag aan de orde moet komen in 
hoeverre zo'n verantwoordelijkheid nog te dragen is. Als slechts het voorkomen van 
gevaren telt, dan dreigen rechtstaat en democratie in het gedrang te komen. Die vragen 
vergen een grondig en serieus debat tussen regering en parlement.”891  
Dit proefschrift gaat over dit soort zaken, waarin overheidsorganisaties verbonden zijn met 
dodelijk en ernstig lichamelijk letsel. Tegenover de woorden van Donner kunnen de woorden 
van H.L. Mencken geplaatst worden:  
“Ik geloof dat elke overheid slecht is en dat pogingen haar te verbeteren voor het 
grootste deel niets meer zijn dan tijdsverspilling.”892 
Deze woorden vormden het startpunt voor dit proefschrift, in die zin dat ze de uiteinden 
bevatten van het spectrum aan mogelijke verklaringen voor overheidsgedrag dat onderwerp van 
onderzoek was. De reis om dit gebied verder te verkennen is verpakt in de titel van dit 
proefschrift: ‘Between error and evil’. 
De combinatie van de woorden ‘dood’ en ‘overheid’ voelt problematisch. Desalniettemin komt ze 
vaak voor: genocides en oorlogen zijn doorgaans verbonden aan de betrokken staatsmacht. Ook 
het legale gebruik van geweld (bijvoorbeeld door de politie) kan leiden tot doden en ernstig 
gewonden. Tot slot kan de verbinding van de overheid met doden en ernstig gewonden gevonden 
worden in fatale ongevallen. Op deze ongevallen concentreert dit proefschrift zich. Zulke 
ongevallen roepen veel vragen op: dodelijk of ernstig lichamelijk letsel is immers precies wat 
overheden zouden willen vermijden. Dezelfde overheid die zich richt op het algemeen belang 
en op de veiligheid van haar burgers is betrokken bij of zelfs verantwoordelijk voor ongelukken 
die leiden tot de dood van haar eigen mensen. Wat zegt dit over overheidsorganisaties, zelfs als 
niemand heeft gewild dat deze tragedies plaats vonden? Welke rol speelt de overheid bij dit 
soort fatale ongelukken en hoe reageert ze er op? En wat vertellen deze zaken ons meer 
fundamenteel over de rol van de overheid in de moderne samenleving? 
 
Bestuurskundig onderzoek heeft zich veel bezig gehouden met het presteren van de overheid. 
Onderwerpen als effectiviteit, efficiency en besturing (‘governance’) hebben veel aandacht 
gekregen. De laatste twee decennia heeft bestuurlijke integriteit meer aandacht gekregen. 
                                               
891 http://www.elsevier.nl/web/1092310/Artikel/Verklaring-minister-Donner-in-Tweede-Kamer.htm (date last 
accessed: 17-02-2013) 
892 http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/1107.html (date last accessed: 17-02-2013).  
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Mogelijk strafbaar gedrag van overheden heeft veel minder aandacht gekregen, alhoewel de 
aandacht ervoor wat is gegroeid, zowel internationaal als het gaat om ‘state crime’ en nationaal 
als het gaat om overtredende overheden. In ‘Unmasking administrative evil’ van Adams en 
Balfour werd een nieuwe dimensie toegevoegd. Bij ‘administrative evil’ gaat het er om dat 
mensen acties kunnen ondernemen die als ‘evil’ (gedefinieerd als acties van mensen die 
onrechtmatig en onnodig leed en de dood van andere mensen kunnen veroorzaken) kunnen 
worden bestempeld zonder dat zij zelf bewust zijn dat ze ook maar iets verkeerd doen. Gewone 
mensen kunnen zelfs op adequate wijze hun rol binnen hun organisatie vervullen – en doen wat 
iedereen vindt dat ze zouden moeten doen – en tegelijkertijd participeren in wat een kritische 
en redelijke observator, doorgaans pas lang nadat de actie heeft plaatsgevonden, ‘evil’ zal 
noemen. Een cruciaal punt hierbij is dat ‘evil’ door verschillende factoren lang gemaskeerd kan 
blijven en zich niet als zodanig aan een ieder zal presenteren.893 Het concept van ‘het kwade’ 
(‘evil’ in het Engels) in combinatie met de overheid is binnen de bestuurskunde relatief nieuw. 
Disciplines als filosofie, sociologie en psychologie hebben dit onderwerp bestudeerd, maar er 
komt ook meer aandacht voor bij sociale wetenschappers die zich bezighouden met gedrag van 
organisaties.894 Hoewel ‘evil’ een omstreden concept is dat vaak sterke emoties oproept, komt 
er langzamerhand meer oog voor mogelijkheden om ‘evil’ als analytisch raamwerk te gebruiken 
voor het duiden van de dynamiek binnen organisaties.  
 
De theorieën die zijn ontwikkeld in ‘Unmasking administrative evil’ zijn nog niet of nauwelijks 
getest in case study onderzoek. Hoewel er vaak vele onderzoeken zijn gedaan naar specifieke 
ongelukken (door onderzoekscommissies, politie en Openbaar Ministerie, inspecties, journalisten, 
wetenschappers et cetera), is er relatief weinig onderzoek gedaan dat de verbinding legt tussen dit 
soort zaken om te leren van het overzicht en om mogelijke patronen te ontrafelen die zich voordoen 
in dit soort zaken. 
 
Een korte analyse van de beschikbare statistische gegevens laat zien dat het aantal doden dat 
valt in fatale ongelukken waarbij de overheid betrokken is naar alle maatstaven als bijzonder 
klein moet worden beschouwd. In kwantitatief opzicht focust dit onderzoek zich zodoende op 
uitzonderlijke situaties. Niettemin is het helder, zoals Helsloot eerder al aantoonde895, dat deze 
zaken meer grootschalige publieke aandacht hebben getrokken dan je vooraf op basis van de 
(kille) cijfers zou verwachten. Aan de andere kant zou het niet als een verrassing moeten komen 
dat dit soort ernstige gevolgen veel aandacht krijgen in het maatschappelijk debat.  
 
 
Onderzoeksvragen en methodiek 
 
De centrale onderzoeksvragen van dit proefschrift zijn: 
 
1) Waarom en hoe leidt overheidsgedrag in Nederland tot het plaats vinden van  
dodelijk of ernstig lichamelijk letsel bij mensen?  
2) Hoe reageren overheidsorganisaties in Nederland op deze zaken en waarom  
reageren ze zo? 
 
Om deze onderzoeksvragen te kunnen beantwoorden is explorerend case study onderzoek 
uitgevoerd naar vijf cases: de Catshuisbrand, drie individuele ongelukken waarin 
brandweerduikers verdronken, de zaak van de Probo Koala, de Schipholbrand en de zaak van 
                                               
893 Adams and Balfour (2009), p. 4. 
894 Jurkiewicz (2012). 
895 Helsloot (2007), p. 11-12. 
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de AP-23 landmijnen en Spijkers. Daarbij zijn verschillende dataverzamelingsmethodes 
gebruikt. Wetenschappelijke literatuur is bestudeerd om relevante theorieën en mogelijke 
nieuwe invalshoeken met betrekking tot het onderzoeksonderwerp te vinden. Er is op beperkte 
schaal statistisch materiaal verzameld over de getallen die gemoeid zijn met gevallen van 
dodelijk en ernstig lichamelijk letsel waar de Nederlandse overheid bij betrokken is. Voor de 
cases studies zijn semigestructureerde achtergrondgesprekken gevoerd met 23 betrokkenen bij 
de cases, teneinde meer inzicht te krijgen in de achterliggende redenen voor het gedrag in die 
zaken van de betrokken overheidsorganisaties.  
 
Criminologen hebben een heldere propositie om crimineel gedrag te verklaren: de combinatie 
van gelegenheid en motief. Onderzoek naar organisatiecriminaliteit en overtredende overheden 
laat zien dat de combinatie van gelegenheid en motief normafwijkend gedrag verklaart. Gelet 
hierop is ervoor gekozen om deze combinatie onderdeel te maken van de theoretische basis om 
verder te exploreren. De theorie van ‘administrative evil’ zoals beschreven door Adams en 
Balfour geeft een ander perspectief. De maskerende factoren die zij beschrijven ontnemen ons 
het zicht op de oorzaken en mechanismen die plaats vinden als het gaat om ‘administrative 
evil’. Zowel de factoren die het ‘evil’ gedrag zouden kunnen verklaren als de factoren die ons 
helpen de reactie van de overheidsorganisaties te begrijpen, worden gemaskeerd. Gelet op het 
voorgaande is er voor gekozen om in alle cases een beschrijving te geven van de genoemde vier 
factoren: gelegenheden, motieven, maskerende factoren en de reactie van de betrokken 
overheidsorganisatie op de case.  
 
 
Case studies 
 
De hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 8 bevatten een uitgebreide beschrijving en analyse van de case 
studies die voor dit onderzoek zijn verricht. Hier wordt slechts een summiere samenvatting 
gegeven van deze cases, met verwijzing van de geïnteresseerde lezer naar de hoofdstukken zelf 
om een rijker en completer beeld van deze zaken te krijgen.  
 
De eerste case study betrof de brand in 2004 in het Catshuis, de ambtswoning van de minister-
president, waarbij een schilder omkwam. Om een waslaag van de vloer van één van de kamers 
van het Catshuis te verwijderen was thinner gebruikt, een middel dat verboden was. Na verloop 
van tijd bleek dat een kritisch rapport van TNO niet beschikbaar was gesteld door de betrokken 
overheden. In dat rapport was vermeld dat de wandbekleding, waar de Rijksgebouwendienst en 
het Ministerie van Algemene Zaken verantwoordelijkheid voor droegen, had bijgedragen aan 
de snelheid waarmee het vuur zich kon verspreiden. Minister-president Balkenende kreeg 
hevige kritiek te verwerken in de Tweede Kamer. In zijn reactie noemde hij de acties van zijn 
eigen ambtenaren ‘onzorgvuldig, onjuist en onvolledig’. Uiteindelijk werd in december 2009 
een overeenkomst bereikt met de weduwe van de schilder over de afwikkeling van de zaak.  
 
In een periode van zeven jaar, van 2001 tot 2008, vonden drie afzonderlijke ongevallen plaats, 
waarbij de betrokken brandweerduikers verdronken. De gemeente Utrecht werd veroordeeld 
voor dood door schuld in 2001 voor haar rol in het eerste ongeval. De gemeenten Urk en 
Terneuzen accepteerden beiden transacties die hen waren aangeboden voor hun rol bij het 
dodelijk ongeval in hun gemeente, waarbij de betrokken wet- en regelgeving op arbo-gebied 
niet was nagekomen (net als eerder bij de gemeente Utrecht). Onderzoek naar deze zaken liet 
zien dat de oorzaken van de drie ongevallen veel onderlinge overeenkomsten vertoonden 
(onvoldoende training, gebrek aan voorbereiding, problematische organisatiecultuur et cetera).  
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De zaak van de Probo Koala draaide om een olietanker, de Probo Koala, die scheepsafval kwijt 
wilde. Het afval werd eerst aangeboden in de haven van Amsterdam, maar de reder, Trafigura, 
vond de verwerking in Amsterdam te duur. Na veel wikken en wegen gaven de Nederlandse 
autoriteiten toestemming om het afval (de ‘slops’) terug te pompen naar de Probo Koala, waarna 
de reis werd vervolgd. De vervuilde afvalstoffen van de Probo Koala werden uiteindelijk na 
een lange reis gedumpt op verschillende locaties in Abidjan, de hoofdstad van Ivoorkust. Dat 
leidde volgens berichten tot meerdere doden (genoemde getallen varieerden tussen 10 en 17) 
en medische behandeling in ziekenhuizen voor vele betrokkenen ( schattingen varieerden tussen 
20.000 en 100.000). Echter, in de loop van de tijd zijn er verschillende perspectieven op de 
gebeurtenissen ontstaan. Zekerheid dat er wel of niet doden zijn gevallen als gevolg van het 
dumpen van het afval is er niet, maar het lijkt met de laatste kennis van zaken inmiddels 
onwaarschijnlijk. Het is wel waarschijnlijk dat het dumpen van het afval tot ziektes heeft geleid 
en het betrokken bedrijf, Trafigura, heeft de hoogst mogelijke transactie die was aangeboden 
door het Openbaar Ministerie geaccepteerd. De samenwerking tussen de betrokken overheden 
in deze zaak was gebrekkig, ondanks het feit dat er intensieve onderlinge consultatie had 
plaatsgevonden.  
 
De Schipholbrand betrof een zaak waarin brand was uitgebroken in een cellencomplex voor 
uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers. Elf gedetineerden kwamen om het leven en vijftien 
gedetineerden werden zwaargewond door de brand. Een rapport van de Onderzoeksraad voor 
Veiligheid over de brand concludeerde dat er minder of geen slachtoffers te betreuren waren 
geweest als de brandveiligheid voldoende aandacht van de betrokken instanties zou hebben 
gekregen. De ministers van Justitie en van VROM alsmede de burgemeester van 
Haarlemmermeer traden af naar aanleiding van het rapport van de Onderzoeksraad. De oorzaak 
van de brand is jarenlang onderwerp van debat geweest. De Libische gedetineerde die een stukje 
brandende shag in een afvalbak in zijn cel gooide werd uiteindelijk vrijgesproken.  
 
De zaak van de AP-23 landmijnen en Spijkers begon door twee ongelukken binnen de 
Nederlandse krijgsmacht. In 1983 explodeerde een landmijn in een instructielokaal van 
Defensie in Oldenbroek. De instructeur gaf les over het gebruik van de AP-23 landmijn toen de 
landmijn in zijn handen ontplofte. Zeven soldaten kwamen om het leven en negen soldaten 
werden verwond door de explosie. Op 14 september 1984 kwam beproevingsleider Rob Ovaa 
om het leven bij een explosie van een AP-23 landmijn. Het Ministerie van Defensie heeft 
jarenlang volgehouden dat de explosies werden veroorzaakt door menselijke fouten en niet door 
gebreken aan de landmijn. Fred Spijkers was maatschappelijk werker bij Defensie. Hij weigerde 
de weduwe van Ovaa te vertellen dat haar man zelf schuld zou dragen voor het ongeluk. Tussen 
Spijkers en Defensie ontstond een conflict dat tot op de dag van vandaag voortduurt. In 1999 
concludeerde een rapport van de Nationale Ombudsman dat het Ministerie van Defensie 
onzorgvuldig had gehandeld door geen aansprakelijkheid te aanvaarden (de vaststelling dat de 
landmijnen gebreken vertoonden was niet kenbaar gemaakt aan degenen die met de landmijnen 
moesten werken) en door de nabestaanden en slachtoffers onjuist te informeren over de 
toedracht van de ongevallen. In 2002 werd een vaststellingsovereenkomst gesloten tussen 
Spijkers en Defensie, waarbij schadevergoeding en een koninklijke onderscheiding werden 
toegekend aan Spijkers. In 2010 herzag de Centrale Raad van Beroep een eerdere uitspraak en 
concludeerde dat het ontslag van Spijkers door Defensie onrechtmatig was en dat Defensie 
grotendeels verantwoordelijkheid droeg voor het ontstane conflict.  
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Feitenoverzicht 
 
In elke case study is het feitenverloop op een rij gezet en zijn een aantal feitelijke aspecten 
beschreven. Standaard in elke case was dat er doden en gewonden waren. Daar was geen 
discussie over, behalve bij de Probo Koala-zaak. Overheidsorganisaties hebben vaak grote 
schadevergoedingen betaald in deze zaken aan de slachtoffers en hun nabestaanden (Probo 
Koala: € 1.000.000, Schipholbrand: € 249.880, Catshuisbrand: € 200.000 (schatting), 
verdronken brandweerduikers: € 0, AP-23 en Spijkers: € 5.400.000). Schadevergoeding werd 
veelal pas betaald na jarenlange strijd in de rechtszaal, in de politieke arena en in de media. De 
kosten van die strijd waren doorgaans aanzienlijk hoger dan die van de betaalde 
schadevergoedingen. De overheid was in verschillende rollen betrokken bij dit soort zaken: 
vaak als werkgever, maar ook als vergunningverlener, toezichthouder en als 
gevangenbewaarder. De rol van de private actoren in deze zaken was eveneens vaak relevant. 
De regels die overtreden werden door overheden lagen op het gebied van milieu, 
arbeidsomstandigheden en brandveiligheid. Politieke consequenties volgden niet automatisch 
in dit soort zaken. De Schipholbrand is de enige zaak waaraan directe politieke gevolgen voor 
de betrokken politici waren verbonden. Er zijn weinig aantoonbare disciplinaire sancties 
aangetroffen voor de betrokken ambtenaren in deze zaken, maar de relaties tussen politici en 
ambtenaren zijn soms wel sterk onder druk komen te staan als gevolg van deze zaken. Enkel 
bij uitzondering werden overheidsorganisaties vervolgd door het Openbaar Ministerie in deze 
zaken, het was nog uitzonderlijker dat ze werden veroordeeld. Private actoren zijn vaker 
veroordeeld in deze zaken. De zaken hebben vaak tot een omvangrijk pakket aan maatregelen 
geleid om herhaling te voorkomen. Grote financiële investeringen werden gedaan en strengere 
regels en procedures werden ingesteld. Dat leidde vaak tot verbeteringen, maar ook tot vragen 
over effectiviteit en efficiency. In bijna elke zaak werden vele onderzoeken uitgevoerd vanuit 
verschillende invalshoeken. Hoe meer doden er vielen en hoe groter het conflict tussen de 
betrokken partijen, hoe meer onderzoek er werd gedaan. Deze onderzoeken namen vaak veel 
tijd in beslag, soms meer dan anderhalf jaar. In totaal duurden deze zaken gemiddeld vijf tot 
zeven jaar, met uitschieters naar boven en naar beneden.  
  
Gelegenheid, motieven en maskeren 
 
In het volgende overzicht worden kort de belangrijkste bevindingen met betrekking tot 
gelegenheden, motieven en de maskerende factoren op een rij gezet: 
 
207878-L-bw-Berndsen
364 
 
 
 
 
Gelegenheden
•Structuur: complexe organisatiestructuren, betrokkenheid van vele actoren
•Cultuur: professionaliteit en loyaliteit, maar ook hiërarchie, juridisering, focus op politieke 
en financiële risico’s
•Politieke systeem: politieke partijen werden onderdeel van de strijd, geen bewijs voor 
onethische relaties met bedrijven
•Wet-en regelgeving en procedures: relevant, maar ook vaak gebruikt als excuus, regels 
moeten ruimte laten voor discretie en gepaard gaan met enige mate van risico-acceptatie
Motieven
•Primaire motieven
•Onwetendheid/onkunde: verbonden met ‘errors’, waarbij aangetekend dat 
professionalisme en loyaliteit vaak wel degelijk groot waren
•Rationele keuze: minder vaak dan verwacht, calculerend gedrag niet vaak 
aangetroffen
•Onwilligheid: niet vaak aangetroffen, alhoewel in de meeste cases lastige dilemma’s 
voor overheidsorganisaties werden aangetroffen
•Secundaire motieven
•Financiële motieven: speelden wel een rol, maar zelden het belangrijkste motief voor 
de betrokken overheidsorganisaties in deze zaken voordat er doden en gewonden te 
betreuren vielen. 
•De positie van de overheidsorganisatie en haar publieke imago: niet bijzonder relevant 
als motief
•Andere normen prefereren dan de wet voorschrijft: vindt niet vaak plaats. Lastige 
dilemma’s vaak, maar dit leidde dan niet vaak tot de keuze om de toepasselijke 
regelgeving te negeren.
•Eisen van politici, burgers, belangengroeperingen of media: niet in alle cases een 
relevant motief, speelde wel een rol in de Schipholbrand en de Probo Koala, voor de 
betrokkenen was dit echter niet het voornaamste motief. Claims dat deze eisen erg 
invloedrijk waren worden niet of nauwelijks ondersteund door de feiten. 
Maskeren
•Relevante factoren:
•Afstand in tijd: duur van de cases gemiddeld vijf tot zeven jaar, oneindige onderzoek 
spiral
•Perspectief: de mythe van het pure kwaad (overheidsorganisatie is geheel goed of 
geheel slecht) en de kloof in believing tussen slachtoffers en daders zijn beide 
maskerende factoren die vaak werden aangetroffen
•Zondebokken: vaak tussen overheidsorganisaties, minder vaak gericht op individuen 
•Technische rationaliteit: coördinatie en overzicht ontbreken vaak, conflicten dragen bij 
aan een gedeelde interne perceptie van de case en leiden soms tot verschaffing van 
onvolledige of onjuiste informatie of tot misleiding
•Minder relevante factoren:
•Afstand in ruimte: moeilijk te bewijzen welke invloed dit heeft
•Dehumanisatie: belangrijk in theorie, lastig te identificeren in de praktijk
•Taal: niet in de zin dat iets ‘evils’ als iets goeds wordt gepresenteerd, wel relevant als 
instrument in de strijd tussen de betrokken partijen
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Conclusies over het gebied ‘tussen error en evil’ 
 
In de meeste zaken lijkt ‘error’ de beste beschrijving van de feitelijke gebeurtenissen. In vrijwel 
elke zaak was een opeenvolging van fouten relevant voor het plaatsvinden van het ongeval. 
Corruptie is in deze zaken niet aangetroffen. Integriteitsschendingen waren soms aan de orde, maar 
over het geheel genomen zijn corruptie en integriteitsschendingen niet de eerste termen waar aan 
gedacht zou moeten worden om deze cases te beschrijven. Organisatiecriminaliteit wordt in deze 
zaken vaak verondersteld, maar wordt weinig daadwerkelijk bewezen (waarbij opgemerkt wordt 
dat dit deels samenhangt met de beperkingen die gelden voor strafrechtelijke vervolging van de 
Nederlandse overheid). Crimineel gedrag van bedrijven wordt soms wel bewezen in de rechtszaal. 
In vrijwel alle zaken was er in enige mate sprake van regelovertreding door overheden. Hoewel 
elementen van ‘state crime’ aanwezig waren in deze zaken, is ‘state crime’ niet een term die een 
accurate beschrijving van het geheel vormt. Daar zijn twee redenen voor: ten eerste wordt 
crimineel gedrag van de overheid zelden bewezen voor de rechter en ten tweede waren de 
handelingen van de betrokken overheidsorganisaties in deze cases niet gericht op de eigen 
operationele doelen in die zin dat dat bepalend was voor de negatieve uitkomst van deze cases. Tot 
slot is de term ‘administrative evil’ als geheel niet van toepassing op al deze zaken, alhoewel het 
wel waardevolle inzichten kan bieden. De zaak van de AP-23 en Spijkers is de enige waarbij, 
tenminste voor een langere periode, de gebeurtenissen aan te merken vallen als ‘administrative 
evil’, in die zin dat dit op het gebied ‘tussen error en evil’ de meest passende beschrijving is.  
 
 
Antwoorden op de onderzoeksvragen  
 
De eerste onderzoeksvraag was waarom en hoe overheidsgedrag in Nederland leidt tot het plaats 
vinden van dodelijk of ernstig lichamelijk letsel bij mensen. In elke casus viel een combinatie 
van ‘errors’ te zien, vaak in een mengelmoes van toeval, falen, pech en soms verkeerde keuzes. 
Maar dat is niet het enige. De overheid is zich vaak niet bewust van de kleine, simpele stappen die 
tezamen genomen ‘administrative evil’ kunnen vormen. Morele beslissingen presenteren zichzelf 
zelden als zodanig. Dit zijn veelal geen ‘zwart-wit’ beslissingen, maar kleine stapjes die op het 
eerste gezicht weinig kwaad doen. Langzaam aan kan zo een neerwaartse spiraal worden gestart. 
Dit proces is moeilijk direct te herkennen of te ontmaskeren. Dit alles vereist een sterk bewustzijn 
van de gevaarlijke dynamiek die gekoppeld kan zijn aan grote en complexe organisaties. Binnen 
overheidsorganisaties kan een breed gedeelde frame zich ontwikkelen als het gaat om casussen 
met slachtoffers of klokkenluiders. Als de eerste stap in dit soort zaken later een verkeerde blijkt 
te zijn, dan is het proces daarna een stuk lastiger om te draaien. Dat leidt tot verbittering en strijd 
en uiteindelijk tot claims voor omvangrijke schadevergoeding en aanzienlijke imagoschade. Bij 
de onderzochte fatale ongevallen waren overzicht en coördinatie vaak gebrekkig, waardoor de 
vraag opkwam wie er nu echt de leiding had en wie verantwoordelijk was. Het gevaar van 
‘administrative evil’ dat zich lange tijd verschuilt achter verschillende maskers blijft dan loeren.  
 
De overheid is nog niet zo vertrouwd met error management in vergelijking met de medische 
sector of de luchtvaart. Hoewel er vaak veel maatregelen worden getroffen naar aanleiding van de 
ongelukken (wat de Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur de ‘risico-regelreflex’896 noemt) en die 
maatregelen vaak leiden tot daadwerkelijke verbeteringen, kan het leren van fouten nog steeds 
worden verbeterd. Uit dit onderzoek valt doorgaans niet te concluderen dat de betrokken 
overheidsactoren ‘slechte’ intenties hadden, maar grote organisatie en doorgeschoten bureaucratie 
kunnen een defensieve houding en een gesloten cultuur stimuleren, uiteindelijk culminerend in een 
                                               
896 Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur, (2012), p. 7. 
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spanningsveld tussen te veel of (vaker) te weinig risico nemen.  
 
Dat leidt ons naar de tweede onderzoeksvraag: hoe reageren overheidsorganisaties in Nederland 
op deze zaken en waarom reageren ze zo? De eerste lijn van reageren was vaak dat de uitkomsten 
van het onafhankelijke onderzoek moest worden afgewacht. Vervolgens werd volledige 
medewerking met het onderzoek beloofd. In veel zaken werd op één of andere wijze steun 
uitgesproken voor het eigen personeel, maar dit was niet altijd het geval. Zulke steunbetuigingen 
van bestuurders aan ambtenaren worden geapprecieerd binnen de eigen overheidsorganisatie en er 
is vaak een hevige reactie als die steun niet wordt geëxpliciteerd. Dit kan verbonden worden aan 
de vaak sterke cultuur van loyaliteit die heerst binnen deze organisaties. Overheidsorganisaties 
benadrukken dat ze geheel open en transparant zijn geweest over wat er in de betreffende zaak is 
gebeurd. Daarnaast wordt vaak verwezen naar wat als complexe en soms tegenstrijdige wet- en 
regelgeving wordt gezien. Verantwoordelijkheden van andere partijen worden eveneens 
benadrukt.  
 
Een opvallend element in de taal die naar buiten toe werd gebruikt door overheidsorganisaties in 
deze zaken was het refereren aan de uniciteit van de situatie en het gebrek aan relevante informatie 
en kennis ten tijde van het ongeluk: ‘met de kennis van toen waren de zaken goed geregeld, met 
de kennis van nu hadden we misschien andere keuzes gemaakt.’ Er waren significante verschillen 
tussen ‘de taal naar buiten’ en ‘de taal naar binnen’. Dat zou geen verrassing moeten zijn, 
aangezien het bij de functie van ambtenaren hoort om hun minister, wethouder of burgemeester 
intern te adviseren over allerlei aspecten. Intern lag, naast het voorzien van relevante informatie, 
de focus bij de advisering vaak op het inperken van risico’s – op het beheersen van risico’s, 
geheimhouding, financiële claims, politieke schade en juridische beperkingen.  
 
Als strategie leken overheidsorganisaties vaak te proberen om tijd te kopen: ‘eerst de feiten, 
dan het oordeel’ was een veelgebruikt adagium. Dat vergt grondig en onafhankelijk onderzoek. 
Daarbij dient opgemerkt te worden dat zonder uitzondering in al deze zaken onafhankelijk 
onderzoek werd uitgevoerd. Overheden hebben zich vaak enorm moeten inspannen om mee te 
werken met het onderzoek en om de onderzoekers te voorzien van alle gevraagde informatie. 
Het aantal onderzoeken naar deze zaken was groot. De betrokken partijen betrokken deze 
onderzoeken in hun onderlinge strijd, waarbij elk nieuw onderzoek weer nieuwe brandstof 
aanleverde in de argumentenstrijd tussen partijen. In sommige zaken ontstaat de indruk dat de 
partijen het over geen enkel feit eens konden worden. Dit leidde tot een ogenschijnlijk eindeloze 
stortvloed aan onderzoeken, ‘de oneindige onderzoek spiraal’.  
 
In veel van deze zaken is op defensieve wijze gereageerd door de betrokken overheidsorganisaties, 
uit angst en met soms een gebrek aan daadwerkelijke openheid en empathie. Juridische 
overwegingen waren vaak dominant. Hoewel er heel veel informatie is verstrekt en medewerking 
is verleend door de betrokken overheidsorganisaties, was er als het mis dreigde te gaan vaak een 
worsteling met openheid, waardoor de indruk van een doofpot werd versterkt. 
Overheidsorganisaties worstelen met de reactie op die beschuldiging. De Catshuisbrand kan als 
voorbeeld dienen: “Hoe kunnen we bewijzen dat iets niet is gebeurd?” Een andere strategie die 
soms werd toegepast betreft ‘incrementele defensie’: pas nadat het bijna onvermijdelijk is 
geworden, stapje bij stapje verantwoordelijkheid nemen en toegeven. Het niet volgen van een 
consistente communicatielijn lijkt politici kwetsbaarder te maken dan incrementele defensie. Dit 
heeft zich uitgekristalliseerd in de zaak van de Probo Koala. Wethouder Marijke Vos was 
weliswaar vrij open, maar was soms ook weifelend en niet consistent in haar communicatie, terwijl 
de strategie van staatssecretaris Pieter Van Geel als incrementele defensie kan worden 
gekenschetst. De conclusie is dat consistentie van politici (zelfs als dat een defensieve en gesloten 
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houding impliceert en het elke keer vermijden of ontkennen van verantwoordelijkheden) meer 
gewaardeerd wordt dan het van gedachten van veranderen (ook als dat vanuit meer openheid 
gebeurt).  
 
 
Discours en tragedie 
 
De centrale onderzoeksvragen zijn beantwoord in overeenstemming met het ontwerp van dit 
onderzoek. Daarmee bleef er echter nog iets knagen. Wat valt er te zeggen over de schijnbaar 
onstuitbare dynamiek die dit soort zaken lijkt te kenmerken? Het verloop van deze zaken lijkt vaak 
op een film of toneelstuk met een tragisch einde waar niemand aan kan ontsnappen. De plot van 
het verhaal is vaak ingewikkeld en de hoofdpersonen worden geconfronteerd met onmogelijke 
dilemma’s. Het perspectief dat zich opdrong was dat de organisatiedynamiek in dit soort gevallen 
veel overeenkomt met de kenmerken van tragedies. De ‘overheidstragedie’ vindt plaats in het echte 
leven, in een omgeving waarin het heel lastig is geworden voor de toeschouwers om feit en fictie 
nog uit elkaar te kunnen houden. Discours theorie is gebruikt om deze invalshoek verder te 
verkennen. Discursieve (wat wordt er gezegd) en dramaturgische (hoe wordt het gezegd en in 
welke setting) elementen worden hierin onderscheiden. Niet enkel wat er wordt gezegd is relevant, 
maar ook wie het zegt, hoe het gezegd wordt en hoe de setting van invloed is. Discoursen bevatten 
niet enkel een manier van kijken naar de wereld, maar zijn ingebed in sociale processen die de 
manier waarop we kijken reproduceren als een vorm van waarheid.897 Drie discoursen worden 
onderscheiden als het gaat om de betrokkenheid van overheden bij dodelijk of ernstig lichamelijk 
letsel: het publieke discours, het ‘risico en error’ discours en het ‘evil’ discours.  
 
Publieke discours 
In het publieke discours over deze zaken (in het parlement, in de media, op internet) worden 
woorden als ‘schandaal’, ‘doofpot’ en ‘samenzwering’ vaak gekoppeld aan de overheid. Er wordt 
vaak verondersteld dat daden van de overheid diepere motieven en intenties hebben. In deze 
gedachtegang wordt gesteld dat de overheid haar fouten niet wilde toegeven en de schuld 
probeerde af te schuiven op anderen. Dat leidt tot overzichtelijke conclusies: de overheid heeft 
gefaald, wellicht onbewust maar vaak ook wel bewust, probeerde het slachtoffer of anderen de 
schuld te geven, weigerde fouten toe te geven en weigerde de slachtoffers te compenseren voor 
het aangedane leed. Er lijkt in dit discours een noodzaak gevoeld te worden om één 
verantwoordelijke partij aan te wijzen (de overheid is dan een populair doelwit) en ook één oorzaak 
voor het ongeval. In dit proefschrift is met meer distantie gekeken en is informatie uit vele bronnen 
gecombineerd met achtergrondgesprekken met betrokken. Daaruit volgt dat bevindingen vaak 
afwijken van de publieke beeldvorming, alhoewel sommige zaken wel degelijk bevestigd konden 
worden.  
 
Risico en error discours 
Het ‘risico en error’ discours benadrukt dat risico en fouten onderdeel van het leven zijn. 
Risicomanagement en error management richten zich op het beheersen van deze risico’s en fouten. 
We moeten leren van onze fouten, maar ze ook accepteren: ‘shit happens’. Eliminatie van alle 
risico’s komt niet zonder hoge kosten voor onze samenleving. Meer realistische verwachtingen 
zijn nodig, temeer nu de overheid een kleinere rol in het risicolandschap dient te vervullen te 
midden van andere partijen in de netwerksamenleving. Nadeel van deze benadering kan zijn dat 
het een gemakkelijke uitweg zou kunnen bieden en teveel relativisme, waardoor de overheid 
                                               
897 De Graaf (2003), p. 43-50. 
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zelden verantwoordelijkheid zou hoeven te dragen. Dat wordt door niemand gepropageerd, maar 
kan wel een mogelijke consequentie zijn als dit discours te ver wordt doorgevoerd.  
 
Evil discours 
Het ‘evil’ discours benadrukt de potentie van de overheid voor regelovertreding, crimineel 
gedrag en ‘administrative evil’. Dat betekent niet dat dit intentioneel hoeft te zijn. Integendeel, 
de gedachte is dat de meeste problemen ontstaan uit routinematige handelingen en beslissingen, 
die zich nimmer als morele kwesties openbaren. De nadelen van bureaucratie en hiërarchie 
worden in dit discours vaak aangehaald. Overheden zouden zich bewust moeten zijn van de 
organisatiedynamiek die zich kan ontwikkelen tot iets wat niemand vooraf gewild zal hebben. 
Meer overzicht, het bevorderen van moreel leiderschap en moed worden gepropageerd als 
belangrijke kenmerken van een overheid om de groei van potentieel kwaad te voorkomen. De 
keerzijde van dit discours is gespiegeld aan die van het ‘risk en error’ discours: het is een 
gemakkelijke uitweg om de overheid overal verantwoordelijk voor te maken. In dit discours is 
het lastig om de overheid niet schuldig te bevinden. Dat komt dicht bij de waarschuwende 
woorden van Donner waar mee begonnen werd.  
 
Dit proefschrift laat zien dat verschillende discoursen relevant zijn om de dynamiek te begrijpen 
die plaats vindt wanneer de overheid betrokken is bij dodelijk of ernstig lichamelijk letsel. 
Overheden moeten betekenisvol kunnen omgaan met deze discoursen.  
 
 
Tot slot 
 
Bij dit alles moeten de beperkingen van dit onderzoek in acht worden genomen. Dit proefschrift 
heeft een beperkt aantal (vijf) cases onderzocht in één land, Nederland en in de publieke sector. 
Het onderzoek is gebaseerd op open bronnen en achtergrondgesprekken, er zijn geen 
vertrouwelijke dossiers of gesloten strafdossiers geraadpleegd. Dat levert weliswaar veel inzichten 
op, maar laat nog veel mogelijkheden open voor een uitgebreidere onderzoeksagenda in de 
toekomst. Onderzoek naar verschillende omgevingen en omstandigheden kan dieper inzicht en 
kennis opleveren over wat er gebeurt in het gebied ‘tussen error en evil’ als het gaat om de rol van 
de overheid bij fatale ongelukken.  
 
Uiteindelijk zijn kant en klare oplossingen niet voorhanden. Het klinkt wellicht niet heel spannend, 
maar zorgen dat het werk goed gedaan wordt is waarschijnlijk nog steeds het beste recept om 
problemen te voorkomen. En dat is uiteindelijk wat burgers mogen verwachten van hun overheid. 
Een deel van de aantrekkingskracht van de overheid is juist dat de overheid met ingewikkelde 
dilemma’s en tegenstrijdigheden moet zien om te gaan.  
 
De ruimte tussen error en evil is gevuld met tegenstrijdigheden en complexe problemen. Het 
kunnen afzetten van het masker dat we soms allemaal dragen is een stevige opgave voor alle 
betrokkenen. Voor de overheid kan dit soms voelen alsof je enkel kunt kiezen tussen twee kwaden. 
Het vereist dat overheden op betekenisvolle wijze kunnen omgaan met verschillende vormen van 
dualiteit. Dat betekent laveren tussen de harde of de zachte benadering. Tussen empathie en 
handhaving. Tussen openheid en vertrouwelijkheid. Tussen behoedzaam omgaan met het geld van 
de belastingbetaler en genereus en barmhartig zijn. Tussen verantwoordelijkheid aanvaarden en 
verantwoordelijkheid daar leggen waar hij hoort te liggen. Tussen error en evil. 
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